1. Why does the universe exist? There are four main types of answer to this question. And if I am not mistaken, these are the only types of answer (assuming that one does not deny the presupposition of the question, namely, that the universe exists.)
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A. One 'answer' is that the universe just exists; it exists as a matter of brute fact. A brute fact, by definition, is a thing or state of affairs that exists, might not have existed, and exists without cause or reason or ground of any kind. That the universe is a factum brutum is the line that Bertrand Russell took in his famous 1948 BBC debate with the Jesuit Frederick Copleston: "I should say that the universe is just there, and that's all."
B. On a second answer the universe U exists of metaphysical necessity: its nonexistence is impossible. If so, the universe is self-explanatory and its existence needs no explanation. If on the brute fact approach an explanation of the existence of U is not possible, on the metaphysical necessity approach an explanation is not needed.
C. According to a third type of answer, the universe exists because it has an external (transcendent) cause, ground, source of its existence. Classical theism gives this type of answer. The universe exists because there exists a being transcendent of it who creates and sustains it.
D. On a fourth approach, that of Quentin Smith, the universe, though contingent, is self-caused in that (i) the universe is just the sum-total of its states, (ii) earlier states cause later states, and (iii) every state has a cause.
2. It is easy to see how Smith's proposal this might work if the universe is infinitely old. For then it is clear that there would be no first state and that every state would have causal antecedents. If every state has an internal or intramundane cause, and the universe is just the sum of its states, then there is a tolerably clear sense in which the universe is cause of itself. It exists, it might not have existed, but it is caused to exist by parts of itself and thus by nothing external to itself. Obviously, a partless whole cannot be causa sui. But it is prima facie conceivable that a whole of parts be causa sui if there are infinitely many parts and the later parts are caused by the earlier ones.
3. But Smith's proposal is also meant to work in case the universe is finitely old. On current cosmology, the universe is supposed to have come into existence some fifteen billion years ago. But if this is the case, how could the universe cause itself to exist out of nothing? I will now quote (with permission) from a manuscript Smith recently sent me:
The most widely accepted cosmological theory of the universe since the late 1960s is not the “oscillating universe” version that implies that there are infinitely many past cycles of expansion and contraction. Rather, it is the version that implies that the universe began to exist 15 billion years ago in a big bang singularity. To say that its beginning is a “singularity” means that the universe begins to exist but there is no first instant t = 0 at which it begins. The cosmic singularity is a hypothetical time t = 0 at which all the laws of nature, space and time break down. It is hypothetical or merely imaginary because if it did exist, it would be a physically impossible state, due to the breakdown of all laws, even the laws required for time to exist. This breakdown at the hypothetical t = 0 implies there is no first instant t = 0 of the finitely old time-series and that each instant is preceeded by earlier instants. An instant is a time that is instantaneous or has zero-duration. An interval is a time that is temporally extended and has a duration of a certain length, such as one hour or one minute. Since there is a big bang singularity, the first interval of each length is “past-open”, which means that there is no instant t that is the first instant of each earliest interval of any length, be the interval an hour, minute or second, etc. Before any instant in an earliest hour, minute, second, etc., there is an infinite number of other instants. Formulated in terms of instantaneous states of the universe, this means that before each instantaneous state of the universe, there are other instantaneous states, and each instantaneous state of the universe is caused by earlier instantaneous states. Accordingly, the universe causes itself to begin to exists in the sense that it began a finite number of years ago, say 15 billion years, but each instantaneous state in any earliest interval is caused to exist by earlier instantaneous states. In terms of the Abbreviation Argument for a self-caused universe, this means the universe causes itself to begin to exist in the sense that (a) each instantaneous state S is sufficiently caused by earlier states and (b) there are no instantaneous states that exist earlier than some finite number of equal-length, non-overlapping intervals . For example, all of the states are such that each state is caused by earlier instantaneous states but no state exists earlier than 15 billion years ago. In terms of the Entailment Argument for a self-caused universe, this means that the states are parts of a whole, the individual U, and U causes itself to begin to exist in the sense that (a) each instantaneous part S of the whole U is sufficiently caused by earlier instantaneous parts of U; (b) there are no instantaneous parts of the whole that exist earlier than some finite number of equal-length, non-overlapping intervals; and the existence of all these parts of the whole U entails the existence of the whole U.
The crucial distinction upon which Smith's proposal turns is that between a temporal instant and a a temporal interval. Given this distinction, there arises the possibility that there could be a first interval of time, whether it be a first second, or microsecond, or nanosecond, etc., but no first instant of time. If Big Bang cosmology is true, then this possibility is actual. But it doesn't matter whether it is actual or not since, as philosophers, we are concerned with the conceivability/possibility of a self-causing or self-creating universe. If a self-creating universe is so much as possible, this will have enormous metaphysical and theological consequences.
So the idea is this. The universe is finitely old, which implies that there is a first interval of time earlier than which there are no instants of time. But this first interval is open in the earlier direction, or, as Smith says, "past-open." That means that for any instant you pick within this interval, there is an earlier one, which in turn implies that for any instant chosen, there are infinitely many earlier instants. Smith is of course assuming that time is either dense or continuous as opposed to discrete. If time is dense, then its moments are packed together like the rational numbers; if continuous, then they are packed together like the reals. Either way, there will be no first instant within any given interval. If there is no first instant in the first interval, then every instantaneous state of U in the first interval, or in any interval, will be caused to exist by earlier states.
Now if U is just the sum of its states, and if every state of U has a cause of its existence, then U has a cause of its existence. This is because a sum exists 'automatically' given the existence of its members. Therefore, U has an internal cause of its existence despite the fact that U is finitely old. Given this internal cause, U cannot also have an external cause on pain of causal overdetermination. U is therefore self-causing or self-creating.
5. I cannot, however, see that Smith's argument is probative. The rest of this post is taken verbatim (except for a slight emendation or two) from pp. 606-607 of my article Could the Universe Cause Itself to Exist? (Philosophy 75 (2000), 604-612.)
The main difficulty is that it [Smith's argument above] appears to prove entirely too much. Granting that the universe may be characterized as a continuum of successive, instantaneous states, this is also true of such rather smaller objects as Smith's life.[4] It too is a continuum of successive states. And it too can be viewed as half-open, open in the earlier direction. One way to do this is to reckon the moment of Smith’s transition from nonexistence to existence – call it time t – as the last moment of the period of his nonexistence.[5] The period that follows, that of his existence, will then necessarily be half-open in the earlier direction. This is because of the continuity of time, which excludes there being a time t’ immediately following t. If one objects that this is arbitrary, and insists on reckoning the moment of transition as the first moment of Smith’s existence, then I will simply invite the reader to ‘subtract’ the first moment from Smith’s life. The remainder, call it Smith’s truncated life, will then be such that its earliest interval is half-open in the earlier direction. There will be continuum-many instantaneous states in this interval each of which will have causes within it. No matter how thin you slice the earliest interval in Smith’s truncated life, it will always contain plenty of instantaneous states — 2-to-the-aleph-zero to be exact — such that no state is internally uncaused. And if no state is internally uncaused, then every state is internally caused. So doesn't the above argument show that the beginning of Smith's existence (or else Smith’s truncated existence) has no need of an external cause and that his life (or else his truncated life) caused itself? The better to appreciate this, substitute ‘Smith’s life’ for ‘the universe’ in the above quotation and leave everything else the same. The result is as follows:
We can characterize Smith’s life as a continuum of successive, instantaneous states. This continuum of instantaneous states begins to exist in the sense that there is an earliest half-open interval of each length (a first hour, a first minute, a first second, etc.). The continuum’s beginning to exist is caused in the sense that each instantaneous state that belongs to the continuum is caused by some earlier instantaneous states that also belong to the continuum.
