One of the arguments against religion in the contemporary atheist arsenal is the argument that religious beliefs fuel war and terrorism. Rather than pull quotations from such well-known authors as Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris, I will quote a couple of passages from one of the contributors to Philosophers Without Gods, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. His piece is entitled "Overcoming Christianity." After describing his movement from his evangelical Christian upbringing to a quietistic rejection of Christianity, Sinnott-Armstrong tells us how he became an evangelical atheist:
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My quietism ended when current events taught me the dangers of religion. I had always known how religions, including Christianity, led to wars in the Middle East, Ireland, and so on. Many wars, of course, are not based on religion. Even religious wars result from non-religious forces as well. Nonetheless, it is hard to deny that many wars have been and continue to be fueled in large part by religious beliefs. It is no coincidence that terrorists are so often motivated by religion, since it is hard to get non-religious people to volunteer as suicide bombers. (76)
It is true that people holding religious beliefs have used, and are using, their religious beliefs to justify war, terrorism, and such other evils as forced conversions and inquisitions. No reasonable person can deny this. But what Sinnott-Armstrong (S-A) says above in the second sentence is that religions lead to wars. Does he really want to say that all religions lead to wars? Buddhism? I understand that there are some Buddhist terrorists. But surely a professional philosopher such as S-A can see the difference between (i) Some Buddhists are terrorists and (ii) Buddhism causes war and terrorism. If a Buddhist is a terrorist, this is an accidental fact about him; there is nothing in the essence of Buddhism that enjoins terrorism. No Buddhist qua Buddhist is a terrorist. It escapes me how the doctrines, precepts and practices of Buddhism cause war, terrorism and kindred evils. Similarly for Christianity. Plenty of atrocities have been committed by people who identify themselves as Christians. But that is not to say that the characteristic doctrines, precepts and practices of Christianity cause war, terrorism and the like. It is rather the opposite: when the doctrines and precepts of Buddhism and Christianity are acted upon they tend to mitigate human savagery.
And then there is the case of Gandhi whose principle of ahimsa (no-harm) derives from his Hinduism. Hinduism as understood and practiced by him surely did not lead to war and terroism. Did he perhaps not understand the principles of his religion? So it cannot be religion as such that causes war and terrorism.
A second obvious point that needs to be made is that even if (some? all?) religious beliefs cause wars and other evils, or rather are part of the motivational framework of individuals who are bellicose and terroristic, this is also true of other belief-systems, belief-systems that are anti-religious. Communism, Fascism, and National Socialism are examples. According to the Black Book of Communism, Communists in the 20th century murdered close to 100 million people. Now Communism is virulently anti-religious. It is a political ideology that is committed to the destruction of religions as to the destruction of an 'opiate' in Marx's famous simile, one that keeps people from realizing the worker's paradise here on earth.
So my question to Sinnott-Armstrong et al. is: If you oppose religion because of its tendency to cause bloodshed, why do you not oppose political ideology as well and for the same reason? Indeed, if you believe that religion is the problem, why do you not hold that belief as such is the problem, or all belief that transcends matters of obvious empirical fact? After all, people fight bitterly over all sorts of beliefs religious and non-religious. (Some believe in wealth redistribution, other do not; some believe in anthropogenic global warming, others do not, etc.)
If one opposes a religion such as Christianity because it causes wars despite its preaching of 'Thou shalt not kill' and 'Love thy neighbor,' but does not oppose anti-religious political ideologies like Communism that also cause wars but which preaches that any end is justified including murder if it leads to the socialist paradise, then the 'reason' proffered for rejecting religion is bogus. It is simply no argument against religion to say that some people use it for murderous ends; for it is also the case that some people use anti-religious ideologies for murderous ends. A good reason for rejecting religion cannot be a reason that would also apply to non-religions and indeed to any belief-system that inspires contention and could be used by someone to kill and commit kindred evils. It is absurd to say: I object to religion because it leads to bloodshed but I have no problem with non-religious belief-systems that also lead to bloodshed.
Sinnott-Armstrong senses the difficulty in his position for he goes on to say:
Of course, atheists kill, too. Russian and Chinese Communist governments are famous examples. However, these atheists killed in the name of communism, not atheism. (p. 76)
The difference, then, is that theists who kill kill in the name of theism, whereas atheists who kill do not kill in the name of atheism. Now surely this is an example of special pleading. For although it is true that some theists kill in the name of theism (e.g. some Christians kill in the name of Christ; some Muslims kill in the name of Allah, etc.), it is also true that some atheists kill in the name of atheism: there are cases of atheists who have tortured and crucified Catholic priests in order to show them that there is no God. These atheists tortured in the name of atheism, whrether they were Communists or Nazis.
To say or imply that no atheist kills in the name of atheism is blatant special pleading. It amounts to saying that atheism is by definition a belief-system that cannot be misused by anyone, and if anyone were to misuse use it that would show that he is not an atheist! If a Communist crucifies a priest to prove to him the nonexistence of God, one cannot reasonably say that it was the Communism but not the atheism of the torturer that was responsible for the crime.
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Related Posts (on one page):
- Sam Harris on Whether Atheists are Evil
- Is Religion the Problem? Why Isn't Belief As Such the Problem? The Special Pleading of Some Atheists
The problem is that such a move depends on a Rawlsian type liberalism, where worldview or comprehensive system is removed from politics. Where politics is separate from personal beliefs. But as Robert George shows here Rawls' claim to neutrality is phony. There really is no getting away from ideology when it comes to political theory. And there is no reason why a religious theory of politics such as natural law can not prove a sufficent ground for peaceful and rational public engagement.
Sinnott-Armstrong needs to ask himself why communist functionaries have been so keen to exterminate "key figures" in theistic circles. To suggest that it had nothing to do with the atheistic stance of "official" communist dogma is absurd.
It's even crazier than that I think. Why should it apply just to murder? It seems to me that if being a communist/fascist/whatever gets an atheist's atheism off the hook for murder, then it must get it off the hook for anything else bad he does. And it seems pretty arbitrary to say that atheism can only be immune to causing a person to do bad things - surely in that case it must be immune to causing good things too. It would seem then that a person's atheism is unrelated to anything they do or say, unless they are somehow entirely devoid of any other beliefs or opinions at all, which none are, and which makes you wonder why (and how) Sinnott-Armstrong is so concerned with advocating it. And, silly me, here I thought atheism was the belief that there was no God, which obviously can affect a person's behavior.
Anyhow, I feel less and less charitable to the evangelical atheists every time I hear this idiotic charge. The first few (hundred) times I heard it, I took it on good faith, and thought it worthwhile to point out the logical fallacy. At this point though, it's been trotted out so many times, and been shot down so many times, that it's just tiresome to hear it again, and there's really no excuse for it. You are right that it's obvious special pleading - so obvious that there's no way the folks making the argument could possibly do so with even a passing regard for intellectual honesty.
But basically no religious creeds condone violence, although I hear Mr. Bin Laden can make a case for it in the case of Islam. Thus, aside from possibly Islam, any religious person who sincerely believes in his or her religion, should they commit acts of violence, are at least in striking dissonance with their beliefs.
Stalin did not just kill religious people. He murdered his own people when they didn't meet the production quotas for their farms. In the case of godless wordlview, it may be the case that nothing particularly interesting is going on here. But a person who sincerely believes their religion's tenets can't do this without realizing the discord between his actions and his beliefs.
Good comment, and not just because you agree! Doesn't Dawkins also make the same move, namely, theists kill in the name of God while atheists kill, not in the name of atheism, but in the name of ommunism? Can you supplyme with a link or reference?
Bob,
"To suggest that it had nothing to do with the atheistic stance of "official" communist dogma is absurd." Well said.
Philip,
"But a person who sincerely believes their religion's tenets can't do this without realizing the discord between his actions and his beliefs." Right. A Buddhist might be a terrorist, but he won't be able to use Buddhism to justify it. Same with a Christian. But a Communist has no similar constraint on his behavior. All morality is 'bourgeois ideology.' If murder is thought to lead to socialist utopia, then it is justified.
One cannot say, flat out, that no atheist could have a moral compass beyond his subjective whims. Many atheists simply take over Christian values while rejecting their foundation. But if the foundation is removed, how long can these values stand? Nietzsche is instructive here.
An excellent post. I think, in fact, that Sam Harris in particular, but also the others, would likely agree with pretty much every word of it.
Harris has been very outspoken about the need to generalize the problem beyond religion per se to include exactly the sort of political ideologies to which you refer. From global-warmism to Maoism, when they become dangerous is when they begin to become extremist secular "religions" of their own, brooking no dissent. The "Worker's Paradise" or the purified Fatherland becomes the soteriological endpoint, and the secular leaders the prophet. Most importantly, the instruments of social cohesion found in religious societies are co-opted almost exactly by these totalitarian systems.
And Harris is quite clear that it is this aspect of religion that he sees as by far the most worrisome: he has no quarrel, for example, with the peaceful Jains, who literally will not hurt a fly. He is also careful to distinguish spirituality - as a sense of the numinous, and as an awareness of the extraordinary potential of attentive effort to result in transformative conscious human experiences - from religion. There surely are atheists who, as you have suggested, simply haven't got a spiritual bone in their bodies, who are deaf to the call of that inner, higher voice - Dawkins is a good example, I think - but Harris is certainly not one of them. (Nor, for that matter, am I.)
