One can believe
that a person exists without believing
in the person. Plenty of people believe that Saddam Hussein exists, but do not believe in him. To believe in a person involves more than believing that the person exists; it involves trust among other things. But can one
believe in a person without
believing that the person exists? Well, one might believe in a person without raising the question of whether the person exists; but if one came to believe that the person one believed in did not exist, then surely the belief-in would not survive. Surely there is something absurd in this little speech: "I know that God does not exist, but I continue to trust in his providence." Or, "The Lord is my shepherd even though he is nothing more than an anthropomorphic projection." In sum,
One can believe that a person P exists without believing in P; but one cannot believe in P if one believes that P does not exist.
An analogous distinction can (and ought to be) made with respect to theories and beliefs. To believe that astrology (alchemy, evolutionary explanations of intentionality . . .) exists is not to believe in astrology (alchemy, evolutionary explanations of intentionality . . .) in the sense of believing that the theory is true or has some such lesser epistemic virtue as rational acceptability or plausibility. But if one believes in these theories, then surely one believes that they exist. In sum,
One can believe that a theory T exists without believing in T; but one cannot believe in T if one believes that T does not exist.
We can also apply something like this distinction to such artifacts as compasses and GPS devices. To believe that Seldom Seen Slim has a GPS unit in his hand in not to believe in said unit. I believe that there is a compass in my hand, but I do not trust it, rely on it, 'put my faith' in it for the reason that I am now in the presence of a strong artificial magnetic field.
Or I say to Slim, "Sho nuff, that there's a footbridge spanning the gorge we need to cross, but I wouldn't trust it if I were you."
We can also stretch the distinction to fit some naturally occurrent items. Where there's smoke there's fire, but my belief that there is smoke over yonder is not the same as my belief in it as reliably indicative of fire.
In each of these cases, belief that X exists is distinct from believing in X as veracious, veridical, reliable, etc.
In ordinary English, 'belief in X' often just means 'belief that X exists.' But then 'belief in belief' would mean 'belief that beliefs exist,' and 'belief in the belief in God' would mean 'belief that the belief that God exists exists.' Surely there is nothing problematic about this meta-belief. We all believe, and believe with truth, that concepts and beliefs about God exist. It is obvious that the concept of God is not the same as God. The concept of God exists whether or not God exists. (Note that the truth of what I just wrote requires reading 'concept of God' as a genitivus objectivus.)
But what Dennett means by the belief in belief is something different: the notion that it is good for us to have beliefs, in particular, the notion that it is good for us to have the belief that God exists. (Cf. p. 221) But more on this later.
There was in ancient philosophy a school called Pyrrhonian skepticism that asserted that what is best for us is to have as few as possible beliefs, beliefs in or beliefs that anything is the case. Every "belief in" or "belief that" is an disappointment waiting to happen as events conflict with our beliefs. Disapppointed in the failure of our beliefs to find confirmation, we fall into distress and unhappiness. The wise man trusts only in appearances and what (now) appears to be the case. Nothing disturbs him because nothing can undermine his trust only in what now seems to be case. Belief and ataraxia are inversely related.
Trusting in appearances does not mean you trust that what appears to be X is actually X. On the contrary.
A prudent Pyrrhonian would never trust that someone who appears to be honest actually is honest ( in the sense that he can be trusted to behave honestly in the future ). The Pyrrhonian knows appearances change and he will prepare himself for and protect himself against adverse changes. He will thus not be vulnerable to the deceit and betrayal that may befall a “trusting” person. Arguably, this is a better and happier position to be in the face of the Heraclitean world of human relationships and loyalties. ( “You cannot step twice into the same relationship.”)
Perhaps we could put it this way. The Pyrrhonian skeptic practices epoche in respect of all doxastic commitments. He engages in a sort of epistemic coitus reservatus. Having suffered the consequences of premature doxastic ejaculation, he now abstains from e-jaculating, from throwing his doxastic spear beyond the sphere of his control. He sticks to the appearances, which, qua appearances, cannot deceive him. He remains in total control, keeping his cool, and not blowing his wad.
