Some time before 1884, Gottlob Frege had a discussion about existence with the Protestant theologian Bernard Pünjer (1850-1885). A record of the dialogue was found in Frege's Nachlass, and an English translation is available in Gottlob Frege: Posthumous Writings, eds. Hans Hermes et al., University of Chicago Press, 1979. Herewith, some critical commentary on part of the dialogue.
1. We have been discussing 'thin' or deflationary approaches to Being or existence. On a thin approach, existence is not a metaphysical or ontological topic but a merely logical one. Consider the general existential, 'Cats exist.' For Frege, the content of such a general existential does not lie in 'exist' but "in the form of the particular judgment." (63) Frege uses the good old 19th century term 'judgment' but the point could also be put, with minor adjustments, in terms of indicative sentences, statements, and propositions. Particular judgments are the I- and O-judgments of the Square of Opposition: those of the form Some S is P and Some S is not P.
Frege's contention, then, is that the content of affirmative general existentials lies in the logical form: Some S is P. But how do we put 'Cats exist' into this form? We need a concept superordinate to the concept cat, say, the concept mammal. We can then write, 'Some mammals are cats.' If we acquiesce in the natural presupposition that there are no nonexistent items, then 'Cats exist' is true if and only if 'Some mammals are cats' is true.
This translation illustrates what Frege means when he says that the content of affirmative general existentials does not lie in 'exist' but in the [logical] form of the particular judgment. The logical form is Some S is P, which is just a bit of syntax, whence we are to conclude that 'exists' is bare of semantic content, whether sense or reference, and merely functions as a stylistic variant of 'Some ___ is ---.'
Those who take a deflationary tack, therefore, can be dubbed someists. We who resist deflation can then be called existentialists.
By showing that 'exist(s)' and cognates are eliminable, Frege thinks he has eliminated those hoary metaphysical subjects Being or existence which fascinate Thomists, Heideggerians, and such other 'thicks' as your humble correspondent.
2. But does Frege's schedule of elimination really work? We saw how 'Cats exist' can be rendered as 'Some mammals are cats.' But what about 'Mammals exist'? This in turn needs elimination. Assuming that the domain of quantification is a domain of existents, this can be translated salva veritate as 'Some animals are mammals.' And so on up the tree of Porphyry, or, if you deem that to be barking up the wrong tree, then supply some other scheme of classification. 'Animals exist' becomes 'Some living things are animals.' 'Living things exist' becomes 'Some bodies are living things.' 'Bodies exist' gets translated as 'Some substances are bodies.'
Clearly, we either now or very soon must call a halt to the ascent by resting in "a concept superordinate to all concepts." (p. 63) Superordinate to all concepts except itself, of course. And what concept might that be? Such a concept must have maximal extension and so will have minimal intension. It will be devoid of all content, abstracting as it does from all differences. Frege suggests 'something identical with itself' as the maximally superordinate concept. 'There are men' and 'Men exist' thus get rendered as 'Something identical with itself is a man.' (63)
3. In ordinary language, the role of maximally superordinate concept, a "concept without content," (63) is played by an hypostatization of the copula. In 'The sea is blue' the content of the predicate lies in 'blue': 'is' is contentless. But from the copulative 'is'
we form a quasi-concept — 'being' — without content since its extension is unlimited. This makes it possible to say: men = men that have being; 'There are men' is the same as 'Some men are' or 'Something that has being is a man.' Thus here the real content of what is predicated does not lie in 'has being' but in the form of the particular judgment. Faced with an impasse, language has simply created the word 'being' in order to enable the form of the particular judgment to be employed. When philosophers speak of 'absolute being,' that is really an apotheosis of the copula. (64)
This is an excellent statement of the thin or deflationary or eliminativist line: there is in reality no such 'thing' as Being or existence. Being (as a metaphysical topic) is a result of an illicit reification or hypostatization of the copula, an apotheosis (deification) of the copula.
