Perceiving the human predicament to be radically defective, and believing that there is a way of salvation, is still not sufficient to make one religious. A third condition must be satisfied: one must hold that there is a trans-human reality by contact with which salvation is to be achieved. It may be that the contact is brought about by our own efforts; it may be that the contact accrues to us by divine grace alone; or it may be – which is surely more likely – that both are required. In an image somewhere to be found in al-Ghazzali, we must work to position ourselves so as to receive the gusts of divine favor. The positioning is our own doing, but “the wind bloweth where it listeth.” Be this as it may, without a trans-human reality to serve as the focus and locus of salvation, there would be no way to distinguish religion proper from a mere ‘philosophy of life.’
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Related Posts (on one page):
- John Hick's Religious Ambiguity Thesis
- What is Religion, Part III
- What is Religion, Part II
- What Is Religion? Part I
I do wonder, though, at the last sentence of this post:
I'm not sure the distinction between philosophy and religion is a neat one. Serious contemplation of ultimates is something philosophers and the philosophically minded engage in whether they profess to be religious or not, and plenty of people who claim to belong to a religious tradition (or to engage in a practice they style "religious") live their lives with complete unconcern about ultimates-- including the ultimate reality lying at the center of their own tradition/practice.
Religion is hard to pin down as a concept. In his classic The World's Religions, Huston Smith lays out six elements found in all religions: authority, ritual, speculation, tradition, grace, and mystery.
While I'm against essentialistic approaches to defining religion, I think Smith is right to shift focus away from soteriology and unsatisfactoriness. His list (I'm not sure that "definition" is the correct term for what Smith is offering) allows back into the "religion" fold those world-maintenance practices that have nothing to do with salvation but serve more pragmatic purposes, such as ensuring a plentiful harvest. By Smith's lights, and mine, these traditions are religious, too.
Kevin
Esoteric religion seems to belong to the axial age, as Bill suggests, while spirit religion belongs to prehistory. They are not necessarily incompatible, as can be seen in the fact that most of the above mentioned list of beliefs is found, in at least vestigial form, in Christianity. Similarly, if we look at ancient Egyptian religion, we find a high degree of continuity with Christianity, even though Egyptian religion looks like a late-stage development of a Neolithic system, and is thus antedates the axial age by millennia.
Yet there is a conflict, as can be seen in the fact that the axial religions tend to look down on the prehistoric religions as superstition, paganism, folklore, or myth. This is perhaps most evident in the "stripped down" version of Buddhism, where all spiritual beliefs are held to be distractions from the path, or just pointers to the ineffable reality. Evident also in the more puritanical sects of Christianity, that want to do away with as much traditional "baggage" as possible.
An interesting question to me is whether the spirit religions were originally esoteric wisdom religions.
(I note that Huston Smith is a proponent of the esoteric unity theory of religion.)
I find your insights helpful.
In academe, Smith gets a lot of flak for his views since he's closely aligned with F. Schuon, whose own views aren't really in vogue these days. We're currently in a backlash period against most or all forms of "convergent pluralism" (the type of religious pluralism that envisions many paths to one summit, most strongly advocated by John Hick and his posse*). Some thinkers are taking a "divergent pluralistic" stance (many paths to many summits), while there's also a huge exclusivistic backlash led by the likes of Alvin Plantinga.
Coming back to the definition of religion: I think the definition needs to remain flexible. A Wittgensteinian "family resemblances" approach is probably one of the best ways to view religion, because this reflects the reality that religious practices and traditions form a rough continuum that is both diachronic (throughout history) and synchronic (across religions of the same era).
I'm also trying to keep in the back of my mind WC Smith's admonition that "religion" is primarily a Western label retroactively applied to a body of human (i.e., social, psychological, anthropological, etc.) phenomena we're only beginning to understand. Smith's argument wasn't that the term "religion" should be thrown out, nor was he suggesting that the Westernness of the label makes it suspect. He was saying, I think, that the term should be used with caution and with an awareness of the complexity of the reality we're attempting to apprehend. The definition should therefore be constantly subject to reevaluation.
For that reason, while I don't necessarily agree with Dr. Vallicella's definition, I applaud his attempt crafting a definition. That attempt is part of a larger dialogue, and that's the way of things-- the Way of the Force.
Kevin
*I'm not fully Hickian, but I'm very sympathetic to his "pluralistic hypothesis."
PS: I didn't forget your long-ago Buddhism and "cosmic consciousness" question. I'll be in the States in December, and I plan to do some research and then write a lengthy post that addresses the interesting issues you raise. (Sorry, Dr. V, for using the comments section to whisper to another commenter about something off-topic!)
And a correction. I wrote:
That should read:
Oy.
(Yiddish "oy," not Japanese "oy" or British English "oi")
Kevin
Perhaps part of the backlash against the Schuon school is because Schuon turned out to be one of those "naughty guru" types?
