Anthony Flood has done metaphysicians a service by making available John N. Deck’s excellent, St. Thomas Aquinas and the Language of Total Dependence. This is an essay that Anthony Kenny, no slouch of a philosopher, saw fit to include in his anthology, Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays (University of Notre Dame Press, 1976).
Mr. Flood finds Deck’s argument to be "unanswerable" to such an extent that it broke the hold of Thomism on him. Although I am not a Thomist, I believe I can show that Deck’s argument is not compelling.
This essay divides into two parts. In the first, I state what I take to be Deck’s argument; in the second, I show how it can be answered from the position worked out in my A Paradigm Theory of Existence: Onto-Theology Vindicated (Kluwer Philosophical Studies Series #89, 2002).
On classical theism, divine creation is creatio ex nihilo, creation out of nothing. Of course, this does not mean that God creates out of some stuff called ‘nothing’; it means that it is not the case that there is something distinct from God out of which God creates. Thus divine creation, classically understood, is not the forming of a pre-given matter, or any sort of operating upon something whose existence is independent of God. Creation out of nothing thus implies that created entities (creatures) are totally dependent on God. By comparison, when I make a sandwich, the product is only partially dependent on me: I merely assemble pre-given ingredients. Human 'creations' are out of something distinct from their 'creators.' Divine creations are out of nothing distinct from their Creator.
Deck’s thesis is that this total dependence of contingent beings on God is logically incompatible with the essence/existence composition that Aquinas and others see in contingent beings. Essence/existence composition refers to the real distinction (distinctio realis) between what a thing is and its existence. Essence here is equivalent to whatness, or quiddity. Essence in this broad sense comprises all of a thing’s properties, whether essential in the narrow sense or accidental.
Thus essence in the broad sense includes those properties without which a thing cannot exist, and those properties without which it can exist. For instance, I cannot exist without being human, but I can exist without being a blogger. Being human is an essential property of me, while being a blogger is an accidental property of me.
Existence, however, is not a property, or at least it is not a property that could add anything to a thing’s whatness. It is rather that which distinguishes a merely possible thing (even a completely determined merely possible thing) from the same thing actually existing.
There is a lot that could be said in defense of this real distinction between essence and existence, but this is not the place. I should add, however, that to call the distinction real is to imply that it is not one that we excogitate, but one that reflects a distinction in contingent beings apart from our mental and linguistic activities. Of course, if two items are really distinct it does not follow that each can exist without the other. Essence and existence in a contingent being are really distinct but not in the way my glasses are really distinct from my head. My head can exist without my glasses and vice versa; but the existence of Socrates cannot exist without Socrates or the essence of Socrates, and neither Socrates nor the essence of Socrates can exist without the existence of Socrates.
Now consider some contingent being C. On the Thomistic theory, C has two ontological factors, essence (ES) and existence (EX). They are distinct, but related. How are ES and EX related? It is natural to think of them as related as potency to act. An essence is a merely possible being until it is actuated by existence. Since the existence of a contingent being is no part of its essence, existence must come from without. Accordingly, on the Thomistic scheme that Deck is criticizing, the essence of C is that which receives existence in the act of divine creation.
An essence receives existence. It receives existence from God as existence-bestower or actualizer. But now it appears that God, in creating, is after all operating upon something distinct from himself. God may not be forming a pre-existent matter, but he arguably is bestowing existence on something that in some sense must be pre-given if it is to make sense to say that essence receives existence and might not have received existence. But then how can C be totally dependent on God?
The problem, in a nutshell, is that total dependence entails that there is nothing apart from God that God operates upon in the act of creation, while essence/existence composition entails that there is something that has or receives existence and which, therefore, is something upon which God must operate in order to create. This lands us in a contradiction.
To put it another way, Deck sees an inconsistent dyad lurking with the Thomistic scheme:
1. Total dependence of X upon G entails that there is no Y such that G operates upon Y to produce X.
2. Essence/Existence composition entails that there is a Y such that G operates upon Y to produce X.
Since (1) and (2) cannot both be true, Deck concludes that no totally dependent entity can be ontologically dual: if an entity is totally dependent, it must be "one in respect to that upon which it depends."
How to Avoid Deck’s Conclusion
Professor Deck would have us conclude that contingent beings are ontologically simple: they are unitary rather than dual and harbor no essence/existence composition. Thus in effect he argues from (1) above to the denial of (2). Deck’s proposal is tantamount to the suggestion (refuted in PTE, Ch. 3) that a thing and its existence are one and the same, that, for any x, the existence of x = x. But I maintain that one can uphold essence/existence composition while avoiding the contradiction codified in the inconsistent dyad above. What we must do is reject two assumptions that Deck tacitly makes but does not defend, namely:
Assumption 1: The only way to conceptualize essence/existence composition is by thinking of an essence as a pre-given receptacle which receives existence or to which existence is added.
