The idea behind the Potentiality Principle (PP) is that potential personhood confers a right to life. For present purposes we may define a person as anything that is sentient, rational, and self-aware. Actual persons have a right to life, a right not to be killed. Presumably we all accept the following Rights Principle:
RP: All persons have a right to life.
What PP does is simply extend the right to life to potential persons. Thus,
PP. All potential persons have a right to life.
PP allows us to mount a very powerful argument, the Potentiality Argument (PA), against the moral acceptability of abortion. Given PP, and the fact that human fetuses are potential persons, it follows that they have a right to life. From the right to life follows the right not to be killed, except perhaps in some extreme circumstances.
In numerous previous posts, with the help of commenters, I have made precise the sense of 'potentiality' in play in PA and PP and have refuted various objections to PP including Joel Feinberg's "logical point," Peter Lupu's somewhat similar objection, as well as some of the probative overkill or proves-too-much objections. There is still an objection or two to turn aside, but the time has come to give positive arguments for PP.
To understand PP one must understand that it grounds the pre-natal right to life in the very potentiality of a genetically human individual to develop, in the normal course of events, into a being that actually possesses such rights-conferring properties as rationality. Therefore, if there are any post-natal genetically human individuals to which we ascribe rights on the basis of their potentiality to develop into individuals that actually possess rights-conferring properties, then subscription to PP is already a fact and its extension to the pre-natal cases will be mandatory unless there can be shown to be a morally relevant difference between the pre-natal and the post-natal cases. Now there are such post-natal cases. Therefore, since we already accept and apply PP to these post-natal cases, we ought to apply it to the pre-natal cases as well unless there is a morally relevant difference between the two sorts of case.
Consider post-natal humans from birth on to the age of seven or so. Do they have rights? Liberals, who believe in all sorts of rights, will presumably maintain that children have rights to health care, education, food, shelter, clothing and what all else. But underlying all of these is surely the right to life without which none of the others has any purchase. Now what is the basis for ascribing rights to neonates or one year olds? They cannot walk or talk, syllogize or philosophize. Chess is out of the question as is cell phone use. They cannot even control their bowels. They are helpless and in a sense good-for-nothing. They don't cook or clean or shop or work or pay taxes. They are more useless than cats who at least can fend for thmselves and control the rodent population. There is little that is actual about them. They don't realize much value or exercise the capacities that confer value or a right to life. And yet, as matter of fact, we consider them precious.
On what basis, then, do we ascribe value and rights to them? We value them for their promise and potentiality. We value them for what they will, in the normal course of events, become. I am not saying that there is nothing actual in young children that we value. We may value their openness to experience, their curiosity, their ability to learn, their sheer existence. But their potentiality outweighs their actuality and this potentiality is the ground of our ascription to them of the right to life and other rights that presuppose this fundamental right. So my first argument goes like this:
1. We ascribe the right to life to neonates and young children on the basis of their potentialities.
2. There is no morally relevant difference between neonates and young children and fetuses.
3. Principles -- in this case PP -- should be applied consistently to all like cases.
Therefore
4. We should ascribe the right to life to fetuses on the basis of their potentialities.
What I am arguing is that we already do accept PP and that we ought to be consistent in its application. To refuse to apply PP to the pre-natal cases is to fail to apply the principle consistently.
I think that being dependent on another human for direct physiological support is a morally relevant difference, which "tempers" any right to life we might attribute to the unborn.
It may be that potentiality is a heavier element - but perhaps potentiality alone is not enough. Someone could argue that they are both logically necessary to confer rights to life on the referent (which seems to be the assumption among people who will protect their young children but still be willing to get an abortion).
In this post Bill presents several reasons for accepting PP. We can divide Bill's reasons into negative reasons (A): namely, reasons based upon refuting certain objections against PP. And positive reasons (B): namely, arguments in favor of accepting PP.
(A) Negative Reasons: Bill claims that he has refuted Joel Feinberg's argument from a "logical point" against PP as well as my "somewhat similar objection" based upon EPP and EEPP;
(B) Positive Reasons: The Slippery Slope Argument. Bill argues that (a) PP applies to infants, for we endow the right to life to infants based upon their potential to become a person; (b) There is no moral difference between an infant and a fetus; (c) In the absence of any moral difference, PP applies to fetuses.
I shall divide my response into three parts:
(I) In this post I shall reiterate the reasons why Bill's arguments against Joel Feinberg's logical point, even if sound, cannot refute my argument based upon EPP and EEPP;
(II)In a shortly forthcoming post I shall argue that while Bill presented certain objections against my argument, those objections are inconsistent with his argument from normativity presented in this post.
(III) In an even later forthcoming post I shall consider Bill's slippery slope (or parity of reasoning or no distinction w/o a relevant difference) argument presented at length in the current post.
Comments on (A):
(i) I shall not address here Bill's claim of refuting Joel Feinberg's logical point, except insofar as his objections pertain to my argument:
(ii) I have stressed in one of my previous responses that my argument based upon EPP and EEPP cannot be similar to Joel Feinberg's logical point, since it is stronger as well as more general than Feinberg's logical point. Let me reiterate briefly the argument I gave:
(a) IF my argument is correct at all, then it is much more general than the logical point. Why?
(b) For suppose Joel Feinberg's logical point is correct; now, there is a general agreement, and that includes Bill, that Feinberg's "logical point" is correct as a general claim about inferences; the question is whether it applies to PA.
(c) Now, someone might argue (as Bill does) that PA does not commit the fallacy of inferring actual rights from potential personhood. In other words, PA does not violate Feinberg's strictures against inferring actuality from potentility; there is no such an inference in play when it comes to PA, since PP is a proposition, not an argument. And this is Bill's only argument against Feinberg's logical point. Suppose that this response to Feinberg is sound.
(d) But, now, notice that my argument, if cogent, applies to PP even if Feinberg's logical point does not. Since EPP and EEPP rule out the conjoining of potentiality with actuality, no inference is required in order for EPP and EEPP to apply. Hence, my argument applies to propositions such as PP, even if Feinberg's does not. Hence, it is more general.
(e) The argument based on EPP and EEPP rules out any claims that the fetus enjoys the right to life based upon its potential to become anything , including a person, whether or not these grounds are logical, conceptual, or empirical. It makes no difference how potentiality is alleged to ground actual rights to life: whether the link is via an inference, or a claim to a conceptual connection, or even an empirical law or generalization. It does not matter! If EPP and EEPP are correct, any and all of these links are ruled out. Period!
Hence, my argument is not only more general, but it is stronger than Joel Fenberg's logical point.
(iii) Therefore, no mere objection against Joel Feinberg's logical point can be taken to be equally an objection against my argument based upon EPP and EEPP.
(iv) Did Bill offer objections against my argument based upon EPP and EEPP that are independent from his objections against Joel Feinberg's logical point?
(v) Yes, he did! One of these objection was based upon the fact that PP involves certain normative properties, namely, the property of having the right to life, whereas EPP and EEPP do not specifically mention normative properties at all. Bill concludes from this that even if EPP and EEPP were necessary truths, they are totally irrelevant to PP and, hence, to PA. Therefore, they cannot be the basis of a refutation against PP.
(vi) In the next forthcoming soon post I shall argue that Bill's objection from normativity is mistaken and that his argument in the current post contradicts his objection from normativity.
peter
I never suggested that refuting Feinberg refuted you, which is why I discussed your ideas very carefully in more than one post. It really doesn't matter how similar or dissimilar your argument is from Feinberg's. But so far you haven't shown why my objection to your argument is not sound.
