Paul Campos maintains that it is:
Torture is wrong. It is always wrong, at all times, in all places, no matter what good one imagines might come from torturing a fellow human being.
It is wrong because to torture a fellow human being destroys the torturer's own soul as surely as it destroys the body and mind of his victim.
Here is a basic truth, understood by all religions and peoples who have not yet sunk into total barbarism: Mortality [sic] is only possible if there are certain things we must refuse to do under any circumstances. You do not "balance" the costs and benefits of torturing your fellow men, because it does not profit a man to gain the world if he loses his soul.
I wish I could agree. I would like to be a good Kantian on the torture question. I would like to be able to say that acts of torture are always and everywhere wrong in virtue of their very nature as acts of torture. The affront to human dignity is just too egregious. I would like to be able to say that acts of torture are intrinsically wrong, which implies that any extrinsic consideration as to the possible good consequences of their implementation is simply irrelevant to an assessment of their rightness or wrongness.
But when we move from this abstract formulation to a concrete case, the matter appears in a different light. Suppose the police have in their custody a number of terrorists who know the location and detonation times of a dozen ‘dirty bombs’ (conventional explosives ‘wrapped’ with radioactive wastes) scheduled to explode in Manhattan. Does one torture the information out of the terrorists or not? Here the consequentialists have a strong case. Surely, they will argue, the good consequences of the use of torture far outweigh the evil of the torture!
Either use torture and save millions of innocent lives, or abjure the use of torture and sacrifice a million lives to a moral principle. Campos has given his answer: torture is always and everywhere wrong no matter what good comes of it. So, in terms of our example, subjecting the terrorist to waterboarding -- which Campos says one would have to be insane not to consider torture -- is wrong even if it would save a million lives.
I am afraid the situation is not as clear as the good professor makes it out to be. Think about it carefully, and think about it in terms of public policy: policy that applies to a public some members of which believe in God and the soul and some members of which do not. The latter will presumably not be moved by the New Testament consideration that, in Campos' formulation, "it does not profit a man to gain the world if he loses his soul." What if he has no soul to lose? What if this life is the only life? What if, on his scheme, being blown to bits spells the absolute end?
For Campos, "Mortality [sic] is only possible if there are certain things we must refuse to do under any circumstances." This is supposed to be a truth accepted by all "who have not yet sunken into total barbarism." This is fine rhetoric and shows what a caring and sensitive fellow Campos is, but it doesn't stand up to scrutiny.
Suppose one adopts a consequentialist approach to morality such as act-utilitarianism: one holds that actions are right or wrong depending on whether or not they contribute to the greatest good of the greatest number. On such an approach, one could easily justify certain uses of torture. Deontological morality is not the only kind, nor is one a barbarian if one is not a deontologist.
I don't have an answer on torture. What I am objecting to is Campos' irresponsible and onesided portrayal of the issue. I also rather doubt that waterboarding should be classified as torture, but that is a topic for another occasion.
Related Posts (on one page):
- Reppert on Torture
- Is Torture Always Wrong?
An immediate question comes to mind. In your concrete case, Bill, you suppose that the terrorists have certain vital information, that it's known that they have that information, and that torture is the last, best hope of obtaining that information (I'll leave the part of saving lives out for the moment). Do you think that there is a difference between torturing a human being for specific, vital knowledge that that person is known to have, and torturing a human being in order to learn just what that person knows?
I do not have a firm view on this issue either, but I wonder if the fact that it is about terrorists helps to obscure our thinking about it. For example:
This brings to mind an image of CIA operatives working over some nasty terrorists, an image we do not find at all unpleasant. We find this argument reasonable because, on some level, we feel that the terrorists are getting what they deserve. But the argument for torture is not about justice but, as you say, a utilitarian accounting of consequences. The guilt or innocence of the tortured has nothing to do with it. Of course, we could make an argument with respect to justice regarding torture, but that is a different argument than the one being made. With respect to the consequentialist argument, it makes no difference whether the tortured is guilty or innocent. The only thing that matters is a utilitarian accounting of consequences.
Therefore, if we want to be clear about what we are arguing for with a consequentialist argument, notions of justice should be eliminated from our thinking. We must be prepared to torture an innocent 14 year old boy if we think that would lead to "good" consequences, as we are to torture a dedicated terrorist. Suppose for example, the 14 year old boy is the nephew of a terrorist and happens to have information by accident, but the terrorists have threatened him and the rest of his family with torture and death if he reveals it. Do we torture the information out of the boy?
And in general, is it legitimate to act unjustly if, in our view, good consequences may come of it? Say, for example, if you are a Roman governor and you send an innocent man to the cross for the sake of the peace?
