Two days ago, I gave an argument that a commenter has convinced me is bad. I argued:
1. P is true =df p would be accepted in cognitively ideal conditions.
Now we know that
2. Cognitive conditions are not ideal.
From (2) it follows via the trivial equivalence principle p is true iff p that
3. Cognitive conditions are not ideal is true.
It follows from (3) via (1) that
4. Cognitive conditions are not ideal would be accepted in cognitively ideal conditions.
But (4) is self-contradictory, whence it follows that
5. The definition of truth in terms of acceptability in cognitively ideal conditions is incorrect.
A natural way to read (2) so that it comes out unmistakably true is as
2*. Cognitive conditions are not now ideal.
But then (4) becomes
4*. Cognitive conditions are not now ideal would be accepted in cognitively ideal conditions
where 'now' refers to the same time, say, 2007 A. D.
It is not obvious, however, that (4*) is self-contradictory. For suppose that in the fullness of time, an intrepid band of researchers becomes so well-placed that their actual cognitive conditions are ideal. They would then be in a position to know that cognitive conditions back in 2007 were not ideal.
But I think I can reformulate the argument so as to evade the objection by replacing (2) with
2R. Cognitive conditions are never ideal.
(4) then becomes
4R. Cognitive conditions are never ideal would be accepted in cognitively ideal conditions.
Now (4R) is self-contradictory since it implies that at no time in the actual world are cognitive conditions ideal and at some (future) time in the actual world cognitive conditions are ideal.
But I hear an objection coming: "Cognitively ideal conditions are not future conditions in the actual world; they are future conditions in some merely possible world. Let 'A' be a rigid designator of our world, the actual world, and let 'W' designate a merely possible world that is exactly the same as A up until the present, but then different from A after the present. 'Cognitively ideal conditions' refers to conditions in the future of W. Now the following two propositions are logically consistent: At no time in A are cognitive conditions ideal and At some (future) time in W cognitive conditions are ideal. Therefore, when 'cognitively ideal conditions' is properly construed, (4R) is seen to be non-contradictory."
But if cognitively ideal conditions are never attained, but are merely possible conditions, then it is difficult to see how the actual truth of any proposition could be identified with what investigators in some merely possible circumstances accept. How can what is actually true be explicated in terms of merely possible judgments?
We should recall that the granddaddy of the sort of epistemic approach to truth that we have been discussing was C. S. Peirce. He wrote that "The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real." ("How to Make Our Ideas Clear") The talk of fate here suggests that truth is being explicated in terms of future judgments in the actual world rather than future judgments in a merely possible world.
Related Posts (on one page):
- Once More on Explicating Truth in Terms of Idealized Rational Acceptability
- Truth-as-Correspondence as Primary Notion of Truth
- Frege's Regress
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4. Some undesirables: The skimmers, those who cannot read but only read-in. The sophists who, abusing argument, argue for the sake of argument. The ideologues, those who are out for power, not truth. The uncivil. The illogical. The politically correct. Worst of all, perhaps, are those who exemplify the anti-Socratic property: those who think they know what they don't know. If Socrates was famous for his learned ignorance, these types are marked by their ignorant unlearnededness.