I await with interest your further contributions.
I think that being dependent on another human for direct physiological support is a morally relevant difference, which "tempers" any right to life we might attribute to the unborn.
I think your pro-choice bias is interfering with your ability to think clearly. For one thing, the neonate is dopendent in the way you mention, and for another, any slight difference would not justify a difference in treatment.
I wonder if you would consider your own right to life "tempered" were you to suddenly collapse in the middle of the road due to a hypoglycemic attack, or were to find yourself in need of ongoing physiological support.
1) Here is one of Bill’s objections to EEPP. I shall call this The Objection from Normativity and quote Bill in full:
“Let me begin with the normativity point. Suppose EEPP is true. Then, to revert once again to our trusty acorn example, none of the properties in virtue of which an oak tree is an actual oak tree are properties of the acorn. Now note that EEPP is a non-normative proposition: it makes no mention of rights, duties, and suchlike. But PP (Every potential descriptive person has a right to life) is plainly a normative proposition. So an obvious question arises: how does the truth of EEPP (assuming it is true) exclude the truth of PP given that one of the principles is non-normative and the other normative?
Let {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} be the set of properties in virtue of which a descriptive person is an actual descriptive person. The property of having a right to life, a property ascribed by PP to every descriptive person, is not a member of this set. So even if EEPP is true, its truth is consistent wth the truth of PP. In other words, one cannot infer the negation of PP from EEPP. It seems to me that this refutes Peter's argument against PP unless he beefs it up with auxiliary premises.”
(2) In the above quotation Bill appears to argue as follows:
(a) EEPP and PP cannot be logically incompatible (“one cannot infer the negation of PP from EEPP”) because while PP includes the normative property of ascribing the right to life to an entity with a potential to become a person, EEPP does not mention any normative properties at all.
(b) Since the scope of application of PP and EEPP are not overlapping over normative properties, they cannot be inconsistent.
(c) Therefore, one cannot launch an argument against PP based upon EEPP, even if the later were a necessary truth.
(3) Here is my response to Bill’s argument:
(a) If EEPP is a conceptual truth about our concept of potentiality, then it applies whenever the right concept of potentiality applies.
(b) Now, either potentiality extends to normative properties or it does not.
(i)* Suppose it is the former: suppose potentiality extends to normative properties in the sense that the potential to be such-and-such grounds normative properties that are essential to being such-and-such, if there are any;
(ii) Then EEPP extends to the very same normative properties that are claimed to be grounded on the potentiality to be such-and-such;
(iv) Therefore, EEPP applies to PP in the sense that we can “infer the negation of PP from EEPP.”
(v) Therefore, If EEPP is a conceptual truth, PP is false.
(vi)* Now suppose that the other disjunct of (b) is true: namely, suppose that potentiality does not extend to normative properties directly in the sense that the potential to be such-and-such can only ground non-normative properties of being such-and-such.
(vii) Then EEPP cannot entail something that contradicts PP;
(viii) But, then PP is false already without the need for EEPP. Why? Because given the above assumption, potentiality does not apply to normative properties and, therefore, it cannot be the basis for attributing such properties. Thus, one cannot say, given the present assumption, the following: all entities that have the potential to F have G, where G is a normative property essential to being an F, because we have ruled out the possibility that potentiality can ground or justify any normative properties of any kind.
(j) Since PP asserts precisely such a proposition, PP is false.
(l) Therefore, whether potentiality applies to normative properties or it does not, PP is false.
(4) I can see only one way that Bill can escape the above argument:
(I) First, he must opt for the second horn of the dilemma; namely, argue that potentiality does not directly apply to normative properties. This move will neutralize EEPP against PP, but the consequence of this move is that PP can no longer be taken to express the proposition that the right to life is directly grounded upon the potentiality to become a person. Hence, if PP is true at all, its truth must be inferred from other propositions.
(II) Second, Bill must argue that PP is derivable from the following premises:
(a) Everything that has the potential to become something that has right-conferring properties such as rationality etc actually has right conferring properties such as rationality etc;
(b) Everything that actually has right-conferring properties such as rationality etc. actually has the right to life;
Therefore,
(c) Everything that has the potential to become something that has right conferring properties such as rationality etc, actually has the right to life.
(III) (c) of course is identical to PP and (a)-(c) is a valid argument. Unfortunately, premise (a) of this argument violates EPP and, therefore, it must be false. While this fact does not render PP false, it certainly prevents the above argument from securing the truth of PP. Therefore, we have no basis to think that the truth of PP can be secured by a sound argument. And we have serious grounds to think that, interpreted in a manner discussed above, it is false if taken to ground the right to life directly on potentiality without the mediation of other premises.
(IV) I cannot see how Bill can escape the full argument outlined above.
But….you might wonder:
(V) What about the infant’s case? If we cannot use PP to justify the fetus’ right to life, then we cannot use PP to justify the right to life of a one hour old newborn, an infant, and even perhaps a your child of 5 years, ten years, and who knows how far this slippery slope goes.
(VI) Indeed! If you accept the above argument and EPP and EEPP, then the right to life of a one year old newborn, an infant, a 5 year old child, etc., cannot be justified or grounded upon PP, since PP is false. But it does not follow that there is no other ways of justifying the right to life of these cases that circumvents PP, yet does not apply to the case of the fetus.
(VII) What the falsity of PP means is that there is no easy and straightforward way of securing the right to life in these cases, a way that is grounded on potentiality. It does not mean that there is no way of doing so at all and at the same time distinguish these cases from the case of the fetus. I shall try to offer some ideas in this direction in my next soon to be hopefully forthcoming next post.
peter
As for whether I'm willing to have my right to life "tempered", if the only way I can continue in existence is by drawing on the physiolgical resources of another, one who, further, must be compelled to continue providing such support, then yes, tempering is appropriate.
(I have just written a brief post making this point over at my place.)
Warning! This post is very long even for me. So I inserted an Abstract which people can read and get a sense of what I am trying to do.
A. Some Preliminaries:
1) This is the third of a series of responses to Bill’s post entitled “Why We Should Accept the Potentiality Principle”; hence, my “minor” addition of ‘not’ to the title of each post in the series. In this third part I intend to respond directly to Bill’s slippery-slope argument as well as defend a claim I made at the end of the second post in this series to the effect that PP (the potentiality principle) may not be the only and certainly it is not the best way to ground rights such as the right to life.
2) My proposals in this post should be taken in the spirit of presenting a direction for further explorations. I do not know and for present purpose do not care whether others in the vast literature on the subject already proposed similar ideas. I do know that some, but not all, of the things I will say here were hinted at or in various ways proposed by other commentators on this site. To them I offer their share of the forthcoming blame for these ideas.
3) I will be using freely and without much apologetics metaphorical devices in order to get a certain point across. So some of the ways I will express these ideas might sound to some initially extremely bizarre. I will remedy the bizarreness as I go along.
