1. I have framed the argument in the first-person to make it more concrete and 'existential.' But the point is of course general, and each should enact the argument for himself. (By the way, the above is further linguistic evidence of non-indexical uses of the first-person singular pronoun.)
2. Moral responsibility is to be distinguished both from causal responsibility and from legal responsibility. Suppose I have just passed my stress EKG with flying colors and have no reason to think I have heart disease. But I have a heart attack while driving home from the stress test and kill a pedestrian. Surely I am not morally responsible for the death. And it would be a draconian law indeed under which I would be held legally responsible. On the other hand, I am morally responsible for the entertaining (if not the initial occurrence) of evil thoughts such as the thought of running down a man who has insulted me, but not legally responsible for them inasmuch as there are no — and should not be — any positive laws regulating what one thinks. (Positive laws are those posited by legislatures.)
3. An action-omission is a failure to act. Example: I promise to meet you at Insufficient Grounds coffeehouse for chess at an agreed upon time, but fail to show up or notify you of my inability to be present.
4. That (P1) is true I take to be either self-evident or more evident than the load-bearing premises of any argument the conclusion of which is its negation. That we take credit for some of our actions/omissions shows that we take ourselves to be morally responsible for them. This credit cannot be accounted for in terms of mere causal or legal responsibility. And the same applies when we blame ourselves and others for actions and omissions.
5. (P2) will be rejected by compatibilists. They will hold that moral responsibility does not require libertarian freedom of the will (LFW), where this is defined in terms of 'could have done otherwise.' Compatibilists believe that moral responsibility can be had 'on the cheap' if a person is free in the sense of not being constrained to act or refrain from acting by anything external to the agent. The basic compatibilist idea is that determinism is compatible with freedom if freedom is taken to be mere freedom from external constraint.
I agree with Kant, however, that compatibilist freedom is the 'freedom of the turnspit' and as such not the genuine article. The spit is free to turn if nothing impedes it. To update the example, think of the spit as a self-contained, motorized, battery-operated unit. One can even imagine it turning itself on when a hunk of meat is attached to it, and turning itself off when the meat is cooked. One can say that the turnspit 'acts' freely as long as nothing interferes with it.
This 'action,' however, is logically compatible with the truth of determinism. Determinism is the view that whatever happens is determined by antecedent conditions together with the laws of nature. The turning of the spit is thus entirely determined and 'free' only in the sense that its operation is not impeded by anything external to it.
But this is not the sense of 'free' in which we morally responsible agents are free. Facing a morally relevant choice, I experience myself as free in the sense that it is 'up to me' what happens, that what I do is determined by me, and that when I do A rather than B (both being possible), I could have done B.
6. One might try to argue that this sense of libertarian freedom, and the sense of moral responsibility that rests upon it, are illusory. I do not believe that it makes any sense to view these phenomena as illusory, but this question is reserved for the next post in this series.
7. The argument given above is not compelling, but then few, if any, arguments for substantive philosophical theses are compelling. (If you think you have a compelling argument, present it to me and I will show you why it is not compelling.) But I do claim that the above argument renders the belief in libertarian freedom of the will rationally acceptable.
This notion of blame is very characteristic of Christianity and I suspect (without evidence other than my own intuition) that it is the most common notion of blame in all cultures until recent times. Not so?
You think one can rightfully be blamed for something outside of their control? You wouldn't blame me if Bill shot you in the foot would you? I hope not. You probably wouldn't since it's outside of my control. So why would you blame Bill if he has no choice about shooting you in the foot? If it is his nature to shoot people named Dave in the foot, and he can do nothing about that, then how can you rightfully blame him? It's just as much outside of his control as it is of mine. (Really, you should blame whoever named you.) I think to say that someone is blameworthy is to say that the person is morally flawed if LFW is assumed. At bottom, to say that someone is blameworthy is to say that the person his or herself has chosen an action worthy of blame. You wouldn't blame a rock for hitting you.
Even if one attempts to complicate things and say that a person is a complex being it wouldn't matter since no sane person would blame a computer for crashing or chastise it when it freezes. At rock bottom a computer's actions are determined. If at rock bottom a human lacks free will (like a computer) but is merely a determined being then (like a computer) you can't blame it.
1. "The basic compatibilist idea is that determinism is compatible with freedom if freedom is taken to be mere freedom from external constraint." I do not know how many compatibilists have construed freedom as mere freedom from external constraints--I think Hume may have been one--but many compatibilists take a more subtle view of freedom. Leibniz, for example, believes that freedom requires (i) spontaneity, (ii) contingency, and (iii) understanding. Without going into exactly what these things mean, it's clear that Kant's turnspit objection fails to touch Leibniz's compatibilism, for the turnspit's movement may be both spontaneous and contingent, but there is no understanding, and therefore no freedom. Another compatibilist who should be mentioned here is Susan Wolf, who sets out her view in Freedom Within Reason (OUP, 1990). Here is how she herself characterizes her position:
I interpret Wolf as a compatibilist because one can be determined to do the right thing for the right reason. But notice that on Wolf's compatibilism, the turnspit is not free, because it lacks the ability to do things for reasons. (This point is not unrelated to Leibniz's inclusion of (iii) in his account of freedom.) Far from refuting compatibilism, then, Kant's objection only undermines certain cruder, less interesting versions of the view.
2. I believe that (P2) can be shown to be false. Consider a variation on Locke's well-known example. Suppose there is a person in a room. As it happens he is locked in and escape is beyond his ability, but he doesn't know this: as far as he knows, he is capable of leaving at his discretion. Now suppose this man hears a cry for help outside this room. He looks outside the locked, unbreakable window and sees a woman whose life is in danger. She is tied to a tree, her hands bound, and appears to be having a heart attack. The man hears her exclaim, "Need medication....[gasp]...in pocket," but instead of trying to help her, he decides he'd rather stay in and not get involved, as he is engrossed in a delightful novel.
This example is an unusual one, I admit, but it shows that one can be morally responsible for an action (specifically an "action-ommission") without being free in the libertarian sense. The man is not libertarianly free to help the woman, because he cannot do otherwise than he actually does; that is, he cannot help but stay in the room and not help the woman. Yet it is undeniable that the man is blameworthy for his failure to help the woman. Therefore, moral responsibility does not require libertarian freedom, i.e., (P2) is false.
Let me forestall one objection to my argument. Someone might say that though the man was not free to do otherwise because he was locked in, still he was free to choose otherwise, and that is what is important. But we could imagine an even stranger example in which the man is not locked in a room, but where someone (an evil scientist, perhaps) has done something to his brain which prevents the man from choosing to help the woman. In this case we suppose that the man does not want to help the woman, and consequently chooses not to, this being the only choice he could have made. Yet his choice is still free and therefore blameworthy. This shows that what makes the choice free is not the ability to choose otherwise, which the man lacks, but, to put it crudely, that he has chosen in accordance with what he wants. (To put it less crudely, the man's will is free because he chose to do that thing which he perceived (in this case incorrectly) to be supported by the strongest reasons.)
I would (if I were a proponent of this view) blame Bill for shooting me in the foot even if he could not help it because he is the kind of person who coud not help it. I wouldn't blame you for it because Bill's shooting me in the foot gives me no information about you, but it certainly gives me some information about Bill.
Your counter argument simply rejects this view of blame without arguing against it. This is like arguing against the devine right of kings on the grounds that the son of the current king may not be the most qualified to lead. But such an argument would have no effect on a royalist to whom meritocracy is merely a peculiar notion. Similarly the idea that one should judge actions rather than people is just peculiar notion to someone of this mindset.