So if the original argument is valid, the parody argument is also valid: after all, the two arguments have the same form, and validity is a matter of form. And if the original argument is sound, then so is the parody. The only difference between the two is in the first premise of each. But it seems that the initial premises are either both true, or else both false. If it is true that the universe is a continuum of successive, instantaneous states, then it is also true that Smith’s life is a continuum of such states. But it is as obvious as anything that the parody argument is unsound, issuing as it does in a false conclusion: we know that the beginning of Smith’s life has an external cause in the conjugal activities of his parents, and since his life’s beginning has an external cause, it cannot have an internal cause or causes on pain of causal overdetermination. I conclude that the original argument is also unsound, which is to say that it is either invalid in point of logical form, or possesses one or more false premises, or both. It is perhaps not unnecessary to point out that from the unsoundness of Smith’s argument one cannot infer that the universe has an external cause: for all that has been shown so far, it might have neither an internal nor an external cause.
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Related Posts (on one page):
- The At-At Theory of Motion and Presentism
- Why the At-At Theory of Motion is Unacceptable
- Motion and Infinitesimals
- Reconciling Creatio Ex Nihilo with Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit
- Causal Overdetermination and the Existence of the Universe
- An Argument for the Universe's Having an External Cause if it Has a Cause
- Quentin Smith on Why the Universe Exists
Alan Rhoda states the position to which I adhere very clearly in the penultimate paragraph of his blog entry, "The Kalam Argument, Zeno's Paradoxes, and Omniscience." To save space, I will not here argue for the position with which I agree (as I think Rhoda does that nicely) but I will merely say I believe that as a solution to Zeno's Paradoxes one must assume, as Rhoda says, that "continuity is metaphysically prior to discontinuity" or, in regards to Smith's proposal, that intervals (or duration) is metaphysically prior to, or more basic than, instants.
As you say, Dr. Vallicella, Smith's argument seems to suggest that we can characterize one's life, even the Universe's life, "as a continuum of successive, instantaneous states." But this is merely a representational description of reality. Reality cannot, in actuality, proceed by successive instants, for no number of non-durational units (i.e., instants) can sum up to a durational "continuum." With the suggestion that there exists a first interval in time but not a first instant I agree. (In fact, I don't think any instants exist in reality.) But I don't agree with the implications Smith attempts to draw from that suggestion. Smith's proposal seems to be based on the two assumptions—faulty assumptions, I would argue—that instants actually exist in reality (at least for the realm of time, I'm not sure about his thoughts on space) and that they (somehow) form, by succession, a continuum. I don't think either assumption is correct.
I must add that Smith's proposal seems, at least to me, to be implausible prima facie. The idea of something causing itself (whether partless or not) to come into existence seems absurd.
Since Don brought up Zeno's paradoxes, let me suggest another way of refuting Smith. Consider the paradox of Division - if I want to cross a room, I first have to go halfway. Before that, I have to go 1/4 of the way. Etc. Now, by Smith's logic, my motion across the room can have a beginning at t0 and yet need no cause for it's beginning because every state of motion (at ti, i>0) it preceded by a prior state of motion (at ti-Δt, 0 < Δt < ti). But this is absurd. Of course there's an initial cause of my motion, namely, me.
Furthermore, Smith is arguably wrong in taking time to be supervenient upon the laws of physics, such that if the laws of physics break down at a certain point then time cannot exist. (He himself argues against this position in his book Language and Time.) Regardless of what physicists may say, time is a metaphysical issue. It is by no means obvious that the quantity 't' that figures in physical laws denotes the same thing as time (as Smith himself pointed out in L&T). From a metaphysical standpoint, it's hard to see why the beginning of the universe would not itself define a moment of time. After all, it marks a transition or boundary between two different states of affairs [no universe] ... [universe].
If you simply mean to say that the universe had a beginning—that is, that it is finite—then I concur, and so would Smith. If you mean to say that the cosmological singularity is a physical entity and existed in reality then I would disagree, and I think Smith would too, as he says, "The cosmic singularity is a hypothetical time t = 0 at which all the laws of nature, space and time break down. It is hypothetical or merely imaginary because if it did exist, it would be a physically impossible state." Below are some quotes from William Lane Craig which explain, much better than I can, the reasons for the position to which I adhere. I realize I quote from Craig at some length, but I think all the quotes are relevant.
I. Craig on ontological interpretation of the cosmological singularity and if it should be considered as a mere mathematical concept rather than a physical reality:
Now the initial cosmological singularity was certainly a real singularity [in the standard model of the universe]. But that does not settle the question of its ontological status. The ontological status of the Big Bang singularity is a metaphysical question concerning which one will be hard-pressed to find a discussion in scientific literature. (Theism, Atheism and Big Bang Cosmology, co-authored, as a collection of essays in debate-like form, with Quentin Smith, 258)
[A]n object which has no spatial dimensions and no temporal duration hardly seems to qualify as a physical object at all, but is rather a mathematical conceptualization. . . . But such a [dimensionless] point could hardly be called a physical object and seems ontologically equivalent to nothing. Moreover, this 'object' does not exist for any period of time; . . . . to say it exists only at a durationless instant is to ascribe reality to a mathematical chimera. (Theism, Atheism and Big Bang Cosmology, 227)
II. Craig on the physical reality of instants:*
[I]nstants and points seem to me to be mathematical fictions. But let that pass . . . . For instants of time and points of space are not typically conceived to be themselves intervals of time and space, but mere boundaries of intervals. And it is consistent to hold that boundary points cannot exist independently of the intervals which they bound. . . . [If so, then instants and points] have no independent ontological status and so cannot subsist alone [cf. your suggestion, Rhoda, that the line is more basic than the points or "continuity is metaphysically prior to discontinuity"]. But in the case of the initial cosmological singularity, this point-instant is said to exist independently. . . . [So, for the A-theorists,] if temporal becoming is instantaneous, at the instant the singularity comes to exist, all other instants are non-existent, mere potentialities. Therefore, it [the singularity] would exist alone. [But this goes contrary to the notion that instants either don't exist at all in reality or at least not independent of intervals which they would bound; thus this can't be the case.] Rather, the universe, the spacetime manifold, does not possess a first temporal instant, but exists at any moment arbitrarily close to the initial cosmological singularity. (Theism, Atheism and Big Bang Cosmology, 259-60)
*I think the latter part of this excerpt (from "So, for the A-theorists" and on) is relevant to you, Rhoda, since I believe you hold to an A-theory of time, though I might be mistaken.