B. Abstract:
I will now state the short version of my argument. It is really simple. The right to life is grounded on the concept of free will as follows: the actual possession of free will at some level and to some degree together with the recognized capacity to gradually expand the scope of this free will is what grounds rights such as the right to life. Call this the free will qualifier to have a right to life. Now, I shall argue that
(a) Contrary to Bill’s claims, PP is not the basis that we normally use to extend the right to life protection to post-natal cases;
(b) I shall argue that we normally use the free-will qualifiers for that purpose;
(c) I shall argue that post-natal infants have the free will qualifier at some level and to some degree sufficient to attribute a capacity to increase such free will in time whereas pre-natal fetuses do not and that this fact is the morally relevant difference Bill was demanding between the two cases.
(d) Given the above, birth constitutes the creation of a new entity, the newborn, which is to be distinguished from the fetus in the above ways, and hence constitutes a new entity which begins a new natural-kind-continuum (in the sense of one of my previous posts). Even though there are significant biological relationships between the newborn and the fetus, the former possesses properties that render it morally distinct from the later and, therefore, it receives and is entitled to receive moral protection of the sort not assignable to the fetus.
C. Some Examples:
In this section I will appeal to a couple of examples in order to establish the tight link we already recognize between rights (particularly the right to life) and free will.
(I) The Capital punishment (CP) Case:
(a) The Facts of the Case: A person R commits several brutal and hideous murders. The evidence shows beyond reasonable doubt that the murderous acts of R were intentional, deliberate, and that R knew what he was doing. In fact, R willingly admits to all of these facts.
(b) The Claim for CP: Now the proponents of capital punishment argue that if these matters are proven in a court of law in a legally impeccable trial, then capital punishment is permissible and even morally appropriate. But, now, how exactly does this argument is supposed to go? R is an actual person: i.e., R is actually “sentient, rational, and self-aware”; so R actually has the right to life, if anyone does. This right protects R against a deliberate, intentional, assault upon his life by anyone, including an entity such as the state as well as against every agent of the state that is involved in acting in a manner that threatens the taking of R’s life. How can this right suddenly disappear? What is the argument that the proponents of CP have that overcomes these difficulties?
(c) The Argument on Behalf of CP: The argument is very simple. Assuming that the facts of the case as established by the legal system are true, R has freely and willingly chosen to waive his right to life by deliberately and intentionally committing certain acts of murder, the taking of life of another without their consent, and by so doing is no longer protected by the right to life. Let me repeat the pivotal phrase here, the one that is in italics, so as to see the point from a different angle: R’s freely chosen actions surrendered his right to life; rendered them null and void, non-existent; thereby, strictly speaking giving moral permission to anyone to take his life. In order to make for a smooth social structure, society exclusively appropriates the permission to kill R and enforces this by means of CP.
(d) Salient Points Of the Argument for CP: I wish to emphasize how in the argument on behalf of CP, the proponents link R’s freely and willingly chosen actions to R’s freely and willingly surrendering his right to life (by taking the life of another without their consent). In other words, there is an intimate link here between the right to life, on the one hand, and free will and choice, on the other; at least when it comes to bringing about a state where this right no longer affords protection to R. I shall eventually argue that a similar intimate link exists between free will and the acquisition of the right to life.
(II) The Permanent Comatose Case:
(a) Facts of the Case: R is in a state of coma brought about by tragic circumstances beyond his control. Let us suppose this comatose state could be permanent: we just do not know. What is a state of coma? Well, it is certainly a physical condition, a condition of the brain. Suppose this is a fact. Without going into a precise description of the conditions of his brain that cause R’s condition, about which I know very little, we (I) can describe the visible facts of his condition that are relevant to our case as follows: R cannot willingly move his body and his extremities; R cannot bring himself willingly to breath and eat, these functions are performed for him by certain medical equipment; R cannot willingly talk or react in any way to verbal or other stimuli; and R fails to exhibit any signs that he can process verbal or other stimuli directed towards him; brain specialists announce that his brain does not show signs of processing cognitive material. In short, R’s body does not function on its own nor can he direct any part of it willingly; his brain does not function as a cognitive mechanism nor can he perform any cognitive tasks willingly. No one can tell whether this condition is permanent or not, but to the best of our medical knowledge it is going to be a long time before R can recover, if ever. These are the facts.
(b) The Claim for Termination: Some argue that keeping R’s body alive by means of machines under these conditions is costly, useless, and unfair to R as well as to his family. The claim is that: first everyone, including R, would be better off if we (society) terminate sustaining R’s meager existence by these artificial means; and, second, that it is morally permissible to do so under the present circumstances.
Note: I know that this is a controversial position. Forget about that for the moment. Just like in the CP case, I am not endorsing any position about what we ultimately ought to do here. I merely wish to highlight a salient argument underlying a certain position, a position that is not foolish, irresponsible, uncaring or irrational. Even the fiercest opponents of termination who would care to calmly think about what is behind their adversaries’ position must concede that the proponents of termination are not savages that enjoy terminating the life of people for no other reason except their own enjoyment. So let us focus on the ball here. And here it comes.
But, now, wait a moment. How exactly are we to make sense of such a claim? Are we saying here that it is morally permissible to deliberately and intentionally kill R? Does not R enjoy the right to life? After all, seconds before R became comatose he enjoyed the right to life and no one disputes that. Seconds after the tragic event, R lost his right to life? (The difference between seconds, hours, days, weeks, months is in our state of knowledge not in R’s condition). How can that be? Certainly, this R, unlike the R in the CP case, did not willingly waive his right to life. He did no such thing. So by what mechanism, if any, did he suddenly lost his right to life, according to this argument.
(I repeat: do not focus on the fact that this is a controversial issue and the opponents will deny all of this.)
(c) The Argument on Behalf of Termination: What changed seconds before R’s unfortunate circumstance and seconds after is that his body lost the ability to direct normal functioning (e.g., breathing, consuming food and liquids) and he lost the ability to willingly direct his body and mind. I shall put this point in what might at first appear to be somewhat puzzling: R lost both his body’s will and his person’s will. I mean what I just said: breathing, consuming (dancing, playing music, to be revisited) and so on are our body’s will to direct certain physical functions necessary for the survival of the body (or its entertainment), just like our person’s will is to direct certain mental functions to act in the world. So both the body and the person lost their will to exercise free reign over their natural domain; the former to perform routine bodily functions; the later to willingly choose actions. It is precisely because of this complete loss of free will, both in the body and the soul, that we even entertain the thought that R thereby lost his right to life.
(d) The Salient Point of the Argument for Termination: Once again I wish to emphasize the manner in which the proponents of termination see here an intimate link between the loss of free will, both in the body and in the person, and the right to life. Free will underwrites in the minds of the proponents of termination the right to life. It is free will that grounds the right to life. And when this free will is gone, both at the physical level as well as at the mental level, then we are seriously entertaining the thought that perhaps the right to life is gone with it. To see this, let us suppose that we know, without any doubt, that R’s condition is permanent; he will be in this comatose condition forever. I think intuitions then will favor the proponents of termination more firmly. And favoring that position is favoring the idea that a permanent loss of free will, in the body as well as in the person, is a permanent loss of the right to life. And so this is the salient link in the case to be made in favor of termination between free will and the right to life.
(III) The Living Will:
What is a living will? Here is a description in Wikipedia regarding a living will viewed as a set of advance directives:
“Advance health care directives or advance directives are instructions given by individuals specifying what actions should be taken for their health in the event that they are no longer able to make decisions due to illness and incapacity.”
