Quine and the Denial of Existence
A second addendum to A Tension in Quine's Theory of Existence. Go there for references and scholarly niceties.
We sometimes issue existence denials, e.g., 'Pegasus does not exist.' On Quine's explication this singular negative existential is couched in terms of
1. ~(Ex)(x = Pegasus).
Now as a solution to the problem of negative existentials this is a joke. For what (1) says is that
(show)
All Related Posts (on one page) | Some Related Posts:
- Existence: A Contrast Argument Defeated
- Existence-Blindness or Double-Vision?
- Being as the Apotheosis of the Copula: Frege's Eliminativism in his Dialogue with Pünjer on Existence...
- Existence and Self-Identity: Another Jab at Quine
- Quine and the Denial of Existence
- Quine, Existence, and Circularity...
- In Defense of Modes of Being: Refutation of Dallas Willard, Part I
- In Defense of Modes of Being: Substance and Accident
- Thin ('Analytic') and Thick ('Continental') Conceptions of Being
Posted by William F. Vallicella on
Thursday April 24, 2008 at 4:37pm
1. The thin account is to equate ‘somethingness’ with ‘existence’ (crudely put, but to the point)
2. But to be something is to be the value of a variable
3. To be the value of a variable is to satisfy some predicate
4. But to every predicate there corresponds a concept (a meaning, an idea) and a property.
5. But there is no general concept or property corresponding to the existence of any individual. For a general concept or property may apply to other things than that individual: it must be ‘predicable of several’. But the concept or property that is proper to any singular individual thing cannot apply by definition to anything but one individual.
6. But neither can there be any singular property or concept belonging to an individual. For such a property or concept can exist without being instantiated. Thus, had Socrates never existed, there would still exist the property of being Socrates, that individual, and we could still have the singular concept of being such a person. This is absurd.
7. Ergo etc.
This is a pretty powerful argument, I agree. But it involves a realist assumption at the very end. Is it true that the existence of an individual property survives the destruction of the individual himself? If so, there is an absurdity, perhaps. But why shouldn’t the nature and existence of a singular property, the haecceity, be intimately tied up with the existence of the individual himself?
You haven’t given any arguments on this score.
Just read the story. What a scumbag! Won't admit guilt. Also hides behind religion as you can see from the story.
What does a guy in your circumstances pay in TOTAL taxes as a percentage of income? Would you say you get good value for your money?
You go beyond what I say above, and some of what you say is unclear. But my point against Peter is that even on Quine's version of the thin theory we must in the end resort to the instantiation/noninstantaition of properties. He thinks one can have a quantification account that does not bring in properties and instantiation. I say that's impossible. The problem is the problem of singular existence, something math and logic types would like to ignore.
Consider the predicate 'socratizes.' Surely the existence of Socrates cannot be identified with the satisfaction of this predicate. So we need something more stable than a bit of language: we need a property, which is an extralingusitic and extramental item, and indeed one that exists whether or not Socrates exists. We need a haecceity-property, say, the nonqualitative property of identity-with-Socrates. No merely qualitative property will do, not even one that is such that, if instantiated, then instantiated by exactly one individual. We need a property that individuates Socrates, that very individual, in the actual world and across all possible worlds.
That there is this property is a necessary but not sufficient condition of its being plausible that the existence of Socrates = the instantiation of some property. But I deny that there is a property like identity-with-Socrates, a property that exists whether or not he exists. Now I haven't argued for this recently on this blog (as far as I know) so this is something I should try to lay out carefully in a separate post.
You write, But why shouldn’t the nature and existence of a singular property, the haecceity, be intimately tied up with the existence of the individual himself?
In a sense, that is my point. The haecceity-property must be "tied up" with the existence of the individual himself. Before Socrates came into being, there was no property, identity-with-Socrates. And in a possible world in which S. does not exist, there is no property, identity-with-Socrates. Now I need to argue for this, but any argument will be based on the intuition that it is just absurd to think of the very identity, ipseity, and haecceity of a concrete individual as a separate Platonic object that exists whether or not said individual exists! As a nominalist you should immediately agree with this.
What you may not agree to is the claim that one needs this property (which is capable of existing uninstantiated) for it to be plausible to identify the existence of Socrates with the instantiation of some property.
Fascinating, eh? Are we back in the Middle Ages yet?
>> ... I need to argue for this, but any argument will be based on the intuition that it is just absurd to think of the very identity, ipseity, and haecceity of a concrete individual as a separate Platonic object that exists whether or not said individual exists!