No offense, but I'm not interested in what proponent of what view I am. I'm interested in what makes sense. You didn't address any of my points at all. You simply labeled me as holding such and such a view and noted that you don't hold to that view, which just says that we disagree. But I already knew that. If you could address my points directly, and I the same for you, I think that would lend to a more productive discussion.
It seems, Malcolm, that if a person built a robot designed to slap you, you would blame the robot. If this is correct, then we are just going to have to disagree on the validity of that point of view. If this is not correct, then could you please explain why you hold such a view as incorrect.
(Minor aside: I did argue against the view which I'm meaning to oppose. I defined blameworthy and showed how determinism was not compatibile with it. I also tried to show that one cannot be blamed for actions outside of their control and that determinism would make one's actions outside of their control. Of course you may think I've gone wrong somewhere but it would help the discussion if you indicate where I have gone wrong rather than simply say that I have gone wrong. Actually, you never even said that I had gone wrong but simply that you differed in opinion. If you think I have gone wrong please say so, and indicate where. I think that would help the discussion. Thanks.)
I don't know that we (who's the we?) do feel it important to hold others responsible. I'm sure some people do and some people don't. But that's not important. You brought something like this up in the other thread saying that a world devoid of moral accountability is "just not how we want the world to be!" But such issues are beside the point since what we want or don't want is irrelevant to logical discourse. (Logical discourse considers arguments regardless of desires.) Also, I think for certain issues you may be confusing "what we want" with "the way the world appears to us." It's not that I want a world where free will is existence but that, to me, the world appears to be that way. The same for rational inference. A rejection of free will seems to undermine such things (as well as others). So I assume free will for the same reasons you assume (if you do) that the external world exists. Not because you want it to, but because it appears that way.
Back to your original question. I don't know that people feel it important to hold others responsible if that is to mean that people want to live in a world where people are held responsible. I'm sure some do and some don't. I would suggest though, whether they want the world to be as such or not, most people agree that the world we live in appears to be so that a person's actions are capable of being considered blameworthy and seems so because the person appears to have chosen (of his or her own free will) to commit the blameworthy action. If one wants to dispense of these common sense assumptions one should have good reasons for doing so, just as if one wants to deny the existence of motion one should have good reasons.
Ad 1. There has been a lot of recent work on compatibilism and it is a large topic unto itself. I was merely sketching the main idea.
It does indeed seem that understanding is part of free action. But consider a 'beefed up' (sorry!) turnspit fitted out with sensors and a sophisticated on-board computer. It understands what sort of meat is attached to it, raises itself or lowers itself vis-a-vis the grill depending on the kind of meat, etc. It understands its role in the ultimate scheme of things and wants to avoid being thrown on the junkheap . . . Still, it is a deterministic system and so not free in a sense that could support moral responsibility.
2. The Lockean examples are very instructive. The first is easily dealt with, so you bring up the second:
You want to say that the man chooses not to help the woman in distress, and that he chooses freely, despite the fact that he is prevented by a brain-modification from choosing to help her. So he is free even though he could not have done otherwise.
But does the man believe (albeit falsely) that he can choose to help her? If yes, then I say he is morally responsible for not deciding to choose to help her, and is thus L-free.
We'll have to come back to these tricky examples.
Is there anyone else who understand what I am getting at and can explain the concept better?
Here's another attempt, based your example of a robot that has a tendency to slap people who look like me: when discussing robots, the issue of blame is an issue of proper operation or faulty operation. If the robot has a tendency to slap people who look like me, then I'd be inclined to view the robot as faulty. I would "blame" the robot for slapping me in the sense that I would come to view the robot as flawed and in need of correction. If I were not a very objective thinker, my emotional response to being slapped by this robot would probably be very much like my emotional response to being slapped by a person. I would be angry, I would come to dislike the robot, I would wish to engage in some sort of retribution against the robot, say by having it shut down —all of the incidentals surrounding real blame.
My point is that this view of blame is probably very common. What it means to blame A is to view A as morally faulty. Yes, the fact that A is morally faulty may have deterministically caused A to commit the offense, but that is not relevant according to this view. What is relevant is that A is morally faulty; that is what one means by "blame" (again, this is not a view that I am endorsing, only discussing).
Your beefed up turnspit raises the issue of artificial intelligence. I believe that even a turnspit outfitted with sensors and a CPU lacks understanding. Searle's Chinese room thought-experiment is to the point here. So I deny that the computerized turnspit understands anything. But that's another large topic; I won't argue for my view here. If, however, the turnstile were capable of understanding (per impossibile), and in particular of grasping the reasons for its turning (or whatever), then I would see no problem with saying that the turnstile is genuinely free.
Yes, the man falsely believes that he is able to choose to help the woman. I'll take a look at your discussion of L-freedom.
I agree that the man is responsible for his decision not to help the woman, but it seems to me that he in not L-free, as you defined that term in your other post. So the man is responsible and therefore free, but not L-free. Therefore, freedom is not L-freedom.
Thanks for pointing out to me that "logical discourse considers arguments regardless of desires." Actually, I already had that in mind, and that of course is what motivated me to point out that we were steering away from that ideal when the notion that "we wouldn't be able to hold people blameworthy" was used as a "reductio" argument in support of the freedom of the will.
One sees a lot of "bad, therefore false" arguments on this topic (more than any other). I don't want to psychologize, but I feel the need to point them out when I see them.
As far as how the world appears, you seem to overlook that the very reason that freewill is such a hard problem in the first place has to do with the fact that the world appears always to exhibit deterministic causality; it is the fact that we feel the need to make an enormous exception only for our own actions that leads us to such bafflement. Yes, we appear upon our own introspection to be completely free, but I am skeptical of the reliability of that observation, because I can't imagine how things would appear differently to us if we were not. Parsimony inclines me therefore me therefore to the view that our own actions are part of the same causal web that everything else in the world appears to be part of, which is troublesome for the notion of free will that you appear to be defending.
I'm not sure what you thought I intended by asking the question I did, but you haven't answered it. I asked not whether it appeared that people were capable of being held responsible, but why it was important that they be held responsible. I think that this bears directly on why the free-will question matter to us so much.
The point I want to make is that regardless of the underlying metaphysical truth of the causation of our actions (a truth we may never know), we are justified in holding people blameworthy and responsible because that stance in turn has a causal effect on their subsequent actions.
I'll field that question about the robot myself as well, even though you meant it not for me but for Dave. The answer depends on the robot itself. If it is a simple automaton, with no flexibility of behavior, then I would not bother blaming it any more than I would blame a stick someone had hit me with. But we are not such simple machines! We adjust our actions according to the climate of social expectation we live in; we learn and modify our behavior based on our experiences; we seek praise, and we avoid blame. If the robot in your example can do all of that, then yes, I would have a good reason to hold it accountable, because by doing so I might reduce its likelihood of repeating its offense in future and because such opprobrium might set an instructive example for other robots of its ilk. (This is not to say that I wouldn't have a bone to pick with the man who built it and set it upon me in the first place.)
Finally, I'm sorry you feel the need to "quit arguing with" me. It's true, I do seem not to share some fundamental assumptions that are almost universal in this group, but I have always thought that the job of philosophy is to question our assumptions as deeply as we can. I do NOT take it as given that we have the radically free will you seem to consider axiomatic; and I think it matters to drill down a bit into what, exactly, we are arguing for, and why it should matter.
Since I know you are a Christian I will say that the heart of Christian doctrine about the sinful nature is basically what Dave is proposing.