A living will need not be restricted only to health or life and death issues; they can extend to include all matters pertaining to an individual’s rights and interests that can be executed by law. Notice that the purpose of a living will is to express a person’s current will, when the person is free and able to do so, regarding a future time when and if the person no longer is free and able to express their will. And a living will may and often does include directives not to undertake extraordinary measures in order to preserve one’s life in the event the person is incapacitated (see the Comatose Case above). A living will illustrates once again the intimate link between free will and rights such as the right to life.
D. Conceptual Connection between Rights and Free will:
The above examples point towards a conceptual connection between rights, including the right to life, and free will. This connection goes beyond mere examples; we can characterize rights in terms of free will. For instance, the right to life may be characterized as an individual’s freedom from a threat to or interference with one’s preservation of their life and well being. This freedom from threat or interference marks a conceptual territory over which a person has sovereignty and others have a duty to refrain from entering without the express consent of the individual.
Therefore, I submit that the right to life is grounded on the actual possession of free will at some level, a fact which alone establishes the capacity to continue expanding this free will to its fullest extent at some future time.
E. The Fetus/Infant Difference:
Now it may very well be that many and perhaps most readers here already accept the link I have been laboring to establish between free will and the right to life and so the extraordinarily lengthy efforts I have expensed on doing so are in vain. Not so! For while we may accept that there is solid connection between free will and the right to life, I wanted to reach further: I wanted to show by actual examples how this link has significant ramifications in actual cases, cases that in many ways resemble the fetus/infant distinction.
(I) The Free-Will Thesis: I suggest that the foremost and principal qualification for rights including the right to life is not sentience, rationality, consciousness, etc: rather it is free will and its actual presence at some level and to some degree together with a recognizable capacity to continue expanding it further that constitutes the grounds for possessing rights such as the right to life.
Note: The Free-Will Thesis is not intended to deny that traits such as sentience, rationality, and consciousness play a very significant role in the link between free will and rights. However, their role is providing the preconditions for forging such a link and then cementing it. It is best to leave the details of these connections for another occasion, for developing them is an arduous and very lengthy matter. The principal point of the Free-Will Thesis is to emphasize that rights are grounded upon the presence of free will, a presence still to be made precise, and that PP glosses over this fact in a manner that has significant implications for the issues we are presently considering.
(II) The Post-Natal Situation and Free-Will: Birth marks the profound stage where a newborn’s body for the first time initiates certain activities such as breathing, smelling, consuming orally, sounding, etc. While the body has been developing for a while in order to prepare the organism to be able to perform these functions, it never did so before. It is now free to do so. The body is now exercising what I have called earlier the body’s own will. I will return to this shortly. Call it what you may, these vital functions are performed for the first time and they are performed without the mediation and continued assistance of the mother’s body. Birth enables the newborn organism for the first time to directly interact with the external environment without the mediation of the mother’s body.
Note: The similarity between the fetus’ condition and the condition of most of humanity as it is depicted in the well known movie The Matrix is striking and profound. It would be an extremely interesting exercise to develop this similarity in detail as well as the similarity between birth and post birth and the way the movie depicts the initial stages of exiting the Matrix. I must leave this to a later occasion.
(III) Direct Interaction with Environment and Expanding Free Will: It is extremely important to appreciate the significance of the newly found independence and freedom afforded to the newborn at birth regarding the question of its rights. The freedom to engage directly with its environment is the process that enables the newborn to continually expand and adjust its free will. It is a process the fetus never enjoys. This process begins as I said with the body’s will at a very elementary level: breathing, smelling, oral consumption, sounding. Note that all of these activities involve interaction with the external environment. Now, some will point out that these activities are exactly opposite to free will: we call them instincts. Indeed! But they are functions with a purpose; they are all designed to achieve a goal that contributes to the sustenance of the newly born. They are teleological processes. And it is this teleological element of these rudimentary processes that provide the blue-print for later activities of a mature human being whose actions are purposeful and goal oriented; i.e., for a mature person’s freely chosen actions. So there is a natural continuum from these instinctive activities of the newborn that are teleological in character to a mature person’s free will. And it all begins at birth when the newborn acquires the freedom to interact with the environment.
(IV) Non-Identity of Fetus and Newborn: The newborn was once a fetus just like a butterfly was once a caterpillar. But a butterfly is not identical to a caterpillar. The newborn shares with the fetus its DNA as well as other physical characteristics. But the newborn is not identical to the fetus; even a one second newborn ceases to be a fetus. Once that little thing cries, breaths, feels on its skin, etc., it is no longer a fetus: it is a totally different entity. The newborn begins to acquire new properties a fetus could never acquire. And more importantly it acquires new kind of properties, among them the all important moral properties. At birth the newborn naturalization into the fabric of moral society begins.
An Objection: But how can the newborn be a totally different entity when its DNA is identical to the fetus and there is a physical continuity between it and the fetus?
Answer: First, this objection presupposes that physical traits and continuity are necessary and sufficient for identity. They may be necessary, but I believe a fairly strong case can be made that they are not sufficient, unless materialism is true. Second, I deny that there is even a physical continuity of the right sort between fetus and newborn. Birth marks a physical discontinuity between the fetus and the newborn, a discontinuity that suffices to undermine any claims of identity. And, third, the DNA of a corps five thousand years old is identical to the DNA of some person that lived then and whose corps this is. But, surely, no one wants to say that the person living five thousand years ago is identical to the corps recently found. No person is identical to a corps. Identity through time is a tricky business, but no theory should entail the proposition that a person living five thousand years ago is identical to a corpse found just recently, simply because the DNA of both is the same.
(F) Summary: I have argued above that PP is not the grounds for assigning rights to post-natal cases. I have argued that it is free-will that grounds such rights. I have also argued that birth marks a significant difference between the newborn and the fetus, a difference that justifies viewing the newborn as a different entity. This difference is the moral difference Bill demanded in his slippery-slope argument. Hence, I deny Bill’s premises (1) and (2). As for the rest of my argument, I think I have made a reasonable case to consider free-will as the grounds for rights and that the newborn exits the Matrix of his mother’s body a different thing from the fetus that was in it. Sure there are many things still to be tightened up in this argument. But the picture I have tried to paint is fairly clear. So I shall now stop.
peter
Appendix: I do not have the time right now to explore a way of extending rights to the fetus de-jure, but such an extension is possible under certain circumstances. This topic on its own has interesting consequences.
Can you summarize II? I'm having a hard time understanding what you are driving at. Try to be pithy. What you don't seem to understand -- and this is what you have in common with Feinberg -- is that the potentialist grounds the right to life in the very potentiality. The truism that the properties that make an actual F actual are not posseseed by the potential F is irrelevant. What is your argument from EEPP to the negation of PP? Can you present that argument simply and clearly?
As for III, some quick comments.
1. If you present an alternative grounding for the right to life, that does not amount to a rejection of PP. It is possible that the right to life have multiple grounds.
2. The question is whether PA is a good argument. You can show that it is not good by showing that PP should be rejected. But that is not the same as showing that some other principle also grounds the R to L or is a better principle for grounding the R to L, or is the one we actually use. For even if all that were true, PP could still be an acceptable principle.
You are shifting the debate away from the merits/demerits of PA, which alone is the issue before us. I say it is a good argument, you deny it, but so far you haven't given me any reason I can understand why PP should be rejected.
This is not to say that your proposal is not also worth discussing.