I agree, but your argument that haecceities are absurd are based on precisely this kind of absurdiy, and not haecceity itself. Then you say
>>What you may not agree to is the claim that one needs this property (which is capable of existing uninstantiated) for it to be plausible to identify the existence of Socrates with the instantiation of some property.
Exactly. The notion of 'property' is very hard to disentangle from that of 'predicate'. There has to be a haecceity predicate if the quantificational account is to work. But does there have to be such a property?
>>I need to argue for this, but any argument will be based on the intuition that it is just absurd to think of the very identity, ipseity, and haecceity of a concrete individual as a separate Platonic object that exists whether or not said individual exists!
I don't think you need to argue for this, because I am not going to disagree. I don't know whether Peter agrees that the horns of the dilemma are such as you are portraying them. I do like dilemmas. Setting up dilemmas is like setting up traps and ambushes in chess.
What do I get, well my daughter goes to a good state school so I get free education for one, but my son goes to a private school. No one in their right mind sends their children to a bad state school, and most of them are, because of the proliferation of gang culture, drugs, teenage pregnancy &c &c. I have private medical insurance though I do support the idea of basic free medical care.
Where does it all go. A very large amount goes to supporting teenage pregnancies. There was a very telling comment on TV the other night. One of these teenagers with children said she didn't like people objecting to her condition because the state was paying very generously for her. It surely must be OK, otherwise the state wouldn't be doing this.
This gives the lie to the liberal claim that state 'insurance' of this sort does not act as an incentive to pregnancy. Clearly it does, because this young woman is actually rationalising her decision to get pregnant (or her not caring about it) by referring to this policy.
It also proves something else I hold (some Conservatives may not agree with this), that we are not really 'free' to choose right and wrong. We need society, or the state, or some Platonic authority to tell us what is right or wrong. Most people's take on morality is just a collection of banal cliches.
I was careful to speak of haecceity-properties. You are right, however, that the notion of haecceity is wider than the notion of haecceity-property. One can reject haecceity-properties without rejecting haecceities. Much depends on whether one thinks of an haecceity as an ontological constituent of the thing that has it, or as a property external to it to which it is related.
And this raises the further issues of the difference between constituent ontologies and relation ontologies. (N. Wolterstorff's terminology.) I conjecture that partisans of a 'thin' appreoach to Being are also relation ontologists.
But the real problem is that you do not understand what I mean when I say that the existence of an individual cannot be identified with the satisfaction of a predicate.
I am entirely baffled by this remark. Surely what you mean is entirely clear. You mean that 'a exists' cannot be reduced to 'something satisfies F', where F is a predicate.
And also what you say is trivially false. The existence of an individual such as Socrates can be identified with the satisfaction of a predicate, namely 'x exists'. If Socrates exists, Socrates trivially satisfies 'x exists'. Otherwise not.
So I am bemused. What exactly do you mean when you say that "the existence of an individual cannot be identified with the satisfaction of a predicate"?
>>Consider the predicate 'socratizes.' Surely the existence of Socrates cannot be identified with the satisfaction of this predicate. So we need something more stable than a bit of language: we need a property, which is an extralingusitic and extramental item, and indeed one that exists whether or not Socrates exists.
Is that right?
Not quite. I am not talking about language but about the world. I am saying that the existence of Socrates, his very being, is not the same worldly state of affairs as some predicate's being satisfied. Why do I say this? Because the first state of affairs obtains whether or not the second one does.
>>And also what you say is trivially false. The existence of an individual such as Socrates can be identified with the satisfaction of a predicate, namely 'x exists'. If Socrates exists, Socrates trivially satisfies 'x exists'. Otherwise not. <<
This statement of yours throws our disagreement into relief. If Socrates exists and the predicate 'x exists' exists, then of course the former satisfies the latter. But it is plainly false that Socrates exists in virtue of satisfying this or any other predicate.
I grant that 'in virtue of' needs commentary, a lot of commentary. But for now, do you understand what I am driving at?
>>Consider the predicate 'socratizes.' Surely the existence of Socrates cannot be identified with the satisfaction of this predicate. So we need something more stable than a bit of language: we need a property, which is an extralingusitic and extramental item, and indeed one that exists whether or not Socrates exists.
Is that right?
Yes that is a fundamental part of the argument. Think of it this way. There are two states of affairs: Socrates' existing, and Socrates' satisfying of a predicate. These are not the same, and the former cannot be reduced to the latter. Why not? Because Socrates exists whether or not any predicates exist.
The point is clearer if we take the moon as our example. It existed before language existed, and it exists in possible worlds in which there is no language.
