Thanatology presupposes philosophical anthropology: what death is taken to be depends on what the human being is taken to be. Although Christianity certainly has affinities with Platonism, the Christian view of man is fundamentally unPlatonic. In terms of Aquinas' Latin, Platonism holds that homo est anima utens corpore, man is a soul using a body. On this view the person is essentially the soul, and the body is a temporary and accidental housing or vehicle. There are Platonic passages in which the soul is described as "imprisoned" in the body. The body is the prison-house of the soul. The soul is in the body like an oyster in its shell. And so on. If one thinks in this way, then death is not a calamity but something good. Death is liberation, release, the separation of one thing, the soul, from another, the body, to which it should not have been attached in the first place. For Platonism, death undoes the fall into time. Death is to that extent good, and the philosopher welcomes it.
Christianity, however, in terms of Aquinas' Latin, maintains that (a) homo non est anima tantum, man is not the soul alone, and (b) anima forma corporis, the soul is the form of the body. The human person, then is essentially a form-matter composite, and not essentially a soul. On the Platonic view S can exist without B, though not conversely, while on the Christian view as understood by Aquinas, neither S nor B can exist without the other. The two need each other: the body needs the soul to animate it and 'personalize' it, to make it a person's body as opposed to a corpse. And the soul needs the body to achieve its proper unfolding. Despite the difference between soul and body, man is a unitary being in a way in which he is not unitary on the Platonic conception.
There is another important difference. For Platonism, the fall into time — see Phaedrus — is a fall into an evil condition. But for Christianity, everything is and is good because it comes from God who is all-good. So our embodiment cannot be evil. For Christianity there is of course a Fall, but it is not a Fall into embodiment.
For Christianity, then, we are not immortal souls accidentally housed in mortal bodies, and death cannot be understood as affecting only our bodies. Death is not release of one part of the self from another, but the destruction of the entire unitary self.
Earlier, in a reply to a comment, I wrote:
On the Christian view we are not naturally immortal: we are mortal body and soul. Any immortality that we come to acquire requires a supernatural agent operating in a supernatural way.
Don Blow then asked:
It doesn't seem obvious to me that, on the Christian view, we are not naturally immortal. Didn't death only enter the picture when sin did?
It is true that on the Christian scheme death first enters the picture as punishment for sin. But it does not follow that we are naturally immortal in our prelapsarian state. The doctor angelicus discusses this question in the Summa Theologica, Q 97, art. 1. If prelapsarian, paradisiacal man were immortal by nature, then he he could not have lost his immortality, which is precisely what happened when he sinned. Some of the angels sinned but did not lose their immortality because they are naturally immortal. But man is not: his prelapsarian immortality was a divine gift. By nature he is mortal, i.e., subject to death, able to die. Aquinas speaks of a "supernatural force given by God to the soul, whereby it was enabled to preserve the body from all corruption so long as it itself remained subject to God."
In sum, man in his own nature is mortal body and soul in both his prelapsarian and postlapsarian states. But owing to a supernatural gift, man in his prelapsarian state was given the power to preserve himself as long as he willed to so so. Prelapsarian man could die, but not against his will. We, however, are condemned to death nolens volens.
But in any case, according to Aquinas' theory, the soul is still immortal per se, in that it is a non-material, non-composite, spiritual substance. It is capable of existing independently of the body. I'm pretty sure every Catholic, Orthodox, and Anglican believes that people's souls are still alive after their bodies die. Other Christians, I'm less sure about.
So we have:
1) Man has a mortal part.
2) Man has an immortal part.
No contradiction there.
Among the characteristics of folk religion are that it is often couched, by turns, in mythological, symbolic, metaphoric, vague, and ambiguous language. We need look no further than the word 'immortal'. What is meant by it? There seem to be at least three meanings:
1) Existing throughout an infinite future
2) Existing throughout infinite time in both directions
3) Atemporal
I take (3) to be equivalent to 'eternal'.
