The argumentative structure of this passage may be set forth as follows:
1. If God were an individual, then it would be a contingent matter whether God is benevolent.
2. It is not a contingent matter whether God is benevolent.
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3. God is not an individual.
(2) is readily granted, but (1) is hardly self-evident. Why can't it be the case that God is necessarily benevolent but also an individual? Tichý appears to be assuming that all individuals are 'bare,' where a bare individual is one that has the following features: (i) it lacks a nature or essence and is therefore not a substance in Aristotle's sense of prote ousia; (ii) the properties it has are not rooted in it or emergent from it but tied to it by an external tie of exemplification; (iii) the properties it has are all accidental, none are essential. Tichý's statment that "any individual is conceivably malicious" is what commits him to a doctrine of bare individuals. What he means, of course, is that any individual is possibly such as to lack any property it actually possesses, and possibly such as to possess any property it actually lacks. (To make this rigorous we probably have to add: any property that it not trivial or transcendental such as self-identity.)
Some philosophers argue that bare individuals are incoherent. But this is not at all clear since noted philosophers have plausibly defended them. Gustav Bergmann famously championed them under the moniker 'bare particulars' and David Armstrong finds use for what he calls 'thin particulars.' J. P. Moreland ably defends them in his Universals, p. 148 ff. et passim. I discuss them favorably in sections 7 and 11 of Chapter VI of A Paradigm Theory of Existence. Of course, to understand bare individuals you must not confuse them with what could be called 'nude individuals,' individuals having no properties at all. Obviously, all individuals come 'clothed' in properties. The question concerns how they have their properties. Let us provisionally grant that there are bare individuals and that all individuals are bare. The rest of Tichý's argument is as follows:
4. Either God is an individual or God is an office.
3. God is not an individual.
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5. God is an office.
'God,' therefore, does not name an individual, but an office, and the existence of God is not the existence of an individual, but the being-occupied of the divine office. But this is puzzling. If God is an office, then what should we call the individual that fills the office if the office is filled? No doubt, if God exists, then the divine office is filled. But filled by what? The office is obviously distinct, really distinct, from the office-holder, and the office-holder is not a mere feature or property of the office. Presumably, what Tichý must say is that the divine office, if filled, is filled by a bare individual. He cannot say that it is filled by God, for God is the divine office and this office does not fill itself. So the divine office, if filled, is filled by a bare individual.
Now this bare individual — which we cannot name — instantiates the requisites of the divine office but does so accidentally because it is bare. Among the requisites of the divine office are omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence. So the bare individual which holds, fills, or occupies the divine office is accidentally omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent. Since this bare individual is what instantiates the omni-attributes, it ought to be called 'God.' But it cannot be called 'God' if the (1)-(3)argument above is sound. And it cannot be called 'God' for the further reason that God possesses his omni-attributes essentially.
The divine office itself, of course, is constituted by the requisites of omnscience, omnipotence and omnibenevolence, but it does not instantiate them: the divine office is not omniscient any more than the office of U. S. president is a U. S. citizen. So how can God be the divine office as Tichy maintains? God is omniscient, but the divine office is not.
My conclusion is that Tichy's conception of God is incoherent. He is driven to say that 'God' does not denote an individual but an office. But if God is the divine office, then he cannot instantiate the omni-attributes: no office instantiates its requisites any more than a concept instantiates its Fregean marks (Merkmalen). (The concept bachelor, for example, has male as a mark, but no concept is male.) On the other hand, if God, as one might naturally suppose, is the office-holder of the divine office, then God is a bare individual who has his attributes accidentally, which is absurd, as Tichy himself points out.
Could God be the divine office together with its office-holder? This is not what Tichy says, and in any case it would destroy the divine unity and necessity. God is a necessary being, but Tichy cannot make sense of this. For whatever instantiates the requisites of the divine office contingently instantiates them due to the fact that any office-holder of the divine office must be a bare individual. But this is equivalent to saying that God exists contingently if he exists.