4. Now why can't I accept this? We saw that to eliminate existence in all cases and make it disappear into the logical form Some S is P we must ascend a classificatory tree at the apex of which is a concept or "quasi-concept" unlimited in extension and empty in intension. This is the concept a being, an existent, something self-identical. Using this concept we can translate salva veritate every sentence of the form Fs exist into a sentence of the form Some being is an F. The availability of such translations seems to strip 'exist(s)' and cognates of all semantic content.
The problem with this was appreciated by Aristotle long ago when he argued that Being is not a summum genus, a highest genus, or a genus generallisimum, a most general genus. (See Metaphysics 998b22 and Posterior Analytics 92b14). Being, as that which makes beings be, does not abstract from the differences among beings. But a concept superordinate to every quidditative concept, which is what the concept a being and the concept something self-identical are, does abstract from the differences among beings. To put it another way, Being, as that which constitutes beings as beings, is not superordinate to every quidditative concept since it belongs to a different order entirely, the non-quidditative order of existence. The Being of a being is its thatness, not its whatness.
The mistake that Frege makes is to think that Being is a highest quidditative determination, a highest what-determination. The concept a being, ens, is such a concept, but this concept is not Being, esse.
In sum: Frege's elimination of existential judgments by tranlation into copulative judgments works only if Being (esse, das Sein) is a maximally abstract quidditative concept, the concept a being (ens, das Seiende). But this is precisely what Being is not. Ergo, etc.
This does not follow from Frege's thesis that 'being' is an apotheosis of the copula, or 'the form of the particular judgment [some A is B]'. On that thesis, being is not a concept at all, since a concept is expressed by a term, i.e. one of the two extrema of the proposition. The proposition 'A is B' ties together the two concepts expressed by A and B. But the semantics of A and B are not the whole semantics of the proposition, since there is the tying together itself, the sensus compositionis as the schoolmen called it. That is part of the meaning of the particular proposition, its form, if you like. But that form, that sensus compositionis is not one of the concepts that are thus tied together or composed.
It seems to me the absurd result you draw in your reductio is exactly what Frege is denying here (and which I too would deny).
This post very much helps clarify things for me. The thick claim is that there is a concept Being, esse, that is distinct from the most general classificatory concept ens, a being, Something, Object, whatever we choose to call it. The thin view is that everything we need to say concerning existence can be said with ens. My difficulty now is that though I can easily understand ens as the concept that fills a gap at the root of the classificatory tree, I have no grasp of what you mean by esse, 'that which makes beings be', if by this you are ruling out the understanding of the causal processes by which things are created and endure. So far your arguments have tried to expose inconsistencies and circularities in the thin position. These arguments have been clouded by discussion about various alternative logics by which the thin view might be interpreted. As a 'math and logic' type I take a naive presuppositionist view---I see no point in admitting non-referring proper names or splattering classical logic with existence assertions, though I think we have to allow the existence of abstract objects, perhaps as described here---under which what things exist is very much an extra- or pre-logical business. The fact that we can use logic to argue about the contents of possible worlds or about mythological creatures makes this almost self-evident for me. So I'm ready to be persuaded that the thin view is incomplete and look forward to hearing what needs to be said with esse that can't be said with ens.
You write, "The thin view is that everything we need to say concerning existence can be said with ens." But even this concedes too much to the thick theorist. For if you give me ens, being, das Seiende, an existent, then I will take that as implying esse, Being (To Be), das Sein, Existence. For a being is that which has Being, an existent that which has Existence, an ens that which has esse, and so on. And then I will start asking about Being, Existence, and so on.
So the best way to put it (building on your formulation) is like this: The thin view is that everything we need to say concerning existence can be said with 'something.'
But even this is not quite right, since I will grant you that every existence sentence can be translated salva veritate into one with 'something' and without 'exists.' Here is the difference:
Thin theory in its pure form: there is nothing in reality that corresponds to 'exist(s)' and its variants. There is no Existence, and correlatively, there are no existents. There are things. You can't say that they exist and you can't say that they don't. In Frege's jargon: existence is a property of concepts not of objects. If you insist on speaking of existence, then existence = someness. 'Exists' gives way to 'something.' 'Something' has two parts, the 'some' part and the 'thing' part. Existence has to do with the 'some' part: existence is the logical quantity, someness. 'Thing' has nothing to do with existence.