As for your remarks about religion in itself as a cause of war, it is hard not to see Islam as particularly troublesome among the major world religions in that it uniquely requires scriptural literalism and inerrancy, and in that scripture explicitly calls for the establishment of a global Ummah, by force if necessary. It is also the only one of the major religions in which its only prophet ruled as political leader as well; in Islam the idea of a separation between church and state is arguably almost heretical.
I do feel the need to comment on one remark of yours above:
I think it can be fairly argued that this puts the cart before the horse, and that the moral sense is far more ancient and innate than any codification of it in Christianity. Indeed we cherry-pick from Scripture and established doctrine only those moral guidelines to which we can offer the assent of our inner judgment, which is a complex amalgam of moral instincts and evolving cultural norms.
I think it is also disingenuous to suggest that without a belief in a supernatural imprimatur there is nothing "special" about humans. It is part and parcel of being human - of having a human brain, and a normal human mind - to have feelings of compassion and empathy for others like ourselves. We might as well suggest that sugar is only sweet because it is divinely, transcendently so.
I am not a theist, yet I feel, I think it is safe to say, as deeply and meaningfully bound to my loved ones and my fellow sufferers in this vale of sorrow as any believer. It is simply what it is to be human.
Given the important role that religion plays in social cohesion, and the great extent to which the customary mechanisms and obligations of religion are co-opted in irreligious totalitarian systems, there is a simple reason for the extermination of religious leaders by such regimes, and the suppression of religious practices: they are a threat.
Point taken on the comment about humans not being special in the absence of God. Even if we are not partaking in some sort of ultimate story, we do seem, via our consciousness and capacity of artistic expression, to be special, especially when compared to the rest of nature.
But any specialness humans have did not compel Stalin to not murder millions. That was moreso what the point was saying. The fact that religious people tend to think humans are all temporal agents headed for eternity, and possibly that God loves them, is not inconsequential to the fact that you don't find many religious totalitarian government exterminating their own citizens en masse.
I think it is arrantly clear that atheists have the same moral compass everyone does. But if one realizes these moral apprehensions are reducible to their experience of them, it becomes perfectly fine to override them if it is both beneficial and desirable. I think it is probable that the genocidal atheist dictators of the last century grew up looking at murder as 'wrong.' But like you say, most atheists choose to adhere to the standard moral values, even if their objective basis is not evident.
With some trepidations, I venture to post on this thread!
Bill's wonderfully chosen title for this thread is:
"Is Religion the Problem? Why Isn't Belief As Such the Problem? The Special Pleading of Some Atheists"
What is *the Problem*?
I suppose we can think of *the Problem* as follows:
(I) Is there a *lawlike* connection between a particular kind of belief-system and systematic acts of violence, war, terrorism, etc?
A weaker formulation is this:
(II) Do certain kinds of belief-systems tend to lead adherents to violence, war, terrorism and such?
(II) is weaker than (I) because while (I) speaks of a "lawlike" connection, (II) merely inquires about a tendency, which can be measured in probabilistic terms.
This problem is motivated, I suppose, by the following:
Bill says:
"One of the arguments against religion in the contemporary atheist arsenal is the argument that religious beliefs fuel war and terrorism."
The obvious response, presented by Bill and others, that many non-religious belief systems fuel the bad stuff. So neither (I) nor, I suppose, (II) are true specifically for religious belief-systems, if we inspect matters historically.
Bill proposes the idea that perhaps belief as-such could be the cause of *the Problem*.
But this proposal is both too weak and too strong.
It is too weak because all intentional acts are caused in part by some beliefs; and so, of course, violence and such are included.
And it is too strong because many cases of systematic bad stuff are typified by the *lack* of certain beliefs; or so it seems.
The atheist argument Bill cited is of course false. But so are the many arguments herein and elsewhere to the effect that materialistic beliefs, atheistic beliefs etc, are somehow systematically linked to the bad stuff. Lumping together Stalinism, Nazism, and philosophical materialism in order to derive the conclusion that all are inclined or at least have no constraints against the bad stuff is of course a fallacy. While Stalinism and Nazism proved to be terrible ideologies, the idea that somehow philosophical materialism is on the same footing is a misunderstanding of both. Even if we were to assume that in some remote way both Stalinism and Nazism lack certain *spiritual* elements and so does lets say philosophical materialism, it is far from clear that this fact can be identified as the lawlike connection, (I) above, or even as a probabilistic generalization, (II) above, that will yield a theory of bad stuff. A convincing argument must be given in order to prove such a conclusion.
Of course, it is a fallacy to think that philosophical materialism inherently lacks the resources of an objective moral framework. Utilitarianism, Kantianism, etc., are counterexamples to this position and they must be ruled out before one renders this conclusion.
The assumption behind posing *the Problem* in this way is the idea that we can have a *general theory of violence*. Once we think that, then naturally we look for something that will make (I) above true. And if that fails, then we look for something that will make at least (II) true. And if that fails, then we cite examples, as many as we can muster, to show that there has to be something that will make either one true.
But, maybe--just maybe--there really is no general theory of violence. Perhaps the bad stuff is an emergent phenomenon of many variables and nothing of significance can be teased out by searching for a systematic causal or probabilistic linkage. Perhaps we need to think of this completely differently.
peter
Indeed, this argument is nearly ubiquitous among the New Atheists. I've endeavored here to dig up examples of atheists saying it in their own words, rather than reviewers and such merely referring to them saying it:
Here's Richard Dawkins doing it in an interview (just search for the word "Stalin").
Here's Sam Harris also doing it in an interview (search for the word "communism").
And here's an example of Hitchens doing it.
I don't think one need look very far to find examples of persecution of religious minorities by state-sponsored religions; we know also that history abounds with religious wars, in which religious communities have sought (and still seek) to enslave, convert, or exterminate one another.
It is that dehumanization of the Other - the exclusion of human groups in possession of alien beliefs and ideologies, whether religious or political, from moral consideration (and presumably, in the religious case, from the affections of God) - that is the common element here.
This is where you run aground:
Of course, it is a fallacy to think that philosophical materialism inherently lacks the resources of an objective moral framework.
How so? If the universe is nothing but matter and its interactions, then it is meaningless to speak of the purpose of anything. If nothing has a purpose, then of course there can be no knowledge of purpose. With no knowledge of purpose, there is no basis for objective morality. Likewise, morality, objective or otherwise, is meaningless in the absence of free will, which cannot exist in a purely material universe.
That is why philosophical materialism lacks the resources to provide a foundation for objective morality. Mere matter cannot give rise to good and evil. It simply is, and so the materialist is stuck with the hard fact that the transient biochemical processes called "Peter Lupu" or "Bill Tingley" do not somehow escape the confines of the mere matter they are to emerge as moral beings. They are nothing collections of pointlessly interacting molecules.
Therefore, those who do know the universe to be more than mere matter rightly identify materialist beliefs as lacking the wherewithal to resist the "bad stuff", as you call it. To the extent that materialists are morally decent, they are inconsistent in their beliefs. Thank goodness for that.
Regards, Bill T
Re Sam Harris you wrote:
This all seems quite reasonable to me.
Except that Harris claims a belief in God is outlandish. This leaves Harris sending the great majority of human beings to the woodshed.
What eludes the man is that his own metaphysical naturalism is born of faith -- as he defines the word: A belief without evidence or even contrary to evidence. (One only has to acknowledge his own consciousness to apprehend, if not comprehend, that nature is not the foundation of all that exists.) So by Harris's own standard, none of us should tolerate him.
Regards, Bill T
No, I think that is wrong, or at least means that we need to clarify what we mean by "purpose". A spider builds its web for the purpose of catching flies, for example. Living things, and their parts, have purposes, even if they aren't aware of them. Likewise, there is a rationale, a purpose, behind our moral intuitions. What we may disagree about is whether the rationale for their design must have been explicitly represented in a Designer's mind, or whether it can be the "free-floating" rationale of evolutionary processes. So we must be clear, here, about what we mean by "purpose". But that can hardly be the case, until one has demonstrated that consciousness is not a natural phenomenon.
(1)The original passage from which you quote is this:
"Of course, it is a fallacy to think that philosophical materialism inherently lacks the resources of an objective moral framework. Utilitarianism, Kantianism, etc., are counterexamples to this position and they must be ruled out before one renders this conclusion."
The point I was making, then, is that unless one rules out (at east) Utilitarianism as well Kantianism one cannot claim that secular philosophies such as philosophical materialism lack the resources to ground objective morality. I suspect that in the end this question depends upon a host of other questions about materialism, such as the mind-body problem; the nature of rationality, free will, etc.
2) Now, as to your claims about the shortcomings of any secular philosophy such as materialism:
"If the universe is nothing but matter and its interactions, then it is meaningless to speak of the purpose of anything. If nothing has a purpose, then of course there can be no knowledge of purpose. With no knowledge of purpose, there is no basis for objective morality. Likewise, morality, objective or otherwise, is meaningless in the absence of free will, which cannot exist in a purely material universe."
(i)It is an open question whether a commitment to a universe that contains nothing but matter and its transformation renders any talk of *purpose* as meaningless. After all, at this time we do not know the fundamental laws of physics and how complex phenomena are to be explained on the basis of such laws. Therefore, it is premature given our current state of knowledge to rule out the possibility that purposeful processes may be an emergent phenomenon of complicated underlying physical processes.
(ii)The same holds of the phenomenon of free will. While I agree that in the absence of free will morality makes no sense, it is far from clear that a materialist philosophy cannot accommodate the phenomenon of free will. The question of whether free will is compatible with a materialist world view is still an open question. You cannot simply stipulate that it is not; an argument is needed.