3. The CP case. I've had similar thoughts myself. I've asked myself: if there is a right to life, how can CP be justified? I think we share the intuition that justice demands CP in some cases, indeed that it is sometimes morally required. I came up with same answer as you: rights, even natural rights, can be forfeited. The murderer forfeits his right to life and he does so freely. You add that he "willingly" do so. But he doesn't consciously will or intend to forfeit his right to life, or does he? That is one wrinkle that needs exploring.
But I am inclined to agree that there is an "intimate link" between free will and rights at least in this case.
But I suppose we need to explore other ways of reconciling the moral acceptability of CP with the right to life that is possessed by all persons (including murderers) if it is possessed by any. Could one not say that the murderer's right to life is overridden or perhaps outweighed by the state's right to exact justice? The murderer would then not forfeit his right to life -- whch implies that his having it is in his power -- but have it nolens volens.
On one view of the right to life it is an unalienable natural right. 'Unalienable'suggests that it cannot be removed from the person who has it by anyone including himself. But it could perhaps be overridden and justifiably violated.
So I think you go too far if you are suggesting that the proponents of CP must hold that the R to L is subject to free will.
Your contribution is very rich and provocative. More responses later.
1) II was intended to be a response only to the argument from normativity.
2) I take your argument from normativity to be the following:
(i) PP is a normative principle in the sense that it explicitly mentions a normative property (the property of having the right to life);
(ii) EEPP does not explicitly mention any normative property;
(iii) Therefore, EEPP cannot contradict PP.
3) There is a simple and a more complex response:
(A) Simple Response: EEPP is completely general; it applies to any property, normative or descriptive. Hence, it covers PP as well.
(B) Complex Response: EEPP, if true, is a constitutive principle of the concept of potentiality. So it applies to any proposition in which potentiality is used.
(i) There are two options:
either
(a) the concept of potentiality applies to normative properties;
or
(b) the concept of potentiality does not apply to normative properties.
(ii) In II I have argued that no matter whether you choose option (a) or (b), PP ends up being false. Why?
(iii) Suppose you opt for (a). Then EEPP applies to normative properties, because it is constitutive of the concept of potentiality and the later concept, ex hypothesis, applies to normative properties. Hence, if true, EEPP contradicts PP.
(iv) Suppose you opt for (b). Then the concept of potentiality cannot underwrite any normative properties, since it does not apply to them, including the property of having the right to life. Hence, PP is already false.
4) The above is the first part of II. Let's ignore the second part. The point of the argument thus fas is that you cannot de-couple PP and EEPP without undermining the former, as your argument from normativity attempted to do. EEPP, if true, applies everywhere potentiality is used, including in PP. Therefore, it either can contradict PP or it need not, because PP is already false.
That was the principal argument of II.
peter
(A)"What is your argument from EEPP to the negation of PP? Can you present that argument simply and clearly?"
Sure!
(i) PP: for every x, if x is a potential person, then x has a right to life.
Let 'a' be an instance of PP. Then the antecedent of PP has this form:
(a) a has the potential to become a person;
and its consequent is
(b) a has the right to life.
(ii) PP is false just in case there is at least one instance of it, say a, such that (a) above is true, whereas (b) above is false.
(iii) The principle EEPP says the following:
suppose G is an essential property of being an F; then EEPP says that
if the proposition
(c) x has the potential to be an F;
is true, then the proposition
(d) x is actually a G.
must be false.
(iv) Let 'F' be the property '...is a person' and let 'G' be the property '...has a right to life'. Assume that the property of having a right to life is an essential property of being a person. Hence the relevant properties mentioned in PP have the right relationship that EEPP requires. Therefore, EEPP applies to PP, if true.
(v) Then for any instance of 'x' in PP, the antecedent will have the form of (c) in (iii) and the consequent the form of (d) in (iii). Namely, let this fetus, call it 'Charlie', be such an instance of PP. Then you got
(c)* Charlie has the potential to become a person;
(d)* Charlie has the right to life.
But, now, EEPP says that if (c)* is true, then (d)* must be false. And that contradicts PP.
QED
peter
Let me begin with a comment about your expository style. You tend to complicate matters unnecessarily. Instead of all the verbiage of (i) and (ii), all you have to say is:
PP. Every potential person has a right to life.
The 'boilerplate' is not wrong, but unnecessary and makes it more difficult to 'take in' the argument in this very fast medium. Why tediously state what everyone already knows? I do of course understand that you are trying to be careful and rigorous.
Your EEPP seems to be this:
If every F is essentially a G, and x is potentially an F, then it is not the case that x is a G.
Unfortunately, this version of EEPP was refuted in an earlier thread. Every oak tree is essentially self-identical (located, space-occupying, material, mass-possessing, etc.), and an acorn is potentially an oak tree. But it does not follow that the acorn is not self-identical, located, etc.
"Assume that the property of having a right to life is an essential property of being a person." Unclear! PP states that potential descriptive persons have a right to life. But having a right to life is not an essential property of descriptive persons. It is an essential property of moral persons. So you seem to be equivocating on 'person' as between descriptive and moral.
I conclude that you have failed to produce a clear and sound argument against PP. In what you say above there are at least two difficulties. One is that EEPP is false, the other is that you equivocate on 'person.'
I have given formulations of EEPP on which it comes out trivially true. But then the problem for you is to show how it contradicts PP. I am quite sure you won't be able to do this. EEPP, properly formulated, is as consistent with PP as EPP is.
1) You make the following claim:
“Your EEPP seems to be this:
If every F is essentially a G, and x is potentially an F, then it is not the case that x is a G.
Unfortunately, this version of EEPP was refuted in an earlier thread. Every oak tree is essentially self-identical (located, space-occupying, material, mass-possessing, etc.), and an acorn is potentially an oak tree. But it does not follow that the acorn is not self-identical, located, etc. “
(i) First, this is not the full and complete formulation of EEPP. The full formulation of EEPP is the following:
EEPP: If an entity is potentially such-and-such at t, then this fact rules out not merely that it is actually such-and-such at t; it also rules out that the entity in question possesses at t any of the properties in virtue of which something is a such-and-such.
(ii) Second, I do not recall that this version, or even the version you site above, was refuted anywhere. Certain alleged CEs were given by several commentators and you have offered the argument from normativity. I have responded to every alleged CE and showed why it is not a real CE. I have not seen any rejoinders to my responses. Hence, I must assume until proved otherwise that my responses were accepted.
(iii) I have discussed properties such as extended in space (space-occupying), mass-possessing, etc. While these properties are indeed essential to every physical object, including an oak tree, it is easy to see that they are not relevant to EEPP because they are not the sort of properties in virtue of which something is specifically an oak tree, a person, etc. I have made this point extensively before.
(iv) As for the property of being self-identical, I do not get the point for several reasons. I shall mention two.
(a) Every object is self-identical. Therefore, self-identity is not the sort of property in virtue of which something is an oak-tree or is this oak-tree. So in this respect self-identity is just as irrelevant to this discussion as are the properties of being extended in space, having mass, etc.
