Earlier discussions seem to have gotten bogged down in confusion over the de dicto/de re distinction as applied to beliefs. So we need to try to get as clear as we can about this.
I will take the following to be the canonical form of de dicto belief reports:
1. S believes that p
where S is a believing subject and p a proposition. I am not saying that every belief report in ordinary English that has the form of (1) is de dicto; I am proposing a regimentation of ordinary English. I am suggesting that we reserve (1) for de dicto reports only. Now consider the example
2. Sam believes that Frege died in 1925.
One of the marks of a
de dicto report is that one cannot existentially generalize on a singular term in 'p.' Thus from (2) one cannot infer that there exists an x such that x died in 1925. A second mark of a
de dicto belief sentence is that one cannot replace a referring term in 'p' with a coreferential term
salva veritate. (
Salva veritate can be translated: in such a manner as to preserve truth.) Thus one cannot replace 'Frege' in (2) with 'The author of the
Begriffschrift'
salva veritate even though it is true that Frege is the (sole) author of the work in question.
These two points should seem obvious. As for the second, suppose all that Sam knows about Frege is that he is a great logician who had an enormous influence on Russell and subsequent philosophy. It should then be clear that (2) does not entail that Sam believes that the author of the Begriffschrift died in 1925.
A de dicto belief report, then, is one that satifies the two requirements just described. That there are de dicto beliefs seems beyond question. Whether a given belief sentence is to be read as de dicto or as de re may be open to dispute, but that there is a distinction between the readings is clear.
Here are what I take to be two canonical forms of de re belief reports:
3. X is believed by S to be F.
4. S attributes the property of being F to x.
These are equivalent. Examples of (3) and (4) respectively are
5. Frege is believed by Sam to have died in 1925
and
6. Sam attributes the property of having died in 1925 to Frege.
One difference between (2), on the one hand, and (5) and (6) on the other, is
that one can existentially generalize on 'Frege' in (5) and (6) but not in (2). A second difference is that in (5) and (6), but not in (2), 'Frege' can be replaced, salva veritate, with the coreferential 'the author of Begriffschrift.' For if Sam attributes the property of having died in 1925 to Frege, and Frege = the author of the Begriffschrift, then Sam attributes the property in question to the author of the Begriffschrift.
A third difference is that 'Frege' in (2) but not in (5) and (6) occurs within the scope of the propositional attitude verb, 'believes.'
Note also that (5) does not entail (2). It could be true that Frege is believed by Sam to have died in 1925 without it being true that Sam believes that Frege died in 1925. How? Well, suppose Sam comes upon Frege's tombstone, but can't read the name due to some obstructing foliage. But he can read the terminal date, 1925. So he forms the belief that the man buried here died in 1925. Now the man in question is Frege. So Sam believes, of Frege, (de re!) that he died in 1925. Suppose further that Sam has never heard the name Frege and so associates no sense with it. Under these suppositions, Sam lacks the belief that Frege died in 1925.
If I understand you correctly, you are proposing to understand the claim
2. Sam believes that Frege died in 1925.
as equivalent to
2.' Sam believes the proposition Frege died in 1925.
Is that right?
But of course the proposition is Fregean, not Russellian: it is a proposition all of the constituents of which are abstracta. Thus Frege himself is not in the proposition as subject-constituent, a Fregean sense is.
D1. Sam believes the proposition Cicero is a philosopher.
D2. Cicero is Tully.
D3. It is not the case that Sam believes the proposition Tully is a philosopher.
T1. 'Cicero' and 'Tully' have the same denotation (are coreferential) in all of their occurrences in the datanic sentences, both in the direct speech and indirect speech positions.
T2. 'Is' in (D2) expresses strict, numerical identity where this has the usual properties of reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity, and the necessity of identity (if x = y, then necessarily, x = y).
T3. Cicero has the property of being believed by Sam to be a philosopher.
T4. If x = y, then whatever is true of x is true of y, and vice versa. (Indiscernibility of Identicals)
But it isn't clear that this septad is inconsistent. It would be if D3 were inconsistent with the claim: Tully has the property of being believed by Sam to be a philosopher. But I see no inconsistency here. If Tully is Cicero, and Cicero has this property, then Tully has this property too, that is, the property of being believed by Sam to be a philosopher, even if Sam doesn't believe the proposition Tully is a philosopher. 'believed' here is de re, whereas 'believe' is de dicto.
I'll have to think about this some more tomorrow.
The orthodox view may not be correct, but you need to give strong reasons why it isn't. Some of the arguments are, that we can deny, using the name of someone, that they have any property you like. Thus, for any F, it is possible to deny that Aristotle is F. (Except, maybe where F = 'is identical with Aristotle' but that doesn't help.