It is the aknowledgement that we do what we don't want to do and we don't do what we see as good. Our Spiritual desire for good is in bondage to the desires of our flesh and the ignorance of our mind. We are therefore not free in regards to our will. (Rom 6-7). In other words, because we are morally corrupt, not just in our actions but in our fallen nature, we are not free to do right. It is interesting to note that the OT sacrificial system was not designed to cover intentional sins, but unintentional ones. I would propose that we are like the man in Spur's post above locked in our cell. The problem is that when we see the woman in trouble and try to get out and can't, we then blame ourselves for not being able to open the door.
Christian doctrine historically teaches that we really can gradually be set free from the state of moral corruption and thus at that point be held truly accountable for our actions. This is where it differs from most other cultures. Here is an interesting verse.
" For in the case of those who have been enlightened and have tasted of the heavenly gift and been made partakers of the Holy Spirit,...and then have fallen away, it is impossible to renew them again to repentance, since they crucify to themselves the Son of God and put Him to open shame." Heb 6:4
The problem is that until someone has been enlightened, their morally corrupt, self-agrandizing nature will blind them to their true nature, thus blinding them to the extent of their bondage. In as much as they are blind they are not blameworthy -they only think they are.
It is escaping from this blindness that Paul describes in Rom 8 (Therefore there is now no more condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus. For the law of the Spirit of life has set them free from the law of sin and death.)This should be interpreted not just as the objective state of the believer, but also the subjective realization of the one living in the Spirit.
I am sorry, but I'm still not understanding you. I was not clear in posing my question. My question about the robot was not if you would be able to blame the robot (you're able to blame a circle for being round if you want). My question was whether or not you would be justified in blaming the robot, that is to say, whether or not the robot was actually blameworthy (regardless of whether you felt, emotionally, like blaming him). So, once more: If a robot was designed to slap you, you believe you would be justified in blaming the robot?
(Note, though, that I am not asking whether the robot needs correction. You used blame in quotes and equated it with "needs correction." But that's not a correct usage of blame. That fact that you put it in quotes indicates that you realize that. Even if the robot needs correction it's not the robot's fault that it needs correction. To blame the robot for that would be like blaming a rock for being thrown.)
The LFW-ist accepts that a portion of the world appears causally determined (or under the laws of deterministic causality). But she also says that a portion of the world appears not to be causally determined--namely, herself (as well as other persons). Why one portion of the world should veto another is unclear to me. One could just as easily aim to cancel out all causal determinism by saying that because I seem not to be causally determined I posit that there is not such thing as deterministic causality. That would be the equivalent of what you're doing. Neither is acceptable to me.
Why is it important that people not be held responsible? I don't see the relevance of your question in this area.
I am confused about your position, Malcolm. Is it your position that even if all our actions were causally determined we would still be blameworthy for our actions?
Your statement about the robot being "simple" is irrelevant. If at rock bottom we're causally determined like the robot then we're just like the robot. A computer is no more free than a calculator. And to argue by saying that humans are an example of complex yet causally determined beings just begs the question.
Malcolm, when I said I need to quit arguing with you I was joking. I meant that I was arguing with you so much that I was going to start calling everybody "Malcolm." Obviously it was a bad joke.
I apologize if I'm not being clear - I was not suggesting that people not be held responsible; quite the contrary.
The position I am drawn toward is as follows:
1) I strongly suspect that LFW, as defined by Bill in his STRONG READING post above, is false, though unprovably so.
2) I don't think that the introspective appearance of our own LFW should be given much weight, because I don't think that if LFW were false we would be able to notice any difference.
3) As I mentioned in a comment on Bill's STRONG READING post, I believe that the truth/falsity of LFW is epistemically inaccessible, and, following on 2) above, that the truth or falsity of LFW makes no discernable difference in the world - that all of our experiences would be utterly indistinguishable in either case.
4) Because epistemic confirmation of LFW is forever to be denied us, and because, in either case, holding others (and ourselves) to be responsible agents creates a causal context that influences us to behave responsibly, I see no reason that we should not, regardless of the unknowable truth value of LFW, continue to do so.
As for the robot, my point was that if by holding it responsible I could influence it toward more acceptable behavior, I would have a good reason for doing so. I wouldn't bother trying that with a stick.
I don't see any of this in the all-or-nothing way that most here seem to. Yes, determinism means that we cannot be perfectly rational. We can, however, be "pretty good" cogitating machines. Likewise, I think that a robot that is capable of altering its behavior, however deterministically, in response to its environment occupies a middle ground between a simple thing like a stick and the godlike freedom of LFW. I think we are in that middle area as well.
This, by the way, is exactly what we do with our young children, after they have been "thrown" by us, as raw, hardwired phenotypes, into the world.
I've seen the examples you offer in your "9.9.2006 11:47pm" post. They're meant to show that moral responsibility doesn't require LFW, where LFW is conceived as entailing the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP; the notion that a person is only free if he could have chosen otherwise). I never found them that convincing for a number or reasons. (I apologize for the length of this post, but it was to maintain clarity.)
(1) You say yourself, Spur, that your first example fails because it only indicates that the man was not free to do otherwise rather than choose otherwise. All these examples, in my opinion, commit this same error. I say a man will be stopped from murdering (and forced not to murder) if he chooses to murder but if he chooses not to murder he will be allowed to continue on unrestrained. Either way the man will not murder. But this, as you say, only shows that the man cannot do otherwise, not that cannot choose otherwise. Note, though, that I didn't say how the restraint would be engaged. Maybe if he chooses to murder, then he will be tackled and so forced not to murder; or maybe if he chooses to murder, then a brain implant will be activated and he will be forced not to murder. The point: it doesn't matter where the restraint is placed; it's still a restraint on what the man can do, not on what he can choose. One cannot stack the deck and say that if the man chooses correctly we will let him choose but if he chooses incorrectly we will not let him choose. Either the man is allowed to choose or he is not. Either choosing is something he can do or it is something he cannot do. If choosing is something the man can do then it is something he can do in either scenario (whether he chooses rightly or wrongly). So the objection you raise to your first scenario, Spur, works against all the examples (unless they're attempting to unfairly stack the deck).
(2) The examples don't really prove much. One can ask why the man is still being held responsible for his action (if he chose the option that leaves him unrestrained). The answer will probably be because he freely chose. But then it can be asked what one means by "freely chose." And we're back where we started.
(3) Continuing from the last point, to say that something was "freely chosen," it can be argued, requires, by necessity, that there be alternative possibilities. I can't choose unless I have options (from which to choose). Which is to say, I can't choose unless I have alternative possibilities (from which to choose). Indeed, then, a choice can only arise, by definition, if there are alternative possibilities.
(4) Those who object to LFW and PAP tend to do so because they don't believe there needs to be some idea of "forking paths" (the alternative possibilities) for free will to exist. But in these examples there are still forking paths, and which path is taken depends on the person. If the individual chooses the option that is allowed, then the brain implant isn't activated. If he chooses the other option (or it is known that he will choose the other option), the implant is activated. So there are still forking paths; they're just cleverly disguised.
If you were a brain in a vat you wouldn't notice any difference either. And I disagree that if we didn't possess LFW we wouldn't notice any difference. In my opinion, we'd be like rocks or computers: we wouldn't notice anything.
I didn't understand your "perfectly rational" comment. Either rational inference may exist or it may not. But it can't imperfectly exist. (Note: the existence of rational inference doesn't mean that we're omniscient or infallible.)
Also, if you're basing your conclusions off of this world then, again, that's just begging the question. If you're analysis is something like "We can reason in this world thus it is possible to reason in a deterministic world," then you're just begging the question since you'd be assuming that this world is entirely deterministic. And equating children with robots begs the question too.
