This is the second in a series of posts on Dennett's new book, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon. See previous post, link infra, for bibliographical data.
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Dennett is out to "break the spell" of religion. He can break the spell if he can show that religion is an entirely natural phenomenon. But what does Dennett mean when he speaks of religion as a natural phenomenon? He means that there is nothing supernatural about it. But what does that mean? It means that religion is
. . . a human phenomenon composed of events, organisms, objects, structures, patterns, and the like that all obey the laws of physics or biology, and hence do not involve miracles. (p. 25, emphasis added)
Note the little word 'hence.' That is a logical word and it indicates what D. means by 'miracle.' A miraculous event is one that contravenes (does not obey) the laws of nature (which of course embrace the laws of physics and biology). D's project, then, is to show that there is nothing supernatural, i.e., miraculous, about religion. It is entirely natural as opposed to supernatural. There is nothing about it that involves any violation of any natural law.
Of course, there are senses of 'natural' according to which religion is not natural. 'Natural' can be used in contrast with 'artificial.' Religion is not natural in this sense; it is artificial, a human artifact, although it remains to be seen whether it is a purely human artifact. One has to be careful with a word like 'natural' since it is so common and is used in a half-dozen different ways. Dennett continues:
Notice that it could be true that God exists, that God is indeed the intelligent, conscious, loving creator of us all, an yet still religion itself, as a complex set of phenomena, is a perfectly natural phenomenon. Nobody would think it was presupposing atheism to write a book subtitled Sports as a Natural Phenomenon or Cancer as a Natural Phenomenon. (Ibid.)
Dennett says this because he doesn't want to be accused of begging the question against the theist, of "presupposing atheism." If he started his book by stating that since nothing supernatural exists, religion must have a wholly natural explanation, then he could be accused of begging the question. That is something he needs to demonstrate, or at least support, not assume. So his project is to provide a satisfactory naturalistic account of religion. If he succeeds, then he will take this to show that there is nothing supernatural about religion.
But let's think about this. Baseball is a human artifact susceptible of a perfectly naturalistic explanation in terms of human actions and decisions. No one will say that any part of baseball is divinely revealed or requires an appeal to a supernatural agent as part of its explanation. So even if God does exist, a complete explanation of baseball will make no reference to God.
Cancer is not an artifact, but it too can be wholly explained in naturalistic terms.
Religion, like baseball, is an artifact, but it is arguably a human-divine artifact: it arguably arose from human-divine interaction. For example, it is possible that Moses on Mt. Sinai had a veridical mystical experience in which God communicated to his mind the Ten Commandments, or something like them, which he then preserved in some form, e.g., by carving them into stone. Or do you think that an arm came out of the sky bearing stone tablets with Hebrew inscriptions?!? The latter would be supernatural in the sense of violating natural laws. But the former is not supernatural in this sense, though it is supernatural in the sense that God is a being transcendent of nature.
Suppose religion is an artifact of human-divine interaction. To be a bit more precise, suppose that some part of one or more religions is an artifact of human-divine intervention. It might be that the divine contribution is very slender, and the human contribution massive. And it may be that the human contribution is mostly 'noise' that distorts and conceals the divine 'signal.' We have independent reasons for thinking that we humans are pretty poor 'receivers' of any truth-signal that comes our way from whatever 'source'; and if the 'transmitter' is divine then it is reasonable to expect that the 'signal-to-noise ratio' will be very unfavorable.
This scenario is not so far-fetched if (as Dennett concedes for the sake of the argument) an intelligent and loving divine creator exists. Such a being might be expected to show his love for human beings by communicating certain truths to them for the sake of their happiness. But since God is God, a being that vastly exceeds our scale, and not just a Big Guy in the Sky, it will not be easy for him to get through to such exceedingly dimwitted and morally corrupt beings as we are. (Imagine trying to communicate to an unruly two year old some moral truth conducive to its long term benefit.) Only a few outstanding human specimens will be receptive enough for the divine message. Only a few will be free of the moral and intellectual impediments that block out in the rest of us the divine message. They will be the founders of religions and the contributors to its core doctrines.
To suppose that an intelligent and loving God exists, but that religion is a "perfectly natural phenomenon" is to suppose that this God does not communicate with man through prophets and religious teachers and is therefore unloving of his creation — which looks to be a contradiction. Thus I deny Dennett's assertion that religion could be completely natural even if God exists. And so I doubt whether Dennett avoids begging the question against the theist. We will have to ask ourselves as we read Dennett's book whether he is just raking together some ex post facto justifications/rationalizations of his antecedent decision that there just cannot be anything that is not exhaustively explainable in naturalistic terms.
To sum up. There is nothing problematic about sports and cancer being wholly natural phenomena. D. is right: A book with the subtitle, Sports as a Natural Phenomenon, would not be taken to presuppose atheism. But he is wrong when he makes the parallel claim about (theistic) religion. To treat religion as if it were "perfectly natural" is to assume that it is a purely human product. But this is precisely to rule out from the outset what religions such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam maintain.