3) A secular philosophical attitude is different than a materialist philosophy. One can be an anti-materialist in the sense that one believes in the existence of non-material entities (Platonism in mathematics, for instance), but does not believe in a deity. A secular philosophy, thus, could very well accommodate an objective morality without positing a deity as its foundation.
4)You say: "To the extent that materialists are morally decent, they are inconsistent in their beliefs. Thank goodness for that."
I would like you to prove the logical inconsistency here.
As for the "Thank goodness for that" ... well, I am not quite sure whether you are relieved that despite their beliefs materialists can be morally decent or you are cheerful about the fact that they are inconsistent in their beliefs. I understand the former, except that I would rather be relieved that anyone, no matter their ideology, are morally decent. As for the later, I do not see why the alleged inconsistency of materialists merits a cheerful response. I would have thought that a more decent attitude, from a moral point of view, would have been to be at least compassionate about proven inconsistency by anyone, anytime, anywhere. Of course, the "proven" issue is still an outstanding matter.
peter
But they're not justified in doing so. That's the point of showing the dissonance between their beliefs and actions.
Peter, I am largely the neophyte here, so although I have thoughts about what you've said, I'd rather hear and learn more. How could Kantianism or Utilitarianism objectify moral values? Wouldn't those moral constructs still be contrived, and therefore dispensable for any given person? If materialism is true, then a moral system like those seem akin to the rules of a sport; someone thought of them, it's not as though they were eternal and unchanging.
As for your third point above, you don't think that moral values have to have some sort of explanation, or origin, to be included in someone's belief system? It seems you think it allowable for someone, though perhaps being a materialist, to simply grant that moral values exist, even when their existence is not somehow tied to another part of reality.
Philip
Why are they not justified in doing so? The Old Testament abounds with massacres explicitly sanctioned by God, and I think it is almost tautologically safe to say that in all cases of religiously motivated persecution a theological justification is given.
In other words, there having been a great deal of smiting of unbelievers over the ages, I think we can call into question your assertion that "basically no religious creeds condone violence."
Instances of violence in a religious text is not equivalent to an endorsement of violence.
It's not enough to say that a theological reason is given for a certain morally dubious action, because I posit that none of these reasons can be satisfactory; after all, even the devil can cite scripture according to his purpose.
By purpose I mean the final cause of an entity. So we can speak of the purpose of a purely physical entity, let's say a neutron, but that can only be meaningful in terms of an external cause. A neutron cannot give rise to its own purpose.
Indeed, a purpose requires an intention, which matter cannot form. Therefore, for there to be purpose in the universe, there must be something more to it than matter. For a materialist to argue that matter could give rise to purpose in some presently unknown manner requires a belief that matter must possess properties so alien to everything we do know about matter as to be something essentially distinct from matter. Such a materialist is in fact no materialist at all. He is a dualist.
Keeping all that in mind, as for consciousness, the burden is upon the materialist to show that consciousness is purely a physical function. That's because consciousness is an aspect of the mind, the operation of which is clearly not deterministically constrained as mere matter and its effects are. Therefore, consciousness certainly appears to be something more than what nature alone can bring about, unless the materialist is going to argue that nature is more than matter, which brings us back to the fact that such a materialist is no materialist at all.
Regards, Bill T
P.S. For materialist, substitute physicalist, metaphysical naturalist, emergentist, property dualist, or the like, because they all logically reduce to the same monism of mere matter.
If we are judging the practical effect of religion in the world, then violence undertaken by religious groups on the basis of their theological doctrines is certainly fair game. For you to insist that this isn't real religion seems, to me, akin to saying they aren't true Scotsmen.
If I understand you correctly, you say above that the Old Testament massacres we've mentioned are not a moral problem because they were in fact commanded by God (whether that alone is sufficent for them to be morally correct is of course another, ancient question). Another possibility, though, is that they were carried out because people imagined that they were commanded by God, which I consider more likely.
Indeed, as you say, anyone can cite scripture in support of morally dubious actions. The problem in the eyes of the unbeliever is that so many have done exactly that over the centuries, with sanguinary results, and no end in sight.
[1] Yes, you did speak of secularist philosophies, but you gave special attention to materialism. You also said that none of the arguments posed against secularist beliefs were effective, but they weren't against secularist beliefs in general. They were against materialist beliefs in particular. I then added my own.
[2] I think my response above to Malcolm effectively elaborates my argument that materialism is not logically consist with objective morality. Any attempt to make it so twists materialism into something unrecognizable as materialism.
[3] I agree, although I think that the secularist maintains a logical consistency only at the cost of an etiological invincible ignorance.
[4] Now, Peter, you are not being charitable. ;) Thank goodness people act decently even if their beliefs logically do not justify their decency.
Regards, Bill T
Merely conversational intolerance??
To appreciate how radical he [Harris] is, consider this: "Some propositions are so dangerous that it may even be ethical to kill people for believing them." (52-53) Note what he is saying: for some propositions p, the mere belief that p may ethically justify killing the believer, whether or not he acts on the belief.
I wonder if Harris’ position entails that the proposition that God exists is one of those propositions whose being believed by a person would justify the person’s being killed. Be this as it may, he does consider God exists to be a core religious belief, (21) and he does maintain that the core beliefs of religious people are absolutely mad. (72, see first quotation from Harris above.) But why does he hold this? We need to uncover his reasoning.
Quoted from this post criticizing Sam Harris, The End of Faith.
I fear that we may have insufficient common ground here for any progress, as you proceed on assumptions with which I am not inclined to agree.
For example, you seem to reject out of hand the notion that the purposes and intentions of living things might arise from material, evolutionary processes: you flatly declare, without making any case whatsoever, that these are something that "matter cannot form". This, however, assumes that we already have in hand an exhaustive understanding of matter, and what it is and isn't capable of - which of course we don't. And even without assuming any presently unknown properties of matter, it seems to me quite comprehensible that the evident purposefulness of living things - the spider's web, the bat's echolocation, or the way in which a bird's wing is "for" flying - could indeed emerge from the complex dance of "merely" physical substances and energies. There is nothing alien about the idea at all.
What is still a puzzle is consciousness, but it seems to me that simply to announce that matter cannot possibly give rise to consciousness, or that consciousness is "clearly not deterministically constrained" (how, I must ask, would you be able to tell if it were?) - and then to substitute a dualism equally mysterious, adds no explanatory value at all.
To be fair, your model, and not mine, may indeed be the right one. But the case is far from proven either way.
I agree with you there; that is a pretty far-out thing to say. Harris acknowledges this, and offers this reasoning for it, if we read the whole passage in context:
Harris is making the point that a civilized people, when confronted with an irrational and implacably murderous foe, will first exhaust all other options: persuasion, capture and incarceration, etc., before being driven to such extremes as a matter of survival.
Taken in its proper context, then, Harris's remark seems not unreasonable, I think.
Tellingly, the only examples you offer of purpose arising from matter are organisms. But organisms are more than matter. They have life. The materialist can do all the hand-waving he wants about how life surely must emerge from matter and science will prove that -- one day, but of course we have no knowledge whatsoever that it does.
Meanwhile, we do know that organisms, at least conscious ones, do not act under the deterministic constraints of matter. This is clearly the case with rational organisms -- i.e., human beings. I know this is true, because I have my own experience as proof.
You ask how can I actually know that I am not completely constrained by the determinism of matter? If I am, then my experience of consciousness is nothing but illusion. I have no volition. I merely function in accord with the laws of physics and chemistry. My current state unalterably determines my next state. I can form no intention, thus I can have no purpose or provide purpose to anything external to me.
The only way out of this materialist hole is to posit a mode of existence that is non-deterministic, unconstrained by matter, and so is distinct from matter and its effects. That means the universe is dualistic, not monistic. And this dualism is not mysterious if one does not arbitrarily restrict his knowledge to what is quantifiable (i.e., matter and mechanics, or more traditionally the material and efficient causes).
If we recognize that knowledge is possible of that which cannot be measured, enumerated, or delimited (i.e., essence and purpose, or formal and final causes), then we can deduce the existence of a non-material agency capable of providing a purpose to the things we observe in the universe, including ourselves. And such an agency explains a great deal, such as why the realm of matter and mechanics exhibits any order at all and how this means to order matter (the formal cause) makes purpose (the final cause) possible in the universe.
Moreover, it explains the apparent indeterminacy of quantum particles prior to the state vector collapse as matter's lack of form (therefore, detectability) until a vertical causation (an agent external to the horizontal chain of causation to which all physical entities are subject) invests it with such.
Alas, Malcolm, I cannot be as equable with you as you have been with me. I honestly can't see how your model could be right, so as you say, the gulf between us is too great to be bridged. I enjoyed the discussion nonetheless.
Regards, Bill T
(1)In this thread Bill raised a specific question and hinted toward a general one.
(2) The specific question can be stated as follows:
(A)Based upon the totality of known historical evidence, are certain atheist arguments that single out religion or religious beliefs and link them to systematic acts of violence sound and fair?
Bill and others point out that such arguments are neither sound nor fair. Much of the subsequent discussion turned on three subquestions:
(A1) Can we turn the tables and prove on the basis of historical evidence that secular systems of beliefs are likewise linked to systematic acts of violence?
(A2) Are secular philosophies such as materialism etc., consistent with an objective morality?
(A3) If they are not, how can people who hold secular or materialist philosophies justify acting in accordance with an objective moral code?
(3) The general question:
(B)Is there (can there be) a general theory of violence (GTV)?