"Belief and ataraxia are inversely related." Well said, Wild Phil. This begs for an extended treatment. So much of the bloody contention in the world arises from the clash of belief-systems. So one will be forgiven for thinking that it would be best to cultivate skepticism toward all beliefs that go beyond the mundane.
Here perhaps the OLPr can join forces with the Pyrrhonian skeptic. Both favor, it seems, a tranquil re-insertion into the quotidian.
I believe you have at some time in the past instructed the brethren in Pascal’s Wager for believing in God’s existence. The key to Pascal’s argument is the incomparable value of attaining salvation. Even discounting that by the improbability of God‘s existence, the payoff is still so great that it compels us to bet on and believe in God’s existence. Believing in God’s existence is very good for us, argues Pascal.
The Pyrrhonian I imagine offering a rejoinder to Pascal and any similar “belief is good” argument. His argument is that “don’t believe” is always the better (dominant) strategy, because ataraxia is the greatest good, and belief in anything is the road to disillusionment and unhappiness. Believe in God, believe in country, believe in love, and the world will teach you to rue and repent your faith. Do not believe in such things, trust only in what now seems to you to be the case, and the world will be unable to blindside and uproot you. Your life will be free of these disturbances. The best bet for happiness is to believe in as little as possible.
What lesson in common do these opposing decision-theoretic arguments teach? That the rationality of belief depends more on what you value than on the credibility or probability of the belief?
Excellent comments. The Pyrrhonist has all sorts of beliefs; beliefs about what ataraxia is, what it is not, beliefs about its value and its relation to other values, beliefs about how to attain it, how to maintain it, etc.
Now the belief that ataraxia is the highest good for humans -- this belief goes beyond appearances does it not? It rests on beliefs about philosophical anthropology, what man is, what his potentialities are, and so forth, and these of course are (and arguably ought to be) matters of debate. After all, our happiness is at stake!
Thinkers like Augustine and Pascal believe that we have a higher destiny, one that we can only dimly glimpse in this life. Given that we desire happiness, must we not investigate these questions depite the mental perturbation that is bound to ensue when we lock horns with our ideological opponents?
thanks, that was exactly what I wanted to say. And, in addition, it bespeaks of an attitude towards the status quo of our life (it's fine as it is, don't bet on anything you cannot perceive as a human being) that I do not sympathize with. I feel that we can try and go further, and try to actually move on and change something, in the heart of it all - not just superficially. This trying can, I believe, enrich our lives - which obviously does not mean that we will not experience
anymore!
I am pleased to see that we agree. But in fairness to the skeptics, I should note that they have ways of responding to the charge that they fall into substantive and/or procedural dogmatism. But this is something to discuss in a separate post.
But what bothers you, bothers me: the acquiescence in the status quo. Same thing bothers me in the OL philosophers.
The Pyrrhonist does not hold up the foolish ideal of belieflessness. He agrees we need many practical beliefs to live by. His recommendation is only that we try to minimize and free ourselves of the many unnecessary DOGMATIC beliefs that we cling to : views philosophical, religious, political, etc.
In polar opposition to those who say we need strong beliefs ( dogmas ) to live by, the Pyrrhonist says these only warp and disturb our life and make us intolerant and factious. Get rid of these beliefs, he predicts ( but does assert ) and you will likely find your life much easier and calmer and happier. The Pyrrhonist does not assert that ataraxia is the summum bonum, but merely remarks that many people find it so. Perhaps you will too.
Pyrrhonism is also a form skepticism that challenges the evidential grounds for our dogmatic beliefs. Every argument for some dogmatic belief, we will find, can be matched with an equally compelling argument for a contrary belief. There is no proof of any of these views, only endless and inconclusive argument and counterargument. True believers of one persuasion, clutching their sacred book, end up angrily eyeing true believers of another persuasion, unable to refute them, but meditating on how to suppress their vile heresy. The more controversy stirs up a fear in the ultimate groundlessness of their own beliefs, the more true believers respond with hatred and violence.
