Many of us internalized the ethical norms that guide our lives via our childhood religious training. We were taught the Ten Commandments, for example. This early training, far from being the child abuse that A. C. Grayling and other militant atheists think it is, had a very positive effect on us in forming our consciences and making of us the basically decent human beings we are. I am not saying that moral formation is possible only within a religion; I am saying that some religions do an excellent job of transmitting and inculcating life-guiding and life-enhancing ethical standards. (By the way, I use 'ethical' and 'moral' interchangeably, as I explain here.)
A. C. Grayling, however, would disagree totally with what I have just written. Anent the inculcation of morality, he thinks "religion is part of the problem, not the solution." Religion has no positive role to play in the inculcation of moral behavior. He continues few lines farther down:
Religion is worse than an irrelevance as regards the inculcation of morality, for the following reasons: in an individualistic society, where personal wealth is the chief if not the sole measure of achievement, a morality that enjoins you to give your all to the poor, that says it is easier for a camel to go through a needle's eye than for the rich to enter heaven, and preaches selflessness towards one's neighbour and complete obedience to a deity — such a morality, wholly opposed to the norms and practices not just accepted but extolled in our society has little to offer. Most people ignore the contrast between such views and the universal instruction to go forth and multiply one's income and possessions; and obey the latter.
And when religious fundamentalists add a preparedness to incarcerate women, mutilate genitals, amputate hands, murder, bomb, and terrorise — all in the name of faith — then religious morality becomes not just irrelevant but dangerous. With such examples and contrasts, it has less than nothing to offer proper moral debate. (Life, Sex, and Ideas: The Good Life Without God, Oxford UP, 2003, p. 8)
Grayling's First Argument
The argument in Grayling's first paragraph can be fairly represented as follows:
1. In the societies of the West, "wealth is the chief if not the sole measure of achievement."
2. Religion preaches against the accumulation of wealth for its own sake.
Therefore
3. In the societies of the West, "Religion is worse than an irrelevance as regards the inculcation of morality . . . ."
The first premise is true, and so is the second if the religion in question is Christianity, which is quite obviously what Grayling has in mind. The conclusion, however, does not follow from the premises. Indeed,it is hard to see how the conclusion is so much as relevant to the premises. From two unexceptionable facts, Grayling leaps to the conclusion that religion is useless for the promotion of moral behavior. Now that is a non sequitur of mind-numbing propertions. It is like arguing:
4. In the Islamic world, intolerance is rampant.
5. Classical iberalism preaches against intolerance.
Therefore
6. In the Islamic world, classical liberalism with its enlightenment values is worse than an irrelevance for the promotion of moral behavior.
The two arguments have the same form, so they are either both valid or both invalid. Obviously, they are both invalid. Surely Grayling, a liberal, would reject the parody argument as invalid. So if he can for a moment rein in his hatred of religion he should be able to see that the original argument is also invalid.
The conclusions of both arguments are plainly false. What the Islamic world needs is precisely a good dose of classical liberalism with its Enlightenment values. The fact that these values go against the grain of the accepted norms in these benighted societies is obviously no argument against Enlightenment values! To think otherwise is to fall into an obvious fact/value confusion. You cannot discredit the value of toleration by pointing to the fact that people are intolerant. Similarly you cannot show that Christian values are untenable or irrelelvant or useless by pointing to the fact that they go against such modes of behavior as piling up loot to the exclusion of all higher pursuits.
Grayling's Second Argument
In the second paragraph quoted above, Grayling argues as follows:
7. Religious fundamentalists are prepared to incarcerate women, mutilate genitals, etc.
Therefore
8. "Religious morality . . . has less than nothing to offer proper moral debate."
This too is a howling non sequitur and Grayling cannot be so dumb as not to realize it. To tar all religionists with the excesses of some Islamic fundamentalists is too primitive a mistake to warrant further commentary.
The truth of the matter is that religion is one of the chief ways in which moral behavior is promoted and maintained. The Left's assault on religion is therefore an assault on morality.
1. Any morality that is wholly opposed to the norms and practices not just accepted but extolled in a society has little to offer (to the members of that society).
2. Our society extols personal wealth as a (the?) norm.
3. Any morality that enjoins you to give your all to the poor, etc., is wholly opposed to personal wealth.
4. Therefore, any morality that enjoins you to give your all to the poor, etc., is wholly opposed to the norms and practices of our society.
5. Hence, any morality that enjoins you to give your all to the poor, etc., has little to offer (to the members of our society).
A few minor problems might need to be fixed, but this is very close to being a valid argument. The question is whether the premises are all true. (1) strikes me as dubious. For instance, suppose there is an anti-Semitic society. Does a morality which opposes such discrimination have nothing to offer to that society? Surely so.