As I recall, my question about cosmic consciousness had to do with the term "cognizing emptiness". I got this term via the age old word-of-mouth transmission line, and not from books about Buddhism. So I don't know how orthodox it is.
Thanks for the comments. You refer to the "last sentence of the post" which makes me wonder whether you clicked on SHOW to see the rest of the post. And I have no problem with you or anyone communicating a message to another commenter if the communication is reasonably brief and somewhere near the topic.
I too would place grace on the list, even though that is hard to square with early Buddhism.
Perhaps our main disagreement is about the pragmatic, non-soteriological "world maintenance practices" you mention. Are they religions or not? I would consider them too riddled with superstition to count as religions. But I wouldn't want to deny that they are religions from the point of view of a sociologist or anthropologist.
My interest is different. I am interested in religion as something that has a chance of being something credible, something with a future, something that a well-informed 21st cent person could take seriously.
I need to spell this out in a separate post. Consider alchemy and astrology. One can study the history of these subjects without taking them seriously as having cognitive value. One can do the same with religion. On them studies them as cultural facts. But my interest is in religion as making a justifiable truth-claim.
I did read the whole post-- that was simply a brain fart. I should have written "the first paragraph" instead of "this post." As my high school students used to say: "Whoop-- mah bad."
I think Henry caught on to your "metaphysical interest" faster than I did. Definitions are often used for specific purposes; I'll keep your purposes in mind as I continue to read your "What is Religion?" series of posts.
I will, however, note that one reason why people in religious studies are wary of over-defining religion is that it makes something like historical analysis rather difficult. If, for example, we accept that true religions all possess a soteriological component, then it makes the Axial Period (as well as the centuries preceding it) look bizarre indeed-- almost as if "religion" per se just popped up. Explaining that sudden appearance is an awkward and unnecessary task: if the historian proceeds with a more evolutionary understanding of religion-- i.e., as something having the aspect of a continuum-- then something like the Axial Period becomes more intelligible.
Thanks,
Kevin
Kevin
First there is the brute fact that currently we are not in control of our own destiny. Our desire for eternal happiness is frustrated.
I don't think any rational person can deny this.
If we say that at its heart religion is the response to this fact then almost all religions in history can be covered. Prehistorical religions emphasized propitiation of the gods as a reponse to their own inability to overcome/control nature or the enemy. In modern American Christianity we have mostly conquered exterior natural threats and even external human threats so the emphasis is more on salvation from our own human nature. (notice the Muslims are much more likely to call on their God to defeat their enemies)
There are only two basic responses to this fact of the human predicament 1. a permanent solution is available or 2. "eat, drink and be merry for tomorrow you die" The difference between these is faith or a lack thereof. There is no middle ground. Therefore faith is the primary principle for defining religion.
I would slightly modify your threefold definition. The criteria for religion would be first of all belief that salvation is possible. Necessary to belief is some object of faith, something that can save us, and necessary to this is some way to connect with this object so that we can be saved. Making this connection implies submitting to the conditions set. Therefore submission is intrinsic to faith.
From here we have two diametrically opposed religious categories. One in which humanity becomes its own god. It is a faith that humanity can save itself by its own effort. The other includes a faith in/submission to something outside of humanity and incorporates your concepts of trans-human reality and radically defective humanity.
One question I keep wrestling with is in what manner can we justify one position over the other. I keep thinking that faith must come prior to a knowledge of the truth. because submission to truth must preceed a knowledge of the truth.
The question you wrestle with regarding whether faith or truth must be "prior" might, I think, represent a false dilemma. Though usually/typically faith precedes knowledge of the truth, and might even motivate its pursuit, there are at least a few stories of blilnding revelation to people who (until then) lacked faith.
I agree that submission is a crucial facet of faith; but I believe Christianity actually can strike an interestingly nuanced key you might be looking for, where the two positions are somewhat merged:
Christianity, more than other religions as far as I know, has developed extremely nuanced theories about Grace (obviously resting on faith), salvation and the human role therein - especially in Christian ascetic spirituality. I think that these relations between human effort and God's grace could offer a way out of your dilemma. Cassian (the Monk) has written fascinating stuff about these issues, esp. in his Conferences.
He suggests that human effort is not entirely useless: submission and human dignity/strength coexist. (An instance of Christianity's 'reversal of values') You should check it out.
I believe that these are the factors of religion that are significant for political discussions, as opposed to philosophical discussions. It is these factors that lead to religious wars, forced conversions, and indoctrinating other people's children in public schools.
So if you are going to grap "religion" for your philosophical purposes, what word am I left with to describe this important political category?
For the last several months I have been trying to figure out a good way to express the relationship between faith, belief and knowledge. Belief and knowledge have been fairly well investigated by philosophers but I have not yet come across a satisfactory answer to the question "What is faith?" As a Christian I live it, but I don't yet fully understand it.