None of this is good for us, says the Pyrrhonist, either personally or with a view toward our the history and future of our species.
15-0! well, if stated thus, I would just agree with the Pyrrhonist. Dogmatism obviously is an unhealthy attitude. One must always be ready to question the basics of one's own assumptions, down to the heart of it all as I formulated it.
And this questioning actually can reveal the many "practical beliefs" we live by but are not always conscious of.
And indeed, 'beliefs in' cannot be proven, only lived out. But one can at least try to be coherent in what one believes in. And, of course, to get back to Dennett, when you only recognize 'believing that', then you can of course (dis)prove a belief (that the world is older than 4000 years for ex.)
Bill, I am very curious if you, after finishing the book, would call Dennett a dogmatic thinker.
A minimal set of dogmatic beliefs might be:
1.) There is another shore.
2.) There is a way to cross over to it.
*Prajnaparamita Sutra
In the meantime I'd intuitively say one could start crossing without having to believe that there is another shore. You might get to places you couldn't otherwise have thought of or experienced.
That was an excellent statement of Pyrrhonism. You rightly point out that people like Sextus do not assert that ataraxia is the summum bonum, but do they believe that it is? Assertion provokes counter-assertion and thus contention. But surely Sextus et alia believe (in their hearts, so to speak) that ataraxia is the highest good attainable by humans. And so they do hold at least one dogma even if they prudently refrain from asserting it.
How exactly do the Skeptics define 'dogma'? I take it that they include under this rubric any belief that goes beyond the mundane and/or sense-perceivable whether or not it is supported (and no matter how well it is supported) by reasons. For they think that for every reason there is an equal and opposite counter-reason.
If I say, 'There is some likelihood that if you dump your dogmas you will be happier,' have I not made an assertion and given expression to a belief?
Your metaphor is usually put in terms of a raft. The sutras and shastras are the raft that takes one across the river of samsara to the far shore of nirvana. But it is merely a means: once on the other side, you ditch the raft.
Similar notion in the Tractarian Wittgenstein: his propositions, though strictly meaningless, are the ladder that leads to the height from where things are viewed aright.. Having ascended, one kicks away the ladder which one no longer needs.
A minimal set of dogmatic beliefs might be:
1.) There is another shore.
2.) There is a way to cross over to it.
More minimally still:
1. This shore is obviously defective
2. It is possible that there is far shore
3. There may be a way across
4. Given (1), (3) is worth exploring.
Indeed, this is what I hold. But each of (1)-(4) is a belief.
1a. This shore is on fire.
2. Disallowing comments from a particular person, or deleting an offensive, off-topic, or otherwise substandard comment, has nothing to do with censorship. People who think otherwise confuse censorship with lack of sponsorship. I am under an obligation not to interfere with anyone's exercise of legitimate free speech rights. But I am not under any obligation to aid and abet anyone's exercise of free speech rights, legitimate or illegitimate.
3. The Comments area is not an open forum for anyone to say anything about any topic. As the name implies, it is primarily for commenting on the author(s)' posts. But to comment on them, one must have read them. And if I have spent three hours on a post, a reader will not understand it in thirty seconds. Secondarily, the Comments area is to facilitate civil discussion between and among commenters as long as the discussion remains on-topic.
4. Some undesirables: The skimmers, those who cannot read but only read-in. The sophists who, abusing argument, argue for the sake of argument. The ideologues, those who are out for power, not truth. The uncivil. The illogical. The politically correct. Worst of all, perhaps, are those who exemplify the anti-Socratic property: those who think they know what they don't know. If Socrates was famous for his learned ignorance, these types are marked by their ignorant unlearnededness.