Assumption 2: Creatio ex nihilo excludes creatio ex Deo.
To show that Assumption 1 is false, I will sketch some of the doctrine presented in Paradigm Theory of Existence. As I argue in PTE, existence cannot be identified with one of a thing’s ontological constituents; it is rather the togetherness of all its constituents, among the latter, the thing’s properties. This is intuitively obvious since the existence of a thing pertains to the whole of it, and cannot be located in one part of it. If it were, the other parts would precisely not exist. So think of C as a whole whose ontological parts include a, b, c, . . . . The idea is that the existence of C is not a further part, but the contingent unity or togetherness of a, b, c, . . . .
On this scheme, there is a real distinction between essence and existence in C: it is the distinction between the constituents and their unity or togetherness. If we now bring God into the picture, we can say that divine creating is the unifying of C’s constituents. God is the unifier responsible for the contingent unity of a thing’s ontological parts. God does not bestow existence upon a pre-given receptacle, for prior to the unifying of C’s constituents, there is no C or essence of C. It is not as if there is an individual C that then (logically speaking) receives existence: divine creation is not the bestowal of existence on a mere possible that already has an identity; it is rather a bestowal of both existence and identity.
To put it another way, on my scheme, divine creation confers both existence and individuality by the same stroke: it does not confer existence on a merely possible individual whose unity is independent of its existence. Creation is not the actualization of, or bestowal of existence upon, pre-given mere possibles.
But we are not out of the woods yet. Suppose the ontological constituents of C are properties construed as universals. If divine creation is the unification of these universals –- their bundling so as to form an individual –- then God operates on universals to form individuals. Do we not then face a problem similar to Deck's problem, namely, the problem that these universals are a pre-given ‘matter’ vis-a-vis the divine creative activity, with the consequence that the creature cannot be totally dependent on the creator?
I say there is no problem. One may construe universals as divine concepts. As such, they do not exist apart from God. It follows that in creating, God does not operate upon anything independent of himself. God creates ex nihilo in this precise sense: God creates, but not out of something distinct from himself. God creates out of himself. Thus the second assumption falls, the assumption that creatio ex nihilo excludes creatio ex Deo.
What I have said does not of course constitute a defense of Aquinas against Deck’s criticism, but it does show that Deck is mistaken in the claim he makes in the last sentence of his article, to wit, "If there is any total dependence anywhere, either of creature upon God or of anything upon anything else, the dependent must be a one in respect to that upon which it depends." For what I have shown is that creatures can be totally dependent on God, dependent both in essence and existence, while also evincing essence/existence composition.
In sum, (1) and (2) are logically consistent if we construe (1) as
1*. Total dependence of X upon G entails that there is no Y distinct from G such that G operates upon Y to produce X.
Related Posts (on one page):
- John Deck's Contrast Argument Against the Philosophy of Being
- Total Dependence and Essence/Existence Composition
This in particular struck me.
On a semi-related track here's a quote from Johannes Tauler on the Incarntation you might like
“The Father…turns inward to Himself with his divine intellect and penetrates in clear self-beholding the essential abyss of His eternal being. In this act of pure self-comprehension He utters Himself completely by a Word. … The act whereby He knows himself is the generation of the Son in eternity. Thus He rests within Himself in the unity of essence, and He flows out in the distinction of Persons.”
I always benefit from your clarity of vision on this subject. If you are ever so inclined, I would be curious to see your response to the argument that divine simplicity entails that creation is necessary (in a way, the obverse of the argument that you addressed here). A version that I have seen goes thusly:
"1. If God is absolutely simple (P), then his act of will to create is identical with his essence (R).
2. If God’s act of will to create is identical with his essence (R), then his act of will to create is necessary. (Q)
3. If God is absolutely simple (P), then his act of will to create is necessary. (Q) (From 1,2 by Hypothetical Syllogism)
4. God is absolutely simple. (Premise S)
5. Therefore, God’s act of will to create is necessary (R). (From 3,4 by Modus Ponens)
Support for (2) is given by the following argument.
(2)If God’s act of will to create is identical with his essence (R), then his act of will to create is necessary. (Q)
6. If God’s essence is had by him necessarily, then if anything is identical with his essence it is necessary.
7. God’s essence is had by him necessarily. (Premise)
8. Therefore, anything identical with his essence is necessary. (From 6, 7 MP)
Seven (7) I take to be uncontroversial and by that I mean that any Christian should agree with it on its face.
(6) can be supported by Liebniz’s Law:
(x) (y) [(x = y), then (P) (Px, ≡ Py)]
For any x and any y, if x is identical to y, then if x has a property P then y must have that same property P and vice versa."
This more or less parallels an argument given by David Bradshaw (professor of philosophy at University of Kentucky) in Aristotle East and West that St. Thomas renders creation necessary.
Phillip Blosser (professor of philosophy at Lenoir-Rhyne College) gave this response.