This question can be divided into several sub-questions. Here are some of them:
(B1)If there is a GTV, is there a *lawlike* linkage (deterministic or probabilistic) between beliefs and systematic acts of violence such that beliefs play an indispensable explanatory role in such a theory?
(B2)If beliefs play an indispensable explanatory role in GTV (i.e., there are GTV-laws), can we distinguish a specific class of beliefs that play such a role?
(B3) If so, how do we individuate this class of beliefs?
I think, and suspect, that these are the sort of general questions that Bill's original post invites us to examine.
(4)I have prefixed my first post on this thread with the following statement:
"With some trepidations, I venture to post on this thread!"
Why did I say that? Because I know based on experience that I have a weak will; I am tempted to participate in discussions that are against my better judgment. Discussions, that is, that go against my own principles. What sorts of discussions? Well, discussions that inevitably turn into charges and counter-charges of the form: since my beliefs are correct, and yours are not, I am more likely to be better.
Let me confess here: I am not better in any sense whatsoever than the majority of people. I don't know why this is so and I do not have a general theory that explains this fact. If someone else has such a theory, I will be very much interested to examine it. I do know this much: I will not become better by merely proving that other people's beliefs are inferior to mine in this or other respect. Since I have just admitted that I am not better than most people, I have no interest in defending my moral and theological beliefs and demonstrate that they are better in some sense or other than anyone else's beliefs. My interest in this topic, therefore, concerns primarily in questions of type (B).
(5)However, since much of the discussion thus far focused upon A-type issues, let me point out a few pitfalls of doing so in isolation from an examination of B-type questions.
(i) Suppose S represents a set of moral principles we deem correct, in some sense to be made clear. It is incumbant upon us to distinguish between:
(a1)Acts that are *in accordance with* the principles of S.
(a2)Acts that are *guided by* the principles in S.
It is possible for someone's actions to accord with the principles enumerated in S without believing them, being aware that they so act, or being guided by such beliefs.
Now reflect upon this situation:
Suppose that someone acts in accordance with the principles in S; suppose they are not guided by these principles; suppose you know both of these facts; suppose you believe that S represents the correct moral principles?
Do you think that such a person's actions are moral? Do you think such a person is morally decent? If you answer 'Yes' to both questions, here are a few other questions for you to reflect on: Do you think that there may be some logical dissonance or disconnect or some kind of logical inconsistency or tension in such a person's personality? or beliefs? or actions? or between their belief and actions? Or perhaps you should reflect on whether you think they are hypocritical in some way?
(ii) There is a distinction in philosophy between
(b1) Meta-ethics: the study of the meaning, nature, origin and foundation of moral terms, concepts, properties, and principles;
(b2) Moral Theory: The study of the correct moral principles and their justification;
(b3) Applied Ethics: The study of specific problems and their moral status (e.g., abortion, etc.,)
An author such as Mackie may believe each and every moral principle your favorite theology lists (e.g., the ten commandments); he may behave in accordance with and guided by such principles; and yet he thinks that THE SENTENCES THAT EXPRESS THESE PRINCIPLES ARE ALL SYSTEMATICALLY FALSE.
How can that be? Because Mackie has a certain meta-ethical view about the nature and character of normative sentences in general; he gives certain arguments that show why this is so; but he nonetheless thinks that it is perfectly consistent, correct, etc, to act in accordance with certain moral principles and moreover one should be even guided by them.
Now, I have selected Mackie as an example; not Utilitarianism or Kantianism or any other secular or materialist conception of meta-ethics and ethical theory. Why? Because I wish to make a point that cannot be misunderstood. Mackie's error-theory is a very radical example of a meta-ethical view; much more radical than a utilitarian or Kantian meta-ethics could ever be.
So, now, here is a challenge:
ANYONE, included Bill T, who thinks there is a logical problem here better come up with a proof. This proof must be a reductio ad absurdum of the conjunction of Mackie's meta-ethical position and his moral disposition.
I doubt that a valid reductio argument can be presented, but in fairness I will keep an attitude of "wait and see".
(6) I do not think there is a way of examining A-type questions in total isolation from B-type questions.
That is to say, if our goal is to take seriously the hint in Bill's original post. If our goal is something else; e.g., to prove that theists or atheists are prone to systematic acts of violence or that it is somehow a miracle that a theist or an atheist is morally decent, well then of course we may take up A-type questions alone and perpetually engage in such debates.
peter
Your last contains quite an assortment of unargued stipulations; while I don't suppose we will get any further, I hope you will forgive me for pointing them out.
In our inquiry into the processes of life, we have yet to find, even at the most microscopic level, anything other than complex material machinery. Perhaps you are referring to the origins of life, for which there are also many promising accounts, and certainly no reason to insist on anything supernatural.
I do.
But this is a non-sequitur. It assumes that non-"illusory" consciousness cannot be a deterministic process or property of suitable arrangements of matter, which is the very point we are disputing. You are simply begging the question. Furthermore, even if, arguendo, we grant that this is true - that your consciousness is an illusion (if that notion is even coherent) - that such a state of affairs might be unwelcome does nothing to prove that it isn't in fact the case.Leaving aside the difficult philosophical question of the underpinnings of "volition", this still does not rule out your being an extraordinarily complex decision-making nexus, one that responds both to its dynamic environment and its store of knowledge with exquisite sensitivity and subtlety. You also have done nothing to explain to us just how it is that you can tell, from within, that your conscious processes are indeed non-deterministic; you merely insist that it is so. Another begging of the question. You simply declare that a material system is incapable of this, again without argument.Likewise.
Again: your model may be the right one, though of course I suspect it isn't. But for you flatly to declare that the mind-body problem is already resolved in favor of dualism is premature, to put it mildly. One cannot substitute axioms for argument. But I've beaten this horse enough around here already, I fear. Last word to you, if you like.
Bill V: This was rather a large digression from the original topic, and I do apologize. The enormous question of materialism seems to be the bedrock against which we repeatedly turn our spades.
Your challenge:
ANYONE, included Bill T, who thinks there is a logical problem here better come up with a proof. This proof must be a reductio ad absurdum of the conjunction of Mackie's meta-ethical position and his moral disposition.
As Mackie squares his meta-ethics (there are no moral facts) with his sentiments (whatever they may be) by chucking out objective morality entirely, what is there to disprove within the confines of the Mackian worldview? So I don't understand how your challenge is relevant to whether or not a secularist philosophy can provide the foundation for objective morality.
Moreover, I think you may have gone in a direction no one here is disputing. A secularist can surely recognize the principles of objective morality, believe them to be true, and adhere to them. After all, those principles objectively exist. I don't think anyone here is arguing otherwise. But what is difficult for the secularist -- and I believe not possible -- is a justification for those principles. He can accept them as brute fact, but that is all. Whether or not that is so is, I think, the crux of the dispute.
Regards, Bill T.
But for you flatly to declare that the mind-body problem is already resolved in favor of dualism is premature, to put it mildly.
You are ignoring the origin of all of our disgressions. My claim is that the materialist, of whatever stripe, cannot logically square objective morality with his metaphysics. For him to claim that matter is all there is while also claiming the existence of objective morality, he must argue that matter has presently unknown properties that give rise to things (e.g., the human mind) that are non-material in operation (i.e., non-deterministic, at least in every appearance so far). He must posit a mode of existence that is radically different from that of the matter we presently know.
Therefore, he is a dualist in all but name.
However, if the materialist-cum-moral objectivist argues that what appears to be non-deterministic is in fact deterministic, and so there really are not two different modes of existence, then he undercuts any foundation he has for objective morality. You seem to agree with me on this, so I am not sure where the dispute between us lies in regard to my original claim made in this thread. None of the points I have made were formulated to persuade you to move from the materialist camp to the theist one. They were made to illustrate that the materialist has a tough row to hoe to provide a foundation for objective morality.
So we can conclude our discussion on that point of agreement.
Regards, Bill T.
Indeed, then, we can. I quite agree that many materialists seem to be bending over backwards to hang on to an objective basis for our moral intuitions beyond their adaptive value: a project that I see not only as unnecessary - we'll be fine without it - but also as having dim prospects.
Malcolm
It seems to me that none of us is able, given the present ratio of our ignorance to our knowledge, to provide an adequate account of objective morality. Nor can any of us provide an adequate account of consciousness. Nor can any of us provide an adequate account of matter. We can proffer a few ideas, and engage in critical discussion of the merits and liabilities of those ideas. We should strive to avoid bald assertions and straw men.
1) So if I understand your last post correctly, you no longer sympathize with the view of "those who do know the universe to be more than mere matter rightly identify materialist beliefs as lacking the wherewithal to resist the "bad stuff", as you call it. To the extent that materialists are morally decent, they are inconsistent in their beliefs."
For it seems to me that now you are willing to concede at least that "A secularist can surely recognize the principles of objective morality, believe them to be true, and adhere to them." I do not see why a materialist should not be given the same courtesy.
2)"But what is difficult for the secularist -- and I believe not possible -- is a justification for those principles. He can accept them as brute fact, but that is all. Whether or not that is so is, I think, the crux of the dispute."
Well, I suppose justification must come to an end at some point (to paraphrase Wittgenstein); so the only question is where, how, and at what cost.
Suppose the secularist meta-ethical theory posits certain moral principles as brute facts. How worst off is he compared to the theist who posits in his theology the existence of a perfect God as a brute fact? And we can go on here quite a while.
But, as I said before, we are steering further and further away from the main question. And I suppose that is OK, as far as it goes.
Ah! one more thing. The concept of *purpose* looms large in Bill T's argumentation.