Didn't we argue about all this some time ago? I remember citing a paper by Braun.
Call views on which names directly attach to their bearers and are not mediated by senses, descriptions, etc. direct theories of reference (DTRs). Suppose for the sake of argument that DTRs are the orthodoxy. (This isn't really true.) In that case, it's really beside the point whether or not Bill has an argument against the orthodox view because his septad can be formulated in terms of definite descriptions rather than names. 'Cicero' and 'Tully' could be replaced respectively with 'the first star that appears in the morning' and 'the last star to appear in the evening' (or something like that) and (mutatis mutandis) what theory of name reference we accept becomes irrelevant.
We are getting tangled up. Let me ask a very simple question. Do you agree that there is a way of construing the belief reports in the following argument such that the argument is invalid?
Sam believes that Dave is drunk.
Dave = Tina's husband
-----
Sam believes that Tina's husband is drunk.
I want to see if you agree that belief sentences are subject to an ambiguity, however we label it.
"Proper names are always de re." What does that mean?
Your last comment is very good. No good purpose is served by calling direct reference theories 'orthodox' as O does. And you are right that the problem arises even without proper names, viz:
Sam believes that the morning star is a planet
The morning star = the evening star
It is not the case that Sam believes that the evening star is a planet.
Yes. If we understand your argument as equivalent to
Sam believes the proposition Dave is drunk.
Dave = Tina's husband
-----
Sam believes the proposition Tina's husband is drunk.
then I agree it's invalid.
As I see it, the distinction between 'de re' and 'de dicto' beliefs is a misleading one. All beliefs have propositional content. To believe is to believe that. Hence, all beliefs take a dictum (or proposition) as an object. The relevant distinction here has to do not with whether a belief takes a proposition or a thing as an object (they all take propositions), but rather with the manner by which the subject of that proposition is referred to. In short, what I want to suggest is that the real distinction at work here is one between 'purely indexical' and 'conceptually mediated' reference.
Purely indexical (conceptually unmediated) reference rigidly designates without any mediating senses. Thus, "Sam believes that Cicero (pure indexical) is a philosopher" is equivalent to "Sam believes that that [let's call it 'Cicero'] is a philosopher". Given this construal, the substitution of 'Tully' for 'Cicero', of one rigid designator for another, is unproblematic.
Conceptually mediated reference, on the other hand, refers through a mediating sense. Thus, "Sam believes that Cicero (mediated reference) is a philosopher" is equivalent to something like "Sam believes that that, being Cicero, is a philosopher." In this case, the name 'Cicero' isn't an arbitrary label that Sam 'imputes' to the subject, but rather one that Sam nonarbitrarily 'reads off' the subject. Consequently, the sense of 'Cicero' and not just a bare 'that' is part of the content of the proposition believed. As a result, we cannot swap 'Tully' for 'Cicero' salva veritate (or even salve significatione).
So, to recap, my claim is that the whole distinction between 'de re' and 'de dicto' beliefs is a misplaced distinction. And that's why it's so apt to generate confusion.
Sam believes that Dave is drunk.
Dave = Tina's husband
-----
Sam believes that Tina's husband is drunk.
Would you say it is valid if construed as follows:
Dave is believed by Sam to be drunk
Dave = Tina's husband
-----
Tina's husband is believed by Sam to be drunk.
This certainly looks to be valid. So perhaps we can say that one and the same OL argument comes out invalid when given a de dicto construal and comes out valid when given a de re construal.
One issue is whether belief is a dyadic relation connecting a believer and a proposition, or a triadic relation connecting two individuals and a property. It is the difference between:
Bel(Sam, proposition, Dave is drunk)
Bel(Sam, Dave, property of being drunk)
The following de re formulation seems to support the triadic view:
Sam believes Dave to be drunk
Dave = Tina's husband
-----
Same believes Tina's husband to be drunk.
Do you agree so far?
You and I agree that there is a 'bird of reality' and that the job is to carve it at the joints. The trick is to find the joints.
I have to quibble a bit with your terminology (for the good of your soul). You contrast 'conceptually mediated' with 'purely indexical' reference. You seem to be blurring the difference between names and indexicals. Suppose proper names refer directly (i.e., not via a sense or a definite description or a Searlean disjunction of definite descriptions, etc.) That is not to say that proper names refer indexically. So you may want to adjust your terminology.
Suppose 'Bill V.' refers directly. That doesn't make it an indexical like 'I.' Anyone can use 'BV' to refer to BV, but only BV can use 'I' to refer to BV. We can't even say that 'I' is a name each uses to denote himself --for reasons I will omit.