Thick theory: Individual things are subject to the contrast existence/nonexistence. Existence belongs to individuals in the way that it would not belong to them if Frege were right. Existence is what individuals must have if they are not to be nothing. Existence is a real determination of things in extramental, extralinguistic reality; it is not the logical quantity, someness.
This is a topic that I haven't yet explicitly discussed. Peter Lupu raised the same concern. I need to write a separate post, but I'd better say something now lest you think I'm evading the question.
Suppose there is a puddle outseide my back door. I can ask why it exists and seek an answer in terms of empirical causes: the puddle exists because there is a depression in the ground, the clay in the soil prevents water from percolating down quickly, and it rained hard an hour ago. But the question about causes presupposes that the puddle exists. There is no need to explain a nonexistent puddle. Thus the question: what is it for a contingent thing to exist? seems distinct from the question: what are the empirical causes of a thing's existence?
If a stands in relation R to b, then both a and b exist. So if causation is a relation, and a causes b, then the existence of a and b are facts logically prior to their causal relation.
I blame 'Ockham' for that.
I am sure you have Frege's works in your library, so you should read or re-read the dialogue with the good Puenjer.
Frege himself says that being is a concept superordinate to every concept. He needs this concept to make his translation scheme work.
Since Being is not a quidditative concept superordinate to every quidditaive concept, he does not succeed in getting rid of existence.
Frege, like you, is existence-blind. He thinks he can reduce Being or existence to a summum genus, a highest quidditative determination. You are in excellent company!
>>I blame 'Ockham' for that.
Where has the discussion been? There has been almost no discussion of the ‘alternative logics’ (by which is surely meant ‘alternative formalisms’ – there is surely only one logic) so far.
I have pointed out repeatedly that there are different versions of the ‘thin’ position immune to the various objections that Bill has been putting forward. Bill has ignored these as though they don’t exist. I wouldn’t mind if he put forward one single argument against the alternative views, but I haven’t seen one. I find this extremely frustrating.
>> Frege himself says that being is a concept superordinate to every concept.
If Frege is saying this and other things then he is surely wrong (and we know he was wrong). But that does not mean, as I have argued, that there is anything fundamentally wrong with some of what he says. If the copula is syncategorematic (i.e. it is part of the semantics of the sentence, but does not stand for any concept on either side of it) then there is no inconsistency in the ‘thin’ view.
Bill, if you say that you would like to ‘park’ the other varieties of someism for some later discussion, I don’t mind. At the moment, you seem just to be ignoring them as something inconsequential or incomprehensible (I’m not sure which). If inconsequential, please say why. If incomprehensible, please say which part you don’t understand and I will try to re-express. You know I prize clarity above all else.
My problem is that I am unclear about how your phil of lang concerns and my metaphysical concerns jibe. But I have no intention of ignoring what you say. So I'll quote you from an earlier thread and I'll try to respond.
(a) A presuppositionist believes that the mere use of a singular term presupposes that the term refers to something. The use of a logically singular term is analogous to pointing and saying ‘this’ – it is impossible to understand what ‘this’ means unless there is something for it to mean. Therefore ‘this thing is this thing’ already presupposes that ‘this’ is ‘something’.
(b) An assertionist (that is me) believes that every singular proposition is a conjunction of two assertions, namely an existence assertion, and a predication. Thus ‘a is a’ is really two assertions: ‘some x is a and x is x’. Again, there is no need to define existence in terms of identity. The first of the implicit propositions asserts existence (by means of ‘something’), the second asserts identity.
Consider 'The king of France is wise.' Since there is no king of France, one hesitates to say that the sentence is true. But if we say it is false, then its negation -- 'The king of France is not wise' -- is true. But since there is no king of France, one also hesitates to say that the negation is true. So I take it that the presuppositionist view is that the sentence has a truth-value only if the presupposition that the subject-term denotes something is satisfied. If the presupposition is not satisfied, then the sentence lacks a truth-value.
You on the other hand seem to be saying something like what Russell said in his Theory of Descriptions. 'The king of France is wise' is analyzed as follows
There exists an x such that x is the king of France, and for every y, if y is the king of France, then x = y, and x is wise.