(b) Second, one might venture to recast the property of self-identity to apply only to a particular oak-tree. Thus, call a particular oak-tree by the name ‘Charlie’. Then one can say that the oak-tree so named has as one of its essential properties the property of being identical to Charlie. Since no other object can have the property of being identical to Charlie, the property ‘…is identical to Charlie’ is an essential property of this oak-tree and this oak-tree alone. So the property ‘…is identical to Charlie’ is different than the property of being self-identical or extended in space. So, now, a particular acorn has the potential at a given time t of becoming this oak-tree, namely, the one we have called by the name ‘Charlie’. Since the property ‘…being identical to Charlie’ is indeed an essential property of this oak-tree in the right way, EEPP rules out that this particular acorn, which has the potential of becoming Charlie, has the property of being identical to Charlie at t. But, this is exactly the kind of consequence we want and should expect. For otherwise we have to say that this acorn at t has both the potential of becoming Charlie and actually being Charlie; and this result violates EPP; a principle you yourself accept.
I conclude, therefore, that self-identity like the rest of similar properties fails to afford a genuine CE to EEPP and, hence, like the other examples fails to refute EEPP.
(v) You say: “PP states that potential descriptive persons have a right to life. But having a right to life is not an essential property of descriptive persons. It is an essential property of moral persons.”
Two problems with this:
(a) If having a right to life is not an essential property of actual descriptive persons, then the right to life is certainly not an essential property of a potential descriptive person such as the fetus either. But, then, why should there be a problem about depriving the fetus from one of its accidental properties? After all, accidental properties come and go; why so much fuss about this one?
(b) If having a right to life is not an essential property of a descriptive person, then it cannot be an essential property of a potentially descriptive person either. Hence PP cannot be taken to state a necessary truth. So it must be some kind of an empirical proposition. If so, then what kind of empirical proposition does it express and what kind of evidence is appropriate to confirm its truth?
I do not think that the prospects of PA are enhanced by viewing PP as some kind of an empirical proposition along the lines of all ravens are black or all children educated in exclusive boarding schools have an impeccable moral character such as being gracious, charitable, etc (which is of course empirically false).
(vi) “I have given formulations of EEPP on which it comes out trivially true. But then the problem for you is to show how it contradicts PP. I am quite sure you won't be able to do this. EEPP, properly formulated, is as consistent with PP as EPP is.”
I do not know to which formulation you refer here. My formulation is neither trivial nor has it been refuted by CEs or any other sustained argument to which I have not offered a reply. It is not trivial because if it contradicts PP and other similar principles, then it cannot be trivial. And since my answers to the alleged CE and arguments against EEPP were not refuted, so far as I can tell EEPP has not been refuted as yet.
As for the question of whether and how EEPP contradicts PP. EEPP contradicts PP if the later is intended to express, as I think most people thought of it, a necessary truth. If PP is construed as an empirical proposition, then it escapes being contradicted by EEPP. However, evading EEPP in this manner does not enhance the prospects of PA because as an empirical proposition PP’s standing is less secure than if it were proclaimed to be a necessary proposition.
(vii) The only objection that I consider to be still standing against EEPP is your and other commentators’ observation that the phrase ‘in virtue off’ requires clarification in order to firm up EEPP. I agree! It would indeed be beneficial to tighten up EEPP in the manner suggested.
(viii) However, even in the absence of such tightening, EEPP is clear enough to seriously threaten PP and, hence, PA. An that was the point of introducing it and its counterpart EPP in the first place. Witness the fact that it is these two principles that forced you, in my opinion, to recast PP not as a necessary proposition but as what now appears to be an empirical proposition. And I have already expressed my assessment as to the viability of this move above. Quite independently of the prospects of this latest move, a principle that succeeds to achieve such results is neither totally obscure nor is it trivial.
peter
First, give me one such counterexample? One CE which I have not already conclusively refuted in some of my previous posts or proved to be based upon some temporal or other confusion; this applies even to the version of EEPP Bill just cited above, although it is not my preferred formulation.
Second, the phrase 'in virtue off' is clear enough and it is used profitably in every area of philosophy where the distinction between essential and accidental properties is accepted. This is not to say that it will not be useful to clarify it further, but again it is no less clear than the concept of potentiality used in PP and throughout these discussions.
Third, while I understand quite well that time and other considerations prevent many of us from answering every rejoinder on sites like the present one; neverhteless, even here I expect statements such as the one you just made to be based at least to some degree upon prior responses already published on this site; you have not directly responded to lengthy rejoinders I have posted here to alleged CE's of yours and others. In the absence of such a reaction or even a sign of recognition that a rejoinder by me was made, I do not see why one should take comments such as the above seriously.
Nevertheless, I did take it seriously.
peter
I'm willing to take seriously the idea that "properties in virtue of which something is a such-and-such" might be distinguished from "essential properties," but that unpacking has not yet been done. And until it is, there's no way to know whether the resulting version of EEPP has any legs.
Again, I'm sorry for any offense I've caused.
To give credit where credit is due, it was indeed you who adduced the spatial extension counterexample. That was a useful contribution since it forces Peter to formulate his EEPP more carefully.
You claim to have an argument against PP. I cannot evaluate this argument until I know what it is, and I cannot know what it is until I know exactly what EEPP is.
You of course have the right to formulate the principle any way you see fit and to modify it under dialectical pressure. And your critics have the obligation to address themselves to your latest formulation, or whichever formulation you deem best.
Immediately above, you reverted to your old formulation:
EEPP: If an entity is potentially such-and-such at t, then this fact rules out not merely that it is actually such-and-such at t; it also rules out that the entity in question possesses at t any of the properties in virtue of which something is a such-and-such.
This formulation does not mention essential properties, unlike the formulation you gave in your preceding comment. The fact that you give different formulations shows that there is unclarity here.
The first clause of EEPP as I have just quoted it is unproblematic, so the essence of the EXTENDED exclusionary princ. of pot. is this:
If an entity e is potentially such-and-such at t, this fact rules out e's possessing at t any of the properties in virtue of which something is a such-and-such.
The problem with this is that it is not very clear. Here is one charitable way to understand it, a way that makes it come out plainly true:
1. If e is potentially an F at t, then it is not the case that e possesses any of the properties that distinguish an actual F from a potential F.
This seems to be as much of a conceptual truth as EEP. Obviously, if e is potentially an F at t, then e is not actually an F at t. It seems to follow directly that none of the properties that make an F actually an F will be properties of a potential F. In particular, being a material object, though an essential property of an actual F and a potential F, is not a property that distinguishes an actual F from a potential F, and is in this sense not an actuality constituting property of Fs as Fs.
So is (1) what you have in mind? This is what I took you to mean in earlier discussions. And notice how charitable I am being: I have interpreted your principle so that it is not only true, but unassailably true.
Now what I need to see from you is a clear and pithy argument from (1) to the negation of PP.
1) "...the formulation of EEPP in terms of essential properties, i.e., "If every F is essentially a G, and x is potentially an F, then it is not the case that x is a G," was confronted with a variety of counterexamples. One that I proposed several posts back in this thread noted that being spatially extended is an essential property of both acorns and oak trees. This suffices to refute the above version of EEPP."
2) Chronology:
(i) On Sept, 30 2008 Bill posted the thread "The Exclusionary Principle of Potentiality (EPP) and the Extended EPP."
(ii)Oct. 1, 2008 Bob proposed the zygote CE and David proposed the Andy Murray example. Later that day Bob presented the extended in space example and in a reply to Bill he introduced for the first time the collapse argument to which I have subsequently replied.
(iii) Oct. 7, 2008 Bill graciously posted a lengthy reply to these alleged CE as well as several more I have introduced because at that time I was unable to post on the site.