9. If some religious fundamentalists supplement standard religious morality in such a way that it promotes incarcerating women, mutilating genitals, etc., then this enriched religious morality "has less than nothing to offer proper moral debate."
10. Some religious fundamentalists supplement standard religious morality in such a way that it promotes incarcerating women, mutilating genitals, etc.
Therefore
11. This enriched religious morality "has less than nothing to offer proper moral debate."
This seems to me to be the closest thing we've seen yet to a sound argument from Grayling.
Christianity may applaud such material sacrifice, but most modern Christian groups have no problem with the accumulation of wealth, so long as God gets his tithe. Whether that is wrong or right, I'll leave to the reader ...
But then, when he wants to argue that religious teaching is immoral, he condemns the norms of another society as inculcated by that society's religious teaching, whereas if he were consistent, he would say that those norms are moral for that society.
I agree with your comment for the most part. But would it be inaccurate to say that Jesus, as depicted in the NT, advocated a morality which "enjoins you to give your all to the poor, that says it is easier for a camel to go through a needle's eye than for the rich to enter heaven, and preaches selflessness towards one's neighbour and complete obedience to a deity"? If not, then it would seem that Grayling's argument applies to that morality, even if you are right that no major religion and most modern Christian groups do not endorse this sort of morality.
We agree that in the first paragraph quoted above, Grayling is giving an argument. For he is trying to support one assertion by adducing others. Not all discourse is argumentative, but this piece of discourse obviously is. But it seems to me that you misidentify the argument by misidentifying the conclusion.
The conclusion of his first argument is given in his first sentence: "Religion is worse than an irrelevance as regards the inculcation of morality. . . ." What comes after are his reasons (his premises) in support of this assertion. You, however, take his conclusion to be, "any morality that enjoins you to give your all to the poor, etc., has little to offer (to the members of our society)."
The argument you present doesn't capture what Grayling is getting at. He wants to show that religion has no positive role to play in inculcating moral behavior in people.
What I have presented as his argment is what he actually says. The fact that it is a worthless argument does not show that it is not the argument he gives. Of course, there is a principle of charity that we ought to employ when we interpret others. But exegetical charity does not extend to ascribing valid arguments to a person who is plainly giving an invalid argument.
As for the second paragraph quoted above, I think you make the same mistake: due to an excess of hermeneutical charity you are trying to read a valid or perhaps even a sound argument into a piece of verbiage that is blatantly invalid.
The second paragraph presents a second reason or premise for the conclusion of the first argument. The result is a non sequitur.
Thanks for the comment. Your point has merit. Grayling clearly thinks that clitorectomy is objectively and nonrelatively wrong, but he also seems to assume that what is the accepted norm in the USA and UK, namely, the pursuit of personal wealth above all else is a genuine norm just because it is accepted as such -- which suggests moral relativism on his part. But as you clearly see, a moral relativist is obviously in no position to criticize any other society and its practices.
Actually, I think Grayling's mistake is even more idiotic. He seems to think that a morality that goes against what is actually done cannot be a valid morality -- which is a blatant fact/value confusion.
Christianity preaches love of God and neighbor over love of Mammon. How is that morality refuted or rendered irrelevant by the mere fact that in Western societies the love of Mammon is paramount?
I agree.
I think that to some degree both of our attempts to reconstruct Grayling's "arguments" exhibit a lack of fit with the text. As you correctly point out, the conclusion of my version ("any morality that enjoins you to give your all to the poor, etc., has little to offer (to the members of our society)") is weaker than Grayling's claim at the beginning of the passage ("Religion is worse than an irrelevance as regards the inculcation of morality"). But at the same time, your version leaves something out: namely, the idea "such a morality, wholly opposed to the norms and practices not just accepted but extolled in our society, has little to offer." As long as your reconstruction fails to account for this statement, it's hasty to conclude that Grayling's reasoning is invalid.
In your reconstruction of the second "argument", you interpret Grayling as claiming that "Religious fundamentalists are prepared to incarcerate women, mutilate genitals, etc." It is clear from your reaction to this that what you mean to be imputing to Grayling is the claim that "All religious people are prepared to incarcerate women, mutilate genitals, etc." (After all, you say that "To tar all religionists with the excesses of some Islamic fundamentalists is too primitive a mistake to warrant further commentary.") But clearly Grayling says nothing of the sort. His claim was that when fundamentalists are prepared to do such-and-such, then religious morality becomes worse that irrelevant.