I'm not sure what to think, because it does not seem wrong to torture a terrorist to save lives. But at the same time I have a deep sense that we have crossed a very significant and dangerous threshold by doing so.
Miss Anscomb walked out and refused him as a student. Rather strange considering her husband's (Peter Geach) rather strange views on the punishments of the afterlife for those who do not believe.
No serious persons, not even those who support torture, support torturing mere bank robbers. The discussion is linked to terrorists (rather than criminals in general) because the scenario always assumed is that the terrorist is withholding information that could save lives. The bank robber, it is assumed, is not in this position.
I also do not have a firm view on this but, with you, I agree that it does not seem wrong to torture a terrorist to save lives.
There is no doubt, David, that, as you suggest, a consequentialist approach to torture would be disastrous. But when you ask, in regards to torture, if it is legitimate to act unjustly, I think this is bad wording. The issue is not whether torture may be legitimatised but whether it may be (morally) just in certain cases. We ought to be concerned with acting justly, not with rationalizing unjust acts. I think you would agree; I'm just pointing out the wording since it may lead to confused thinking.
The problem with the consequentialist is that she does not take motives, intentions, etc., into consideration. If a person tortures a terrorist for fun and happens upon some important information which saves lives, then that act would be considered just. But torturing for fun is not just, no matter what the result. This also, I think, is where much of this issue becomes muddled. Some confuse "torturing" with "torturing for fun" and so, at the outset, assume it unjust. This assumption is correct given that understanding of torture. However, that is simply a mistaken understanding of torture. Torture need not be done for fun nor with enjoyment. Either is wrong.
If torture is done to someone, say, a terrorist, refusing to prevent the killing of others (not to an innocent person who is not in the same moral boat as the terrorist) and for the simple reason of saving those lives, then I can see nothing wrong with it. Some will object, "But it treats the person as a means and not an end." So does asking questions. Some will object, "But it's inhuman." If they mean unjust, then they are simply begging the question. If they mean it is treating the person like an animal then (1) they are wrong—nobody tortures animals for information—and (2) that would make prisons unjust.
The point is, we have nothing in our past, public traditions (outside of slavery) that includes torture. So, for example, we don't round up and torture known or suspected rapists and child molesters and kidnappers in the process of attempting to find missing persons.
If we are a people of principle, including the principle of the rule (not the exception) of law, I think it to the point that we ask ourselves why we treat terrorists differently, if we do. If we pass laws that permit torture of terrorists because we find terrorists a separate, special case, I think we can ask additional questions in the context of our existing traditions.
It never occured to me that criminals like pot smokers and bank robbers ought to be tortured to find hidden crops and missing funds. So perhaps I am a serious (enough) person after all to be asking questions.
Furthermore, I'm guessing that in point of fact, if we have tortured people suspected of being or known to be terrorists, we have done so not to save lives directly, as in Bill's (valid) illustration, but to learn enough to prevent future terrorists acts, and that we do so with less than sure knowledge of what the (suspected or known) terrorist may in fact know. So it seems to me that in practice, torturing to save lives is still not so straightforward as you seem to imply that it is.
I am not sure what you are getting at. First off, torture is not the same as interrogation. One would be justified in interrogating a Gitmo detainee to see what he knows, but not in torturing him just to see what he knows. But the example I gave was one in which a suspect is known to have dteailed info about a particular plot that will case perhaps a million deaths. In that case, how could one rule out torture?
I'm not a consequentialist, but a deontologist. So I would never say something like the following: 'It doesn't matter whether Tookie Baby is innocent or guilty of the crimes he is charged with; executing a certain number of thuggish individuals like him has the salutary consequence of deterring crime.'
My case was one in which you have a known terrorist in custody; he is guilty of past terrorist acts; he is known to have the inside dope re: a plot that will take out the whole of Manhattan. Now do you allow a million innocents to perish in gruesome deaths because of the precious dignity of this fellow that you dare not violate? Or is this a case where you simply must look to the consequences in order to determine the rightness/wrongness of the act?
My point is that there is a moral dilemma here and that people like Campos just don't see it.
Thanks for that tidbit about Miss Anscombe. As you know, she considered Truman's ordering of the nukings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to be a violation of just war theory -- which they obviously were.
But would you call those nukings acts of terrorism?
Now, suppose you and I agree that in the case of your example torture is justified. How will we write a just law governing that use of torture? How will we enforce it? I think (though I could be wrong) that part of what Mr. Campos is driving at is that it would be impossible to have a civil policy of torture, even if one can think of cases where torture is the "right" thing to do.