This post is the third in a series on Pavel Tichý's "Existence and God" (J. Phil., August 1979, 403-420). So far I have sketched his theory of existence, made a couple of objections, and refuted his argument for it. I now turn to section II of his article (pp. 410-412) in which he discusses Descartes' Meditation Five ontological argument. But in this post I will address only the preliminaries to the discussion of Descartes. Tichý writes,
1. Why do you and Tichý think that it is absurd that God is a bare individual who has his attributes accidentally? Because God possesses his omni-attributes essentially?
2. I'll have to read the chps. 7 and 11 in your books concerning bare particulars.
I understand bare individuals according to Tichý and his Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL) as follows.
Trivial properties have constant extension classes in all conceptually possible worlds and at all times (like properties being /numerically/ self-identical, being identical to a particular individual a, being identical to a or b, being identical to neither a nor b). Primary properties are those which are intuitive, pre-theoretically given, and no further definable (like being red, being 2 m high, believing that G. W. Bush is cool, being a car, being a human, being wooden). Non-primary properties are parasitic on the self-identity of individuals instantiating them; such properties are derivative, often mere logical shadows cast by primary properties, thus, they are often phoney: e.g., being apprehended by a, being 50 km south from a. Finally, two examples of non-trivial non-primary properties had by some individual (precisely, by the particular individual a) necessarily: being as high as a, not being 50 km south from a.
Now, according to TIL, no individual has any non-trivial primary property by any sort of logical necessity; all individuals are, in this sense, bare. It seems that by logical necessity, strictly logical, analytical or conceptual necessity is meant:
No strictly logical necessity: For every non-trivial primary property F and every individual i, it is not true that in virtue solely of the nature of the meanings of logical words (terms) it is true that F(i).
No analytical necessity: For every non-trivial primary property F and every individual i, it is not true that in virtue solely of the nature of the meanings of words it is true that F(i).
No conceptual necessity: For every non-trivial primary property F and every individual i, it is not true that in virtue solely of the concepts it is true that F(i).
3. Now I want to contrast TIL with essentialism of Aristotelian scholastic tradition (as I understand it).
First, according to this tradition, some individuals do not really exist necessarily. I mean here strictly logical, analytical, and conceptual necessity, and also different kinds of metaphysical necessity (temporal necessity, power-necessity, and, say, "Being-necessity"):
For some individual i, it is not true that in virtue solely of the nature of the meanings of logical words it is true i really exists.
For some individual i, it is not true that in virtue solely of the nature of the meanings of words it is true that i really exists.
For some individual i, it is not true that in virtue solely of the nature of the concepts it is true that i really exists.
For some individual i and some time t, it is not true i really exists at t.
For some individual i, it is not true that no object at any time can (has the power to) do anything to prevent that i really exists to be the case.
For some individual i, it is not true that i is Being itself.
But it is doubtful that TIL would take these saying as true or meaningful.
Second, according to essentialism of Aristotelian scholastic tradition, some individuals have some non-trivial primary properties essentially. E.g., I am an individual which is essentially a man and an animal:
For some individual i and some non-trivial primary property F, in virtue solely of the essence of i it is not true that: i really exists and it is not true that F(i).
Note: In the tradition, it seems, essence of some individual i is the objective concept which is immediately designated by the right answer to the question "what is it?" applied to i which (i.e., the answer) does not provide other information about i and does not express the individuality (the numerical identity) of i. Objective concept is a real aspect of a real object of an intentional conceptual act as conceived by that act. In TIL, however, essence means the sum of all requisites of some intension, mainly of some property or office. Thus, TIL does not talk about essences of individuals, but about essences of intensions, mainly of properties and offices.
But here comes a complication. Consider(*):
(*) For some individual i, some individual's essence E1, some different essence E2, some time t1 and some different time t2,
at t1 i has E1 and at t2 i has E2.