(1)Here is one type of purposeful behavior:
(a) A *desire* to bring about a certain state of affairs S in the future: call this desire D.
(b) A *belief* that certain causal conditions C suffice to bring about S; call this belief B.
(c) B plus D causally produce a certain behavior that creates the causal conditions C.
(2) The materialist thinks that desires and beliefs are brain processes. So he thinks that (a) and (b) are materialistically reducible. (c) is certainly not a problem for a materialist, since it is simply a causal relationship between physical events.
So here is a simple (perhaps even simplistic) materialist reduction of one kind of purposeful behavior. I suppose Bill T and Bill V and PL and hosts of others would scream that no materialist produced a reduction of desires and beliefs to brain processes and such. And I agree in general ('PL' after all is me). But that is not an argument that they can't or will not. Brain science, AI etc., are working hard at it. They set the agenda. Anti-materialists must respond or find principled arguments why it won't work. We cannot simply rule them out come what may.
So if this is the discussion one wants, then so far as I can see these are some of the ground rules. Either everyone follows them and others or we all talk past each other.
peter
[1] I am not walking away from any previous statements. While a materialist may acknowledge the reality of objective moral principles, his materialist beliefs cannot justify them. For that reason his materialism lacks the wherewithal to resist the "bad stuff".
As for "secularist" and "materialist", it appeared to me that you were relating the two in terms of the latter being a species of the former. So that's how I used them in my response to you. I hope that clarifies this particular matter for you.
[2] God isn't a brute fact for the theist, or at least for the Christian. His existence answers the question of why there is objective morality instead of no morality at all. Moreover, His existence provides a logical account of how, as an agent of vertical causation in the universe, mental acts can have effect upon matter without being a part of the horizontal chain of physical causation.
[3] You are indeed right that purpose looms large in my meta-ethics. Morality is incoherent without it. But how does purpose arise if your (a) and (b) are nothing but the effects of matter? Purpose requires intention, a mental act thus a non-deterministic one. Yet matter operates only deterministically. So where is the room for intention in a materialistic (a) and (b)?
Finally, the burden really isn't upon the non-materialist to show that (a) and (b) cannot be materialist phenomena. The experience of our interior life tells us they are not, and our great knowledge of physics tells that there is nothing likely to be true of matter that would make that experience an illusion. The burden is upon the materialist to show the error of the common sense, born of what we all experience, that the mental is fundamentally different from the physical.
Regards, Bill T
You also claim that if beliefs and desires are materially realized, there's no room for intention. What if intention is instantiated by the causal relations between beliefs and desires? That's a standard move in cognitive science. Where does it go off the rails? A standard counter move is to claim that intention requires consciousness. While I'm sympathetic to that view, nobody, so far as I know, has constructed a very persuasive argument to that effect. Rather, it seems to depend on our untutored awareness of our own mental processes. Yet there are empirical demonstrations that in at least some cases where subjects believe they have acted with particular conscious intentions, they did nothing of the sort. So our untutored awareness of our own mental processes is not a reliable indicator of what's actually going on.
1) You did appear to abandon the charge that there is something logically inconsistent with a decent materialist's beliefs. There is a huge difference between charging someone with having logically inconsistent beliefs and claiming that some of their beliefs cannot be justified. I suspect that every system of beliefs suffers from the later; the question is whether and when this fact is epistemically significant.
2) Let us suppose for the sake of the argument that the materialist accepts certain fundamental moral propositions as brute facts. E.g., suppose they argue that the proposition that such-and-such moral properties are identical to certain physical properties is a brute fact. Thus, the existence of these moral properties is then a brute fact for such a materialist.
Now, what does that mean? Well, one thing it means is that, according to such a view, there is no answer to the question: "What is the nature of such-and-such moral properties?" except to say: These properties are identical to such and such physical properties. That is it.
Now, the theist accepts the following proposition: A perfect God exists. Now, what would the theist say if asked: What caused God to exist? I suppose the theist would say: Nothing can cause God to exist because (Aristotle) God is the first cause. But isn't the theist now taking the fact that God is the first cause and, hence, cannot be caused to exist as as "brute fact".
So it appears that your statement:
"God isn't a brute fact for the theist..." because, you argue "His existence answers the question of why there is objective morality instead of no morality at all."
has things backwards. The theist indeed will explain the existence of objective morality in terms of the existence of God. So this makes objective morality for the theist not a brute fact because it is explained lets say in terms of the existence of God. But, now, when it comes to explaining the fact that God exists, the theist I suspect will not have an answer to give. He will simply say that I accept that God exists on faith; i.e., as a brute fact. What else could the theist say?
3) I do not think that you fully understood what I have proposed about the possible reduction of purposeful behavior. So let us take an example.
Suppose I open the refrigerator door for the purpose of taking out milk. This is a purposeful action.
So how would it work according to my proposal.
(i) I have a desire that the state of affairs *milk-is-out-of-the-refrigerator* obtain in the near future.
(ii)I believe that opening the refrigerator door will enable me to retrieve the milk carton (and I also believe there is no other way for me to retrieve the milk carton).
(iii) The desire in (i)and the belief in (ii) cause me to behave in a manner that opens the refrigerator door.
My opening of the refrigerator door was a purposeful behavior. I have explained it in terms of desires, beliefs, and causal relationship between these and a piece of behavior. What else do you find missing here that you call "purpose"?
Now, let me repeat what I have said previously. I think this to be a simple/simplistic account. But if you cannot refute this account without begging the question, I ask, how can you expect to respond to much more sophisticated reduction proposals by much more sophisticated materialists.
You ask "But how does purpose arise if your (a) and (b) are nothing but the effects of matter?"
But the simple account I have offered is intended to be a full account of this kind of purposeful behavior; there is nothing left "to arise".
You might argue: "Purpose requires intention, a mental act thus a non-deterministic one. Yet matter operates only deterministically."
Two points. First, I have already given in my example a full account of what causes the opening-of-the-refrigerator behavior. The materialist will ask you: What intention? The desire and belief cited in this account suffice as the cause of this behavior. There is no further something or other Bill T calls "intention" that is left unaccounted for. If you, Bill T, think there is, then you must think that the desires plus beliefs cited do not suffice as the cause of the behavior. But, if you Bill T claim that, then it is your burden to show us that something essential is missing from the explanation given. What could that be?
Second, matter does not operate "only deterministically" if by "deterministic" one means that the laws and initial conditions determine a unique outcome. The fundamental laws of quantum mechanics are probabilistic. Thus laws and initial conditions do not determine a unique outcome but a range of outcomes with a variety of probability assignments. What if the world (with all due respect to Einstein) is probabilistic all the way down?
4)I fail to understand the argument in your last paragraph. For instance, how does the "experience of our interior life" *tell* us that desires and beliefs are not materialistically reducible? Which part of your experience of your inner life announces "I am materialistically irreducible because of such-and-such"?
And, finally, you say: "The burden is upon the materialist to show the error of the common sense, born of what we all experience, that the mental is fundamentally different from the physical."
But I beg to differ! Whose common sense are you talking about here? I think current common sense is actually on the side of the materialist, judging by what the majority of people would say if asked about this question. But, then, again if common sense is determined by the view of the majority, then I suppose we would have to prove that Santa Clause does not exist, if the majority would have believed in his existence.
But, it is fairly easy to show that common sense is prone to errors. Common sense told our ancestors that the earth is flat; that the sky is a coating around the earth; that the sun moves; etc. Common sense was proven wrong many a times; So why not now? Why not about the mental? If that is all you got against the materialist, you already lost the battle.
5) Two inconsistent metaphysical theories can entail some of the same consequences.
It is possible (and I do not have a proof of this) that a materialist metaphysics and a theist metaphysics entail exactly the same moral code. If this is at all possible, then the burden of proof is divided equally:
you need to prove that in the case of a materialist metaphysics this cannot be the case;
and the materialist metaphysician's burden is to keep showing that this possibility is still alive.
peter
You make some excellent distinctions that need to be observed. You pose this question: Suppose that someone acts in accordance with the principles in S; suppose they are not guided by these principles; suppose you know both of these facts; suppose you believe that S represents the correct moral principles. Do you think that such a person's actions are moral? Do you think such a person is morally decent?
I am inclined to say yes to both questions, but there is a wrinkle if you remember your Kant. He distinguishes between acting from duty and acting in accordance with duty. Suppose I do my duty for prudential reasons but not because it is my duty. (A shopkeeper does not cheat his customers, but not because he ought not cheat them, but because cheating them would be bad for business once the cheating was detected.) Kant would say that in that case the action lacks moral worth.
But you are getting at something different. Apart from the Kantian considerations, I think we agree that a given theist can be just as moral as a given atheist: they can accept the same code and adhere in the same measure to the same code even though they differ wildly in their meta-ethics. The theist might be a divine command theorist while the atheist might be an 'error theorist' along the lines of Mackie's theory.
So it is something of a cheapshot when some theists accuse atheists of being immoral because they don't believe in God.
But the issue is more complicated. We all, theists and atheists alike, agree that slavery is a grave moral evil. It is evil because there is a sense in which we are all equal as persons despite significant empirical differences between individuals and races. But what grounds this equality? The theist has a ready answer: we are all made in the image and likeness of God. The atheist must seek a different ground, and it is not clear that he can find one that is satisfactory. Suppose we are just complex physical systems. A strong individual may have various reasons for not enslaving a weak individual, but what moral reason could he have? The mere fact that he had internalized a Christian code before he became an atheist would not be a good moral reason. Nor would any merely prudential considerations.