As for your main point, I am struggling to understand it. "All beliefs have propositional content." Do you mean that every belief is a dyadic relation connecting a believer to a proposition? With propositions being Fregean rather than Russellian? I like this view, but I wonder if you are entitled to be so cocksure about it.
Cicero is long gone, dust in the wind. So I can't use the demonstrative 'that' to refer to him. Does this fact cause some trouble for your view? It causes some trouble for my understanding of your view. Reporting what Sam believes, I say, 'Sam believes that Cicero is a philosopher.' Since 'Cicero' is a proper name and neither an indexical nor a demonstrative, I cannot see that the last sentence is equivalent to 'Sam believes that that is a philosopher.' But perhaps I'm being uncharitable.
You want to say that if 'Cicero' refers directly, then 'Tully' and 'Cicero' are intersubstitutable salva veritate. But notice that then the proposition before Sam's mind is not Fregean but Russellian inasmuch as it contains not a sense of 'Cicero' but Cicero himself. Is that what you intend?
I am also puzzled by the apparent implication that 'Cicero' can be interpreted as directly referential or not even though both occurrences are within the scope of the verb 'believes.' How can 'Cicero' induce referential opacity in one case but not in the other?
The logically prior question is whether such names as 'Cicero' refer directly or via senses/descriptions in oratio recta. Once we settle that question, then we can investigate how names behave in oblique contexts. But what you seem to be doing is switching between the two theories of names within an oblique context -- and that is puzzling to say the least.
I may be missing something.
Do you mean the difference between, say,
1. Ralph believes that someone is a spy
and
2. Someone is believed by Ralph to be a spy?
(2) entails (1), but (1) does not entail (2).
I think I agree with everything you say in your latest comment (directed at me). It seems helpful to think that in the de dicto case, belief is dyadic, and in the de re case triadic.
I'd say polyadic rather than polymorphic. In your example, it looks like Believes would would a pentadic relation. Not appetizing.
>>O writes, "You talk about a confusion between de dicto and de re." I didn't say that at all.
Ahem: reading your post again, it seems to me you did!
>>"Proper names are always de re." What does that mean?
It means, on the direct reference view, that any sentence containing a proper name is of the logical form Fa, where 'a' is the name in question, and F is the 'gappy sentence or predicate. If that is the case, a=b implies Fb. And Fa implies Ex Fx.
All the other formulations are a little slippery. The idea that ' names directly attach to their bearers and are not mediated by senses, descriptions' is somewhat obscure, I think.
Bill:
>>One of the marks of a de dicto report is that one cannot existentially generalize on a singular term in 'p.' Thus from [Sam believes that Frege died in 1925] one cannot infer that there exists an x such that x died in 1925. A second mark of a de dicto belief sentence is that one cannot replace a referring term in 'p' with a coreferential term salva veritate. […] Thus one cannot replace 'Frege' in (2) with 'The author of the Begriffschrift' salva veritate.
I don't follow your argument here. By definition a de dicto report is one where you cannot existentially generalise, correct. But it does not follow that 'Sam believes that Frege died in 1925' is a de dicto report, thus it does not follow that on cannot existentially generalise.
A second point: when you say we cannot replace the 'Frege' with 'The author of the Begriffschrift', you appear to imply that this is because 'Sam believes that Frege died in 1925' is a de dicto report. Or do you mean that 'Sam believes that The author of the Begriffschrift died in 1925' is de dicto, whereas the report containing 'Frege' is de re?
Spur:
>>it's really beside the point whether or not Bill has an argument against the orthodox view because his septad can be formulated in terms of definite descriptions rather than names.
It depends whether you have the view that sentences containing definite descriptions are of the form Fa, where 'a' is the description in question. Most direct referentialists would not hold this (unless the description is demonstrative, as 'this author, who wrote the Begriffschift').
Bill:
>> you are right that the problem arises even without proper names, viz: / Sam believes that the morning star is a planet / The morning star = the evening star
/ It is not the case that Sam believes that the evening star is a planet.
Why does the 'problem' arise without proper names? There is no clear reason for believing that any definite description sentences is of the form Fa, where 'a' is the description in question. Why not? Because the description clearly contains a predicate, and a predicate, by definition, is not of the form 'a'. In which case, there is no problem about substitution. There is only a problem with substitution for sentences that are genuinely of the form Fa, such as sentences containing proper names, which do not appear to embed any description.
How does it depend on this? Please explain.
>>How does it depend on this? Please explain.
I took you to be implying that there is equally a problem for definite descriptions. Apologies if not. If you are implying that the septad represents a problem for definite descriptions, then I beg to differ, because
Well, if we replace 'Cicero' by some description in the septad, D1 does not obviously imply T3 any more, and there is no obvious difficulty.