III. Craig (and Paul Copan, the coauthor) on the finitude of the universe while lacking a first instant
But having a beginning does not entail having a beginning point. Even in the standard model, theorists sometimes "cut out" the singular point without thinking that therefore space-time no longer begins to exist and so the problem of the origin of the universe is thereby resolved. Time begins to exist just in case, for any finite temporal interval, there are only a finite number of equal temporal intervals earlier that it. (Creation our of Nothing: A Biblical, Philosophical, and Scientific Exploration, 235)
Assuming there's no time prior to creation, what we have sans creation is a state of affairs that includes only God. But with creation that state is followed by another state, God+creation. What I'm saying is that the transition between those two states, from God alone to God+creation, defines the first event and thus the first instant of time.
Here's another way of looking at it. Time requires a before-after sequence of states of affairs. Sans creation there is neither a before nor an after. There is just God. (Atheists can replace God with Nothing.) With creation, however, there comes about a before-after relation between the states God (Nothing) and God+creation (Something). So time begins with creation. Now suppose that the initial state of creation had no successor states. In that case, there would be no successor moments to time. There would be one, and only one, temporal moment--the God/God+creation (Nothing/Something) transition.
What I'm arguing, then, is that the universe's having a beginning is by itself sufficient for there being a first moment of time. Time, on my view, is not a physical thing at all - it is wholly meta-physical. So considerations of physical singularities are irrelevant, in my view.
And, yes, I am an A-theorist, specifically, a presentist.
Definitions:
1. An instant is instantaneous or has zero-duration.
2. An interval is temporally extended and has a duration of a certain length.
3. An interval is "past-open" when it lacks a first instant (i.e., when it is open in the earlier direction).
Argument:
1. The universe begins to exist but (or and) there is no first instant at which it begins.
2. If the universe begins to exist but (or and) there is no first instant at which the universe begins, then as we approach the singularity each instant is preceded by earlier instants.
3. Therefore, as we approach the singularity each instant is preceded by earlier instants.
4. Therefore, the first, or earliest, interval (in the life of the universe), be it any length, is "past-open."
5. Therefore, before any instant in an earliest interval there is an infinite number of other instants.
6. Therefore, before each instantaneous state of the universe, there are other instantaneous states, and each instantaneous state of the universe is caused by earlier instantaneous states of the universe.
7. If each instantaneous state of the universe is caused by earlier instantaneous states of the universe, then the universe causes itself to begin to exist.
8. Therefore, the universe causes itself to begin to exist.
I am pretty much okay with Smith's argument until premise (6)—namely, the second half of it. (Note: If Smith is meaning for his statements to be interpreted literally in regards to their metaphysical implications—which seems to be probable—then I would take objections with the second and third premises, since they would entail the actual existence of instants in reality. However, the part of the argument I discuss below—namely, the latter part of six—definitely entails the metaphysical issues which I do take exception with.) Premises (4) and (5), and the first half of (6), seem to be just restatements of (3), which is validly deduced from (1) and (2). In the second half of (6) Smith proposes that "each instantaneous state of the universe is caused by earlier instantaneous states [of the universe]." This statement is essential to Smith's argument yet, unless I missed it, he didn't argue for its truthfulness anywhere but simply assumed it. To begin with, I don't see how an instantaneous state (which I think could rightly just be called "an instant") can cause anything. In order to cause anything instantaneous states would have to exist. But how can a dimensionless, non-durational state be said to exist, much less to cause anything? I think Smith is failing to realize that our division, for mathematical/theoretical sake, of continuous time into instantaneous states (or instants) is, as Craig says, "a mathematical conceptualization." However, Smith takes instants to be actually existing things; he, in my opinion, is reifying the mathematical/theoretical concept or construct known as an instant (or instantaneous state). Moreover, Smith's assumption (namely, that "each instantaneous state of the universe is caused by earlier instantaneous states [of the universe]") suggests that the life of the universe is simply an aggregate of instantaneous states. But I don't think this is true at all. For reasons stated in previous comments, I think that the continuity of time is prior to our conceptualization of it into instants.
In short, it seems that one can disprove Smith's argument by showing that instantaneous states have no actual existence in reality or that the universe is not simply an aggregate of instantaneous states. Also, Dr. Vallicella's reductio against Smith's argument, while not showing precisely how or where the argument is flawed, indicates, with compelling force, that it must be flawed.
Aside from all that I said above, I think one can look at the conclusion of Smith's argument (namely, that "the universe causes itself to begin to exist") to realize that his argument must be flawed; for it is impossible—logically as well as metaphysically, I would say—for anything, including the universe, to cause itself to exist. (If someone presented an argument, regardless of its complexity, that concluded "Therefore, I caused myself to begin to exist" or "Therefore, my life caused itself to begin to exist," I think it would be rejected upfront, specifically analyzed and critiqued later.)
I apologize for overloading the comments section. It's Saturday. I've got nothing to do!
I think it's incorrect to say that the state of God sans creation is followed by the state of God+creation or that God+creation comes after God sans creation. If you agree that there is no time prior to creation how can creation—i.e., God+creation—(temporally) follow anything (cf. William Lane Craig's "God and the Beginning of Time," specifically the section entitled "Temporality vs. Atemporality of God sans Creation," which is about half-way down the page, and everything after that.)
I don't know if you read section II of my Craig quotes ("Craig on the physical reality of instants") but I think he gives a knock down argument against A-theorists (especially those such as yourself who believe that "continuity is metaphysically prior to discontinuity") being able to hold that there exists a first instant of time. I would like to hear your thoughts on that section.
I don't think I ever used the phrase "physical singularity," but if I did I did not mean to suggest that the singularity might be considered as something like a (infinitely more microscopic) microscopic piece of matter. I simply meant to convey the idea of the ontological or metaphysical, the real or actual, existence of the singularity. That is to say, my concern here, as yours is, is metaphysical.
Regarding your reconstruction of Smith's argument, I would reject the very first premise, as I think a beginning to the universe (with no time sans the universe) entails a first moment of time.
You seem to think that Craig has refuted this. His argument turns on the claim that temporal instants can only exist as boundaries of temporal intervals. I don't think that's necessarily true. For example, I seems possible that there be one, and only one, instant of time. All we need is an absolute, instantaneous replacement of one state of affairs with another. Furthermore, it seems possible that time not be continuous. For example, suppose there's a world in which everything is static except a solitary lightbulb which alternately turns on and off instantaneously (we'll also suppose that the speed of light in this world is infinite). In that case we would have a succession of on-off events that is not continuous because there is a well-defined 'next' event.
Now I do believe that time is in fact continuous and that every event after the first has been merely a boundary of a temporal interval, but I don't think that had to be the case and I think God could bring time to an absolute end if he so wanted. If that's right, then there's nothing about the God/God+Creation transition that requires that event to be the boundary of a temporal interval.
Thanks for commenting on that excerpt from Craig.
Doesn't your proposing that there be a first instant of time (and your being an A-theorists) explicitly violate, as Craig explains, your claim that "continuity is metaphysically prior to discontinuity"? I ask this because though you mentioned Craig in your last post you didn't really comment (at least not explicitly, unless I just missed it) on the full implications of your suggesting that there need be a first instant of time in light of your also suggesting that "continuity is metaphysically prior to discontinuity."