Thanks for the comment but one doesn't need to be a Calvinist to be a Christian. I don't need to believe that I am causally determined to sin. In fact, I think that's biblically unsound and theologically disastrous. God didn't make me to sin nor does He make me sin. Rather, I choose to sin.
To clarify my last post: Robots don't choose anything. They're programmed (i.e., causally determined) to act a certain way.
I don't share this opinion. Is there anything you might offer in support of it (without begging the question along the lines of "computers don't notice things, but we do; computers are deterministic, therefore the difference must be that we aren't")?
A machine that mimics ideal rational inference may exist; such a machine would generate the same output, given the same inputs, as a being (if any even exist) that exhibited the "genuine" article. Such a machine would have its limitations, but might do a perfectly acceptable "real-world" job. That is what I think we are. What I'm saying here is that if I assume that the world is deterministic, I can still posit, without any inconsistency, the existence of beings such as ourselves (that I claim are rational-inference-simulators as suggested above). We don't need the ideal rationality you seek; the mechanical implementation we work with is good enough for our purposes.
Well I think the argument you mention in your 1st paragraph is a strong one (and it doesn't beg the question). The fact that objects which we tend to think lack LFW also lack the ability to perceive is a good reason to think that if a thing were to lack LFW it would also lack the ability to perceive. Of course it's not a knockdown argument, but it's a start.
I would advise against trying to conceptualize what we would be like if we lacked LFW. In my opinion that is like asking what a circle would be like if it wasn't round. Well, it wouldn't be a circle. Of course I could be wrong in that analogy, but to avoid the issue altogether it would be better to think about what some thing (and not ourselves) would be like if that thing lacked LFW.
Computers simulate our rationality. I agree. But if our rationality is also simulated then we're just like computers. A computer that builds other computers is just as artificial as the computers it builds.
But if our rationality is simulated (and I don't think that it is) then it must be simulating something. So you would have to explain this "ideal" rationality. We can say that computers are rational only when we suggest that they mimic our rationality. But if our rationality mimics another sort of rationality, then where is that other sort of rationality to be found? A tendentious theist might ask: If a computer was created in the image of us, as it were, then we were created in the image of what?
Lastly, to say that something mimics something is to say that though it appears to be that something, it really isn't. So computers mimic our rationality, but they aren't really rational--that is, they don't engage in rational inference. (If they do, it's amazing that they never get an answer wrong or that they can divide 942354 by 23 in their heads.) If, however, we merely mimic rationality, and aren't really rational ourselves, then we're in the same boat as the computer, that is, we're not really rational.
This seems an awful lot like question-begging to me - we must have LFW, because, well, we wouldn't be US otherwise, but don't try to think about that...
I could just as easily assert that we must NOT have LFW, because, obviously, everything we've ever seen all around us is deterministic.
Neither of these arguments is going to get us anywhere.
I'm willing to accept that "we're not really rational" in the strong sense you seem to be angling for. My point is that we fake it pretty well, because we are fine-tuned to do so.
As for what we are simulating, I might argue that the "real" rationality you presuppose simply doesn't exist anywhere, and that our version (mechanistic and imperfect as it is), which arose by matching our needs against the actual world, is simply as good as it gets.
Unfortunately I'm at work and can't add more at the moment...
Your (1) misses my point. In my second example, the man is unable to choose to help the woman. The only thing he is capable of willing is to refrain from helping. It isn't that if he chooses to help, the restraint then comes into play. The restraint prevents him from choosing to help in the first place. (You could even imagine that God or an evil demon is putting this restraint into place.) Yet the man happens to want not to help (the only thing he is capable willing), and so he wills to help. Yet his so willing is free, because he is willing in accordance with his desires. Therefore, freedom does not require the ability to choose otherwise.
Ad. 3. When I spoke of the man "choosing" not to help, I meant nothing other than that he willed not to help. But willing to do X (or not to do Y) does not presuppose that there are alternatives that the person is capable of willing given all the same prior factors.
Ad. 4. This point again illustrates that you have misunderstood my example. The implant in the guy's brain prevents him from choosing to help. It does not simply activate when the man chooses to help, or when it becomes clear that the man will choose to help. The implant prevents him from being able to make that choice in the first place. There is no hidden forking path in my second example.
I dealt with your response to my (1) in the second half of that same section. Your response, again, is stacking the deck; but now you're simply changing the terminology, nothing more. If I will to help you (and do so freely), then I have chosen to will to help you. If the man "freely wills," then he has chosen to will. If the man has not chosen to will, then he has not freely willed.
To avoid this digressing into a mere semantic dispute, I will try to make my point simple. You are now saying that the individual freely wills (rather than "freely chooses") not to help. Is this correct? If so, what makes his willing free?
There is a hidden forking path, Spur. Based on what the individual wills or chooses or does (or whatever terminology you want to use), the brain implant will either be activated or not--two possible paths.
(As an aside, I am uncertain why you bring "willing" into play now, suggesting that it is essential to understanding your examples, when earlier you failed to even mention it in those examples.)
You are right that what I said was a lot like question begging. (I didn't mean it in the sense that you interpreted it though, that is, as an argument for LFW.) Let me briefly comment on the "conceptualizing things without LFW" idea. I don't think this is a good idea at all because it just confuses matters and is irrelevant to the discussion. Also, people will insert their own preconceptions into their conceptualizations, so it wouldn't benefit anybody anyways (which is what I was trying to get at before). So, for instance, of course we can conceptualize a sort of Terminator-like being. I even admit that such a being is possible, a robotic being that acts just like us. But that is not the issue here (and it's irrelevant). The issue isn't whether or not we can construct complex robots. The issue is whether or not we are robots. The Terminator, though it appears person-like, if it were a true robot would, in my opinion, lack many things we persons have (e.g., self-consciousness, the ability to reason, first-person perspective, etc.). The Terminator would be, in actually, as self-conscious as Talking Elmo, even though he would mimic our self-consciousness better. Now that is what I say. Others (maybe yourself) would say that (given enough complexity?) he could actually be self-conscious, have first-person perspective, etc. This is not clear to me, though, and I would have to disagree. (There is a certain level of complexity above which self-consciousness arises?) But arguments could not really be advanced here since everyone carries their preconceived conclusions to the images and inserts them. And this is why these conceptualizations do nothing to advance the conversation.
Another poor way to approach the discussion is appealing to ourselves as examples of people with LFW or as examples of complex robots. So when you say that we fake rationality well, this is just begging the question because it assumes we are complex automatons, which is the very thing under discussion. The same for the recent statement I made about LFW and circles. (Note: it is not question begging to point out that we appear not to be automatons. Making note of that appearance is as valid a point as pointing out that the external world appears to be real.)
Now that I've said that, let me talk about how I think the conversation should be advanced. It should be debated whether or not determinism would allow for self-consciousness, rationality, moral accountability, etc. If it would not, then we would either have to say we don't have these things or that (we do and) the world is not deterministic. A good book that lays the discussion (or a similar discussion) down in these terms is Victor Reppert's C. S. Lewis's Dangerous Idea.
Basically, Malcolm, I think we've been jumbling things around incorrectly, which is why not much progress has been made in our discussion (though I think some progress has been made and I've enjoyed the jumbling anyway). I think we should try to focus in on one particular issue or agree to ceasefire. What do you think?
I concede that I haven't properly answered you so far. I agree with you about understanding and the Chinese room, so I withdraw that response.
I'll have to think some more about the man in the Locke'd room. I'm an incompatibilist and you are not; that's the issue between us.
Excellent. That is the issue between us.
Don,
How have I stacked the deck? All I have done is described an example in which a person makes a choice which is, intuitively, free, and yet lacks the ability to choose otherwise. Do you consider any argument that undermines your view guilty of stacking the deck?