On this analysis, the analysandum comes out false since the existence condition is not satisfied.
Now these are interesting questions in the phil of logic and the phil of language. But I don't see how they bear on the metaphysical issue of thin vs thick. If you go back to the first post in this series you will note that I borrow the term 'thin' from Peter van Inwagen and I use it in his sense.
As I see it, the issue has nothing to do with sentences or truth-values or what speakers presuppose or do not presuppose when they use singular terms. It has to do with the individuals out there in the world. As a nominalist you deny that there are universals out there in the world. But surely you do not deny that there are individuals in the world. Now consider any extralinguistic individual x you like. Is there such a thing as the existence of x? Or is there just x? The thick theorist says that there is a real distinction between x and the existence of x. The thin theorist denies this. For the thin theorist, there is no existence of individuals. Talk of existence is talk of someness. (Your man Williams says this explicitly. I can quote chapter and verse if you want.) Or else talk of existence is talk of the instantiation of concepts.
As I see it, that is the precise bone of contention.
1)It appears that we are having trouble agreeing on what is the problem of singular existence and how best to characterize the thin's and the thick's positions and the dispute between them. Previous posts as well as this one show that Bill and O cannot agree on how to characterize the thin's position and the same holds for exchanges between Bill and myself.
2) For instance, Bill thinks that one of the hallmarks of the thin's position is the elimination of singular existence. But, what does this charge mean? How should we assess it?
3) Let us take examples.
(a) Nominalists deny that universals or properties exist. Do they eliminate universals? Well, nominalists do not think that they eliminate universals; from their point of view there is nothing to eliminate since universals do not and never existed.
(b)Is there a neutral way of stating the dispute between nominalists and their adversaries? A way that does not beg the question against either side? It is not easy, but perhaps one can start as follows: Universals are the sort of entities that can have multiple-realization.
(c) Are there such entities? Notice that we do not here assume that there are such entities and the nominalists are somehow blind to their existence. We start from a neutral point of view: we simply do not know whether there are universals or whether there are no universals. So now each side will bring considerations which support their position. Nominalists will argue that there are no considerations which require us to posit such entities. Realists will argue that there certainly are considerations of this kind. And so it goes, each side will review the other sides arguments.
(4) Can we identify a neutral position between the thins and the thicks, a position which does not beg the question against either side just like in the case of universals?
(a) Well, Bill frequently suggests that rejecting the distinction between an individual and its existence is a necessary condition for being a thin; so, perhaps, accepting it is a sufficient condition for being a thick.
(b) But, perhaps, it is not quite that simple. Accepting the distinction may not be a sufficient condition for being a thick, if there is some third position. It may only suffice to being a non-thin. Who knows?
(c)Bill also toys with rendering this as a sufficient condition; I think he has not as yet stated an official position on the question of whether this is sufficient. Can we and should we consider this suggestion as a neutral way of characterizing the problem?
(5)I myself am tempted to accept it until I read Bill saying things like this:
"For the thin theorist, there is no existence of individuals. Talk of existence is talk of someness."
(a)But, how can that be? Did Frege, Russell, Quine, et all deny the existence of individuals? I don't think so. Certainly Quine could not have done so. He was at heart a quisi-nominalist; at least he wished it could have been proven. And how can one deny the existence of individuals and yet argue that talk of existence is talk of sameness? Sameness of what? Individuals of course! So then individuals exist after all! (Do you see the seeds of the vicious-circle argument right here?)
(b)So what is going on here? Thins of course do not really deny the existence of individuals; certainly, they do not do so qua thins. And Bill does not really mean to say that they do. But, Bill occasionally speaks as if he does mean to say that. So what does he really mean to say?
(c) He means to say that thins are willing to accept that individuals, say Socrates, are either fat or thin, tall or short, smart or not so smart. And thereby they are willing to say that individuals feature certain properties or something--some stuff--which renders them fat or thin, tall or short, smart or not; but thins are unwilling to give the same courtesy to existence.