Suppose I were to say that when certain greedy politicians take bribes, the whole political process becomes a sham, and you replied to this by saying, "To tar all politicians with the excesses of some immoral politicians is too primitive a mistake to warrant further commentary." I could justifiably reply that I only claimed that certain politicians take bribes, not that all politicians (or even all greedy politicians) take bribes. By the same token, Grayling implies only that certain religious fundamentalists go to extremes, not all religionists.
I think my reconstructions would fit the text better if combined and refined in the following way:
1. Any morality that is wholly opposed to the norms and practices not just accepted but extolled in a society has little to offer (to the members of that society).
2. Our society extols personal wealth as a (the?) norm.
3. Any morality that enjoins you to give your all to the poor, etc., is wholly opposed to personal wealth.
4. Therefore, any morality that enjoins you to give your all to the poor, etc., is wholly opposed to the norms and practices of our society.
5. Hence, any morality that enjoins you to give your all to the poor, etc., has little to offer (to the members of our society).
6. Religious morality enjoins you to give your all to the poor, etc.
7. Therefore, religious morality has little to offer (to the members of our society); that is, religious morality is irrelevant as regards the inculcation of morality.
8. Further, if some religious fundamentalists supplement standard religious morality in such a way that it promotes incarcerating women, mutilating genitals, etc., then religious morality is "not just irrelevant but dangerous" and "has less than nothing to offer proper moral debate."
9. Some religious fundamentalists supplement standard religious morality in such a way that it promotes incarcerating women, mutilating genitals, etc.
10. Hence, religious morality is "not just irrelevant but dangerous" and "has less than nothing to offer proper moral debate."
11. Thus, religious morality is irrelevant as regards the inculcation of morality, and is "not just irrelevant but dangerous," having "less than nothing to offer proper moral debate."
This way of interpreting Grayling is immune to your criticism that I have gotten the conclusion wrong.
It is true that I am being very charitable, but I think this is appropriate. As far as I can tell, there is nothing in this most recent interpretation that does violence to the text, and this way at least I don't have to suppose that a really smart philosopher is guilty of a "howling non sequitur" which he "cannot be so dumb as not to realize" is a non sequitur. The appealing thing about my reading is that at least we have Graying making a valid argument--something an intelligent philosopher could be viewed as accepting--even though it is far from sound and is even dubious.
1. Jesus did tell one young man that in order to enter the Kingdom of God he had to sell everything and give it to the poor. However, this was not a generic prescription, it was a story with a point:Jesus was offering to trade the man eternal riches for a bit of transitory fluff and the man was sad! That is the point of this passage, not that we should all give everything we own to the poor, but that if we value transitory things more than eternal things, then we are not ready for eternal life.
2. The passage about the camel through the eye of the needle follows this story --Jesus is teaching about what just happened. He isn't teaching that there is something wrong with being rich but that the rich, by way of their material comfort in this world are too unconcerned with matters of the soul. He also adds that with God, all things are possible: that the rich can be saved.
3. The word "selflessness" is ambiguous and is wrong or right depending on how you take it. Jesus says to love your neighbor "as yourself", not "more than yourself".
Thanks for your generous comment. I think it is indeed "animus against religion" as you put it that causes Grayling to go off the rails.
In your reconstruction of the second "argument", you interpret Grayling as claiming that "Religious fundamentalists are prepared to incarcerate women, mutilate genitals, etc." It is clear from your reaction to this that what you mean to be imputing to Grayling is the claim that "All religious people are prepared to incarcerate women, mutilate genitals, etc." (After all, you say that "To tar all religionists with the excesses of some Islamic fundamentalists is too primitive a mistake to warrant further commentary.") But clearly Grayling says nothing of the sort. His claim was that when fundamentalists are prepared to do such-and-such, then religious morality becomes worse that irrelevant.
Not so. You are failing to perceive that G. is making a point about religion as such. Religion as such has nothing positive to contribute to moral formation. The problem is that you have not properly identified his conclusion, which is stated at the beginning of the first para. You also fail to see the connection between the two paras. The first gives his first reason for his conclusion, while his second para gives his second reason. Note that in the first para he speaks of 'reasons.' The plural means that there are at least two reasons. Two reasons for the same thesis. I captured those reasons in my reconstructions.
The fact that you can cobble together a valid argument using his words proves nothing, except perhaps an excess of exegetical charity.
But there is little point in discussing this further since there is no algorithm for extracting an explicit argument from a specimen of (sloppy) OL argumentative discourse. Plus, you don't have the full context. I have his five-page essay, "Moral Education," in front of me. And I have read most of the book in which the essay is embedded.
I am sure you will agree that understanding of context is crucial to the understanding of any stretch of discourse.