(iii) On Oct, 9, 2008 you again raised the issue of logical equivalence of EPP and EEPP, without arguing against my claim that while they may be obviously extensionally equivalent, they cannot be intensionally equivalent.
(iv) I have not as yet responded to that last post.
3) Now, I have answered the zygote example, the extended in space example, David's Murray example etc. I have not seen any response, let alone a detailed response, to these answers. The only response Bob gave was that EEPP collapses into EPP. But, now, why should anyone think that? EPP does not mention essential properties, in virtue of anything; it is a statement about a relationship between certain state-of-affairs. EEPP, by contrast, explicitly appeals to essential properties. Why would anyone think that a principle about state-of-affairs could be logically equivalent, from all things, to a principle about essential properties. Suppose there is a possible world in which nothing has essential properties, but some things nevertheless have the potential of becoming something or other. Then EPP will apply to these cases, whereas EEPP will have no application whatsoever. Similarly, if it were to turn out that the concept of essential properties in whatever form or shape is incoherent, then EEPP will be incoherent; but that will not effect EPP. So, clearly, the threat that EEPP is logically equivalent or could collapse into EPP is not a serious threat.
4) The central question that is on the table, and that is the only serious threat to EEPP, is whether in the philosophical world of essential properties, the phrase 'in virtue of' which I have used in my formulation, can be made precise. I think it can be, if the whole metaphysical business of essential properties is to make sense at all.
5) Every object is self identical and every physical object in addition is extended in space, has a mass, etc. These are essential properties of the sortal 'being a physical object'; being an acorn, oak-tree, fetus, adult human, etc, all must have these properties in order to be physical objects.
I have repeatedly said that EEPP cannot rule these things out because the antecedent object said to have a given potential must already actually have these properties; otherwise it could not be a physical object and therefore could not be said to have any potential whatsoever.
I thought that this should be clear to everyone who thinks about this matter a bit. But it certainly should have been obvious to anyone who read my lengthy response.
So let me make this as clear as I can:
No principle can rule out what already is true of the objects said to have a given potential. Self-identity, extended in space, having mass, and so on are all properties essential to be a physical object; hence, they are essential to everything.
6) The notion of an essential property is important in philosophy not because philosophers wanted to make sure that objects are self-identical (what else could they be: other-identical?) and that physical objects are placed in space or have a mass (vs. where else would they be: out of space?). The notion of essential properties is central in metaphysics because it promises to individuate in a unique way classes of things from other classes of things, a way that is preserved under counterfactual permutations.
7) Now, if someone objects to the concept of essential properties altogether, then they should say so explicitly and we certainly can discuss that matter. Otherwise, we proceed by assuming commonly accepted principles about the distinction between essential and accidental properties and see how this distinction helps elucidate the current topic. If one accepts the distinction, then one also accepts that properties such as self-identity are essential to being an object as such; not this or that kind of object. Being extended in space, and so on are essential properties of being a physical object, not of being this or that kind of physical object.
8) In Conclusion: I certainly accept that EEPP would benefit by some sharpening. But, I refuse to accept that it has been refuted by examples I have shown not to be CEs, and by argument to which I have responded at length without the benefit of even one rejoinder. We either play the game straight or we do not play it at all.
peter
The first question that needs to be answered is this:
Do you view PP as an empirical or a necessary proposition?
If PP is put forward as an empirical proposition, then EEPP does not contradict it; but, then, PP is in a very precarious situation already.
If PP is put forward as a necessary proposition, then I maintain that EEPP contradicts it.
Now, as for the later claim: EEPP contradicts PP, provided
(a) we accept the distinction between essential and accidental properties;
(b) we take essential properties in the sense of distinguishing between kinds of objects within a given broad metaphysical category (the broad category of physical objects);
(c) we do not pretend to apply EEPP to essential properties which the object said to have a given potential already must have simply in virtue of being an object in general (self-identity) and a physical object (extended in space, has mass, etc.);
Given these provisions, EEPP contradicts PP; I am willing to show this again provided I first get an answer to my question above and we agree on the provisions (a)-(c).
peter
It is really simple:
Do you believe that there are one or more properties that are essential to being an oak tree (not a mere object or a mere physical object; but an oak-tree); a human being; or any kind of object at all?
If you think there are such essential properties in virtue of which an object is an oak-tree as opposed to being a mountain, an animal, or whatever, then simply construct your own example of a potentiality, and then apply EEPP.
If you do not believe there are such properties at all, then you reject the metaphysical distinction between essential and accidental properties, in which case our dispute is focused on the wrong thing, namely EEPP.
I asked this question before. Perhaps, now, you may be willing to answer it directly.
peter
That is exactly what I thought. Good!
So finally now we are on the same page.
First, I am using 'essential properties' in the standard sense used by those who make a distinction of the relevant sort: Being rational is an essential property of being human, and so on.
'Being an oak-tree' is a sortal; it characterizes all and only those things that are oak-trees. It is a necessary condition of being in the set of all and only oak-trees that an object be an oak-tree; but a necessary condition is not the same thing as a necessary or essential property. You only accept the former; this discussion is about the later. Hence, we are and have been talking at cross purposes all this time. Which is what I have suspected for some time now.
Now, if PP expresses a necessary proposition, in the sense that having the right to life is an essential property of being a person, and hence of being a potential person, then EEPP contradicts PP.
If PP does not express a necessary proposition of the above kind, then EEPP cannot refute PP; but then PP is merely an empirical proposition and the claims it makes need to be clearly stated: e.g., does it claim that as a matter of empirical fact all those who have the potential to become persons are endowed by their society the right to life? If not, what exactly is the empirical claim that is being made by PP? And what is the evidence that supports its truth, if it is true?
peter
Permit me to supply an argument for you from EEPP to ~PP.
1. EEPP: If e is potentially an F at t, then it is not the case that e possesses any of the properties that distinguish an actual F from a potential F.
Therefore
2. If this fetus is potentially a descriptive person at t, then it is not the case that this fetus possesses any of the properties that distinguish an actual descriptive person from a potential descriptive person.
3. The right to life is one of the properties that distinguishes an actual descriptive person from a potential descriptive person. (Premise)
Therefore
4. If this fetus is potentially a descriptive person at t, then it is not the case this fetus possesses the right to life at t. (From 2, 3)
Therefore
5. ~PP: It is not the case that every potential descriptive person possesses the right to life.
This is a valid argument, and I have charitably construed your EEPP so that it comes out plainly true. See what a nice guy I am? But the argument is not sound, since (3) is false. The properties had by actual descriptive persons are properties such as agency, self-awareness, rationality and the like. But right to life, which is a normative property, is not on this list. So it is not one of the properties that distinguish an actaul from a potential descriptive person. This fleshes out my charge that you equivocate on 'person' as between descriptive and moral.
Now it may be that the above argument is not the argument you intend. But then the burden is on you to tell us what your argument is.
OK, I'll play along. PP is necessary and I grant your provisions (a)-(c). Now you must provide a rigorous and clear statement of EEPP and a sound argument from it to ~PP.
Will do! Tomorrow morning as usual.
thanks
peter
Are we on for tomorrow in Scottsdale? Please confirm.