Note: I previously proposed the language of singular-existence-stuff; SE-stuff. Thins, I proposed, deny that there is SE-stuff such that we can say that some things possess SE-stuff and other things (Pegasus, for instance) lack SE-stuff. (It does not matter for now what is SE-stuff. It is the sort of stuff that the thicks will eventually have to explicate so that things that exist necessarily have it; things that do not exist lack it.) But Bill did not find this language useful. So be it.
(d) So the thins do not deny the existence of individuals as such. Rather they deny that the existence of individuals requires us to decouple the individual from its existence in a way that then we are somehow need to embark on a search for an existence-something; some existence property, or mode, or feature, or stuff such that this existence-something needs to be posited in the case of each existing individual.
(e) The thins thus deny that we are in need to explicate existence statements, propositions, or whatever in a way that forces us to search for the holly grail of existence: the existence-something; some-stuff that necessarily applies to each existing individuals and does not apply to those individuals that do not exist.
The thicks maintain that we cannot explicate existence without positing some-stuff like that.
(6) So how do the thins, or some thins, explicate existence without positing the holly grail of existence?
(a) I have argued in one of the other thread (I don't know which one) that one should not suppose that the thins construal of
(i) Socrates exists
as
(ii) (Ex) (x=Socrates)
is tantamount to the thesis that the thins identify existence with self-identity or even identity. (Right now I forgot my own argument and I do not wish now to search for it throughout all of these threads and find it: I recall it was reasonable one).
(b) Rendering (i) above as (ii) is a much more complicated rendering. I have said before that (ii) should be understood as stating that some domain (in this case the actual world)--the domain of the quantifiers--contains an individual designated by the constant 'Socrates'.
Note: Forget about the linguistic rendering of the point right now. Focus on the idea as to what (ii) means. The linguistic formulation can be eliminated in various ways.
(c) Look at this:
(iii) Something is tall.
is rendered as
(iv) (Ex) (x is tall)
Now, (iv) says that the domain contains at least one object that is tall or that there is some object in the domain that is tall. So 'something' (iii) or 'there is' or 'there exists' according to this interpretation is a complicated relational property between a domain, universe of discourse, range of quantifiers and an object and a property (being tall).
(d) Now, think of (i) exactly the same way. To say that Socrates exists is to state a relationship between a certain set of objects and an object: namely, it is to say that one of the members of the set in question is Socrates. So this simple statement of existence is simultaneously about Socrates as well as the actual world. And that, according to the thins, is what existence amounts to; it is a full explication of existence! Nothing more is needed
(6) This view, the thin's view expounded here, is not the same as eliminating existence or denying the existence of individuals. It is rather stating what is it for something to exist without positing an existence-something, an existence-stuff that each individual somehow must possess in order to exist.
(a) Sometimes Bill accuses such a view of reducing existence to a logical notion, thereby, depriving it of a legitimate metaphyscial status. This accusation is the flip side of his other charge that this view eliminates existence; what Bill means, I suppose, is that by explicating existence in terms of logical notions, this view removes it from being a legitimate subject matter of metaphysics.
(b) Bill is only half correct about the charge that for the thins existence is a logical notion. Involving logical concepts in explicating something does not mean that the explicandum (thing to be explicated) becomes a purely logical notion. Frege's project of reducing numbers to purely logical notions failed because such a reduction is only possible if we reckon sets in our explication. And sets are not purely logical notions. Similarly, the thin's project is to think of existence in terms of the (logical) apparatus of quantification (quantifiers, variables, identity); BUT, no such explication is possible without positing sets and it is the existence of sets that is the critical element in the thins explication. Does Bill wish to deny the existence of sets?
(7) Bill's other argument, the vicious-circle argument, has been discussed on many of these threads. I do not think it can be properly assessed unless we somehow find a way of stating the positions and the dispute in some neutral way; I have suggested one here, and elsewhere. But my main concern here is the methodological point of whether there is a way of finding neutral ground from which the thins and the thicks can be characterized.
peter
I also think that I see why the thin theory is inadequate. There seems to be a difference between Sylvester Stalone and Rambo that is more than just the domain that I chose to quantify over. The domain that includes Sylvester Stalone and other things that exist is privileged in some sense. Can your theory of existence be characterized as an attempt to explicate exactly why this domain is privileged?