I would think that to be an eternal something requires it to be a changeless something. So an eternal alive something would have to be incapable of changing from an alive state to a dead state.
But in any case, how can Christianity be evaluated based on doctrinal formulations that use the ambiguous word 'immortal'?
You say that there are Catholic articles stating that the soul is inherently immortal. I rather doubt that, but perhaps you have a reference for me.
There is a tension in Christianity as between Platonic and Aristotelian tendencies. For one thing, if the soul is the fom of the body, if the person is a composite of two factors neither of which can exist on its own, then how can the soul exist apart from the body?
But even if it can exist apart from the body, that is not to say that it is "per se immortal." It is not immortal by its own power, or in its own nature, but by a special act of divine sustainment.
What you say is no contradiction is indeed no contradiction. But so far no one here has explained how JC can be both mortal and immortal. That is a prima facie contradiction.
Looks like I don''t have time now to respond to your second comment which I like very much. Later. Do you have anyy thoughts on bike seats and prostate
issuesproblems?In my comment I noted that I might be unclear on what you mean by "mortal." Are speaking of this world or of any world, of earthly mortality or of annihilation? If you're speaking of earthly mortality, then I think the fact that earthly death only enters the picture as a consequence of sin indicates that, in that sense, man is naturally immortal. To be sure, I am not using naturally as meaning inherently. I am meaning it as "in his natural state." Mortal man is thus, in my understanding, in an unnatural or fallen state. Maybe, though, I am unclear about what you mean by "naturally (im)mortal." It does seems that we are understanding "naturally" differently since my use of the term here does not entail the following statement: "If prelapsarian, paradisiacal man were immortal by nature, then he could not have lost his immortality . . ." I agree that man is not inherently immortal (speaking of earthly immortality). That much is obvious. But it appears to me that in his natural state he is (or was).
When if speaking of mortal man you're speaking of the possibility of man being annihilated then I don't see any basis for that. But that doesn't seem to be what you were speaking of, so I'll leave that issue alone.
on whether the soul is, according to (current RC) Christian teaching, the Cathechism of the Catholic Church states:
"Even though man's nature is mortal God had destined him not to die." (#1008), to be found in this passage, concerning dying and resurrection of man.
Bill, I still have not read, unfortunately, the article which was at the start of this subject. Hope to do so soon, I trust you will try &get back to the problem of the explanation of Christ's being both mortal and immortal.
Perhaps, indeed, we as humans actually also are mortal and immortal. As the above quote states, God meant us to be immortal, but because of our sin we became mortal. With the incarnation we see the same movement, but then in the reverse: In Jesus, God appeared and lived among us as a mortal human being, because of his love. At the same time God shows us ourselves in Jesus as he envisioned us: immortal.
As I understand Catholic doctrine, this is exactly what is meant by the incarnation and death of Jesus: namely, God showing us himself (immortal) and us (mortal) in one concrete and singular 'act'.
I like your pithy summary of the Christian teaching on the unity of body and soul. They are the matter and form of the substance that is a human being, and so both are essential to a human being. We were made to exist within Creation, that realm of space and time, hence the need to be physical creatures. However, we were also made in God's image to become creators ourselves, hence the need to also be mental creatures.
Therefore, a body without a soul and a soul without a body are incomplete, or imperfect. So, our Earthly resurrection will be a bodily one. We presently suffer death as the penalty for Original Sin. However, that death is a bodily one. The soul cannot die. (I don't have a handy reference for you on this at the moment, but you can check out the Fourth Lateran Council on this subject.) The soul, after the death of the body, endures outside of Creation (and so outside the constraints of space and time) until Christ's Kingdom is established on Earth and our souls are reunited with our bodies in the resurrection.