The difference between me and someone like CJF Williams is that I see the possibility of a philosophical subdicipline called the ontology of existence, whereas he does not. For him there is just the logic of 'exist(s)' Hence existence and being are 'thin' logical topics not thick ontological (metaphysical) topics.
And the argument seems much stronger than you want. If a predicate is a piece of language, and if language does not exist, then the predicate does not exist. Then the truth of many propositions (e.g. that dinosaurs are now roaming the earth, which was once a fact) does not depend on satisfaction of a predicate.
Did you want your argument to be as strong and comprehensive and wide-ranging as that? Such arguments are notoriously vulnerable to counter-examples.
1) You say: “The moon exists. I want to know what it is for the moon or any contingent being to exist. You say that it is for that item to satisfy a predicate. But predicates are themselves contingent beings. So I don't see how you avoid linguistic idealism.”
2) I take your general argument against the thin conception to be as follows:
(P) Either the thin conception (TC) leads to “linguistic idealism”, which is absurd; or TC is viciously circular; in which case it is not a viable account of existence.
(i) Bill’s argument that TC leads to “linguistic idealism:
Suppose TC is the view that existence consists in the satisfaction of predicates: e.g., the existence of the moon consists in the satisfaction of the predicate ‘…is the moon’. Then it follows that the existence of the moon depends upon the existence of the linguistic item ‘…is the moon’ in English and therefore on the contingent existence of English. But certainly the existence of the moon should not depend upon the existence of a contingent entity such as English.
(ii) Bill’s vicious circularity argument:
In order to avoid “linguistic idealism” the proponent of TC must characterize existence without appeal to the satisfaction of predicates yet still cling to the quantificational apparatus. Bill thinks that the only option is this:
“Suppose the domain of quantification contains only existing individuals, and no Meinongian indviduals: individuals that actually have properties but do not exist. Then for a to exist is for a to be identical to something that exists. From this, however, I learn precisely nothing about what it is for an individual to exist. I learn nothing because the explanation moves in a circle of embarrassingly short 'diameter.'”
The circularity, if I understand Bill correctly, emerges as follows. We shift characterizing existence to the domain of quantification. But in order to specify this domain we must assume that a particular object, lets say Socrates, is in this domain. But now we have already assumed the existence of Socrates (by including Socrates in the domain of the quantifiers) instead of stating what Socrates’ existence consists in: a vicious circle “of embarrassingly short diameter.”
(iii) Therefore, TC is either absurd or it is not a viable account of existence.
3) I think (P) is false because
(i) The argument for “linguistic idealism” cannot be right;
(ii) The argument for vicious circularity presupposes that a viable account of existence is required to answer a question that I submit no *philosophical account* can answer without being viciously circular in exactly the same way as Bill charges that TC is circular. And the reason for this is that the question itself is suspect.
4) Examining Bill’s argument that TC entails “linguistic idealism”:
(i) I did not say that to exist is to satisfy a predicate, per se. I said that to exist is to be the value of a bound variable (I am here echoing Quine’s position). So this conception represents existence claims as having a certain form: namely, the form of certain existentially quantified sentences. A refined analysis of this position will indeed incorporate some notion of the satisfaction of predicates (or open sentences), relations or functions (such as identity), etc., together with the apparatus of quantification and variables.
(ii) If Bill’s argument that TC entails “linguistic idealism” is correct, then so will be any theory that countenances the existence of concepts and sets (as some kind of abstract objects). Here is why: since concepts are what meaningful terms in a language express, it follows by Bill’s argument that the existence of concepts depends upon the existence of terms and, hence, upon the existence of a language. Moreover, consider the set of all and only human beings. This set can be characterized as follows: {x!: x is a human being}. Now, this characterization involves the predicate ‘…is a human being’. So according to Bill’s argument the set of all and only human beings depends on the existence of the predicate ‘…is a human being’ and, therefore, on the existence of the English language. But that is patently absurd! The set of human beings exists quite independently of the contingent fact of whether or not the history of the world evolved so as to produce English. Since the later arguments are unfounded, so must be Bill’s argument that TC entails linguistic idealism.
(iii) So, what is wrong with these arguments? Well, first I think we can agree that in general, the existence of concepts, properties, sets and objects does not depend upon the existence of language. At least not in the sense of language that is a socio-historical contingent entity (such as English). (I shall ignore here a view such as Jerry Katz’s who thinks that a language is an abstract object.)