There are answers that could be given, but I suspect they will all involve very dubious constructs such as merely imagined deliberations behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance.
My aversion to slavery, whatever its ultimate source, arises from a sense that the slave and I are alike, and the fact that I can mirror in my own imagination the pain and humiliation my enslavement of him would cause. I think all psychologically normal humans are capable of this sort of putting-oneself-in-the-other's-place (indeed, new research has revealed specific brain structures, called "mirror neurons", that appear to mediate this effect), and the issue then becomes a cultural question about to whom this courtesy - of being included in the circle of empathy - is granted. The question then might be "well, fine, I can imagine what it's like for him, but why should I care?"
The answer to that is, I think, that once we have entered this relationship, the caring is built right in as a neurobiological feature - along with the other attractions and aversions we experience as part of our nature, such as sexual attractions, aversions to feces and corpses, etc.
Obviously, morality takes many complex and subtle forms, and is subject to continuous cultural revisions and variations. But I think it rests always upon this inbuilt capacity for empathy, which itself has arisen due to its immense adaptive value in the functioning of human groups. That it can be suppressed for those not in the group has obvious adaptive value as well, and I would say that the history of morality and its cultural variations is that of a shifting tension as regards the boundaries of this circle of empathy.
Let me pause for a second in my zeal and profess that I am not a materialist; never was. My principal interest in this thread, as I am sure Bill V knows, is not to defend materialism. My interests are as follows:
1) To show that B-type questions (see one of my earlier posts above), questions about whether there is a general theory of systematic violence (GTV), are the type of questions that need to be addressed in order to deal with the issues raised in this thread.
2) To argue that it is very unlikely that there is a viable GTV because it is highly unlikely that we can identify any lawlike connection between beliefs and systematic violence prone behavior.
3) To conclude from (2) that neither the atheist argument that religion or religious beliefs are the principal causes of immoral behavior nor the contrary argument that atheist beliefs are the principal causes of such behavior are true.
4) To argue that the above offers sufficient evidence to pursue a line of inquiry whereby one shows that there can be significant common ground between the theist's and atheist's conception of morality despite their radically divergent metaphysics. Certainly much more than commonly supposed and as exemplified by some of the valuable exchanges on this thread.
5) To argue against any form of *belief-elitism*; this is a second-order attitude whereby one thinks that their own beliefs are superior than those held by others; that their own beliefs somehow guarantee or are more likely to lead to moral behavior whereas beliefs of others are less likely; that they are better moral agents because of the beliefs they hold than others; that the beliefs they hold are sanctioned by the standard bearer of morality, whether that be God, an ideal rational observer, or whatever; and so on.
6) Rejecting a second-order attitude of belief-elitism does not mean that anything goes; that all belief systems are equal. One ought to be a belief-elitist with respect to certain ideologies such as Nazism, Racism, Color-supremecism, and other isms of such sorts. But here is the pivotal philosophical epicenter of this position:
Within the context of rejecting the second-order attitude of belief-elitism in general, how can I consistently recommend it with respect to some belief-systems? How am I going to distinguish those with respect to which belief-elitism is unjustified and those with respect to which the belief-elitist attitude is not merely justified; it is obligatory?
That, my friends, is the question I wish to pursue here with you, invite all of you to pursue with me, and ask your help and assistance to untangle.
peter
One will find that in many cases, although not all, horrendous behavior is the culmination of a certain elitist type reasoning that goes something like this:
Second order belief: My first-order beliefs are morally superior and sanctioned by the moral standard bearer (Whatever that may be);
First order belief: I believe that this group of people must be exterminated; subjugated, enslaved, expelled, or whatever.
Second-order belief: Since my first order beliefs are morally sanctioned and one of my first order beliefs is the above, it follows that my action of exterminating, subjugating, etc, this group is morally sanctioned.
peter
"Emergence" is a tricky word, with two meanings, and arguments like this often trade on the ambiguity. One possibility could be that "purposeful processes" "emerge" in the same way that a Baker's Dozen "emerges" from putting 13 fresh bread rolls in a box. In other words, nothing has actually emerged at all in an objective, ontological sense. It's just that we subjectively mark certain configurations of matter as "special" in some way, and we give them certain labels. If this is what is meant, then "purposefulness" is simply a label we ascribe to processes that give us a certain impression when we see them, but which are in fact no different from other blind processes in any fundamental way.
If this is what is meant by "purposeful processes", then Bill T would be correct that we can have no knowledge of purpose on which an objective basis of morality could be based, since "purpose" would be a subjective construction, not objective knowledge of the world.
On the other hand, perhaps by "emerges", you mean that the laws of the universe are set up such that, when certain configurations of material appear, real irreducible purpose actually pops into existence - something genuinely, ontologically distinct from that matter, who's properties and actions are genuinely not derived from the matter that triggered its coming into existence. And perhaps we are able to infer the existence of that purpose by observing processes that involve it.
In this case, I'd agree that we can have knowledge of purpose (though whether objective morality could have a basis in this is a matter for further debate). However, I would deny that the universe described by such a scenario is compatible with philosophical materialism, as it contains real things, such as purpose, that aren't reducible to matter, even if certain configurations of matter trigger their coming into existence.
Bill T:
I don't think I'd go so far as to say that a morally decent materialist is necessarily being inconsistent. I don't think materialism dictates that you have to be bad, but rather it is devoid of any objective standard of right and wrong. Thus, if the materialist has a disposition that makes them feel like acting in ways we'd consider decent, then there's nothing about acting that way which contradicts their materialism, in and of itself. Of course, if a materialist is the worst monster in the history of the world, there's nothing about acting that way which contradicts their materialism either.
However, I think that most materialists do act inconsistently with their materialism, and that the most consistent ones are probably the least decent. That's because I think most decent materialists are probably carrying around various vestiges of Christianity, or political correctness, or what have you, that they take to be objectively binding on their behavior. For instance, I think that most materialists who treat women well are probably doing it based on some vague idea of universal human dignity, or the virtue of chivalry, or women's rights, or what have you - all things that don't exist if their stated philosophy is correct. The womanizing jerk who carries no such pretensions is being more consistent.
Also, a materialist is speaking inconsistently with their philosophy whenever they pass moral judgment on someone else, or claim that you should or should not act in a certain way for any reason besides the materialist personally wanting you to. Whenever Hitchens, or someone like him, condemns Muslims for subjugating women because it violates their rights (or whatever), it makes about as much sense as a self-proclaimed Christian condemning the eating of pork "because Allah forbids it". Of course, then again, purposefully speaking inconsistently with your own beliefs (ie lying) in order to get something you want isn't itself inconsistent with materialism.
When a materialist like Hitchens criticizes Islamic regimes for oppressing women, he does so because according to his moral beliefs - the voice of his conscience - oppressing women is wrong. When a Christian theist makes the same criticism, he also does so because according to his moral beliefs - the voice of his conscience - oppressing women is wrong. So both are quite consistent as far as that goes. What the Christian also brings are three additional beliefs, not shared by the materialist:
1) That the voice of my conscience should only be trusted if it is speaking for God;
2) That God exists;
3) That my conscience is indeed speaking for Him.
But both parties are acting quite consistently with their beliefs.
Whenever these "can atheists be as moral as believers" debates come up, the moral metric in question typically revolves around the big criminal ones: murder, burglary, rape, etc.
How come the metric in question isn't based on, say, the likelihood of engaging in premarital sex? Most certainly the atheist would lose on that one. "That's not a fair comparison" you say, "because that's a Christian moral, and atheists don't agree that premarital sex is immoral in the first place!"
But that's exactly the point. That moral isn't used in the comparison because atheists in general don't grant its legitimacy in the first place. But what about rape? Why, in principle, is it any different? I say it's not. There's no officially binding atheist doctrine according to which premarital sex is okay and rape is bad - rape is just an area where they don't seem to have departed from the cultural consensus at this point in time.
See, when we ask "Can an atheist be as moral as a Christian?" what we're really asking is something like "Can an atheist avoid those really bad things, that most everyone including atheists still generally agrees are bad, as well as a Christian?" But "still agrees" is the rub. In a world where most atheists thought that rape was okay, a rapist atheist could be as "moral" as a Christian by definition implicit in that question.
And how about those "borderline" morals - the ones most people assent to, but that probably won't get you arrested? For some perspective, here's Dawkins promoting cheating on your spouse (and, comically, declaring jealousy over a cheating spouse to be morally wrong). And I think most of us know Bertrand Russel's opinions on that matter. The "who's more moral" question is misguided, because there's no apples-to-apples comparison to be made. Presumably when Dawkins says that atheists are more moral than theists, he's not counting adultery.
Fifty years from now, it's safe to say, Christian teaching will still be that premarital sex is wrong, much as it was fifty years ago. Where will average atheist opinion have shifted on issues like cheating and pedophilia? Does anybody want to place bets?
I don't think it's necessary to insist that what emerges is a new sort of substance. But it's also not just a label for processes that "give us a certain impression." Lot's of things might give us a false impression of purpose (in the sense relevant to agency); for example, various structures and processes that have arisen through natural selection. The kind of purpose relevant to agency, on the other hand, might require nothing more than that beliefs and desires are causally related in such a way that they provide regulatory feedback for "purposeful behaviors." In that scenario, emergence doesn't mark anything new so far as ontology is concerned. But regulated behavior would still be emergent in the sense that the the systems, but not their components, manifest purposeful behavior.