You say, ". . . it seems possible that time not be continuous." I agree that it seems logically possible, but I wouldn't agree that it is metaphysically possible. Your light bulb scenario disregards the time dimension necessary to judge the on-off events of the light bulb. And I don't even know what it means to say that the speed of light is actually infinite; that is to say, I don't think that's actually (metaphysically, not logically) possible. Though I should do so before I say too much, I'm, lazily, not in the mood to work out all the implications of an infinite speed of light; but I wouldn't be surprised if it resulted in many complications that would render it actually impossible (though it might not). However, if we simply exchange your (material) light-bulb-only universe with a (immaterial) mind-only universe, where one solitary immaterial mind pops into and out of existence, then I don't see the significance in the speed of light alteration anyways. Nevertheless, we both agree that time is continuous; so all the speculation in this area (if it's possible that time not be continuous) seems to be irrelevant.
As I alluded earlier, I think your believing that there is a first instant of time (and your being an A-theorists) entails that discontinuity (the first instant, which is discontinuous, of time) is metaphysically prior to continuity, and that, in my opinion, completely turns on its head one of your earlier statements. Moreover, how does the rest of time, which you assume to be continuous, append itself to that first instant? Does a second instant of time append itself onto the first and a third onto the second, and so on, to create the continuum of time? If this is proposed, then that notion will run into problems of which we're both aware. Or is the (remaining) continuum of time simply appended onto that first instant of time and said to begin to exist after the first instant while lacking a second instant which would be appended onto the first as the previous proposal assumed (and which would make time fundamentally discontinuous). If this second approach is proposed, then, considering time after the first instant of time, how does it differ from the idea that the continuum of time simply begins to exist and that there is no first instant of time? In this second approach, continuous time (i.e., time after the first instant of time) is said to begin to exist (namely, after the first instant of time) but still lack a "first" (actually second, in the overall picture) instant of time.
I would also like to ask, Alan, whether or not you are meaning to equate the first instant of time with the cosmological singularity? If so, then doesn't that run into the problems previously mentioned, by Smith, that the singularity is not a physically possible state and, by Craig, that such a dimensionless point seems ontologically equivalent to nothing and that to say it exists (especially considering that it would have to be said to exist as a dimensionless, durationless point/instant) "is to ascribe reality to a mathematical chimera"? (Note that if this is your approach then it is exactly the same as mine except that I don't grant the singularity—i.e., the first, and only, instant of time for you—ontological status.) If not, if you mean not to equate the first instant of time with the cosmological singularity, then wouldn't your reasons for requiring there to be a first instant of time following the singularity also require that there be (or apply to there needing to be) a second instant of time following the first instant and a third following the second, and so on?
When I approach philosophical problems I find (and I assume this applies to most people, not just to me) that my first glance intuition seems more often that not, though certainly not always, to be vindicated upon further analysis. Above I have provided my further analysis. Upon encountering Smith's argument my knee-jerk response was to suggest, as you have done Alan, that there be a first instant, and only instant, of time. But my gut intuition was that this was completely ad hoc. How and why could I possibly say there need be a first instant of time but not a second? All my arguments (actual arguments, not mere excuses, e.g., "Well, heck, it's the beginning!"* simply to avoid conclusions such as Smith's) for their needing to be a first instant of time seemed to require that there also be a second and third and fourth, etc. But that ran into the discontinuous time issue. Blah, blah, blah, etc, etc. A few arguments, counter-arguments, and many confusions later (all presented in some form in my comments here), I arrived at my current conclusion, the one I share with/stole from Craig. But I think this simple, first glance issue deserves consideration: Why is it not ad hoc to claim that there need be a first instant of time but not a second and third and fourth, etc?
*On the retort, "Well, heck, it's the beginning (or end)!" one need only look at any converging series or open interval to see that something may come to an end without having an ending point or that something may begin without having a beginning point or that something may have a limit, be bounded, etc., yet lack the limiting point.
Thanks for the detailed comments. I'm glad you found this post so stimulating. You write:
Pedantic point: we don't sat that a proposition is truthful but that it is true. Only a person can be truthful or the opposite. I'm quite sure Smith would distinguish an instant -- which is a purely temporal item -- from an occupant of an instant such as an instantaneous physical state. Smith seems to be assuming not only the continuity of time but also the continuity of causation. He seems to be thinking of causation as itself a causal process consisting of continuum-many phases. This is of course open to question. Indeed, to get really clear about whether the universe can cause itself one must get clear about what one means by causation.
You continue,
What you are saying here is plausible, but I suspect Smith would reply by saying that what you call reification is for him just the recognition of what exists. Thus he would not take what you are saying as refuting him but as opposing him.
You say, "the continuity of time is prior to our conceptualization of it into instants." I think Smith would reply that the continuity of time just is its being composed of durationless instants. This of course difficult to understand, in particular, how there could be 2-to-the-aleph-zero instants in any interval of time, no matter how short!
Yes, if you think of the universe en bloc, as a unit. But your quick refutation doesn't work if we grant Smith his assumptions.
Good comments. You write,
"Now, by Smith's logic, my motion across the room can have a beginning at t0 and yet need no cause for it's beginning because every state of motion (at ti, i>0) it preceded by a prior state of motion (at ti-Δt, 0 < Δt < ti). But this is absurd. Of course there's an initial cause of my motion, namely, me."
You are onto to something important here which really require a separate post, namely, how to understand intramundane causation. My cat slaps a ball with his paw and starts it rolling. What I take you to be suggesting is that in a case like this, on Smith's way of thinking, there would be no need for an external cause of the ball's motion — which is absurd, since it is the paw's contact with the ball that starts it rolling.
You say something very intriguing:
I have trouble with "With creation, however, there comes about a before-after relation between the states God (Nothing) and God+creation (Something)." Why exactly?
There are two STOAs in question: 1. God's existence, and 2. God's existence plus contingent beings. You want to say that (1) and (2) stand in a before-after relation. But you also say that apart from creation there is no before-after. So it is not clear to me how (1) and (2) can stand in a before-after relation.
Yes. One of my objections to Smith is that his argument that the universe does not need a cause, if sound, would also show that no continuous process with a beginning needs a cause. Since the latter is absurd, Smith's argument must be unsound.
A second objection of mine has been to insist that there being a beginning suffices to show that there is a first moment to time, namely, the beginning itself. Smith tries to avoid this by viewing time as a continuous and purely intramundane thing, so that it exists on only one side of the No World/World divide with no first event. I claim that time is not inherently on either side of that divide but take the divide itself to be the first event. You ask for clarification about this:
Strictly speaking, I don't think there are actual (i.e., existence entailing) temporal relations between STOAs. As a presentist, I hold that there is one maximal STOA of infinitesimal temporal width that is continuously replaced with a different maximal STOA. This replacement constitutes the flow of time. The reality of past STOA's consists in the traces they leave in the present, which traces I identify primarily with God's memories. The reality of future STOA's consists in the determinations of the present toward their obtaining. So when I say that (1) God's existence sans creation, and (2) God's existence plus the world as it is right now are related as before and after what I mean is that (2) contains a full representation of (1) as past. (1), however, contains no representation of anything as past, so there is no before. What about an after? Well, (1) may include a determination on God's part to realize (2) in the course of time. If it does, then (1) already points to (2) as something after.