Regards, Bill
On the bicycle seat problem, I don't really have much help to give you. All I know is that a lot of work has apparently been done to try to improve bike seats with that problem in mind, and there are special seats available. Maybe you have a good bike shop in your area where you could find someone knowledgeable? Maybe try to find a coach for a local racing team to help you with that.
http://www.catholicapologetics.net/qb7
It is a simple, indivisible, spiritual substance, that does not perish with the body, because it is by its very nature incorruptible.
http://www.catholicculture.org/docs/doc_view.cfm?recnum=644
The first argument [by Aquinas] to demonstrate the immortality of the soul is of a metaphysical nature and is derived from the nature of the human soul. As was explained in a preceding article,[7] the human soul is a substance, that is, it subsists by itself (per se) and not in virtue of some other reality such as the body.
...
Since it is not a material substance (not composed of material parts), but a spiritual one, that is, superior to the material order, the soul is simple and therefore incorruptible.
...
But St. Thomas corrected him [Aristotle] on this point, seeing in the soul the "form" of the body, but regarding it as a "substantial form" and therefore subsistent per se, and therefore independent of the body in its existence: it is therefore of such a nature that it can subsist even after the dissolution of the body of which it is the form.
Nevertheless, the human soul, inasmuch as it is a form, that is, the principle of organization and of life of the body, even when the body after death has been dissolved into its elements, preserves with it a transcendental relation: in fact, the union of soul and body is natural, while their separation is "contrary to nature": "It is clear that the soul is united to the body by nature: because by its essence it is the form of the body. Therefore it is contrary to the nature of the soul to be deprived of the body.[Aquinas]"
[Another case of "clear as mud"?]
Also I think we should agree on, or at least discuss, whether the terms immortal and mortal are denials, that is, on whether immortal means not mortal. Some are suggesting that a person can be both mortal and immortal, which is not possible if the terms are denials. When such statements are made, though, I understand (maybe wrongly) the individual to be saying that man's body is mortal whereas his soul is immortal. But then that confuses things since mortal and immortal are being applied differently, one to the body, the other to the soul (though they agree that mortality implies death and immortality, no death). So maybe a discussion of the terms in use here is in order.
It may be more obvious to take the case of simplicity. Consider the following possible definitions:
(1) Necessarily, God has no parts.
(2) God does not by necessity have any parts, but He may have them contingently.
Your argument appears to imply that (1) is the case (the Word of God cannot have a human part), but I see no prima facie reason why (2) is unacceptable. Divine simplicity means "God has no proper parts," but I see no reason why He cannot have parts accidentally by addition to His person. Likewise, I see no reason why the property "X is human by necessity" is logically entailed in instantiating the human nature. Since the property of instantiating the human nature contingently is incompatible with neither the divine nature nor the human nature, I see no reason why a divine person cannot have it.
If you admit that Word of God can have parts, then the terms do not contradict each other, as they are obviously predicated of different parts.
2. Disallowing comments from a particular person, or deleting an offensive, off-topic, or otherwise substandard comment, has nothing to do with censorship. People who think otherwise confuse censorship with lack of sponsorship. I am under an obligation not to interfere with anyone's exercise of legitimate free speech rights. But I am not under any obligation to aid and abet anyone's exercise of free speech rights, legitimate or illegitimate.
3. The Comments area is not an open forum for anyone to say anything about any topic. As the name implies, it is primarily for commenting on the author(s)' posts. But to comment on them, one must have read them. And if I have spent three hours on a post, a reader will not understand it in thirty seconds. Secondarily, the Comments area is to facilitate civil discussion between and among commenters as long as the discussion remains on-topic.
4. Some undesirables: The skimmers, those who cannot read but only read-in. The sophists who, abusing argument, argue for the sake of argument. The ideologues, those who are out for power, not truth. The uncivil. The illogical. The politically correct. Worst of all, perhaps, are those who exemplify the anti-Socratic property: those who think they know what they don't know. If Socrates was famous for his learned ignorance, these types are marked by their ignorant unlearnededness.