Yes, of course. Everything is planned. Will be there most likely before 12:30. Will be next door at the coffee shop reading the paper.
peter
Must respond later tonight or tomorrow morning because right now I need to prepare to take people to the airport.
peter
Like Bob I'm still not clear about EEPP. It would help enormously if we could find an agreeable example of potentiality to which we can apply EEPP. I accept that my Andy Murray example does not capture potentiality in quite the way you and Bill intend. Instead, would you consider an unripe apple a potentially ripe apple? This seems to meet the criteria for 'potential' that we have converged upon. Can you give us some examples of the properties in virtue of which something is a ripe apple which EEPP would rule out in this case?
1) The modal account of the distinction between essential vs. accidental properties is, roughly, that a property holds essentially of a given object or set of objects just in case it holds in all possible worlds in which the set of objects in question exists; a property is accidental just in case it only holds in some possible worlds. (Kit Fine has argued against this modal account of essentialism. I shall assume it so as to simplify matters).
(2) Call an essential property (in the above sense) categorical just in case any object must have it in order for it to exist at all as an object (not this or that sort of object). An example of a categorical essential property is self-identity. Another example is the property of being extended in space or has mass: any object must have these properties in order to exist as a physical object. While all categorical properties are essential properties, not every essential property is categorical. EEPP does not, and cannot, rule out categorical properties. Therefore, such properties cannot be genuine counterexamples to EEPP.
(3) Similarly, EEPP cannot rule out a property that an object already has independently of its potentiality properties. Thus, suppose x is an F at the time it is claimed that it has the potential to become a G. EEPP cannot rule out x having F even if being an F is an essential property of all objects that are G. Thus, properties that are shared by the object said to have a potential to become such-and-such and all objects that are such-and-such cannot be counterexamples to EEPP even if this property is an essential property of both.
(4) It does not matter to the scope of application of EEPP whether an essential property holds of objects other than the ones that x is said to have a potential to become. Thus, suppose that F is an essential property of being a G, but it is also a property shared by things other than Gs; say Hs. As long as the object said to have the potential to become a G does not already feature F (i.e., is not itself in the class of Hs) independently of its potential to become a G, EEPP rules out that the object in question has F. So essential properties that are shared by the objects that x is said to have a potential to become with objects other than x can be presented as genuine counterexamples to EEPP.
(5) The above restrictions on examples that qualify to be CE’s to EEPP are fairly intuitive and make complete sense. EEPP (as well as EPP) are principles designed to capture the idea implicit in our concept of potentiality that having the potential to become a certain kind of object involves having certain internal constitution such that, given favorable external condition and sufficient time, the object will develop into being that kind of an object. But this idea clearly presupposes that at the time the object has the said potential it is not already such-and-such (EPP). Now, surely, not being such-and-such involves lacking something specific to being such-and-such other than merely not being such-and-such. For instance, not being human involves lacking something other than simply lacking the property of membership in the class of humans. If being rational is such a property, then not being a human involves lacking the property of being rational. And having the potential to become human, then, will exclude actually being rational (EEPP), in addition to ruling out actually being human (EPP). But no principle can rule out being self-identical, because that is constitutive of being an object in general and it is not specifically involved in the question of whether something has a given potential. Similarly, if an object already features a given property independently of having this or that potential, then of course no principle, not even EPP, can rule out that such an object has the said property. For after the object has the property in question independently of whether it has this or that potential. So the property in question does not come into play because the object has a certain potential: the object has the said property antecedently of the question of whether it has this or that potential. These are the examples of extended in space, having mass, and so on.
(6) Can there be any counterexamples to EEPP? I don’t think so. The above restrictions rule out many cases that turn out not to be genuine CEs for reasons stated above. EEPP’s vulnerability is not that it might be refuted by CEs; its real vulnerability is that it might not have any application beyond the cases already ruled out by EPP. (Perhaps, this is the concern Bob raised when he wondered whether EEPP might collapse into EPP). This can happen provided things do not have essential properties beyond categorical properties and essential properties that the object said to have a given potential already has independently of its said potential. What is the likelihood that no essential properties beyond the above exist? i.e., is it reasonable to suppose that EEPP might not have an application at all? I think that intuitively if essential properties make sense at all, then the danger that EEPP is empty is not a serious one.
(7) Does EEPP, then, contradicts PP and does this mean that PP is refuted by EEPP? The answer to these questions depends upon how we view PP. Consider Bill’s other principle
(RP) All actual (descriptive) persons have a right to life.
(i) I think Bill intended (RP) to apply to actual descriptive persons.
(ii) The qualifier term ‘descriptive’ as applied to persons is intended by Bill to be contrasted with the qualifier term ‘moral’. What is the intended contrast? Well, I suspect the intended contrast here is between properties such as being rational, sentient, having consciousness, vs. explicitly moral properties such as being virtuous, righteous, benevolent, good, subject to rights and duties, etc.
(8) Now, we might wonder what type of proposition does (RP) express? Is it a necessary proposition? If so, is it necessary because it expresses the proposition that having a right to life is an essential property of being rational, sentient, and having consciousness? Suppose both questions are answered in the affirmative. Now consider PP:
(PP) All potential descriptive persons have a right to life.
(9) If (PP) simply extends (RP) to the class of potential descriptive persons, then it too must be a necessary proposition. For what (PP) does is simply extend the essential connection that already exists between having a right to life and being rational, sentient, and having consciousness from the class of actual descriptive persons to the class of potential descriptive persons. If that is indeed how we view (PP), then EEPP applies to (PP), contradicts it, and refutes it. If Bill does not intend to view (PP) in this light, then he needs to clarify how we should view (PP).
(10) How does EEPP refute (PP), viewed as a necessary proposition along the above lines? Well, viewed in the above light, (PP) states that the essential connection that exists between having the right to life and being rational, sentient, and having consciousness extends to all those objects that have the potential to become rational, sentient, and have consciousness. EPP rules out that under these conditions such an object is actually rational, sentient, and has consciousness at the time of the said potential. EEPP extends this verdict to the essential property linked to being rational, sentient, and conscious. I think there is no way of blocking this result under the present assumptions. Consider the following two analogous propositions:
(RP)* All actual descriptive persons have duties.
(PP)* All potential descriptive persons have duties.
(11) Clearly, even if (RP)* is taken to be true necessarily, for reasons one can easily make out, (PP)* should be necessarily false. The essential link that we might insist upon between the property of having duties and being descriptive persons immediately disappears once we review this link in the context of potential descriptive persons; namely, in the case of (PP)*. (PP)* is and should be necessarily false. And sure enough, EEPP rules out the possibility that the property of having duties can be had by potential descriptive persons merely because having duties is an essential property of descriptive persons. So EEPP’s verdict here is just as it should be. I maintain that its verdict in the case of (PP) is likewise, just as it should be.
peter
Say an essential property of the right sort of a ripe apple is that it is edible.
Thus, EEPP rules out that an unripe apple is edible at the time it has the potential to become ripe.
And that is exactly what we should expect.
peter
Thanks for your last two comments. I have it now, I think. EEPP appears to say that if an F is a potential G then there is a non-empty set S of properties possessed by Gs and not by Fs. This looks just like EPP to me just as to Bob, but let's not be sidetracked by that. Bill has highlighted a property p possessed by Gs that he claims is also possessed by Fs by virtue of being potential Gs. So by EEPP (and EPP) p cannot be in S. But why need we have thought that p was in S to start with? S may have a different element, q, say. For example, F=foetus, G=descriptive person, p=has rights, q=has duties. Bill would then have to explain why q is S when p is not, but I don't think this will present him any difficulties. His position is not inconsistent, I think.
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