Frankly, I don't have any trace of this ethical intuition that the anti-torture people are apparently blessed with. To me, torture is no different in kind from pushing someone, punching someone in the nose, bashing someone with a bat, or shooting someone in the head. Each of these acts of violence should to be avoided, but each one, along with torture, is a right and proper thing to do in certain situations. How is an absolutist refusal to torture any different from any other sort of absolutist refusal to defend oneself?
In any conflict, the most violent side gets to pick the level of violence. For someone else to refuse to raise to the level of violence of a vicious enemy is not an act of moral strength but an act of moral weakness. In the current war, we are dealing with people who hide among civilians and bomb schoolbuses. We have a moral obligation to raise our level of violence sufficiently to counter their tactics. This doesn't mean cutting off body parts, but it does mean some pretty harsh interrogation techniques.
Are you suggesting that if torture is just in some cases then it is just in all cases? If so, that doesn't seem to be sensible. Locking a criminal up for 5 years is just in some cases (I would say). But that doesn't mean we ought to sentence a man to 5 years in prison for speeding.
Well said. You stated my position better than I could have.
The question I'm wrestling with (I'm glad Dave and Henry are not) doesn't cut across crimes as far as I can see, as in your five year sentence illustration. I'm trying to think only in the context of torture to save lives. In that context, Bill's illustration is straightforward, but I think the legal questions (or as Dave has quite rightly put it, the practical questions) Mr. Campos raised in his article are being neglected in the process. In truth, I'm still trying to understand his argument, as well as the ones presented here in reply to his argument.
At this point, it seems to me that we are missing Mr. Campos's argument from legal questions as the ground for ethical decisions about torture (e.g., if you cannot make a just law, you cannot empower ethically, so since laws governing torture are unworkable by their nature, it is therefore correctly considered ethically wrong by all religions and all civilized people to empower anyone to torture others for any reason, regardless of perceived benefit; to do empower the use of torture on the basis of inherently unjust law is to sell out the values of civilization and religion), but again, I may be wrong. I may be incorrectly reading Mr. Campos's train of thought. In any case, Mr. Campos raised legal questions along side ethical ones, so my sense is that they somehow fit and belong together in his argument.
As an aside, I think we should not think from the legal or practical to the ethical. It is (or ought to be) backwards to do so. The state ought to strive to make just laws. And in doing so the legal presupposes--and dervies from--the ethical. That, I think, is the way it ought to be. (Aquinas, you might be aware, talks about this in depth in his Summa Theologica.) In short, the issue ought to concern whether or not tortue, in some instances, is just.
I don't think torture is justifiable. I view it as a form of terrorism (the targets of terror need not be innocents). A rhetorical question: Would it be acceptable to use rape as a way of "breaking down the resistance" of someone withholding vital information?
I am glad you wanted to see what sorts of considerations people might raise, but did you consider them?
There are some things, I would say, that are by definition wrong. Rape, I think, is one of them, as is murder. There are many others too (such as torturing for fun or satisfaction). I think Dave's post--especially the second paragraph--explains best why torture is just in some cases. I do not share Dave's confidence on the subject, but I do not share the confidence of the, to use Dave's term, "absolutist refusal" on terror either (such as that of Campos). Personally, I have more reasons for supporting tortue in some cases than for supporting the absoluteist refusal; thus that is what I do. But I do not think your rhetorical rape question is analogous to the situations in which torture is thought (by some) to be just.
I'm also not sure why you would view torture as a form of terrorism. It may be, but it need not be, and I've rarely (if at all) heard of it being done for the same reasons terrorist do what they do. Torturing for satisfaction (which may be the most common implementation of torture; I don't know though) is never right, but in my opinion that isn't a form of terrorism. If, though, many are equating "torture" with "torturing for satisfaction," then maybe we ought to use one of Dave's terms again and replace "torture" with "harsh interrogation techniques" (I'm sure the politicians would be proud, at least some of them).
Are you aware that rape is not unusual as a form of torture? And this is not simply "torture for satisfaction," but an effort to "elicit" compliant behavior.
I'll turn your question around: Why wouldn't you view torture as a form of terrorism? Isn't the point to do things so horrific that people loose their will to resist?
Are you aware that rape is not unusal as a form of sex? (What's that say about sex? That it may be abused? I agree.)
You have a one-sided view of torture, Bob. Torture need not be the way you are defining it. Of course if it is done that way it is immoral. I've said so before. If someone attempts to stab me, it is just for me to disarm the offender and secure my safety. It is not just for me to disarm the offender and beat him to a bloody pulp out of rage. If one defines self-defense as the latter then of course one is going to view self-defense as immoral. (For the same reason, some people have a negative view of karate, even though, if administrated properly, it simply teaches self-defense. But they have something like Mortal Kombat in mind.)