Now, I'm not sure if that goes far enough to clarify my position vis-a-vis Smith. In fact, I'm pretty sure I've raised a whole bunch of issues that require further probing. But my wife's got dinner ready, so I'd better run.
That's funny that you should mention that "pedantic point." While typing it I was thinking, "This doesn't sound right," but I glossed over it with the ol' "Well, they'll know what I mean." Now that you have pointed out what was wrong with it, it's going to bug many any time I see that same mistake made elsewhere (kind of like when I see "valid argument" synonymized with "sound argument").
I grant your point about the distinction between instants and instantaneous states. I think then that Smith's argument hinges on whether or not instants actually exist, since if they don't exist their occupants can't exist either. I'm sure there's a way but it would be interesting, at least to me, to see how, assuming that instantaneous states determine subsequent instantaneous states, one could escape determinism. (But maybe this isn't a problem at all and I'm just having a mental slip, because I don't recall seeing the idea of time/instants that Smith is proposing ever being linked with determinism.)
On a different note, going back to Zeno's paradoxes and the seeming requirement that continuity metaphysically precede discontinuity, I don't know how any instantaneous state (occupying an instant) can cause another, presumably subsequent, instantaneous state (occupying another instant), since instants, being dimensionless, have no immediate predecessors.
You are also correct, Dr. Vallicella, to point out that in my critique of my formulation of Smith's argument, I didn't really refute him (indicate how, in my opinion, he had erred), but merely opposed him (indicated where, in my opinion, he had erred). I do think, though, that dispersed throughout my several posts I have given some indication has to how Smith has erred and why his argument is unsound. Briefly, though, the gist of my approach to refuting Smith's argument would be (1) to show that Smith's argument hinges on the actual existence of instants and the notion that their aggregate whole forms a continuum, and (2) to show that the notion that instants collectively form a continuum is a faulty assumption* because, to name but only two reasons, (a) no amount of instants, being non-durational, can "sum up" to a continuum and (b) if instants were to exist then temporal progress would be impossible (cf. Alan Rhoda on Zeno's paradoxes).
*I would also question the mere idea that instants actually exist by inquiring as to how a durationless object, state, etc., such as an instant, could be said to exist.
En bloc or Smith's way, I still maintain that nothing can cause itself to come into existence. Smith is just taking a different, and very clever, approach at attempting to explain how something (namely, the universe) might cause itself to exist. In my opinion, the attempted method (Smith's) is different; but the principle still applies: nothing can cause itself to come into existence. Smith tries to prove this principle wrong; and that, ultimately, is why he fails.
I agree with you that nothing can cause itself to come into existence, whether it be a partless entity, or a partite entity taken en bloc, or a partite entity with earlier phases causing later phases. But I don't think one can simply invoke as self-evident the principle, "Nothing can cause itself," in order to refute Smith. At the end of the day, this principle emerges unscathed, but only after the detailed considerations some of which you yourself have provided.
"I would also question the mere idea that instants actually exist by inquiring as to how a durationless object, state, etc., such as an instant, could be said to exist."
Well, do you accept that there are entities that are not in time at all? If abstracta can be accepted, then why balk at entities that are in time but are durationless? Can you derive a contradiction from the existence of durationless temporal items, or otherwise show them to be incoherent?
What you say in your last comment makes your view clearer. But of course, to refute Smith we cannot presuppose the existence of God. Perhaps the difference between you and Smith -- leaving God out of it -- is as follows:
Rhoda: There is a first instant (moment) of time and this is the moment of transition from Nothing to Something.
Smith: There is no first instant (moment) of time, but there is a first interval of time.
Smith may well show up in this forum -- if he can figure out how to navigate my site -- and if he does I would be interested in seeing how he responds to you.
As I see it, the difference between instants and abstracta, such as propositions or truths, is that instants are temporal, or "temporal items" as you put it earlier. Moreover, when we say, "Time exists" we mean something very different than when we say, "God exists" (if we say that) or "Abstracta exist" (if we say that). In fact, some people—maybe most people—when they say, "Time exists" are merely meaning to say, "Things change," not that some object exist. The same manner in which we mean "Time exists" to be understood is the same manner in which "Instants exist" ought to be understood. (Note that if by "Time exists" one merely means "Things change," then "Instants exist" seems to be giving a whole new meaning to "Time exists" and, really, to the concept of time. Also, if time is normally not considered to be an object but instants are, then, if instants are responsible for time and are said to actually exist, it's not clear to me how to rectify that with the notion that time is not an object.)
I think you hint at the distinction yourself, Dr. Vallicella, when, while referring to instants, you asked me, ". . . then why balk at entities [instants] that are in time but are durationless?" One difference is that instants, on Smith's understanding, are not in time; rather, they are time, that is, they constitute time. Instants, for Smith, if I understand him correctly, don't exist at certain times; the "at's" of time are instants. Abstracta differ here because they in fact can be said to exist at certain times, whereas instants cannot. Actually, Smith could literally say that certain abstracta exist at certain instants. But one can't say that certain abstracta exist at certain abstracta; that doesn't seem to make sense. So it appears there must be a difference in what we mean when we say these things (instants versus abstracta) exist. This argument can also be seen with the concept of thoughts versus the concept of mind. Thoughts are in the mind, or mental products of the mind, it is normally understood. But a mind can't be in the mind nor is it a mental product of the mind. Thus the two (thoughts and minds) must have a different sort of existence. Ergo, if I have it right, the mind is usually considered to be an immaterial/mental substance, whereas thoughts are not.
As an aside (which may be irrelevant), it is unclear whether particular abstracta, such as truths, actually exist or, at least, are fundamental to reality (see the fourth paragraph of Alan Rhoda's "The Kalam Argument, Zeno's Paradoxes, and Omniscience").
As another aside (which I think to be more relevant that the previous), maybe we should think of instants more as temporal states or "snapshots." If that is the case I don't see how a temporal state could be non-durational.
Lastly, I must add that I think the best route one may take to refute Smith's argument was given in my earlier post (Timestamp: 7.10.2006 11:18 am):This avoids the uncertainty in the discussion of whether or not a durationless, temporal object/state can exist, or rather, it approaches the issue differently (and better, I think).
A. R. Pruss and R. M. Gale make this idea more explicit when presenting the cosmological argument by S. Clarke:
(The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion, ed. W. J. Wainwright, p. 122, maybe available here from your university or library. Cf. this paper by Pruss, ch. 3.)
Pruss, especially in his new book on the principle of sufficient reason, modernizes this argument. Crucial premises (defended by Pruss) are:
1. The priniciple of sufficient reason (Pruss-version): every contingetly true proposition has an explanation.
2. The explanation of the existence of a concrete contingent being ultimately involves the causal efficacy of another concrete being. This premise Pruss seems to ground on the premise 1.