It seems that according to TIL (*) could be true -- it could strictly logically, analytically, and conceptually:
It is not true that in virtue solely of the nature of
... the meanings of logical words it is not true that (*),
... the meanings of words it is not true that (*),
... the concepts it is not true that (*).
However, maybe that essentialist scholastic Aristotelianism can agree even in this point with TIL! So, what would be, then, the difference?
Still, there is maybe some sense in which, according to scholastic Aristotelianism, (*) can't be true, but according to TIL it can. Which sense is it? Maybe this?:
In virtue solely of the individuality (the numerical identity) of individuals, it is not true that (*). In other words, for every individual i, every individual's essence E1, every different essence E2, every time t1 and every different time t2, in virtue solely of the individuality (the numerical identity) of i it is not true that at t1 i has E1 and at t2 i has E2.
And probably the Aristotelian scholastic tradition would assent to and TIL would frown at these two claims:
For some individual i and some non-trivial primary property F, in virtue solely of the individuality (the numerical identity) of i it is not true that: i really exists and it is not true that F(i).
For some individual i and some non-trivial primary property F, i qua i possesses F.
1. If God were an individual, then it would be a contingent matter whether God is benevolent.
2. It is not a contingent matter whether God is benevolent.
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3. God is not an individual.
You want to know why (2) is true. Now I can't speak for Tichy, but I suspect we both find it too obvious to need defense. The divine attributes are essential to God. He has them in every possible world in which he exists, and he exists in every possible world. But I can give an argument if you want:
a. God is "that than which no greater can be conceived."
b. A being that possessed its perfections contingently would be such that a greater being could be conceived, namely, one that possessed its perfections necessarily.
Therefore
c. A being that possessed its perfections contingently could not be identified with God.
Therefore
2. It is not a contingent matter whether God is benevolent.
The problem with Tichy's argument is not (2) but (1).
As for your #3 above, some of what you say is unclear, but basically you are right to see a radical difference between a 'bare individuals' approach to ontology and an Aristotelian approach.
"For some individual i, some individual's essence E1, some different essence E2, some time t1 and some different time t2, at t1 i has E1 and at t2 i has E2." Assuming the bare individualist will speak of essences at all, he could agree that this is possible. But I don't see how any Aristotleian could agree that it is possible.
Materna applied to comment, I approved him, but so far he hasn't commented.
As for b. A being that possessed its perfections contingently would be such that a greater being could be conceived, namely, one that possessed its perfections necessarily. Is there some rationale for (b)? I ask because Tichý questions the claim that necessary existence is always a perfection. This question is not unreasonable. Shouldn't he (and we too) then also question the claim that having a perfection necessarily is always a perfection?
Further, in TIL, individuals different from the individual which occupies God-office are not ontologically dependent on this individual. God did not created them. And they would occur somehow (not exist, as we are said that existence is not a property of individuals) even if God did not created anything different from God. This seems to be in conflict with the theism of scholastics (like Anselm, Aquinas, and Duns Scotus), too.
I think we should ask first which kind of necessity (b), scholastics, and Tichý think of.
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Could you, please, explain main differences between between (your) 'bare individuals' approach to ontology and Aristotelian approach?
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""For some individual i, some individual's essence E1, some different essence E2, some time t1 and some different time t2, at t1 i has E1 and at t2 i has E2." Assuming the bare individualist will speak of essences at all, he could agree that this is possible. But I don't see how any Aristotleian could agree that it is possible."
Again, we should ask: which kind of possibility? I suspect TIL sometimes means by "possibility" something other than Aristotelians. Recently, you wrote in the post Still More on the Potential and the Actual:
"EPP, if true, is necessarily true, and we both agree that it is true. And I agree that it is plausibly viewed as a conceptual truth, a truth whose truth is grounded in the conceptual framework we ineluctably employ; although one might also see it as metaphysical truth, one whose truth is grounded in rerum natura. The difference is subtle and needn't detain us at the moment."