To answer your question, what makes the man free is that he wills what he wants, or what he perceives to be best. It just so happens that what he wills is the only thing he could have willed.
No. That is not the way the example is set up. The implant prevents the man from choosing to help; it does not activate in response to the man's choosing to help. I don't see how I can make that any clearer.
I am using 'chooses' and 'wills' interchangeably.
No, I don't automatically shout "Stacked deck!" at any argument that undermines my position. I explained in my first post (timestamp: 9.11.2006 8:32am) why I believed those examples--certain versions of them--to be stacking the deck. Whether or not my explanation is ultimately successful, I didn't just shout "Stacked deck!" and leave it at that.
Given the set up of your examples there are obviously cases in which the brain implant will not be activated. Is this correct? If so, are there also cases in which the brain implant will be activated? If not, then what is the point of the brain implant?
Before I respond to the rest of your post, I ask that we stick with one term, so that things don't become so muddled and, more importantly, so that this doesn't degrade into a mere semantic dispute. Do you prefer sticking with choose or will?
As you say, a cease-fire might be in order, as I think we are getting into areas that are so speculative that we'll just be lobbing our intuitions at each other. For example, I see no need to postulate some sort of Terminator-like being in order to have an example of a conscious being without LFW; on the contrary, because I see no reason whatsoever to imagine that LFW is true, I simply assume that conscious-beings-without-LFW is what we are. Why you seem to take it as given that LFW is a prerequisite for self-awareness, I can't imagine.
You mention that we appear not to be automatons. But what do we really have as examples of automatons with which to prime our intuition? Our clumsy man-made ones? We've only been building them for a few years; crude things they are, and to assume that they have exhausted the possibilities of what matter can become is hardly a convincing position. We, on the other hand, have been undergoing continuous refinement for billions of years, and in us the the state of the art has advanced a good deal further.
I believe that the truth or falsity of LFW is unknowable. I also think that anyone who asserts that any empirically observable real-world consequence should depend on the truth or falsity of LFW must be prepared to explain in clear terms what would be different, and why. Generalities about not being able to be conscious, when we have no idea in the first place how consciousness works, simply won't do.
But if you'd like to keep going, I think the question of rational inference might be a place where some progress, at least in terms of clarification, could be made. I assume you have in mind the C.S. Lewis-style argument about the divergence between "Cause and Effect" and "Ground and Consequent". I have already agreed that our rationality, under physical determinism, would have to be an "as-if", mechanical version, tuned to agree with the regularites of the world, rather than the abstract, dualist process we'd prefer, in which our thoughts are shaped directly by Reasons rather than by Causes; are you saying that even this watered-down (but good-enough-for-our-hominid-purposes) version is impossible?
In my example, the brain implant is not something that is activated at all. Think of it as a passive rather than active mechanism: it simply prevents the man from choosing to help, much the same way that the locked door prevents the man from leaving the room. You wouldn't say that if the man decides to leave the room, the door lock activates and prevents him from leaving. The door is locked regardless whether he decides to leave or stay. Similarly, this brain implant is a passive mechanism, the key difference being that it doesn't just prevent the man from doing something, it prevents him from choosing something, namely to help. (Even from an (dualist) interactionist perspective interfering with the brain can prevent certain mental events from occuring.) So the man has only one choice available to him. Yet, intuitively, he is free, because he chooses to do what he wanted to do. If a person chooses to do that thing which, all things considered, he most wants to do, then how can it be denied that the person chooses freely? That would be bizarre. Therefore, free choice does not require the ability to choose otherwise.
You write: "to say that something was 'freely chosen,' it can be argued, requires, by necessity, that there be alternative possibilities." I would love to see this argument. My example, together with the attending argument, seems to show that what you say here about free choice is false, and I believe that my argument is stronger than any argument we have for thinking that free choice requires alternative possibilities.
I am happy to continue speaking of choosing, rather than willing. I consider the terms synonymous. I only introduced the latter term into the discussion because you claimed that the very idea of choice presupposes alternative possibilities. I simply pointed out that by 'choice' I meant nothing other than 'willing', and since one can will without alternative possibilities, one can also choose (in the sense I'm using the word) without such possibilities.
The man can either be prevented by the implant or not be prevented by the implant, otherwise what is the point of the implant? In the specific case (within the example) that you give the man is not prevented by the implant. Is this correct? But if it were know that the man would choose to help the woman, would not the implant prevent him from actually choosing so? And is this not different from if it were known that the man would choose, freely, not to help the woman?
We both, Spur, agree, I think, that a man has chosen (willed, etc.) freely if he has done so, that is, if he was not causally determined to do so. Do you agree with this? If so, then we both seem to agree that only if an action (doing, choosing, willing, etc.) is self-determined (rather than causally determined) may that action be considered free.* Do you agree?
Let me set up your example again and see if we both can agree to it. There is an implant inserted in the brain of a man called Jones. He hears a female cry for help. If it is known that Jones will choose to help, then the implant will be triggered and cause him to choose not to help. If it is known that Jones will choose not to help, then the implant will not trigger, and here, in this second case, it seems that we are able to hold Jones morally responsible for what he has chosen. But we will notice that Jones cannot chose otherwise. Do you agree to the set up of this scenario?
*(All of this note is but my opinion; I'm not arguing for anything here. I'm merely stating what I think to be the case so as to help clarify my view. I'm sure you disagree with much if it, Spur. But it was not meant to convince, merely to clarify.) I think it is important to make this distinction (of self-determination) so that (causal) determinism isn't adopted prematurely. For example, I concede that our biological make-up is beyond our control. We are different, and that's what makes us different. But that does not imply determinism. Flannery O'Connor (not a philosopher) says that "free will does not mean one will, but many wills conflicting in one man." The "many wills" O'Connor speaks of are, I think, what are normally called desires (I've seen them referred to as "first-order desires"). So I may have conflicting desires when I see a couple getting mugged: the desire to run away and the desire to help. These desires might be said to by beyond my control; I cannot help them. But I can choose or will one (I've seen this referred to as a "second-order desire"). That is what makes me free. In the paper that Bill cites in a recent post, the author speaks about "irresistible desires" (such as drug addition). I do not think there is such a thing as "irresistible desires." No doubt certain drugs will cause you to have a strong desire (first-order desire) to want them. That is an inescapable effect of the drug, and it is beyond one's control. Certain drugs are addicting, true. But addiction is not coercion. The addict still, of his or her own freedom, chooses (second-order desire) to act upon or to intend to act upon (even if he or she is ultimately prevented by lack of money or some such thing) that particular (first-order) desire. A first-order desire can never annihilate a second-order desire, in my opinion. And I think they should be recognized as distinct. Our ability, in my opinion, to choose between the "many wills" is what makes us free.
Either something engages in rational inference or it does not. It may mimic it well, but it is still not rational at all. Cabbage Patch dolls mimic self-consciousness when they say "I love you." But they are not in the least bit self-conscious. Similarly, in keeping with your "as-if" rationality, we, as humans, though we mimic the ability to reason well, would in no way be rational.
The first two sections that follow are adapted from chapter four of Reppert's C. S. Lewis's Dangerous Idea. His arguments are specifically against naturalism but many of them work against causal determinism as well. (When I say determinism I am speaking of causal, mechanistic determinism.)
1. If determinism is true, then no event can cause another event in virtue of its propositional content. Thus you couldn't possible come to find an argument convincing because you "see" it to be structurally valid its premises to be true.