3. The principle that to explain the parts is to explain the whole (as in the case of infinitely old universe - which is Hume's objection to Clarke) is not true.
... The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion, ed. W. J. Wainwright, p. 122, maybe available here from your university or library...
I see that kalam arguments against the infinitude of the past are discussed. These arguments are relevant our problem: why the universe exists. As I understand kalam arguments, they try to establish that the series of past temporal states is not actually infinite (i.e., having aleph-zero of higher cardinality). Then the whole finite past temporal series is taken as something which began to exist. Arguably, the whole has a cause which is not a part (whether proper or improper) of the whole. Thus, the cause is neither a part of the universe (because the universe is a part of the whole), nor temporal. Maybe we can argue that tha cause is God-like, too.
Well, but how, in detail, should be the first point - that the past is finite - established? I've studied W. L. Craig's kalam arguments, and only this one used to seem promising to me: given temporal series of infinitely many past year and a counter counting one negative integer a year, the counter should at any point in the past have already finished counting all the numbers, since a one-to-one correspondence exists between the years of the past and the negative numbers. Thus, the past is not actually infinite. (See this paper by Craig, the section Second Supporting Argument.)
First, I tryed to make this argument more explicit:
1. If the series of past temporal states (in actual world and ordered according to the relation earlier than) is actually infinite, then it is possible that there is a token A (e.g., of machine-type) which assigns (in one-to-one correspondence) to all of the past temporal states negative integers. Premise.
2. The series of past temporal states is actually infinite. Premise for reductio.
3. It is possible that there is a token A which assigns to all of the past temporal states negative integers. From 1 and 2, by modus ponens.
4. It is possible that every past temporal state has assigned by a token A just one specific negative integer. From 3.
5. It is not possible that every past temporal state has assigned by a token A just one specific negative integer.
Why? Because it holds for any of the past temporal states and for any of the negative integers that a temporal state doesn‘t have assigned just one specific negative integer – because (in such an actually infinite series) every negative integer has already been assigned to some previous temporal state.
6. It is not the case that 2. From 4 and 5.
Later, thanks to Wes Morriston, I found a problem in this argument:
Must the Past Have a Beginning?
My section II in the Reply to Mr. Guminski is an attempt to make both W. L. Craig‘s and W. Morriston’s ideas even more explicit than as above. (But I admit that the section II is clumsy and that I failed to use abbreviations.)
In fine, it seems that the best Craig's argument fails. (I won't discuss here other Craig's arguments.)
(II) Oderberg: a Hope for Kalam?
Let me present a kalam argument against the infinitude of the past from the principle of sufficient reason. It is inspired by D. S. Orerberg's paper "Traversal of the Infinite, the "Big Bang," and the KCA", Philosophia Christi 2002, pp. 310ff. (Available through the previous link.)
(II.1)
Suppose we have a person called Tristam Shandy. Shandy writes an autobiography. It's very detailed: it takes him a year to record one day of his life. Suppose further that the past is infinite: there is actually infinite number of past days. And suppose Shandy writes from eternity past.
Now, Oderberg asks (p. 311), could Shandy complete his life story? (1) we see Shandy, before us, putting the final full stop to the final page of the last page of his autobiography; (2) Shandy has been writing for an infinitely long time. Are (1) and (2) compatible? Oderberg says they are not - at least if the principle of sufficient reason (which reads: every event has an adequate explanation) holds.
P. 315f.:
Here's a formal presentation. First, some abbreviations.
"E(p)" stands for "There is an adequate explanation of the fact that p". p is a proposition about events to be explained.
Let's have two concrete proposition f and g. "f" stands for "Tristam Shandy finishes at a particular time, say, t(0)". "g" stands for "Tristam Shandy finishes at a previous particular, say, t(-1)".
"not-p" stands for "It is not true that p."
Now, the argument.
(1) We see Shandy, before us, putting the final full stop to the final page of the last page of his autobiography.
Premise.
(2) Shandy has been writing for an infinitely long time.
Premise.
(3) not-E(f and not-g) and not-E(g and not-f)
From (2), the Principle of Correspondence, and the fact that only the Principle of Correspondence can be useful in the given context.
(4) From
not-E(f and not-g) and not-E(g and not-f)
we can infer
not-E((f and not-g) or (g and not-f)).
Why? Because:"If neither of two events have an adequate explanation, there is no adequate explanation of their disjunction." (p. 316)
(5) not-E((f and not-g) or (g and not-f))
From (3) and (4), by modus ponens.
(6) not-E(f or g)
From (5).
(7) The principle of sufficient reason (Oderberg-version): every event has an adequate explanation.
Premise.
(6) contradicts (7). Thus, ((1) and (2) and (7)) is not consistent.
(II.A)
Now, Oderberg suggests that a similar argument can be made for the general conclusion that it is not true that the series of past temporal states is actually infinite. He wrote (p. 316f.): "the hypothesis of such a series violates PSR". There is "no adequate explanation of how the series can terminate at any specific point" (just as there is no adequate explanation of the fact that Shandy finishes his autobiography at a particular time); thus, "there is no adequate explanation of how it can terminate tout court".
I've wondered how would the argument look like - because I haven't been able to read it off Oderberg's paper.
I've tryed to make use of the kalam argument (against the infinite past) from the task of counting all negative integers (see above, section I). This argument seems relevantly similar to the case of Tristam Shandy. I started with this idea: If the series of past temporal states (ordered according to the relation earlier than) is actually infinite (i.e., having aleph-zero cardinality), then it is metaphysically possible that there is a token entity P (e.g., of machine-type) which assigns (in one-to-one correspondence) to all of the past temporal states negative integers. (By "temporal states" I mean really different maximal complexes of simultaneous occurences - i.e., really different complexes of whatever occurs at a time.) Maybe I can show, I thought, that there is no explanation why P finishes its counting (more accurately, its putting into one-to-one correspondence with all temporal states) of all negative integers at a particular time. But I found out that I am not able to deduce the conclusion (that there is no explanation why P finishes at one specific time or at the previous time) from metaphysical possibility of P and that I need P to be in actual world (details apart). Now, If P is in actual world and if it suffices for P to exist that the past is infinite, it would be strange to say that P is a concrete (as opposed to abstract) entity or that P is a machine. P should be something whose existence is more ready to be entailed. What about some abstract process? Maybe. I also found out that someone might object that finishing at one specific time is essential for P - this would block the argument because in such a case it would be strange to say that there is no explanation why P finishes its task at a particular time. From these considerations arose the premise 1 below.
Abbreviations:
"e": There is some collection K of past temporal states which is: actually infinite (i.e., has aleph-zero cardinality); in actual possible world; ordered according to the relation "temporally later than", in this way:
... C B A
(State A is later than state B, B is later than C, etc. State A is the latest temporal state.)
"f": There is a token P (of abstract-process-type) which: is in actual possible world; gives successively all members of K into one-to-one correspondence with all negative, whole, ordinal numbers in such a way that: there is the correspondence between ordinal numbers of members of K on the one side and temporal topological properties of members of K on the other side; state A corresponds to -1, in this way:
... C B A
... -3 -2 -1
(The numerals should be exactly below the letters.)