Well, I think such modal differences must detain us here. I suspect TIL would say that (*) is strictly logically and analytically possible, and neither Aristotelianism, to my knowledge, denies that (*) is strictly logically and analytically possible. But according to Aristotelianism, I'd say, (*) is not possible in the sense of not being ruled out by the individual nature of individuals.
Few days ago, Professor Pavel Materna wrote to me via e-mail that he will probably participate in the discussions.
Compare: It is not a contingent matter whether bachelors are male. Would you demand a proof of that? It would make no sense to demand such a proof since 'Bachelors are male' is an analytic truth. It makes no sense to demand why a word has the meaning it has or is stipulated to have.
If I stipulate that God is a being that has these and these attributes, then it would be senseless for you to respond, "Prove it!"
If we think of 'God' as a rigid name along Kripkean lines, then it does not have a meaning like the term 'bachelor' does and therefore the necessity of 'God is benevolent', if it is necessary, cannot be based on analyticity.
Moreover, suppose 'God' is rigid and we take the sentence 'God is benevolent' to be necessary; it still could be that 'God is benevolent' is a-posteriori; namely, knowledge that is based upon experience, in some sense (if Kripke is right that there are necessary truths that are a-posteriori, such as e.g., water=H2O).
I find this line of thought much more congenial than simply relying on analyticity. First, it appears to me that there are few analyticity based necessary truths that are philosophically interesting; I am not objecting to there being analytic truths, only question whether even if there are, they can carry the burden that some hoped for it. Second, we of course could stipulate that the word 'God' in English means a being that is maximally benevolent, but then you get the trivial objection that such stipulative definitions do not yield interesting truths; second, that there may be alternative uses of the word 'God' in English and only one of them features such a meaning, and so on.
Just some thoughts
peter
The issue is whether or not 'God' names an individual. Tichy maintains that it does not: 'God' names an individual-office. His reason is that if 'God' named an individual, then it would be a contingent matter whether God is benevolent. But it is not a contingent matter, therefore, 'God' does not name an individual but an individual office.
That is an interesting argument, don't you think? But it presupposes that all individuals are 'bare' in the sense explained above.
I agree with your analysis above and its consequences regarding this strange position. I suppose that the "office" is itself a metaphysical entity. What sort of entity is this? An individual? and if so, is it also a bare individual? That can't be, of course. So it must not be itself an individual. But then what is it? A universal? Neither? I am not sure I get the metaphysical status of the "office".
peter
Consider the phrase, 'the president of the U. S.' It is not a proper name but a definite description. What does it refer to? Tichy says it refers to an individual-office, an office which, if occupied, is occupied by an individual. But the office is not itself an individual. It is more like a concept or property. His main point is that existence cannot be predicated of individuals, but only of offices. Since an office is not an individual it is not a bare individual.
The exact metaphysical status of offices is not clear to me either, but it is clear that they are not individuals. Offices are either occupied or not, but it makes no sense to say the same of individuals.
In TIL, indiviual office (individual role) is a function having some individual as value in different possible worlds at different times. It is constructed by some construction. Every construction is an algorithmically structured abstract (extralinguistic, extramental) procedure. See the paper by Duží (Properties on the Edge, section 1-2).
Proponents of TIL do not take its ontological commitments instrumentally, and they try to justify these (realistically embraced) commitments indirectly -- via TIL's solutions to most of the problems in the philosophy of language and logic.
Last Friday and Saturday, I met P. Materna. He told me that it is not true that in TIL individuals different from the individual which occupies God-office are not ontologically dependent on this individual, that God did not created them, and that they would occur somehow even if God did not created anything (different from God). Present formulations of TIL just assume a non-empty set of individuals as their starting point and do not try to address the question whether this set is in any sense of the word necessary.
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