For the atheist, Christian teaching is simply another sort of cultural consensus, and likewise one that is also, evidently, subject to cultural revision (heretics are no longer tortured by Christian churches, for example; for all I know, in another 50 years they will be again).
The only difference, as I mentioned above, is an additional set of beliefs regarding the source of one's moral intuitions. To the atheist, the moral opinions of the Christian are no more rooted in anything permanent or metaphysically objective than his own (leaving aside secular Platonism, as Peter reminds us); all that is different is the Christian's belief that they are.
But the Christian can offer no demonstration that these additional beliefs are in fact true; he just believes that they are, that's all. So we are left with a stack of beliefs in both cases, with the Christian's beliefs simply stacked a bit higher.
You are obscuring the distinction between belief and objective reality. When I, as a theist, say that it is wrong for you to oppress women, I'm saying that it's wrong because it's objectively, factually wrong to oppress women, not because my conscience tells me that it is. The fact that my conscience tells me something, by itself, implies no obligation on your part. What does my conscience have to do with you? I believe that my conscience is delivering to me the objective truth, but it's that objective truth that is binding on you, not the fact that my conscience delivers it to me.
I'm not contradicting my philosophy when I say that it's wrong for someone else to oppress women, because I believe that my conscience is ascertaining the objective truth when it tells me that. If, as Hitchens, I had a philosophy according to which my conscience isn't delivering to me objective moral facts that are binding on others, then I would be speaking contrary to my philosophy when I made moral claims on others.
Perhaps you will try to defend Hitchens (and others) by saying that objective moral talk is "valid" as a convention of language or somesuch. That "Action A is wrong" is a valid shorthand for "My conscience gives me the subjective negative impression of action A" or something like that. Well, it's also a convention that stating something objectively when you actually believe it to be only a subjective impression is considered to be intellectual dishonesty.
But, beyond that, it would be highly ironic for Hitchens, or any New Atheist, to defend that kind of talk. Aren't these the same people who extoll the glories of rationalism, who enjoin us to embrace objectivity and to throw away subjectivity? And yet on the subject of morality, they would have us engage in mushy, confused speech and thought, blurring the line between objective fact and subjective impression? We should obscure scientific fact to feed our subjectivist fantasies? This standard would invalidate any claim they make against religious talk and religious morality, regardless of the truth or falsehood of religion.
I do agree that some materialists apparently wish to cling to some means of claiming an objective grounding for our moral intuitions; usually this takes the form of citing their adaptive value - which is indeed objective, but not, I think, moral in any objective sense. I have chided them often for refusing to "grasp the nettle".
But what I disagree with you about is your claim that in the absence of the belief that our moral inclinations are rooted in a supernatural authority, that we are somehow forbidden to follow them, or inconsistent in doing so. When I say that I think it is wrong to oppress women, I mean that it is wrong according to my conscience, and as a result I am, following its guidance, going to work toward a world in which such oppression no longer occurs.
Your notion, however, that in order for me to follow the guidelines of conscience, I require a further belief in their supernatural underpinnings, is simply one that I do not share. Furthermore, a nontheist will of course suspect that your metabeliefs about such supernatural underpinnings are false, and that they are only an illusion, a mechanism by which your confidence in your moral urges defends itself. That we should need such additional beliefs in order to act upon our moral dispositions is, I think, reminiscent of the magic feather that Dumbo needed in order to fly.
We certainly don't imagine, when declaring a landscape to be beautiful, that it is only beautiful if God has declared it to be so. We have no qualms about insisting, without referring to metaphysical absolutes, that our neighbors maintain their properties in such a way as to conform with our standards of aesthetic acceptability, and I see therefore no inconsistency in Hitchens desiring likewise that our global neighbors conduct themselves in conformance with our standards of moral acceptability.
In other words, your telling anyone that it is "objectively, factually wrong", say, to oppress women does not in itself make it so; that is just your belief. Furthermore, there are Muslims, for example, for whom it is objectively, factually right to oppress women, for precisely the same sort of theistic reasons that you profess, and if you insist on the supernatural objectivity of morals, then one of you is certainly wrong. To what authority, then, shall we appeal to resolve the dispute in such a way as to satisfy a neutral observer?
Finally, while some argue that there is a danger in not having an objective foundation for morality, the nontheist can argue that it is just as frightening to confront an unshakeable belief that one's own moral viewpoint - for example, one that calls for flying a plane into an office building, stoning adulteresses to death, or burning heretics at the stake - is the explicit will of God. It seems most awfully arrogant, from the outside, to hear someone insist: "There IS a God, and I know just what He wants."
Just a minute ago, Malcolm was putting this forward as an example of real purpose. Oy!
As you've written it, this appears to be circular. You've just defined purpose in terms of that which provides feedback for "purposeful behaviors" (and purposeful behaviors would be behaviors full of purpose, I presume). The use of the word "for" also presumes purpose.
But what, objectively, would be the in-principle difference between a genuinely purposeful system, and one that gave only a false impression of purpose, such that said system would be purposeful regardless of whether or not anybody else thought of it as purposeful?
Well, I still am. That's as real as it gets. Of course there is consciously represented purpose also, which is an interesting subspecies, but they're all still purpose. A bird's wing is "for" flying in any meaningful sense of the word, it seems to me.
I hoped the scare quotes would preclude worries about circularity. So try this substitute: The kind of purpose relevant to agency, on the other hand, might require nothing more than that beliefs and desires are causally related in such a way that they provide regulatory feedback in virtue of which behaviors tend to bring about the state of affairs which is the object of desire. Such behaviors we might call "purposeful".
Presumably, the essential difference between such a system and a system in which only natural selection operates (and creates the impression of purposeful designs) is that beliefs and desires play an essential role in purposeful agency, but are not essential to the productions of natural selection. In short, no purposeful agency in the absence of beliefs and desires. (Please understand that I'm not endorsing any particular view about purposeful agency; just trying to avoid bald assertions and straw men.)
I hope with all the posts in between yours and my response to it below, this won't be too difficult to follow.
[1] You did appear to abandon the charge that there is something logically inconsistent with a decent materialist's beliefs.
I didn’t. You’re picking nits.
[2] But isn't the theist now taking the fact that God is the first cause and, hence, cannot be caused to exist as a "brute fact".
We can agree that the buck stops somewhere. If you are calling what the buck stops on a brute fact, in that sense God would be. However, that vitiates the usefulness of the term. There is a difference between: (a) A fact for which no cause can be known, and (b) a fact for which we no cause is possible. The former is a brute fact; the latter isn’t.
My point is that there is a qualitative difference between a materialist claiming that a moral fact – e.g., murder is evil – is a brute fact, and theist countering that the moral fact has an explanation in God’s existence. The materialist stops the buck at the moral fact on epistemological grounds, whereas the theist stops the buck at God on metaphysical grounds. (And that is what the materialist must be doing if he claims a moral fact as a brute fact, lest he has an explanation for how that fact arises from the existence of matter.)
[W]hen it comes to explaining the fact that God exists, the theist I suspect will not have an answer to give. He will simply say that I accept that God exists on faith; i.e., as a brute fact. What else could the theist say?
What I said above. It is the difference between an epistemological dead end and a metaphysical foundation. Besides, what does faith have to do with it, Peter? Surely you do not dispute that one can determine through reason that God exists. You may not agree with that reasoning, but forming a belief in God does not require faith. Banishing any doubt as to the truth of that belief requires faith, but not the belief itself.
[3] I do not think that you fully understood what I have proposed about the possible reduction of purposeful behavior.
Your example was fine as a demonstration of purpose. You ran aground when you subsequently claimed that (a) and (b) of your example can be reduced to the effects of matter. At that point purpose vanishes, because (a) and (b) can be nothing more than deterministic result of a chain of physical causes and effects. As I said, purpose requires intention. Now let be clear what I mean by intention: It is the mental act of primary cause. No prior physical or mental state determines that it must occur.
This is not true of matter. All of its effects are determined by its prior states. The indeterminacy of quantum mechanics, as you suggested, offers no escape from the determinism that imprisons the materialist. The probability of quantum mechanics is clearly and tightly bounded and does not produce any unexpected results. Indeed, beyond the quantum scale, matter is utterly deterministic in its causes and effects, as would be the case with (a) and (b) of your example. And even if quantum indeterminacy had observable effects at least up to the biological scale, that indeterminacy or probability is not synonymous with liberty, which the hallmark of intention.
[4] [I]t is fairly easy to show that common sense is prone to errors. Common sense told our ancestors that the earth is flat; that the sky is a coating around the earth; that the sun moves; etc. Common sense was proven wrong many a times; So why not now? Why not about the mental? If that is all you got against the materialist, you already lost the battle.
Not hardly, Peter, as should be evident from what I have written so far. My point about common sense is that the materialist is not relieved from the burden of making his case by putting it to the theist to demonstrate that there is no possible way in which consciousness is purely an effect of matter. If it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, common sense says it’s a duck. The one who says otherwise has the burden of showing that it’s not.
Similarly with consciousness. We do not experience consciousness as a physical process. How do we know this? Because we do experience physical processes and consciousness is distinctly different. The materialist can say that a genuine difference is experienced, but consciousness is still an effect of matter, just not an effect we have yet discovered. Alternatively, the materialist could say the difference is not genuine, because we are not capable of recognizing the deterministic effects of matter that produce consciousness. But these are not explanations; they are speculations begging the question against the non-materialist.
[5] Two inconsistent metaphysical theories can entail some of the same consequences.
Sure.
It is possible (and I do not have a proof of this) that a materialist metaphysics and a theist metaphysics entail exactly the same moral code.