I hope you will be patient with me if I ask some more questions that were probably already asked by people who caught on more quickly:
1. If the existence of Socrates is distinct from Socrates, does the existence of Socrates exist? If so, aren't you bothered by the infinite regress implied by this?
2. Do concepts exist? For example, can it be the case that the concept of Pegasus exists even though Pegasus does not exist?
3. Is existence a concept or an object?
4. Do you agree with Frege's account of identity statements --that is, that such statements refer to the concepts rather than the objects? Or is self-identity also a property of objects?
5. Should I just buy your book and save you the annoying questions :-).
Doc,
"There seems to be a difference between Sylvester Stalone and Rambo that is more than just the domain that I chose to quantify over. The domain that includes Sylvester Stalone and other things that exist is privileged in some sense."
Of course there is a difference between Sylvester Stalone and Rambo; the former is a person while the later is a fictional (movie) character. The former exists as a person whereas the later does not. So the domain of quantification of the actual world will include Sylvester Stalone, but not Rambo, at least by normal standards of such a theory.
But none of this shows an inadequacy of the thin's conception, except insofar as the thins need to come up with an adequate theory of fictional entities. But, then, so does everyone else; so Rambo presents no special difficulty for the thins.
peter
I think that I finally understand what the argument is about. If I may try to phrase it in Fregean language of concepts and objects (which I find comfortable): thins believe that existence is a feature of the concept, while thicks believe that it is a feature of the object.
You got it. That's basically what the argument is about. But just to refine it a bit: Thins hold that existence is a property of concepts, but never of objects, while thicks, without denying that there is a sense in which existence can be a property of concepts, maintain that existence can be attributed to objects.
For example, 'Cats exist' does not predicate existence of individual cats; it predicates instantiation (being-instantiated) of the concept cat. As a thick theorist I have no problem with that. But now consider a particular cat, Max. The thick finds it meaningful to attribute existence to Max whereas the thin find this meaningless.
Russell, who follows Frege closely, at least on the topic of existence, compares existence with numerousness. It is meaningful (and also true) to say that cats are numerous. But it is meaningless to say that Tibbles, or Max, or Felix, is numerous. The PURE THIN THEORY -- the 'Fressellian' theory -- is in this sense eliminativist about singular existence. Singular existence for the pure thin theorist is like numerousness. In Fregean jargon,'___exists' like '____is numerous' is not an admissible first-level or first-order predicate.
Now I will try to answer your questions, which are very good, by the way.
1. If the existence of Socrates is distinct from Socrates, does the existence of Socrates exist? If so, aren't you bothered by the infinite regress implied by this? Although I want to claim that there is a real distinction between the existence of S. and S., and not merely a conceptual or mind-made distinction, I deny that the existence of S is separable from S or that it exists on its own. As I understand Giles of Rome, he held this, but my view is more like Aquinas: there can be a real distinction without separability.
2. Do concepts exist? For example, can it be the case that the concept of Pegasus exists even though Pegasus does not exist? Here is a better example: can it be the case that the concept winged horse exists even though Pegasus does not exist? But now I must ask whether you are thinking of concepts as mind-dependent or as mind-independent?
3. Is existence a concept or an object? The logically first question to ask is whether existence itself exists or not. I say that existence exists. (I am well aware of how bizarre this sounds! But I have published a paper on this question which I may upload.) Now if existence exists, the next question is: to which category should be assign existence? Is existence a concept? Is it a property? If a property, a property of individuals? Or perhaps a property of properties? Is it a set? An operator? A quantifier? An individual in its own right? Something else?
Although I cannot explain what I mean in detail, let alone justify it via arguments, my answer is: the existence of each concrete contingent individual is the unity of its ontological constituents, and Existence as that which is common to all concrete contingent existents is an individual in its own right.
If you are using 'concept' and 'object' in Frege's way, then I would say that existence is neither a concept nor an object.
4. Do you agree with Frege's account of identity statements --that is, that such statements refer to the concepts rather than the objects? Or is self-identity also a property of objects? Since I don't agree with your characterization of Frege's account if identity statements, I think we should leave this topic for another occasion.