2. If determinism is true, then logical laws are irrelevant to the formation of beliefs.
3. If determinism is true, then no person can rightfully be held accountable for his or her actions.
4. If determinism is true, then no person has any control over his or her beliefs. So if after being hit by sledgehammer you come to the belief that getting hit by a sledgehammer is not pleasant, you have not deduced that belief from your prior experience. Rather, you were causally determined to hold that belief. Only coincidentally did it occurred after your being hit by a sledgehammer. Or if you come to believe such a thing even before being hit by a sledgehammer, you have not "seen" the rationality in believing that. Rather, you were causally determined to hold that belief.
If you want to hold that you never accept a conclusion of an argument to be true just in case you "see" (through rational inference) that the argument is sound, then that is up to you. We're just going to differ there. It should be apparent, though, that all of this undermines philosophical discourse (as well as much else). This whole discussion we have been engaged in would be useless since neither of us (nor anyone else) would be capable of convincing anybody of anything. All of this is put badly by me, Malcolm. I highly recommend Reppert's book (if for no other reason than for clarity's sake). It is a short and easy read. And it states all this much more clearly and convincingly than I can.
About the "choosing, by necessity, requires options," see my (3) in my "9.11.2006 8:32am" post. Your response (Ad 3 of post "9.11.2006 1:32pm") simply changed the terminology (from "choice" to "will") and assumed that that qualified as a refutation. I didn't see your response as successful though, so I don't see any reason to modify what I said earlier.
As an aside, I'll quote some of Chesterton's Orthodoxy again. Some of what he says here, no doubt, is rhetorical; but some of it, I think, makes a good point. (I'm not quoting it as an argument but, rather, just because I find it interesting.)
I think I agree with much of what you say, though I'd like more clarification on the distinction between causal determination and self-determination. So far I've just been talking about determination simpliciter, and that includes self-determination, and doesn't necessarily mean causal determination (though I'm not entirely clear about what that is).
I object to your characterization of my example. You continue to refuse to accept the example on its own terms. As I have set the example up, the implant prevents Jones from choosing to help the woman, so there can be no meaningful talk of knowing that Jones will choose to help. Jones cannot choose to help, and so it makes no sense to speak of knowing that he will choose to help. (There is no hidden forking path here.) And as I have pointed out multiple times, the implant is not active; it is not activated or triggered. It is passive and is at work all the time, preventing the man from choosing to help.
Previously I glanced over your second Lockean-type example quickly noticing that I had already seen it before. I did not read it through, so I did not notice that the way you set it up it renders it incomplete. You say,You say, "In this case we suppose that the man does not want to help the woman" and go on to explain what is to follow. But you do not explain what is to follow in the case that the man does want to help the woman. (You will not find any literature on this, where these types of examples are used, but where what is to follow in the other "case" is left out of the set up.) In your set up, you say that the man cannot choose otherwise, not that he cannot want otherwise. If you are equating (again) want with choose, which is fine with me, then the part about wanting (since in that case it would be redundant) may be removed, for clarity, and your example would then read as such:Do you agree to this? If not, then would you please present your example as you would have it to be presented, only using the term "choose" (not want, will, etc.), which he agreed to use.
From my understanding, something is causally determined just in case it is caused by something outside of its control. When a rock is pushed it is causally determined. The same for Jones, if he were pushed. Something is self-determined just in case it itself is the cause. So when Jones freely chooses, he chooses; and thus his action is self-determined.
I have been using 'chooses' and 'wills' interchangeably, so I am happy to restrict myself to just the first. But wanting and willing are different things. It is essential to my example that the man wants to refrain from helping. That is why he chooses (i.e., wills) not to help, and that is why his choice (i.e., willing) is free. So, no, I cannot reformulate my example substituting 'choose' for 'want', because those are quite different things. Suppose I have two mutually exclusive options, A and B. I have reasons for wanting to choose A and reasons for wanting to choose B. But I cannot choose (will) both of these options; rather, I choose (will) the one that I want the most, that is, the one for which I have the strongest reasons to choose. As this should make clear, wanting is quite different from choosing and willing.
Re: causal vs. self-determination. As you use the term 'causal determination', it really means nothing more than 'other-determination' or 'external-determination'. Is that right?
Suppose that one of my mental states is caused by a prior mental state of mine (e.g., my thought of a certain thing causes me to be angry). Is this causal determination or self-determination? On the one hand, it could be classified as causal determination, because the later state is caused to occur by something external to it, namely, another, earlier state. On the other hand, it could be classified as self-determination, because one of the states internal to me is being caused by another state internal to me. I would be tempted to say that if there is such a thing as self-determination, it has to be this sort of thing, where one state of a substance causes or at least determines another state of the same substance. If saying that Jones' choice is self-determined means nothing other than that Jones is the cause of his choice, then I do not really understand this notion of self-determination. If Jones chooses to help the woman, in what sense does he cause his action, that is, his helping of the woman? (You say that "Something is self-determined just in case it itself is the cause" and also that Jones' action is self-determined.) I would say that Jones makes his choice, but that is quite another thing from saying that he causes his choice.
The manner in which you are intending to use want renders it is equivalent to the way we have been using choose or will. You seem to be falling into a mistake I earlier made. Whenever you began to talk about willing rather than choosing I said that, in order to be free, the man had to choose to will. But I realized, when you explained (correctly) that they were being used synonymously, that that is literally saying the man had to choose to choose. But if he had to choose to choose then he had to choose to choose to choose, and an infinite regress begins.* Thus I realized that when you said "he wills" what was important was that he wills, which is what I meant by he chooses.
So you say, "It is essential to my example that the man wants to refrain from helping." The way in which you use "wants" here makes it no different than "wills" or "chooses." The only way it would be different were if it were a general (first-order) want, in the sense that the man may want to refrain from helping but also want to help (one of the conflicting "many wills"). But if this is the way you intend on using want then it is not at all essential to the example that the man wants (in this sense) to refrain from helping for he also wants (in this sense) to help. The way, though, in which you use "wants," the man has judged these (first-order) wants or desires and now, to use your phrase, "wants the most" (wills, chooses, etc.) to refrain from helping. The want, as you use it, is not first-order, but second-order.
In short, the want is either not essential to mention (if it's first-order) because he has many conflicting wants on par with it, or it is equivalent (if it's second-order) to the way we have been using choose and will. Either way, it ought to be dropped. I see one objection you might make, so let me speak on it. If you mean want as a first-order want but simply that it is the strongest want then it is still irrelevant to note since a person need not choose (second-order) what he most strongly wants (first-order).
I've already agreed at length that a deterministic brain doesn't engage in the ideal, abstract process you call "rational inference", but I still see no reason that what such a brain is capable of can't be a perfectly usable substitute. You insist it has to be "all or nothing at all", and I think that is, simply, wrong. But if you must defend the term so closely, I'll even concede that we are not rational "at all". We do something different, then, but in terms of input and output, we still get very acceptable results.
One can design causal systems that work very nicely in simulating rational behavior; a chess computer has its causal structure put together so as to take chess moves as inputs, and arrive at just the sort of output that a human master would make. Physical systems can be brought into causal accordance with the regularities of the world - can even be set up to do internal, predictive modeling of them - and that's what I am suggesting happens in our skulls. (In fact, I think you and Reppert and Lewis et al. have the tail wagging the dog here; I imagine that the notion of pure rational inference is simply an extrapolation from what our brains do, and that what you are insisting on really exists nowhere at all.) But yes, the process in our heads is reducibly physical, so if you are going to guard the term "rational inference" so closely, we can call it something else, like "thinking".