(Topological correspondence means: if state x has higher ordinal number than state y, than x is temporally after y. E.g., if x has ord. nr. -4 and y has or. nr. -8, then x is temporally after y. Negative number -4 is higher number than -8. But maybe the talk about topological correspondence is unnecessary.)
"g": P gives successively all members of K into one-to-one correspondence with all negative, whole, ordinal numbers in such a way that: there is the correspondence between ordinal numbers of members of K on the one side and temporal topological properties of members of K on the other side; state B corresponds to -1, in this way:
... D C B
... -3 -2 -1
(Again, the numerals should be exactly below the letters.)
1. If e, then (f and (it is metaphysically possible that g))
Premise.
2. e
Premise, for reductio.
3. f and (it is metaphysically possible that g)
From 1 and 2, by modus ponens.
4. f
From 3, by simplification.
5. not-E(f and not-g) and not-E(g and not-f)
Premise.
Why this premise? Because, to paraphrase Oderberg, "any finishing" state is "as good as another" for completing the task. And "it is hard to see what... can be advanced as an adequate explanation of" P's finishing at one state "rather than another". Thus, "there is no adequate explanation for the fact that" P completes at the temporal state A and not at the temporal B "and no adequate explanation for the fact that" P completes at B and not at A. (p. 316)
6. (not-E(p) and not-E(q)) entails not-E(p or q)
Premise.
If "neither of two events have an adequate explanation, there is no adequate explanation of their disjunction. (Example: there is no adequate explanation of the fact that I am ill, and no adequate explanation of the fact that I failed to submit my paper, so there is no adequate explanation of the fact that either I am ill or failed to submit my paper.)" (p. 316)
7. not-E((f and not-g) or (g and not-f))
From 5 and 6.
8. not-E(f or g)
From 7. See p. 316.
9. Every event has an adequate explanation.
Premise.
9 is in contradiction with 8. Where is the problem? A hypothetical supporter of the argument says the problem is premise 2. And maybe the argument can be modified to deal with the past series with greater than aleph-zero cardinality, too. However, the premise 1 is quite bizzare, isn't it?
Section II.1
I need to say that the premise (1) and f means the same.
(6) reads: (f or g) and not-E(f or g). From (1) and (5).
Section II.A
(8) reads: (f or g) and not-E(f or g). From 4 and 7.
Let me reformulate my argument from the section I (Craig fails) above as follows:
1. If there is a series of past temporal intervals of the same length which is metrically actually infinite (i.e., the series is of actually infinite duration), then it is possible that there is a token A (e.g., of machine-type) which assigns (in one-to-one correspondence and successively in time) to all of the past temporal intervals negative integers.
Like this:
Past intervals
... -4 -3 -2 -1
Premise.
2. There is a series of past temporal intervals of the same length which is metrically actually infinite. Premise for reductio.
3. It is possible that there is a token A which assigns to all of the past intervals of the series negative integers. From 1 and 2, by modus ponens.
4. It is possible that every past interval of the series has assigned by a token A just one specific (precise, particular) negative integer. From 3.
5. It is not possible that every past interval of the series has assigned by a token A just one specific negative integer.
Why? Because it holds for any past interval of the series and for any negative integer that an interval doesn‘t have assigned just one specific negative integer – because (in such an actually infinite series) every negative integer has already been assigned to some previous interval.
6. It is not the case that 2. From 4 and 5.
However, as we saw (above, section I: Craig fails), W. Morriston objects: "The Principle of Correspondence entails at most that all the numbers could have been counted by now, not that they would have been.” Thus, 5 does not follow.
Recently, Mr. Craig answered to me very briefly (by e-mail): “I've defended the position that given infinite time, the counter would (not merely could) have completed its super-task. I note that this sort of inference is used frequently in physical science.” Well, the most sophisticated defence - which I know - of the claim that the counter would (not merely could) have completed its task is just the criticised Craig’s paper The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe, more precisely, its section Second Supporting Argument. However, I cannot see how this section deals with the Morriston's objection. It seems that the section, at the bottom, just claims: "the counter should at any point in the past have already finished counting all the numbers, since a one-to-one correspondence exists between the years of the past and the negative numbers." How this is supposed to solve the Morriston's objection? Craig also writes about the practice in physical science. But what is the rationale for this practice?
But let me try to use Craig’s idea.
4.1. It holds for any past interval of the series and for any negative integer assigned to this interval, that it is possible that the negative integer is assigned to some previous interval.
Why? Because of the Principle of Correspondence. See above, section I: Craig fails.
4.2. If something can happen somewhere in a metrically actually infinite temporal series and there is a metrically actually infinite temporal series, then at any temporal state (say, t(x)) of this series that something happened already (i.e., it happened at some t(y) for y lower than x).
Premise.
4.3. It holds for any past interval of the series and for any negative integer that the negative integer has already been assigned to some previous interval.
From 4.1 and 4.2, somehow.
5. It is not possible that every past interval of the series has assigned by a token A just one specific negative integer.
From 4.3, somehow.
It seems that it is 4.2 that is mentioned in Craig’s anwer to me. See also Oderberg’s paper (discussed above in section II: Oderberg, a Hope for Kalam?), p. 315: Craig assumes that all possibilities are realized during an infinite period of time. It would be interesting to see how Craig would argue for 4.2 in detail. But he has given a sketch already: 4.2 is “used frequently in physical science.”
Do you think that this can be tied to Dr. Vallicella's "no first instant" argument? ISTM that the only thing that could distinguish counters would be when they started counting, and if there can never be any internally identifiable instant for "starting," then there can never be sufficient reason for distinguishing counters in that regard.
you wrote,
But the premise 4.2 does not presume (i.e., entail) the existence of an actual infinite. 4.2 does not say that there is an actual infinite. 4.2 says that if there is a metrically infinite past, then something follows.
IF:
something can happen somewhere in a metrically actually infinite temporal series
AND
there is a metrically actually infinite temporal series,
THEN
at any temporal state (say, t(x)) of this series that something happened already (i.e., it holds for any t(x) that that something happened at some t(y) for y lower than x).
Craig has examples of using 4.2 at least in the physical cosmology (e.g., this paper, section Vacuum Fluctuation Models):
You wrote also:
But the claim that "the only thing that could distinguish counters would be when they started counting" seems to beg the question. More precisely, why should a supporter of an infinite past accept that?
Thanks for your comment.
I should add that my tentative argument in the section Craig's Answer aims to show only that it is not true that there is a series of past temporal (non-overlapping) intervals of a same length (e.g., 1 hour) such that the series is metrically actually infinite (i.e., the number of the intervals in the series is aleph-zero).
Even if the argument is successful, it does not follow that there is no metrically amorphous time - i.e., time series of temporal states which is ordered according to the relation earlier than, but such that the distance between non-overlapping intervals is not defined.
Sure, metrically amorphous time seems bizzare (and I don't know what is the usefulness of such a concept), but it is quite standard objection to kalam arguers. The objection can run like as follows. If there there is a metrically amorphous past earlier than metrically finite past, you cannot argue like this: 1. there is a metrically finite past; so, 2. this past, taken as a whole, began to exist; so, 3. the whole has a cause which is not a part of the whole; so, 4. the cause is not temporal; so, 5. the cause is God-like, etc.