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All Related Posts (on one page) | Some Related Posts:
- Dennett Responds to Wieseltier
- An Exchange Between Daniel Dennett and Michael Ruse
- Dennett-Swinburne Exchange on Breaking the Spell
- Belief That, Belief In, Belief in Belief
- Lichtenberg on Dennett
- Dennett on the Deformation of the God Concept
- Burgess-Jackson on Leiter on Wieseltier on Dennett
- Dennett's Scientism Denounced in New York Times Book Review
- Religion as a Natural Phenomenon
- Problems with Dennett's Definition of Religion
We probably won't be able to agree on premises here, but I want to note an objection, just on principle.
In the first post about this book you wrote:If God is communicating to anyone in such a way that it affects their subsequent actions, regardless of how few people are able to detect the signal above the noise (though why God should have to emit such a feeble signal is another matter altogether), then God is most definitely interfering with natural causal chains. So I just want to delineate a few "possible worlds" here.
A) God exists, but does not directly interact with the created world. There is no way to prove or disprove his existence, and in a positivist sense, it doesn't matter either way, so let's not even bother. Religion springs from a number of human idiosyncracies that are themselves the result of our biological history and makeup.
B) God exists, but interacts only with the minds of those who can hear the signal.
C) God exists, and interacts BIG time, in a "miraculous" way - smiting the wicked, parting the waters, plaguing with locusts, etc. These acts contravene the laws of nature, but it's OK, because after all, this is GOD we're talking about here.
D) "God" exists, but is a part of nature in a way that is not yet understood by us. Our understanding of nature's laws is simply incomplete at this point. All sorts of things, mystical and miraculous, are part of the natural world in ways that we may come to comprehend as our own wisdom increases. After all, my wireless laptop would have seemed pretty miraculous a thousand years ago. As Arthur Clarke said, "any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic."
E) God does not exist. Religion springs from a number of human idiosyncracies that are themselves the result of our biological history and makeup.
Now if I know Dennett, he's going to end up at either A) or E). I also suspect that you would argue for a distinction between B) and C), but I think they are equivalent - whether the hand of God appears from the clouds, bearing tablets, or simply tweaks Moses's thoughts, makes no difference at all, because the causal deed has been done either way. Of course a dualist might see things differently, but I'm no dualist. This is where I expect we disagree. Surely, though, you must admit that an adjustment of a person's thoughts can extend causally into the wider world.
But I agree - we all know where Dennett stands on religion, and it is perfectly obvious that he is going to argue against much of what Judaism, Christianity, and Islam maintain. Again, to the extent that he is not presupposing atheism, I can only imagine that he is heading for A). But I think he really prefers E). I do expect him to argue his point well, though.
Though it would be too sanguine to expect any agreement, except on peripheral matters, I am grateful for the comments, and one likely benefit of the discussion is that each of us will understand his own position better.
1. It is not that God emits such a feeble signal, it is that the human receivers are so crappy. Changing the metaphor somewhat, the brightest sunlight can't shine through windows thoroughly besplattered with mud. Mud as metaphor for sin, original sin, ignorance, original ignorance. There is also the Zen Buddhist simile of 'polishing the mirror.'
Your parenthetical thrust is easily parried and turned against you -- which shows that it is not a compelling point.
2. Would a divine communication interfere with natural causal chains? I think you are conflating two different lines of argument. One of the points in my first post was that that Dennett fails to distinguish two senses of 'supernatural.' A supernatural being need not be a being that violates any natural laws. Abstract objects are super-natural but violate no natural laws for the simple reason that said laws do not apply to them. Same goes for deistic concrete God, and even fro a thesitic concrete God on some conceptions.
In the second post, I was arguing from D's own concession of a loving, intelligent creator and arguing an incoherence within his position on the basis of his own concession.
Still, there is merit to your question. Assuming God communicates with Moses on Mt Sinai, does the former interfere with the operation of natural causes? As I set it up, the communication is Mind-to-mind, but then Moses' mental changes bring about physical actions, e.g. writing down the Ten Commandments, say. But this is just the mind-body problem, and has nothing specifically to do with theism or religion. I've already given plenty of arguments against D's philosophy of mind.
A: If you take a positivist line, then I refute positivism with separate arguments.
C: Here you are not being serious.
D: Arthur C. Clarke was a boyhood hero of mine, but what you quote from him I would argue is incoherent.
E. Dennett conflates religion with theism, which is not a good idea, but let that pass. Whether (E) is true is precisely the issue. So far D's case is off to a poor start but I have plenty more to read and maybe 10-20 more posts to write.
Are you reading the book yourself?
I'm at work, so must be brief, but:
So God can't make a light bright enough to shine through a dirty window? Seems an odd limitation on the Creator of the Universe. I'll assume He chooses not to bother. This is obviously susceptible of a lengthy and penetrating exegesis, but for now, not worth quibbling over.
Distinguishing E) from A) would be a knotty problem, no? I doubt Dennett will attempt it. I'm sure he has the sense and experience not to attempt to prove the nonexistence of the God described in A), though he may well suggest that there is no good reason to believe in such a God.