The rape question is a red herring, first because I don't think there is a believable case where rape is the best way to get information, and second because rape is impermissable for other reasons besides the violence done to the victim.
Don, I didn't mean "harsh interrogation techniques" to be a synonym for torture. I meant it to refer to techniques that stop short of true torture, such as waterboarding. I switched from "torture" to "harsh interrogation" because I believe that true torture is never necessary for getting cooperation from the captive (but if that belief turns out to be wrong then I'm willing to go further).
As to my level of certainy, what can I say except that I have examined my soul and there is no trace of a moral intuion (1) that torture is different in kind from other sorts of violence (the same is not true of rape), (2) that violence is wrong regardless of circumsances, or (3) that there is some cut-off level of violence above which the violence is wrong regardless of circumstances.
Speaking of which, the following quote from The Fifth Element might be appropriate:
What is "true torture"? In my earlier comment about your phrase "harsh interrogation techniques," my point there (and it was not meant as a snide remark, but rather, as a serious one) was that this discussion should not be merely semantic. If one is defining torture as "immorally harsh interrogation techniques" then that just makes the entire debate pointless. If one wishes to say "harsh interrogation techniques" rather than "torture," I don't care. I think the terminology used is entirely beside the point. That was what I meaning to get at.
And I wasn't meaning to criticize you when I commented on your level of certainty. I'm not sure if it came off as a criticism but I didn't mean it as such. (Nor, in that passage, did I mean to criticize Campos for his level of certainty.) It was merely a statement about my own level of certainty on the issue.
Dave - I think I probably would kill a terrorist, in fact however many I thought necessary, in order to save innocent lives. But I don't share your view that torture is less "extreme" than killing. There are other sorts of extremity besides lethality, and certainly, fates worse than death.
The rape question might, indeed, be a red herring, but not for the reasons adduced. First, torture is not just, or always done in order to extract information; and second, because torture, if it is impermissible, might well be impermissable for other reasons besides the violence done to the victim.
Bob: arguably, some forms of torture are more extreme than killing, but surely you admit that there are many harsh interrogation techniques that are less extreme. Would you rather be killed or humiliated? Killed or prevented from sleeping? Killed or water-boarded? And if you are willing to kill, why not willing to do the others?
While I'm willing to kill, but only defensively and only if necessary, I also think there are limits on how we kill. Most obviously, I don't think it's morally justified to torture someone to death. And I don't think it is ever necessary to kill someone who is already in custody and constrained as the subject of torture would be.
When I objected to the way that you seem to be defining torture, I meant that you have, or seem to have, a preconceived moral stance implicit in your concept of torture (which makes it impossible to debate the issue). This, I think, is evidenced by your saying torture is a form of terrorism. In all honesty, I think it's ridiculous, and offensive, to even somewhat equate what a CIA agent might to Bin Laden (in order to thwart his plan to blow up NYC) to what Bin Laden does to "infidels." One is done to save lives, the other to take them. That's almost on a par with Sheehan's referring to terrorists as "freedom fighters."
If you view torture as something necessarily done for satisfaction or out of hatred, then there is no possible way we can debate this issue. But that conception of torture is just badly mistaken, in my opinion. Your view, as it appears to me, is like someone altogether objecting to fighting because he perceives it as bullying, not realizing that it may just be self-defense. (The second paragraph of Dave's '9.27.2006 8:15pm' post explains this better.)
So why, again, do you view torture (in cases such as the ticking-bomb scenario) as immoral?
Tom: I'm not old enough to have been around to experience WWII, and my generation for the most part doesn't reflect too much on those events, but I'm interested, Bill, in knowing just how Truman and his advisors justified the use of nuclear bombs on Japan. I know Just War theory is VERY specific in what conditions have to be met before one is justified in going to war. I'm curious, is there any published account of Truman's reasoning on this? Or was it basically just "This will for sure bring the war to an end and save more lives than would otherwise surely die." If true, wouldn't Truman's choice be right?
Tom
I wasn't around in those days, either. This is not a topic I've researched, so I can't help you.
Assuming that many more would have died had the nukes not been used, does it follow that Truman's decision was morally right? It is a tough question. Two quick points. Noncombatants in a very clear sense of the term were targeted: babies being born, people in hospitals near death, monks in their monasteries, nuns in their nunneries, all sorts of harmless people who had nothing at all to do with the war effort, as opposed to munitions workers, farmers, et al.
Surely there is a moral question about the wholesale slaughter of such people, not to mention genetic damage, environmental degradation. On the other hand, without the nukes the fanatical Japs might have kept the war going for years. They might have acquired nukes themselves (perhaps from the Krauts). They would not have hesitated in attacking our civilian population.
There is no easy answer.
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