From the little I have learned I would say that blinding revelation can come prior belief but not prior to faith. I don't believe we are robots. God respects our freedom to reject Him. In order for revelation to occur we must accept or submit to whatever God gives us. This receptive attitude is faith or at least the inital act thereof. The result of this faith is belief. Whether belief comes as a moment of blinding revelation or gradually over time is only a matter of degree not kind. Either way it doesn't appear to me that I can directly choose what I believe, only I can stop belief from occuring through a lack of faith.
Faith is a mystery to me, too. The best known story of blinding revelation, of course, is that of the conversion of Saul of Tarsus to Paul the apostle. I don't think that story supports the notion that Saul had faith prior to what transpired on the road to Damascus.
That's entirely too vague for my taste. Read one way, a whole-hog materialist could accept it. This would make a nice separate post.
Thanks for bringing up the Argument from Desire. I am very symapthetic to it, and hope to write a post or three on it. It is not that easy, however, to hammer it out in a rigorous form. Peter Kreeft has a version of it somewhere, but his borders on the sophomoric.
Good comment. You wrote:
My problem with including prehistorical religions is that they are indistinguishable (pretty much) from supersititon, and they have a completely crass and materialistic notion of salvation. Religion must involve a non-superstitious quest for transcendence including the transcendence of one's petty ego.
If no distinction can be drawn between religion and superstition, then religion is a bankrupt or aberrant 'symbolic form' (Cassirer) and something to be overcome.
If I understand you, you want to say that Christianity and Marxism are both religions, whereas what I want to say is that, despite their similarities, Marxism is not a religion. I take one difference to be that, whereas both systems see the current state of the world as unacceptable, Marxism thinks that recuperating from it is possible by human effort alone. Marxism is a form of humanism, whereas I would deny that that is true for any genuine religion. A lot more needs to be said.
No doubt political ideologies serve as ersatz religions for their adherents. The history of Communism provides countless examples. But an ersatz religion is not a religion.
You want a label. How about political ideology?
Thanks for keeping me thinking. You said "Religion must involve a non-superstitious quest for transcendence including the transcendence of one's petty ego."
If religion is a quest, it must be a quest in time, not in eternity but how can we get rid of superstition in time? From our previous discussion religion looses all superstition when God becomes for us a fact, but outside of eternity this is not possible.
I think the problem here stems from the dichotomy of time and eternity that we exist in. I think it was Kirkegard who said something to the effect that conceptual knowledge is eternal but that we live in time. (I reject his conclusions that these are not reconcilable but the idea is true)
Maybe we can say that religion consists of both a set of beliefs and living out those beliefs in time. In as much as those beliefs are true religion consists of knowledge not superstition. In as much as religious practice conforms to truth, to God's true/righteous action it is not superstition. These two are joined in us because our beliefs effect our actions and our actions effect our beliefs. I have observed that righeous action leads to right beliefs and right beliefs in turn lead to righteous action. The same applies in the opposite direction.
Under this definition there can be a non-superstitious religious ideal but not a non-superstitious religion - only religions that more or less closely approach the ideal.
Saul did not have faith in Jesus, at that point he did not know Jesus. But can you say that he did not have faith in God? Consider, a young devoted Jewish man for whom the worst possible sin was that a man claim to be God. When he didn't know Jesus his faith drove him to stop this blasphemy. But confronted by Jesus Himself, his faith was the reason why he believed rather than continuing blindly in his own ideas of God. He submitted to God's truth as revealed. He could have shaken the whole thing off as a dream or a revelation from the devil. Remember other pharisees had marked down Jesus's miracles as from the devil.
Not to be excessively contrarian, but the relationship between faith and knowledge is getting sort of slippery here, especially if the object of faith and the object of knowledge don't need to be in correspondence. If we do "fix the object," then even by your own account, it would appear that Saul acquired knowledge of the person of Jesus prior to acquiring faith in that person.
Of course, the case of Paul is exceptional. But I do think it should give pause about any formula like "faith precedes knowledge." Indeed, I have deep problems with any "formulaic" approach to these matters (unless it's "expect to be surprised").
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3. The Comments area is not an open forum for anyone to say anything about any topic. As the name implies, it is primarily for commenting on the author(s)' posts. But to comment on them, one must have read them. And if I have spent three hours on a post, a reader will not understand it in thirty seconds. Secondarily, the Comments area is to facilitate civil discussion between and among commenters as long as the discussion remains on-topic.
4. Some undesirables: The skimmers, those who cannot read but only read-in. The sophists who, abusing argument, argue for the sake of argument. The ideologues, those who are out for power, not truth. The uncivil. The illogical. The politically correct. Worst of all, perhaps, are those who exemplify the anti-Socratic property: those who think they know what they don't know. If Socrates was famous for his learned ignorance, these types are marked by their ignorant unlearnededness.