Actually, I was being dead serious in C), because that is exactly the God that an awful lot of Americans believe in, and it is the prevalence of that sort of belief, I think, that inspired Dennett to write the book.
As for causality, I just wanted to make sure that we keep in view the fact that mind-mind communication is not exempt from participation in ordinary-world causality. Yes, it's the mind-body problem again, of course. I just didn't want to let that be swept under the rug in this discussion. Agreed, it has nothing to do specifically with religion, but I have little doubt that Dennett will mention it. If God is planting visions in people's heads, impelling them to action, then He has causally entered the world. Not that most Christians would object; after all, Jesus was as causal as they come. But if you are going to play in the physical world there are rules, and you either have to obey them or account for why you aren't.
How is Clarke's comment incoherent? It is simply a statement of a type of faith in materialism. If I had appeared on the scene at the Battle of Hastings and started dropping laser-guided JDAMs from B-1s above the clouds it would have seemed pretty magical, I think. Anyway, the point is that we may still have a thing or two to learn about the world and its underpinnings.
Again, it is important, I think, to keep in mind that this book is not intended as a technical paper for philosophers; in order to develop the arguments with that kind of professional rigor he would lose most of his intended audience. It is, rather, a response to the astonishing prevalence in this country of the unsubtle view of God described in C), which he thinks is pretty creepy and depressing. I think so too.
I haven't started the book yet - I'm finishing some other reading first. Between working, parenting, husbanding, reading, training, blogging, chess, and music I need about twenty extra hours in each day.
Malcolm asks why God couldn't shine a bright enough light through a dirty window. In the east they say the light is consciousness itself. How much brighter could anything be, since everything that appears appears in its light? Of course, I imagine Prof. Dennett would not think much of what the eastern mystics have to say. He speaks of the God-as-essence as too vague to support religious belief.
And quite right, any Eastern sort would agree that in order to let the light in you have to draw the blinds. Our inner work isn't up to God, it's up to us. And all we have to do is get out of our own way.
Perhaps this can be glimpsed in something like the following: Would Kurt Goedel have pursued, much less discovered, his incompleteness theorems if he had not been reacting, from a Platonist stance, to the anti-metaphysical Vienna Circle? Well, we could explain Platonism naturalistically. Then the natural predisposition to Platonism would mean that incompleteness would eventually be discovered. Or we might say that Goedel's Platonism was just a contingent factor in his work, that some mathematician would have made the same discoveries anyway, just by virtue of their mathematical inevitability. But there remains a nagging sense that, well, it may just be that Platonism is true, and that explains why Goedel discovered his theorems.
Bill, does this make sense? You could probably express it better than I can.
I'll try and find the quote this evening (local time, Netherlands ;o)
Hi Henry,
That's an interesting thought. The incompleteness theorem has an interesting quality to it, in that it is in its way outside of any particular instantiation of formal mathematics - it always stands on top of whatever hierarchical level it is operating on. It sort of builds a tower into the sky, and no matter what particular set of non-platonic, human-designed rules we choose for our formal system, it is always limited "from above" by Gödel's theorem. It's easy to see why an arch-platonist would have been the one to think of it. On the other hand, though, the argument is itself quite formal and man-made. It's a curious business all round.
I find the absolute existence of abstract objects to be an extremely perplexing question, and it astonishes me, frankly, that people are so blithe about accepting them. I simply cannot fathom what their mode of existence might be, and attempts at explaining it always seem like pure sophistry to me. I know Bill has written extensively about this, and I should read what he has had to say. My hunch is that if we ran into an utterly alien species they would have a very different taxonomy of abstracta than we do; I strongly suspect that our categorization of the World is so deeply conditioned by our evolutionary history that we simply can't see past it.
Malcolm, I don't disagree that Platonism has problems, as Plato already expressed in the Parmenides. I also don't doubt that we are conditioned in ways we can't see, at least not under normal circumstances. But if we admit to the existence of conditioning, isn't it also possible that the conditioning limits our understanding of how abstracta can be real?
It's interesting that an alternative philosophy of mathematics to Goedel's, L.E.J. Brouwer's intuitionism, was also based on mysticism, but an apparently opposing kind of mysticism.
Here it is, indeed from the 1st lecture:
"To plead the organic causation of a religious state of mind, then, in refutation of its claim to possess superior spiritual value, is quite illogical and arbitrary, unless one has already worked out in advance some psycho-physical theory connecting spiritual values in general with determinate sorts of physiological change. Otherwise none of our thoughts and feelings, not even our scientific doctrines, not even our dis-beliefs, could retain any value as revelations of the truth, for every one of them without exception flows from the state of its possessor's body at the time."
quoted conveniently from The Varieties online
Please all go and read James' book, if only this first lecture from it: it is short and razor-sharp, and relevant to this thread.
Henry: Oh and, yes, I am Dutch - and your name does sound pretty Dutch now that you mention it...
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