Interesting. Do you control your beliefs? How do you do that?Right! Caused to hold that belief, just as any sane person should want to be, by my prior experience. If I am hit by a sledgehammer, I am already equipped with flexible neural circuits that will adjust their state so as to render me averse to repeating the experience, an aversion that I think it is fair to say was caused by the initial blow. In fact, just seeing someone swinging a hammer in my direction, given all the setup I've already had regarding regularities of motion, etc., is likely to induce me to take defensive (or offensive) action. Is it entirely deterministic? Could be. Who knows? Who cares? How would I be able to tell the difference?
And when we argue, because we are both such sophisticated, well-tuned machines - we've had our whole lives to learn what the marks on the screen stand for - my remarks drive you into a state that prompts you to respond intelligibly, and vice versa. We've all seen "expert systems" that can do the same thing; we do a much better job, of course - and we are conscious of it all, too - but I can't see how any of that hinges on the unknowable microdetails of LFW.
You suggest that if our thinking is in fact causally determinate in the way I describe, that it undermines philosophical discourse. Right you are - I think that to some extent it very well might, and the inability of philosophy to tie down some of the more vexing problems it faces may well be a symptom. The human mind is nowadays often pressed into work that it was not designed for, and ideal ratiocination is not, let's face it, abundantly evident in human affairs. But we do muddle by.
You realize, of course, that I am playing Devil's advocate here. The point is that I don't think we need LFW to be as free as we need to be, and in fact even with LFW the question of what drives our choices is really made no simpler; I suspect that the very notion of "agent-causation" is not particularly coherent.
My point that I have failed to get across is that you're approaching this discussion entirely wrong. I never denied that highly complex robots were possible. And you keep referring to us (humans) as examples of highly complex causally deteministic beings, which just begs the question. All the complex robots we know of don't have first-person experiences. To say, "Well look at us, we have first-person experiences, so we work well enough" just begs the question by assuming that we are merely mechanistic beings like robots (only more complex) that happen to "work well enough." But this is entirely the wrong way to approach the discussion. One needs to debate what causal determinism logically entails (or precludes), not what one can imaginatively conceive. I can't really add anything more to the discussion, though. I still recommend Reppert's book.
I've been trying to do exactly that: my point is that there is no reason to assume that determinism precludes the sort of thinking we do. I'm not begging the question - the truth about LFW is unknowable anyway, so I am every bit as justified in assuming that LFW is false as you are to make an extraordinary exception for it in one place in the Universe only, namely inside our heads.
You have been alleging, without adducing any evidence, that LFW is necessary for such things as consciousness, using an argument that goes like: "robots aren't conscious, and they are determinate, but we are conscious, so we must not be." In other words, you seem to be saying:
1) All X possess property D.
2) No X possesses property C.
3) Humans, however, do possess property C.
4) Therefore, humans cannot possess property D.
Clearly this is not a compelling argument.
I think we have probably got as far as we are going to get with this.
I'm just trying to get this Lockean example set up correctly so that we can discuss it rather quibble over the semantics of it. But in certain set ups, the semantics of the set up conceal the example's incoherence. So, unfortunately, in those cases this is necessary to discuss. In an earlier post you suggest that it doesn't matter if you add that the man (Jones) will want to help. But it does. It is crucial to the set up and understanding of the example. If completed as it is, your example would read as follows:There is no difference, though, in the way in which want and choose are being used here. And this renders the example incoherent since it then involves sentences that literally read, "If . . . Jones [chooses] to help the woman, then the implant would have prevented him from choosing to help the woman." I'm assuming that it is apparent that this is the manner in which want is being used here. If you maintain that want is still being used in the sense in which we commonly use desire (in that I may have a desire to do something and then choose to do it) then I'll explain, or attempt to explain, that that usage renders the example useless (since, for starters, I may have desire, in that sense, to do something and still refrain from doing it). I don't want to argue against that position now though since my post is long enough as it is and since you might agree with what I have said here anyways. (Honestly, the set up a gave in my "9.12.2006 8:55am" post is the strongest I've seen it presented in all the literature on this I've read. I still think it is flawed, but this, as far as I can tell, is a problem with all of these Lockean-type examples: they're all flawed in that they're either incoherent or useless.)
I agree that we have probably got as far as we are going to get. It was enjoyable.
1. In my example, the man wants to stay inside and not offer help. What this means is that all things considered, this is the option he wants or desires the most. I guess that's what you call a "second-order desire," though that's an inapt term because in ordinary usage a second-order desire would be a desire for a desire (a first-order desire being a desire for some thing that's not a desire.) I would prefer to say that the man's desire to stay in the room is his prevailing desire. I didn't specify whether he also has a desire to help the woman. For all I've said, he has no desire whatever to help.
2. Note that the man does not arrive at this prevailing (or "second-order") desire by "judging" which of his "first-order" desires is strongest, as you suggest. The strongest "first-order" desire just is the prevailing desire.
3. You seem to equate "second-order" desires or wants with choices. But what I am calling a prevailing desire or want is quite distinct from the act of choosing. As I see it, a person always chooses that which they want the most. But choosing X should not be conflated with wanting X the most. If these were the same thing, then one could never explain why a person chose X by saying, "X is what she wanted the most." But that is a perfectly reasonable explanation. Therefore, choosing and wanting the most are not the same thing (even though they are coextensive in the sense that a person always chooses what he wants the most.)
4. Even with animals and infants there can be things which they want or desire the most. Yet animals and infants cannot make choices. Therefore, choices are different from things which are wanted the most.
5. It follows from (3) and (4) that my Lockean example is not rendered incoherent by my talk of choosing that which is wanted the most.
6. Your most recent account of the example gets the basic idea right, but there's a lot of unnecessary stuff in it. It is unnecessary to consider your second case. In the first case, Jones cannot choose otherwise (by supposition) and yet is free in his choice. That shows that freedom does not require the ability to choose otherwise. Why then do we even need to consider your second case? What of relevance does it add to this?
It is obvious you maintain that want is not being equated with choose. Okay. But then if you mean it simply as a desire then, as I have said, it is irrelevant to note that (merely desirous) want in the Lockean example. You sayI don't at all agree with that. Unfortunately, we can't debate this because your position on it is simply unfaslisiable, since if I tell you that I've chosen to do something other than what I most strongly wanted to do you can simply say that what I thought I most strongly wanted wasn't really what I most strongly wanted. So we'll just have to disagree on this. The rest of that paragraph (section 3) just seems confused.
Do people have a choice over what they "want the most"? If not, then if people always "choose" what they want the most then they really have no choice in the matter. (By the by, I think you should ask yourself if--unless it's followed by "what they choose"--one can ever use the phrase "people always choose." Always?).
I completely agree that "wanting the most," when used properly, is distinct from choosing. I disagree, though, that you're using it properly, especially when you say that people always choose what they want the most.
These Lockean examples only work if Jones cannot choose otherwise. It is only know that Jones cannot choose otherwise when the second case is given. The second case makes the brain implant relevant. The first case can be said about a man without a brain implant.If that's the only case that's going to be discussed then one doesn't even need to mention the brain implant in the first place.
If none of this is convincing to you (which is probably due to my inability to clarify well), then just read any literature on this, and re-read that which you've already read, and, if I were a betting man, I would bet that you would not find a single one of these Lockean-type (or Frankfurt-type) examples that left out the second case (the case where the man wants to choose otherwise, or it is known that he will choose otherwise, or it is seen that he has chosen otherwise, etc.). That's because, as I'm trying to say, it's necessary for a complete, working example.
The brain implant is relevant in both cases. In the first, it makes it the case that the man could not have chosen otherwise, even though it doesn't prevent him from choosing what he wants. You say that it is only known that Jones can choose otherwise in the second case. But that's not true. It is known that Jones cannot choose otherwise even in the first case, because it is known that the brain implant is there preventing him from choosing otherwise.