Second, the characterization of a set or the expression of a concept certainly depends upon a language, for how else can we state a condition that characterizes a set or expresses a concept other than by the use of language. Similarly, the statement that some object or other exists also depends upon the use of some language. However, I object to the next step of Bill’s argument. For Bill seems to conclude that the existence of the set of all and only human beings depends upon the predicate ‘…is a human being’, simply on the grounds that we use this predicate in order to characterize this set. But surely such an inference is not justified. The set in question would have existed whether or not we go about characterizing it by using this predicate or any other. Therefore, linguistic idealism does not follow unless one is willing to accept the absurd view that any theory of anything leads to linguistic idealism merely on the grounds that any theory must be expressed by means of language.
(iv) A particularly Disturbing Example For Bill:
For the sake of this (and only this) example, let us entertain the possibility, which Bill thinks we must, that there is a special property attached to the existence of Socrates and only to the existence of Socrates. Let us now ask: What is this property?
One answer is this. Let us introduce a new predicate ‘Socrabe’ into our language such that this predicate expresses the property uniquely instantiated by Socrates’ existence. Clearly this answer is vulnerable to (P). Why? Because, either we say that the existence of this unique property depends upon the existence of the newly introduced predicate ‘Socrabe’; which leads to “linguistic idealism” or we explain Socrabe as the property that is uniquely instantiated only by Socrates’ existence, which is viciously circular, since Socrabe was supposed to be an account of the unique existence of Socrates.
Is there any alternative answer to this question that is not subject to the same dilemma? I don’t think so! More on this issue in a moment.
5) Let me try now to offer a diagnosis why Bill’s argument expressed by the proposition (P) must be rejected.
(i) I have been defending here a Quinean version of TC that is expressed by the slogan: “to be is to be a value of a bound variable.” In order to highlight my concerns with Bill’s argument (P), I wish to present an alternative to this slogan:
(S-Ex) To be is to be a member of a set that can serve as the domain of the quantifiers of a language.
(ii) Now, S-Ex clearly does not render existence dependent on a language. Why? Because S-Ex characterizes the existence of an individual object such as the moon by reference to a set of objects that exists quite independently of any language. The reference to the domain of quantifiers only enters as a possibility and that is certainly not vulnerable to Bill’s “linguistic idealism” objection. Therefore, S-Ex is not vulnerable to Bill’s “linguistic idealism” objection.
(iii) But is S-Ex vulnerable to the “vicious circularity” objection? Well, strictly speaking Bill’s vicious circularity objection can be raised against S-Ex. How? To say that the moon exists according to S-Ex is to say that the moon is a member of a set of objects (e.g., the set of celestial objects) that can be the domain of the quantifiers. But, now, Bill is liable to object that S-Ex makes two critical assumptions:
(a) It explains the existence of the moon by reference to the existence of a set of celestial objects; hence, it presupposes that such a set exists.
(b) It also presupposes that one of the members of the set in question is…what else…but the moon.
Hence, S-Ex is viciously circular.
(iv) My response to (a) is that it cannot be an objection against S-Ex because if it is, then the same objection is going to be applicable to any account of existence no matter what it claims. Consider the example of *Socrabe*. Socrabe is a property that is instantiated uniquely by Socrates’ existence. But if such an account were to be possible, it would explain the existence of Socrates in terms of the property *Socrabe*. But now such an account will have to assume that such a property exists. And so I will ask: What is it for the property *Socrabe* to exist? Clearly, this leads to an infinite regress that cannot be stopped.
(v) Objection (b) offers the opportunity to see clearly what is wrong in my opinion with the kind of question posed by Bill regarding singular existence. The motivation behind objection (b) is that S-Ex does not explain what it is for the moon to exist without presupposing the moon’s existence as a member of some set. True! But, then, so what? The goal of the present account is to explain what the form of existence claims is; i.e., what is conceptually involved when a claim such as “The moon exists” is made. If we can successfully give a general account along these lines of such claims, then we have achieved our goal.
Bill, of course, wants more. He wants an account of singular existence to give a general account of what it is for an individual object to exist without presupposing its existence or (perhaps even) the existence of anything else. But the question is this: Can any account satisfy this requirement without being “viciously circular”?
(vi) I submit that no such an account is possible! Why? Because Bill’s project is not an invitation to explain the causal antecedent’s of the moon’s existence; i.e., he is not interested here in a scientific account of how the moon was formed. Nor does Bill’s project involves an account of the essential properties of the moon or the category or set to which the moon could be a member. Rather, Bill is interested in a general account of something that necessarily coincides with and only with the moon’s existence. But what else could that something be except…what else…the moon’s existence.
