Ernest Gellner speaks of a "greased pole" upon which one can slide up as well as down. Or should we think of the positions as stations along a unidirectional via dolorosa culminating in the death of OLP but without hope of resurrection? In any case, here are the positions in Gellner's words, but not all his words. (Words and Things, unrevised ed., p. 166). Commentary follows.
1. There are no philosophical problems. We use language in certain ways, that is all. [. . .]
2. There are no philosophical problems properly speaking, but there are important difficulties generated by language which can be clarified by understanding language.
3. There are philosophical problems, but neither they nor their answers can be articulated, for they concern the very possibility of language and its relations to things, and that cannot be spoken of in language.
4. There are problems, but their answers must not conflict with the actual use of words, for it is the actual use of words that gives them meaning, and a question or answer formulated in defiance of that use lacks sense.
5. You may disregard ordinary language at the end, but only if you have taken care to give meaning to your neologisms. At the start you must reflect on the actual use.
6. Some problems are by-products of linguistic confusions.
7. Some apparent problems may be by-products of linguistic confusions.
8. I like knowing how I use words. (And make no claims whatever for its relevance. Kindly leave me in peace to get on with it.)
The spectrum of positions runs from the substantive but false to the true but vacuous. My objection to OLP is a nuanced affair, not a blanket rejection. I reject (1)-(4), with the brunt of my animus borne by (1) and (2). But I find (5)-(8) quite congenial. Indeed, I would insist on (5).
One cannot do philosophy in a rigorous and responsible way without careful attention to actual usage. Language leads our thinking and can easily mislead it. Attention to actual usage, therefore, may prevent us from falling into traps.
But a claim like (1) is preposterous on the face of it, and no one to my knowledge has come close to making a solid case for it. It is also the sort of high-flying claim that one would not expect the devotees of the particulars of actual usage to be making.
I wish I had a copy of Geller to hand, but I also think I’d have trouble reading very much of it. Lots of flogging straw men and dead horses, I fear.
Apparently the principal enemy targeted in (1)—(3) is the later Wittgenstein. We all know some of his notorious dicta like “philosophical problems begin when language goes on holiday.” Now whether slogans like that represent a systematic and no-exception programme on Wittgenstein’s part, I just don’t know.
I think I can say, however, that Austin ( and his friends ) did not subscribe to (1) – (3), nor to (4). Austin acknowledges there are genuine philosophical problems. Problems concerning, for example, human freedom and responsibility. He says only that our philosophical reflections should not charge forward in utter disregard and contempt for what OL has to say about these matters. What sort of excuses for failing to act are already built into our language? What refinements and complications have the law and psychology added?. Austin says we should consider all of these resources. OL is at best the “first word”, never the only or last word, in philosophical inquiries. See his prolegomena to OLP, “A Plea for Excuses”.
Austin would also agree with you on (5)-(8).
Let me add: I believe that there were in fact fundamental problems with the methods of OLP as Austin and other practiced them-—you don’t, for example, study ordinary usage by introspecting on what you’d think people would say about strange cases—but I haven’t heard anything like coming from Geller.
It is a very good book, albeit polemical. You would enjoy it. He's a maverick too, like you and me.
I think you and I basically agree. "OL is at best the “first word”, never the only or last word, in philosophical inquiries." I'll drink to that.
Good comment. I agree.
2. There are no philosophical problems properly speaking, but there are important difficulties generated by language which can be clarified by understanding language.
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Why do you put two important ideas together like this? Surely one can hold, as I do, that there are some very difficult philosophical problems on which linguistic techniques have no purchase. But, equally, there seem to be certain problems that have a root in misunderstanding of or problems about language.
Did you read what I wrote? Why do I put two important ideas together like this? It is obvious that I am quoting Gellner here.
I'm not sure whether the "Geller" typo was a (Freudian) slip with Uri or Efim Geller in mind. I assume everyone is old enough to remember Uri on the Carson show "bending" spoons with his mind.
The only book I studied seriously in high school was MCO, so the latter is also possible. I gave up chess in college because I found my better games invariably gave me a pounding headache. Is this a common problem that the pros just get through? I never did. I'd like to start playing again, but I don't need more headaches!
May I give you and your readers an interesting footnote to this discussion of OLP? Gellner and friends seem to assume that OLP was some sort of novel anti-philosophical pathology of the 20th century. But OLP, at least as far as a commitment to (4)-(8) is concerned, has deep roots in the history of philosophy. In the 13th century there was an approach to various logical and semantic problems called cassation ( cassatio ). Utterances like "I am not speaking right now" or "everything I say is a lie" are analyzed and rejected as nonsense ( nil dicis ) from the perspective of the ordinary speaker ( rusticus ).
I never reached the pro level (though I've drawn and beaten plenty of titled players in tournament play (unfortunately, they beat me more often)), but I never suffered headaches from chess, and am not aware of my peers or betters having that problem. (Maybe it's what happens when you try to study soporific works like MCO. I spent almost all my chess time playing and looking at the games of world champions, and I'm glad I did.)
One unpleasant physical phenomenon I do recall experiencing in a competitive context was a sick, nervous feeling from a sustained adrenalin rush. I don't recall experiencing that during my "original" chess career, but when I returned to the game after a several year absence it was all too noticeable.
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4. Some undesirables: The skimmers, those who cannot read but only read-in. The sophists who, abusing argument, argue for the sake of argument. The ideologues, those who are out for power, not truth. The uncivil. The illogical. The politically correct. Worst of all, perhaps, are those who exemplify the anti-Socratic property: those who think they know what they don't know. If Socrates was famous for his learned ignorance, these types are marked by their ignorant unlearnededness.