Not if materialism means materialism. Matter is deterministic in its operation, therefore, cannot give rise to free will. Morality is meaningless sans free will. For there to be free will, there must be a mode existence in the universe more than deterministic matter. This must be a mode capable of primary causation free of the chain of physical cause and effect. Once the materialist goes down that path, he is not a materialist. That doesn’t make him a theist, but his materialism goes out the window.
I persuaded of this, Peter, because that is what this ex-materialist had to do to account for the reality of objective morality.
Regards, Bill T
You've claimed several times that matter operates deterministically. It seems that "our great knowledge of physics" indicates otherwise.
Matter clearly operates deterministically at the biological scale. As for the indeterminacy of matter at the quantum scale, it remains at that scale and has no effect beyond it. (A philosophical explanation for this is that matter lacks form at that point, and we do need a philosophical explanation because the measurements needed for a scientific one are not possible.) Even if it did, such indeterminacy does not translate into the liberty required for free will, as the remarkable precision of quantum mechanics shows time and again.
Regards, Bill T
Peter, for the record, when I take the time for a discussion, I don't care to argue for the sake of argument. Instead I like to find out what others (truly) think when they say novel, provocative, or interesting things. I learn a thing or two that way, and maybe I have returned the favor in what I had to say.
So, there was little point to our argument over the efficacy of materialism as a foundation for objective morality, if you are not a materialist and had no interest in defending materialism.
Regards, Bill T
"Peter, for the record, when I take the time for a discussion, I don't care to argue for the sake of argument. Instead I like to find out what others (truly) think when they say novel, provocative, or interesting things. I learn a thing or two that way, and maybe I have returned the favor in what I had to say."
Interesting!
Obviously we do not share the same philosophical temperament. I see philosophical discussion as primarily exploring the meaning, consequences, and boundaries of various positions on interesting questions, whether or not my partners in a conversation "truly" believe them or not. While I do have some philosophical beliefs, I find clinging to them a sign of my own weakness and generally do not feel comfortable with them. I feel most happy when I participate in a philosophical conversation that attempts to unveil deeper layers of a question and I can care less whether I or anyone else "truly" believes the starting, middle or end points. That is when I learn most.
So, sorry to have disappointed you. To my defense, I can only say that in the first post in this thread I have stated what I consider to be the interesting questions raised by Bill. Defending materialism was a side matter and I made it fairly clear there. Perhaps, it is very important to you; but so far as I am concerned there are much more significant issues lurking here that I for one would like to focus on. Unfortunately, it appears I am in the minority on this matter, once again.
peter
I was annoyed, not disappointed. To justify disappointment you would have had to fail to meet a standard you were obliged to do so, which you weren’t. It was not your duty to suit my temperament in a conversation. And, yes, we do have different temperaments. As a machinist by trade, I am enamored with ideas when I can put them to work. For them to work, they have to be true. Once I find that they are, I have no problem “clinging” to them as knowledge or belief. Indeed, I then want to discover the foundation for them so that I can strengthen my confidence in them. That is why I dig deeper.
Regards, Bill T
(1) Here is a lengthy quotation of your argument:
“We all, theists and atheists alike, agree that slavery is a grave moral evil. It is evil because there is a sense in which we are all equal as persons despite significant empirical differences between individuals and races. But what grounds this equality? The theist has a ready answer: we are all made in the image and likeness of God. The atheist must seek a different ground, and it is not clear that he can find one that is satisfactory. Suppose we are just complex physical systems. A strong individual may have various reasons for not enslaving a weak individual, but what moral reason could he have? The mere fact that he had internalized a Christian code before he became an atheist would not be a good moral reason. Nor would any merely prudential considerations.”
(2) You seem to argue here that while the theist and the atheist can both believe that slavery is wrong, only the former can offer “satisfactory” grounds or justification for believing such a proposition. You grant that the atheist “may have various reasons” for rejecting slavery, but such reasons cannot be “moral reasons.” Prudential reasons will not do and “the mere fact that [the atheist] internalized a Christian code before he became an atheist” will not do either because by becoming an atheist he thereby rejected the very moral justification or grounding that such a “Christian code” requires.
(3) So your argument seems to be as follows:
(a) In order for certain reasons to “satisfactorily” ground or justify a moral belief such as ‘slavery is wrong’ these reasons must be moral in character. Call these constraints “Moral Constraints” on justifying reasons, or MC;
(b) The theist’s reasons to believe that slavery is wrong satisfy MC;
(c) The atheist reasons to believe that slavery is wrong cannot satisfy MC;
Therefore,
(d) The theist and atheist are not on a par with respect to their justification of their respective beliefs that slavery is wrong.
Is this argument sound? Instead of making the usual move and attempting to object to premise (c), I will argue that this argument is not sound by objecting to (b).
(4) I will present here your argument on behalf of the theist that aims to prove the truth of premise (b):
(A) The Theist’s Argument:
(Ai) Slavery is wrong.
(Aii) Slavery is wrong *because* “there is a sense in which we are all equal as persons despite significant empirical differences between individuals and races.”
(Aiii) The proposition ‘we are all equal as persons despite significant empirical differences between individuals and races’ is justified by the truth of the proposition “we are all made in the image and likeness of God.”
Does (Ai)-(Aiii) prove that premise (b) is true? I don’t think so. I think that both (Aii) and (Aiii) fail to satisfy MC. If I can show that, then I have shown that premise (b) is false and therefore your argument is not sound.
(5) (Aii) fails to satisfy MC:
(5.1) Clearly, the term ‘because’ in (Aii) is not intended to signify a causal relationship. Rather, it is intended to offer a *reason* that slavery is wrong. The reason given in (Aii) is the fact that “we are all equal as persons despite significant empirical differences between individuals and races.”
(5.2) So the intuition here is this. Slavery is the practice of owning certain individuals or groups. This practice, therefore, sanctions the differential treatment of certain individuals and groups compared to the treatment of other individuals or groups based upon certain “empirical differences.” But, despite the fact that there are empirical differences between individuals and groups, all human persons are equal. Therefore, slavery is wrong.
(5.3) Assuming that (5.2) accurately captures the reason for thinking that slavery is wrong, does this reason satisfies MC? That is, is this a moral reason? By itself the reason given here does not satisfy MC, since it is not a moral reason. For fortunately it does not follow that we *ought* to treat all human persons equally merely based on the fact that despite empirical differences they are all equal as persons. I said that this is fortunate because then we would have to kill women and children in a war simply on the grounds that we kill men in uniforms, since they are all equal as persons despite the empirical difference that the later are combatants whereas the former are not. Other unacceptable consequences flow from a principle such as the one here entertained. So (Aii) does not satisfy MC and in fact it is a good thing that it does not. Suppose that there is some way of refining (Aii) so that it does satisfy MC without yielding unacceptable consequences. Let (Aii)* be a suitable revision of (Aii) that is not vulnerable to the counterexamples cited above. Suppose we say something neutral such as the following:
(Aii)* We are *morally* all equal as persons despite significant empirical differences between individuals and races.
(6) (Aiii) fails to satisfy MC.
(6.1) How does (Aiii) supposed to ground or justify (Aii)*? Well, the intuition again is that since all human persons are made in the image and likeness of God, they are all *morally* equal, etc. So the reason given to justify the moral equality of all human persons is the FACT that all such persons are made in a certain likeness and image.
(6.2) But, why should one think that such a reason satisfies MC? That is, how is this reason supposed to be a moral reason? Surely, the mere fact that we are all made in a certain image or likeness has no moral significance unless of course we also add the proposition that anyone made in such and such an image *ought* to be treated equally. But, why should anyone think that this later proposition is true? Perhaps, one might argue that God made us in his image or likeness because God wants us to treat all creatures made in his image or likeness equally. But there are several problems with this view. First, such a reason will satisfy MC only if we add that we *ought* to do what God desires. Second, what evidence is there that God created human persons in his image in order for us to treat each other equally? Third, there is quite a lot of Biblical evidence that directly contradicts such a proposition.
(6.3) Therefore, (Aiii) as it stands fails to satisfy MC. And I do not think that there is a way of fixing it that would satisfy MC and also offer a reasonable justification or grounding for (Aii)*.
(7) Therefore, (b) is false.
peter
My last post is directed to Bill V's argument.
peter
I'm thinking about your objections. A new thread may be in order. More later.
That is OK. I am sick anyway; my brain is fried. I can't think straight.
peter
2. Disallowing comments from a particular person, or deleting an offensive, off-topic, or otherwise substandard comment, has nothing to do with censorship. People who think otherwise confuse censorship with lack of sponsorship. I am under an obligation not to interfere with anyone's exercise of legitimate free speech rights. But I am not under any obligation to aid and abet anyone's exercise of free speech rights, legitimate or illegitimate.
3. The Comments area is not an open forum for anyone to say anything about any topic. As the name implies, it is primarily for commenting on the author(s)' posts. But to comment on them, one must have read them. And if I have spent three hours on a post, a reader will not understand it in thirty seconds. Secondarily, the Comments area is to facilitate civil discussion between and among commenters as long as the discussion remains on-topic.
4. Some undesirables: The skimmers, those who cannot read but only read-in. The sophists who, abusing argument, argue for the sake of argument. The ideologues, those who are out for power, not truth. The uncivil. The illogical. The politically correct. Worst of all, perhaps, are those who exemplify the anti-Socratic property: those who think they know what they don't know. If Socrates was famous for his learned ignorance, these types are marked by their ignorant unlearnededness.