4 does not follow because a cause of the whole metrically finite past could be (some part of) a metrically amorphous past.
I should add that Craig attempts to deal with metrically amorphous time here.
IF:
something can happen somewhere in a metrically actually infinite temporal series
My point is that the reason people think something can happen somewhere in a metrically actually infinite temporal series is because of some limiting behavior. For example, in the case of vacuum fluctuations, the assumption would be that there is a non-zero probability of occurrence on any metrically finite temporal interval and that it would in fact occur after sufficiently long time. Absent that assumption, there would be no good reason to think that the conditional premise was true.
It looks to me like Craig actually blew by questioning that assumption when he said "According to such models, it is impossible to specify precisely when and where a fluctuation will occur in the primordial vacuum which will then grow into a universe." It's not clear to me why it's sound to extend a non-zero probability of occurrence in finite time to something actually happening (ISTM that you would only get an extremely high probability of something happening, not its actual happening). The PSR argument seems to suggest that there would never be a sufficient reason for it actually happening at any particular point no matter how long the time period is extended, so it wouldn't be sound to reason from a finite non-zero probability in some certain interval to something actually happening (or having happened) at any particular time. It doesn't look to me like Craig questioned this, but ISTM that the reason that such assumptions are "used in physical sciences" is simply that they went unquestioned, not that they were philosophically sound.
Morriston more or less denies the assumption that infinite time means that something would have happened, as he is well within his rights to do if my explanation for the unsoundness of that assumption is sufficient, but the PSR argument still catches him.
My assertion of what distinguishes the counters was simply intended as an example of how an asserted reason fails, but if the PSR argument is sound, then the advocate of infinite time won't be able to come up with any reason, not merely the one that happened to come to my mind. If they don't accept my reason, that won't excuse the advocate of infinite past to proffer an alternative.
I agree that metrically amorphous time isn't caught by this argument. However, I suspect that what the advocate of an infinite "past" buys with metrically amorphous time (particularly in the sense of a Bell-type continuum) is going to end up costing him too much in terms of what a "past" or "causation" means at all. But this isn't the place for that.
Thanks for the interaction! You've been particularly helpful in getting Craig's argument straight for me.
If time is metaphysical (as you say; and I agree it is), then why think time begins ith the creation of a physical universes? Or am I misunderstanding you? It seems to me that positing a beginning for time at the creation of the universe makes time an attribute of the physical world, the not metaphysical world. Yes? No?
Tom
Tom
I will let Alan speak for himself but, for my part, if time is simply a product of change (or exists in the presence of change), as I think it is often considered, then I don't see the difficulty.
thank you, too.
Let me one more note. It seems you like the argument inspired by Oderberg: here, section II.A. I formulated this argument according to Oderberg's suggestions mentioned in the section II.1. But I don't know if II.A harmonizes with Oderberg's real intention. The premise 1 in the II.A seems strange. And it is quite easy for an opponent to take 1 as problematic or not plausible enough. Maybe one can make better use of the Oderberg's ideas in the II.1 and make a better argument than my II.A. But, currently, neither I am able to do this, nor I am able to read such a better argument off the Oderberg's suggestions.
Tom
That issue you bring up is a good one. It is covered by William Lane Craig in several of his articles, namely those under the "Divine Eternity" section (e.g., "God and the Beginning of Time," specifically the section entitled "Temporality vs. Atemporality of God sans Creation," which is about half-way down the page, and everything after that).
Tom
Most Christians "bite the bullet" on the Trinity. Why? Because (1) it seems a necessary consequence of correct exegesis and (2) if understood properly (which is not to be confused with understood fully) it entails no logical contradiction. I don't think Craig bases his God sans creation hypothesis on "intuitions." He gives, in my opinion, a very compelling argument (not intuition) for the finitude of time. This conclusion has consequences (cf. reason #1, above, for the Trinity doctrine). Consequence: How are we then to reconcile the eternality of God with the finitude of time? Craig proposes the God sans creation notion. It, as far as I can tell, entails no logical contradiction. It, just like the Trinity, might lack any good analogies, but that says nothing about its being the case. If Craig knew of any better (more plausible, less paradoxical) way to reconcile the finitude of time with the eternality of God I'm sure he'd quickly adopt it. I know I'm open to any better solutions.
Maybe I can clarify where I’m coming from. Let’s lose “intuition” and adopt “argument.” From a logical/mathematical point of view, I can’t see any fatal flaws in Craig’s argument about the impossibility of actual infinites. From this point of view, God’s being temporally eternal entails a logical absurdity, i.e., that of an actual infinite.
For others atemporal divine personhood entails absurdities from other points of view (the theological and the existential). These don’t find consciousness/awareness and loving, personal relationality at all meaningful when prefixed with the adjective atemporal. Craig doesn’t find atemporal personhood problematic. I think (just a guess) that’s because he finds logical/mathematical arguments ‘categorically’ superior to existential ones. But for those of us who do find atemporal personhood absurd, what do we do when contradictory accounts on some question (temporal vs atemporal divine personhood sans creation) both involve absurdities? We have to do the best we can.
Now, I don’t think reality is ultimately paradoxical/contradictory. Were we sufficiently knowledgeable, one set of absurdities would disappear. Until then, we have to pick our poison and try to be as objective as possible in weighing the relative strength of competing arguments. I can live with supposing that our mathematical/logical knowledge on this question is missing something that would otherwise show actual infinites are possible in a way we don’t now perceive (or that a temporally infinite past doesn’t really constitute an actual infinite, or that actual infinites are ‘merely’ mathematical/logical problems). But I can’t now live with supposing that my intuitions about consciousness/awareness, loving and personal relationality are that incomplete or misguided. That is, an unresolved mathematical paradox creates far less havoc for me logically and mathematically than the notion of atemporal divine personhood creates for me theologically and existentially. And I can’t see any a priori reason for being more tolerant of existential absurdities than of logical ones.
So I’m not offering a logical or mathematical argument for how Herbert’s hotel really makes sense. Craig’s arguments seem pretty sound. I’m saying there are other arguments of a more existential type that appear equally as sound to some and which convince them that atemporal divine personhood is equally as absurd as Herbert’s hotel.
Tom
I very much get your point. I'm just not in the same boat as you because I don't think atemporal divine personhood entails absurdities. If I did, or if it could be shown to be that it does, I would quickly jettison my current opinion on the matter. We're of the same mindset here, just that we have differing opinions on the absurdities involved in atemporal divine personhood.
I have briefly voiced my opinion on this matter in the first paragraph of this comment (Timestamp: 02.28.06 – 5:58 pm). Note: The discussion here was whether or not God could be atemporal and yet engage in relations with a temporal world. That information might help clear up how I stated some of the things I stated. For instance, one commenter was suggesting that God sans creation, thus entailing atemporal divine personhood, is an example of God being atemporal and yet engaging in seemingly temporal actions. I argued that this was not the case. (By the by, it's Hilbert's, not Herbert's, Hotel.)
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