I'm not surprised that you disagree with the claim that a person always wills that which he wants the most, which is my causal way of saying that a person always wills that which his intellect represents as the best. But it is a claim with an impressive philosophical lineage (having Platonic roots and having been endorsed by Aquinas, Leibniz, and many other philosophers), and should not be dismissed lightly.
Does a person have control over "that which he wants the most"?
As is obvious I cannot make it clear to you that both cases are needed (within the one example). But the fact that, in any literature concerning free will, you will not find a single one of these Lockean-type/Frankfurt-style examples that lacks both cases should prove my point. We cannot really go anywhere from here since you don't realize the importance of the second second.
I didn't say that it is only known that the man can choose otherwise in the second case. I said that it is only known (read, proven) that the man cannot choose otherwise when the second case is given.
I can give an example which involves a first case where Jones chooses not to help the woman (as in your example) but also includes a second case where Jones chooses to help the woman. I can't then just assert that Jones can't choose otherwise. The example hasn't been set up as such. It has to be proven, by the set up of the example, that Jones cannot choose otherwise. The second case proves this.
You think you can simply assert that the implant prevents Jones from choosing otherwise without explaining how.* But you cannot. It has to be proven, by the set up of the example, that if it were known that Jones would choose otherwise that the implant would prevent him from doing so, and thus--and only thus--is it known that Jones actually cannot choose otherwise.
*This "how" is always what renders these examples impossible or useless. That your example leaves this out makes it incomplete (even though you don't realize it). You can't just say the implant magically prevents Jones from choosing otherwise without explaining how. This has to be a situation that is possible, otherwise the scenario is impossible--and you can't draw conclusions from an impossible scenario. And if possible it has to be useful to making the intended point, otherwise it's useless. For example, if one were to say the implant prevents Jones from choosing by changing his choice after he has chosen, then the example is useless since the alteration is made after Jones chooses otherwise--and thus Jones can still choose otherwise (even if not for long).
1. Based on your most recent remarks, it seems your criticism of my example is that it treats as possible something that isn't possible, namely, that a brain implant could prevent Jones from choosing to help. That's a simple point to make, so if that's been your criticism all along, I am puzzled why it took you so long to communicate it clearly.
2. But I wonder if that really is what you've had in mind all along. In earlier posts, when you criticized my example for being incomplete, your suggested remedy was to add in the second case, (roughly) the case where the man wants to help but the implant prevents him from choosing accordingly. But adding that bit does nothing to address what you are now identifying as the incompleteness in my example. You are now saying that in order to complete my example, I need to show how such an implant could prevent Jones from choosing to help. But this is the first I've heard of this. You can see, I hope, why it seems that you have simply changed your criticism.
3. I think you are asking for too much when you ask me to explain how this hypothetical implant could do its work. We certainly know from experience that many, many mental functions can be impaired and otherwise altered by doing things to the brain, so there is no special reason for doubting that one's ability to will (choose) a certain thing could be impaired in this general way. In view of this, there should be a presumption in favor of the possibility of such an implant, rather than its impossibility. Consequently, the burden of proof is really on the critic (in this case, you) to explain why this could not happen, or else to explain why the burden of proof is on me rather than you.
4. You ask whether a person has control over that which he wants the most? I am inclined to say that a person does have some control over his wants, but limited. There are such things as second-order wants, and these may allow a person to have some control over their first-order wants. But it may be that ultimately there is no real control at all. It may be that ultimately God is the only one who is really in control.
5. You say that your claim about the need for the second case is proved by the fact that it isn't ignored in even a single discussion in the literature. This claim is easy to make, very hard to confirm. It would be much easier for me if you could give just one good source where the second case is thought to be necessary, so that I could read someone else's explanation of this. So far in this discussion I haven't been given any good reason to think that the second case is essential to the success of my example.
I changed the critcism because at first I viewed your example wrongly (I substituted a complete version for your incomplete version). I said I always thought these sort of examples were flawed. Later I specified, saying they were either incoherent (I meant impossible) or useless.
So a person has (somewhat?) control over that which he wants the most? Which means, presumably, that he can (somewhat?) choose that which he wants the most. But after (somewhat?) choosing that which he wants the most, he always chooses that which he wants the most (which he has already somewhat chosen)? So he always chooses what he (somewhat?) chooses? (I talked about this sort of infinite regress in an earlier post.)
Read any literature on this, Spur. If I give you a specific example that just means I can give you a specific example proving my point. If you look in any books you have, any at the library, any articles online, you will find that what I have said is true. I can't confirm it for you. I can only claim it. You'd have to confirm it for yourself.
I never questioned the workability of such an implant. I'm not asking you for a neurological thesis, Spur. I provided you with a complete example previously (which didn't include a neurological breakdown). And, again, if you take any examples you can find elsewhere they will be complete. The only "how" that needs explaining is how the man will be prevented from choosing otherwise. You can't just say he magically will and leave it at that. After he has chosen will the implant be triggered? Or if it is known that he will choose then will the implant be fired thus preventing him from actually choosing? Again, any examples you find elsewhere will explain this much (rather than just saying the man will magically be prevented by the implant in some unspecified way). They don't give a neurological break down. That's not what I asked for. But if you are not going to offer me a complete example then there is nothing I can do here. Then we're just at an impasse.
We are indeed at an impasse; there is no point in discussing this further. You stubbornly refuse to accept my example on its own terms, and you fail to provide adequate justification for this refusal. As I have pointed out a number of times, the implant, by supposition, prevents the man from choosing to help; it's a passive rather than active mechanism. It therefore cannot be said that this implant works by triggering after the man has chosen, anymore than the lock on the door activates just in case the man tries to leave the room. Nor is it appropriate to ask, "if it is known that he will choose [to help,] then will the implant be fired thus preventing him from actually choosing [to help]?" Again, the implant prevents him from choosing to help, so there can be no talk of the implant firing when it is known that the man will choose to help.
When you write that "You can't just say the implant magically prevents Jones from choosing otherwise without explaining how," I do not understand what you are asking for if not something at least partly neurological or physical. How does the brain implant prevent Jones from choosing to help? I do not know exactly, but it is not magical. In general terms the idea is that it does something to his brain, which then perhaps affects his mind.
It is unfortunate that I came off as stubborn. It was just disagreement. If I disagree I can't do other than say I disagree. Same for you. I'm not refusing to agree, though. I just don't agree. (By the by, I'm still planning on doing some serious reading of Leibniz. Would have been done earlier, but got sidestracked by some things.)
Glad to hear you are planning to study Leibniz. Cheers.
2. Disallowing comments from a particular person, or deleting an offensive, off-topic, or otherwise substandard comment, has nothing to do with censorship. People who think otherwise confuse censorship with lack of sponsorship. I am under an obligation not to interfere with anyone's exercise of legitimate free speech rights. But I am not under any obligation to aid and abet anyone's exercise of free speech rights, legitimate or illegitimate.
3. The Comments area is not an open forum for anyone to say anything about any topic. As the name implies, it is primarily for commenting on the author(s)' posts. But to comment on them, one must have read them. And if I have spent three hours on a post, a reader will not understand it in thirty seconds. Secondarily, the Comments area is to facilitate civil discussion between and among commenters as long as the discussion remains on-topic.
4. Some undesirables: The skimmers, those who cannot read but only read-in. The sophists who, abusing argument, argue for the sake of argument. The ideologues, those who are out for power, not truth. The uncivil. The illogical. The politically correct. Worst of all, perhaps, are those who exemplify the anti-Socratic property: those who think they know what they don't know. If Socrates was famous for his learned ignorance, these types are marked by their ignorant unlearnededness.