5. Should I just buy your book and save you the annoying questions :-). Your questions are mostly good and reasonable and such that I need to answer them. The book however is way too expensive; last time I checked the price was jacked up to $145! Outrageous. University libraries should have it, and you might be able to get a copy from a local library via Interlibrary Loan.
You've given me a lot to chew on. For now I will chew on the following passage:
(5)I myself am tempted to accept it until I read Bill saying things like this:
"For the thin theorist, there is no existence of individuals. Talk of existence is talk of someness."
(a)But, how can that be? Did Frege, Russell, Quine, et all deny the existence of individuals? I don't think so. Certainly Quine could not have done so. He was at heart a quisi-nominalist; at least he wished it could have been proven. And how can one deny the existence of individuals and yet argue that talk of existence is talk of sameness? Sameness of what? Individuals of course! So then individuals exist after all! (Do you see the seeds of the vicious-circle argument right here?)
(b)So what is going on here? Thins of course do not really deny the existence of individuals; certainly, they do not do so qua thins. And Bill does not really mean to say that they do. But, Bill occasionally speaks as if he does mean to say that. So what does he really mean to say?
First of all, you are confusing someness and sameness. I said that for the thin theory existence = someness, not sameness.
Yes, Frege and Russell deny that individuals exist in the following sense: they deny that existence is attributable to individuals. That is the whole point of the theory and why it is of such great anti-metaphysical significance. For these gentlemen, an individual no more exists than it is numerous. 'Socrates is numerous' is nonsense in the way that 'Philosophers are numerous' is not. Same goes for existence on their theory.
You are not a PURE thin theorist, but an ADULTERATED (Quinean) thin theorist.
You wonder how a thin theorist could say that existence = someness? What's the problem? He's proposing a replacement: you replace existence with someness. He is saying that when people talk about existence all they can be talking about is the logical quantitiy, someness.
When Feuerbach says that God is an unconscious anthropomorphic projection, is he presupposing the existence of God? Of course not. He is saying that God does not exist. He is making an eliminativist claim, not an identitarian claim. Similarly, the thin theorist who says that existence is someness is making an eliminativist claim: he is saying that there is no existence of individuals. He is not saying that there is the existence of individuals and what it is is someness.
You say "Thins of course do not really deny the existence of individuals;" But of course the pure thins do, as I have explained in detail many times. The reason you do not see this is because you construe the thin theory along adulterated Quinean lines. You assume along with Quine that the individuals in the domain of quantification are existing individuals. It is a natural assumption, no doubt, but it leads to blatant circularity. Surely you can appreciate the circularity of an analysis of 'Cats exist' in terms of 'There exists an x such that x is a cat.'
That doesn't get rid of singular existence; it presupposes it. The pure thin theory has the virtue of being noncircular. For on the pure thin theory the items in the domain neither exist nor do not exist.
This is why 'Ockham' does not admit the circularity. He doesn't admit it because he is a pure theorist like his teacher the Fregean C J F Williams. For 'Ockham' there is no difference between something and something that exists.
You see the circularity, and for that very reason you make a differnt object than O makes: you think that every theory of existence must be circular.
To say that Socrates exists is to state a relationship between a certain set of objects and an object: namely, it is to say that one of the members of the set in question is Socrates. So this simple statement of existence is simultaneously about Socrates as well as the actual world. And that, according to the thins, is what existence amounts to; it is a full explication of existence! Nothing more is needed
In a nutshell, then: x exists iff x is an element of the set that is the actual world.
I wonder: could the actual world be a set? Sets have their members essentially. But thew actual world is constantly gaining and losing members without prejudice to its identity. Doesn't it follow that the actual world cannot be a set?
Hate to trot out my circularity objection yet again, but presumably the actual world is actual in virtue of its members being existents. And so one goes round in a circle if one says that Socrates' exstence is his membership in a set of existents.
More tomorrow.
"I wonder: could the actual world be a set? Sets have their members essentially. But thew actual world is constantly gaining and losing members without prejudice to its identity. Doesn't it follow that the actual world cannot be a set?"
