Jimmy Licon writes:
So I take it from your recent responses to objections against interactionist substance dualism that you are a proponent of such? If not, are you a dualist at all?
Are there any good contemporary defenses of substance dualism? Any recommendations?
I ask because I've always had a hard time accepting physicalism, or something near enough (haha!)
I'm glad you asked, Jimmy. My main target in a series of posts over the past weeks and months has been metaphysical naturalism. (As opposed to epistemological and ethical naturalism which I also reject.)
I haven't positively advocated substance dualism, but I maintain that it is a serious contender, along with idealism. I have been concerned to show how weak and dogmatic virtually all contemporary rejections of substance dualism are, especially those of top philosophers such as Dennett and Searle. For the moment, you could put me down as either a substance dualist or an idealist, with a preference for idealism. Idealism receives almost no discussion currently.
I would recommend the following contemporary defenses of substance dualism in no particular order: W. D. Hart, The Engines of the Soul (Cambridge 1988); John Foster, The Immaterial Self (Routledge 1991); Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul (2nd ed. Oxford 1997); Beloff and Smythies, ed. The Case for Dualism (U. of Virginia Press, 1989). You can find further references in Edward Feser, Philosophy of Mind: A Short Introduction (Oneworld Publications, 2005, p. 37). Ed is a colleague of mine over at Right Reason, and a very good philosopher. I suggest you begin by reading his chapter on dualism before plunging into the more technical material.
And thanks for reminding me that I need to get a copy of Jaegwon Kim's new book.
1. Dean Zimmerman, ‘Material People’ in Loux &Zimmerman (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, or ‘Christians Should Affirm Mind-Body Dualism’ in Peterson &Arragon (eds), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion.
2. Michael Rea, World Without Design.
On idealism:
3. John Foster, The Case for Idealism, or better 'The Succint Case for Idealism' in Robinson (ed) Objections to Physicalism.
4. John Foster, The Nature of Perception.
5. Howard Robinson, Matter and Sense.
6. Robert Adams, Leibniz: Theist, Determinist, Idealist.
I believe John Leslie's Infinite Minds also argues for some kind of idealism.
Something we don't hear much about is Rusell's Neutral Monism, which is defended by people such as Michael Lockwood in Minds, Brains, and Quantum, and David Chalmers in The Conscious Mind. Some of these titles are on my list to read when I retire (I should say I haven't yet started a full-time permanent philosophy job).
Best wishes,
Joseph Jedwab
Peter Unger, All the Power in the World
Unger entertains and defends substance dualism and idealism. The book is not out yet but lengthy chapters are available at his website.
Best wishes,
Joseph Jedwab
Thanks for the excellent suggestions. I am aware of some of those titles, but was too pressured to list them all. In particular, I have Foster's book on idealism. I liked his discussion of topic-neutrality and how it could be used to support idealism. I also have Robinson's Matter and Sense, which I recommend.
Unger's a brilliant fellow -- not that the others aren't -- so I am particularly interested in acquiring his book.
Let me throw in two more:
William Hasker, The Emergent Self (Cornell, 1999).
Charles Taliaferro, Consciousness and the Mind of God (Cambridge 1994)
I thought I might be asked why I included Hasker's book since he is not a substance dualist but rather an emergentist. I did so because of his good discussion of substance dualism in chapters 5 and 6. Particularly good is his discussion of the unity of consciousness, a phenomenon which is a real thorn in the side of physicalism.
So I don't disagree with your characterization of his position.
Are you working primarily in the philosophy of mind?
I am not working primarily in philosophy of mind. Primarily metaethics...I do like philosophy of mind, so much so, that I am using Kim's critiques of supervenience in philosophy of mind to hopefully unfold similar critiques of its use in realist views of ethical naturalism.
Thanks for giving your reasoning &keep up a great blog! I know I have learned a lot.
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