Michael Liccione (with whom we are already acquainted) offered his own response.
I, however, think it would be more straightforward simply to argue that premise (7) equivocates between created existence and divine existence, so that God's existence is necessary precisely because His existence does not admit of being characterized by identity with properties in the way that (6) would require. A suitable defeater can be made out along the line that Barry Miller takes in A Most Unlikely God by noting that (7) improperly predicates necessity of God internally rather than externally. But given that Miller's concept of existence is debatable (and that you yourself have offered a counter-position), it would be helpful to see what your own argument would be.
Lest I appear pushy in making requests out of my own curiosity, please take for granted all of the standard disclaimers about your own interest, time, motivation, etc. I have mentioned the problem only because I thought it would interest you.
You write, "premise (7) equivocates between created existence and divine existence,. . ." But 'existence' does not occur in (7). So I'm not sure what you mean.
I would question (1) in the above argument. I see that no support for it is provided. Why is (1) true? Divine simplicity is essentially the denial that there is any composition in God as between act and potency, form and matter, essence and existence, nature and suppositum. But this seems consistent with the claim that God has certain accidental properties such as the property of having created.
I was thinking along the following lines.
St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII:1:
"For what to be wise is to wisdom, and to be able is to power, and to be eternal is to eternity, and to be just to justice, and to be great to greatness, that being itself is to essence. And since in the Divine simplicity, to be wise is nothing else than to be, therefore wisdom there is the same as essence."
St. Thomas Aquinas, ST I, Q.40, RO 1:
"And as the divine simplicity excludes the composition of subject and accident, it follows that whatever is attributed to God, is His essence Itself; and so, wisdom and power are the same in God, because they are both in the divine essence."
I would gather, then, that having willed would be identical with will itself, which would be identical with God's essence under the doctrine of divine simplicity. Would this not be the difference between "having created" and "having willed to create?"
That's what I find troublesome about the possibility of "certain accidental properties." It would seem that such accidental properties must either be Cambridge properties (strictly external relations) or be covered under the identity relation of divine simplicity. That is why I didn't consider (1) objectionable in itself, provided that "identical" is understood to refer to the same identity by which God is identical to His own properties. Am I missing something?
That is why I considered (7) (and its application through (6) to (2)) to be the nub of the difficulty instead. The trouble seems to be in conceiving what it means to say that God's essence is "had by him necessarily." I can't think of any way to understand this given the doctrine of divine simplicity except to say that there necessarily exists a being who has his nature by being identical with it. But in that case, it wouldn't make any sense to speak of "anything" being identical with the divine essence in the sense of (6), since it would understand the "anything" in question as something apart from God that is exemplified in God (like the exemplification view of properties from Plantinga). That suggests to me that the concept of necessary existence in (7) must be flawed as well; it implicitly construes existence in Plantinga-style fashion in its assertion "God has his existence necessarily."
Perhaps it would be clearer to say that (6) and (7) are question-begging as a response to divine simplicity, because they assume a debatable view of existence with which divine simplicity cannot possibly be consistent. But I still don't see why (1) is doubtful. I can see why multiple things could be willed in the same act of will, but it does seem that there must be one act of will (identical with the divine essence) in which they are all willed.
Since Divine Simplicity is off-topic for this thread, I'll post something on DS before too long and attempt to address your concern there.
But for now, I ask you: Do you appreciate Deck's criticism of Aquinas? Do you think it is sound?
Sorry for having skipped ahead. I just leapt from the notion of "divine concepts" to the question of how metaphysically simple God can have "divine concepts" without those concepts themselves being God.
Well, I don't think you've quite appreciated Deck's point -- essences are particulars and he says nothing about universals -- but that is not where your interest lies in any case. Your question is: How can a simple God 'contain' a plurality of concepts? That is indeed a question that needs an answer. I hope to try to answer it before too long.
But so that I know where you are 'coming from': Are you for DS or against it?
Are you for DS or against it?
For it.
Well, I don't think you've quite appreciated Deck's point -- essences are particulars and he says nothing about universals -- but that is not where your interest lies in any case.
Could be that I've missed something, or I may have just mapped Deck's ideas to the wrong terms. What I am getting at is that essences instantiated (I think your term was "bundled") from divine ideas are not formed "from" anything other than God. I may have misunderstood your argument and Deck's, but I was just trying to restate what you said here:
One may construe universals as divine concepts. As such, they do not exist apart from God. It follows that in creating, God does not operate upon anything independent of himself. God creates ex nihilo in this precise sense: God creates, but not out of something distinct from himself. God creates out of himself.
I think that whatever Y Deck assumes is "out there" on which God operates eventually devolves to a divine idea at some point (implicitly in his theory of existence, as you argue), and there is no reason to think that divine ideas cannot be contained in God (although Deck didn't perceive the need to address this, thinking he had avoided it by viewing the existence of a thing as identifiable with the thing itself).
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