1) There are several ways of dealing with the problem you raise here. Take the class of all human beings. This class constantly changes due to deaths and births. How do we convert this class into a set, which as you correctly point out has its members essentially? Well, you specify the set in question as the set of all human beings ever lived, currently live, or will be born in the future. Now, the set includes all human beings ever lived and this set does not lose or gain any members. The same method can be generalized to all things in the actual world.
2) A somewhat related problem is this. While sets have each of their members essentially, none of the things that are part of the actual world are so essentially. While Socrates is in fact a member of the actual world, Socrates could have not existed. Therefore, the actual world could have not included Socrates. But, the set of all things actually existing could not have been the same set without Socrates as a member.
This problem can be resolved by observing that while the actual world is the set of all existing things, it could have been the case that some other set that does not have Socrates as a member could have been the actual world.
3) I will deal with the circularity objection (Nocha Mull) in another post.
peter
Frege/Russell and Eliminativism.
1)"First of all, you are confusing someness and sameness. I said that for the thin theory existence = someness, not sameness."
Guilty as charged. I did confuse someness with sameness. In fact it was worst than that: I thought you misspelled 'sameness' by writing 'someness'. I am sometimes very slow!
2)"Yes, Frege and Russell deny that individuals exist in the following sense: they deny that existence is attributable to individuals. That is the whole point of the theory and why it is of such great anti-metaphysical significance. For these gentlemen, an individual no more exists than it is numerous."
Let me try to convey my take on Frege and Russell's views on this matter and why I think that your characterization of their view as eliminativist is somewhat misleading. Frege and Russell, just like Kant before them, indeed deny that "existence is attributable to individuals". So F/R reject the view that existence should be viewed in the same vain as rationality, for instance, or weight, or temperature, etc.
Take rationality. If one considers rationality as a property of certain things (say human beings) and not of other things, say rocks, then it makes sense to inquire as to the nature of this property: i.e., it makes sense to ask certain questions such as "What is it to be rational?"; "What is the nature of rationality?", "What makes something rational?" etc. Thus, these questions indicate that we think of rationality as the sort of things that has a nature; that it is the sort of thing that has some sort of a structure and, therefore, it makes sense to inquire what is its structure. In short, since we think of rationality as a structured property, it is appropriate to go further and ask about its nature.
So we can state three theses:
(a) F/R denial that "existence is attributable to individuals".
(b)Kant's thesis: Existence is not a property.
(c)It makes no sense to inquire about the structure of existence like it makes sense to inquire about the structure of rationality.
I propose to take (a), (b), and (c) as equivalent. To deny that "existence is attibutable to individuals" is equivalent to the denial that existence has a structure that needs to be unveiled by some inquiry, in this case a philosophical or metaphysical inquiry.
So we should not interpret thesis (a) as if F/R claim that to say that "Socrates exists" makes no sense in the same way as the phrase "Socrates is an even number" makes no sense. Rather we should think of their claim as follows:
It makes no sense to think of "Socrates exists" in the same way as we think of "Socrates is rational", because then we will threat '...exists' along the lines of '...is rational' and we will be tempted to inquiry into its nature and structure just like we view rationality as a property and thus inquiry as to the nature and structure of this property.
Instead we should construe existence differently so as to avoid the above temptation. But in so doing F/R do not deny that "Socrates exists" makes sense; they deny that this sentence makes sense if interpreted in a certain way. Interpreted in some other way, it makes complete sense. Hence, F/R cannot be viewed as propounding a thesis that can be legitimately viewed as eliminativist. Rather, they eliminate existence viewed as a property and propose instead a different way of looking at it.
peter
These problems have worried me before and I don't think that I have a complete answer.
Good comments! Responses tomorrow, I hope. Tired now. That Mexican dinner did me in!
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4. Some undesirables: The skimmers, those who cannot read but only read-in. The sophists who, abusing argument, argue for the sake of argument. The ideologues, those who are out for power, not truth. The uncivil. The illogical. The politically correct. Worst of all, perhaps, are those who exemplify the anti-Socratic property: those who think they know what they don't know. If Socrates was famous for his learned ignorance, these types are marked by their ignorant unlearnededness.