Thanks for your constructive comments. I appreciate it. I’d like to try and clarify what I have in mind. I apologize in advance for the length.
Regarding my use of ‘indexical’, I think of an ‘index’ in Peircean terms as anything that establishes a dyadic relation with an object. On this understanding, any referring expression, whether a name, definite description, pronoun, or token-reflexive, counts as indexical. What I gather from your comment is that common philosophical usage prefers to restrict ‘indexical’ to refer to token-reflexives. Is that right?
Regarding my claim that “All beliefs have propositional content”, I do mean that every belief is a dyadic relation connecting a believer to a proposition, with propositions being understood in a broadly Fregean fashion. (Russell’s theory of propositions seems implausible to me – if it’s right, then how could there be propositions about nonexistent individuals, like Santa Claus? As for dyadic versus triadic belief, that’s something I’ve got to think about more. But why go triadic if dyadic will do?)
You say, “Cicero is long gone, dust in the wind. So I can’t use the demonstrative ‘that’ to refer to him.” I agree insofar as the demonstrative ‘that’ implies having a direct experience of, or being causally impinged upon by, its object. But I think that ‘that’ (and ‘this’) can be used to refer not only to what is experienced but also through what is experienced to the putative (proximate or remote) source of those experiences. For example, while reading a copy of Aristotle’s writings I may say to myself “This guy [Aristotle] was really sharp, much more so than that guy [name of appropriate dead person].”
With regard to “Sam believes that Cicero is a philosopher”, ‘Cicero’ would normally carry some kind of sense for Sam. Suppose that the sense that Sam associates with ‘Cicero’ is simply ‘the author of this book’. In that case what Sam believes is that the author of this book is a philosopher. If ‘Tully’ carries the same sense for Sam, then we can swap the two names without alteration of meaning. So this inference is valid:
Sam believes that Cicero (as Sam conceives of him) is a philosopher.
Cicero = Tully (as Sam conceives of them)
Therefore,
Sam believes that Tully (as Sam conceives of him) is a philosopher.
But this inference is invalid:
Sam believes that Cicero (as Sam conceives of him) is a philosopher.
Cicero = Tully (as we conceive of them)
Therefore,
Sam believes that Tully (as Sam conceives of him) is a philosopher.
Both of the examples above have to with what you would call ‘de dicto beliefs’. What you call ‘de re beliefs’, on the other hand, involve us assuming an external standpoint in which we pretend that we know something that the believer may not. Thus, we know that what Sam conceives of simply as ‘the author of this book’ is in fact Cicero. Furthermore, we know that Cicero = Tully. Hence, from our vantage point, we can validly reason as follows:
Sam believes that Cicero (as we conceive of him) is a philosopher.
Cicero = Tully (as we conceive of them)
Therefore,
Sam believes that Tully (as we conceive of him) is a philosopher.
From our external perspective, Sam’s conception of Cicero is irrelevant. Hence we can safely suppose here (if we want to) that Sam’s conception of Cicero is a bare, contentless ‘that’, a name that refers but not via any senses.
Finally, you say, “The logically prior question is whether such names as ‘Cicero’ refer directly or via senses/descriptions in oratio recta.” I’m inclined to think that names in singular propositions normally (if not always) refer via senses or descriptions. Thus, when I say “Cicero was a Stoic” I intend to refer to a particular individual of whom I have several (descriptive) beliefs and I isolate one of those beliefs to report on. If the name ‘Cicero’ had no descriptive content for me whatsoever, I’m not sure that I would be in a position to express any singular propositions about him. The only time, so far as I can see, that we can treat names as directly referential apart from any senses/descriptions is when we assume an external standpoint (and switch to an oblique context). But that doesn’t show that names don’t refer via senses. It only shows that, from the external standpoint, whatever senses the name may carry within the oblique context are irrelevant.
I hope to respond tomorrow. I saw your post over at your blog, and tried to leave a comment on the post preceding it. But I forgot my Blogger password. Anyway, I just wanted to mention that McTaggart is an example of an atheist who is not a materialist, and that John Post is an example of someone who tries -- unsuccessfully -- to combine theism with supervenience physicalism in the last chapter of his Faces of Existence.
One quick note. Near the end of my previous comment I got my terms crossed up. Instead of saying, "The only time, so far as I can see, that we can treat names as directly referential apart from any senses/descriptions is when we assume an external standpoint (and switch to an oblique context)" I should have said non-oblique.
I've been puzzling over your post at your blog, but I am having a hard time evaluating it. I find this subject-matter extremely difficult.
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