Thus, singular existence is not a property nor is it reducible, explainable, characterizable or whatever in any other terms without reminder or without a vicious circle. Hence, the best we can do philosophically is to give the truth conditions of existence claims, including singular existence claims, in the most general way possible. The conceptual tools involved in providing such truth condition will then serve to give an explication of existence. Such an account is revealing not because it reduces the existence of objects to something else. It is revealing because it is sufficiently rich to contain all that we need to state the conditions under which existence statements are true. The terms used to give such truth conditions will of course themselves appeal to the existence of objects. But this fact is objectionable only if we demand from such an account to reduce singular existence to something else. Once such a demand is given up, the fact that such an account appeals to the existence of objects is not objectionable provided such appeal is done properly.
peter
P.S. I need to apologize (once again) for the lengthy post. These issues are complicated and I wish to give them the time and space they deserve.
On the other hand, as I argued in my (shorter) post, Bill's argument seems a little too strong.
Thanks for the comments. I have a whole book full of arguments againts the thin conception. So it is not just linguistic idealism or circularity.
I really do appreciate your careful recapitulations of my arguments before you begin your evaluations. Would that everyone were so responsible!
We aqree on the following: what goes for predicates also goes for concepts and indeed for any entities that depend on language or minds like ours. For example, if concepts are necessarily tied to the mental acts or mental dispositions of finite minds, and if the existence of Fs is identified with the instantiation of the concept F, then an objectionable conceptual idealism arises. But this is not a problem for my view; it is a welcome extension of it.
Let me put the point really simply. You quote, "To be is to be the value of a [bound] variable." Now Quine intends that to be understood in the context of a theory of ontological commitment -- which I haven't discussed. But suppose we take the dictum naively as a proposal for what it is for something to be. Then it implies an objectionable linguistic idealism. The mountain I am looking at existed long before (human) language existed. Now a variable is an expression of a modified human language. Now do you really want to say that the existence of yonder mountain depends on the existence of variables?
I am sure you understand the difference between the value of a variable and a substituend of a variable. But just to be clear: a substituend is a bit of language that replaces a variable -- which is a bit of language. Thus 'Socrates' is a possible substituend of 'x' in 'x is mortal.' Socrates is not. And Socrates, but not 'Socrates,' is a value of the variable 'x' in 'For any x, if x is human, then x is mortal.' Are we on the same page? Values of variables are extralinguistic items.
So if you tell me that to be is to be the value of a variable, then you are telling me that nothing can be without language -- and that is absurd. But note: I am taking the dictum at face value. What exactly Quine means by that dictum has not been my concern thus far.
I haven't said anything about sets recently. Surely the set of planets does not depend on language!
The rest of what you say is a very nice challenge which I will address in a separate post. I will begin writing it now.
You say "I am sure you understand the difference between the value of a variable and a substituend of a variable."
Are you referring here to the distinction between a substitutional and an ontological reading of the quantifiers?
If so, then of course Quine's dictum about existence must be given the ontological and not the substitutional reading.
peter
Well, the two distinctions are related. One usually speaks of substitutional vs objectual interpretations of quantifiers.
Roughly, on the objectual interpretation, '(Ex)Fx' is true iff some object has the property expressed by 'Fx'; whereas on the substitutional interpretation, '(Ex)Fx' is true iff there is some name 'a' such that 'Fa' is true.
Quine of course endorses an objectual interpretation of quantifiers.
you are right; the correct terminology is "objectual". It escaped me for a while...
And, yes, Quine endorses the objectual reading. Others have argued that the substitutional reading is incoherent in some way until...Kripke, of course.
peter
2. Disallowing comments from a particular person, or deleting an offensive, off-topic, or otherwise substandard comment, has nothing to do with censorship. People who think otherwise confuse censorship with lack of sponsorship. I am under an obligation not to interfere with anyone's exercise of legitimate free speech rights. But I am not under any obligation to aid and abet anyone's exercise of free speech rights, legitimate or illegitimate.
3. The Comments area is not an open forum for anyone to say anything about any topic. As the name implies, it is primarily for commenting on the author(s)' posts. But to comment on them, one must have read them. And if I have spent three hours on a post, a reader will not understand it in thirty seconds. Secondarily, the Comments area is to facilitate civil discussion between and among commenters as long as the discussion remains on-topic.
4. Some undesirables: The skimmers, those who cannot read but only read-in. The sophists who, abusing argument, argue for the sake of argument. The ideologues, those who are out for power, not truth. The uncivil. The illogical. The politically correct. Worst of all, perhaps, are those who exemplify the anti-Socratic property: those who think they know what they don't know. If Socrates was famous for his learned ignorance, these types are marked by their ignorant unlearnededness.