Now what exactly is the objection? It seems to be this. If mind and body belong to mutually irreducible ontological categories, and yet minds and bodies interact causally, then this violates conservation principles. For example, if my intention to paint the bathroom is an irreducibly mental state that causes the states of the brain that control the motions of my limbs, then there is presumably a transfer of energy into what is supposed to be a closed physical system in violation of the principle of conservation of energy.
The trouble with this objection is that it blatantly begs the question against the dualist by presupposing a transfer theory of causation that makes dualist interaction impossible from the outset. Obviously, there could be a violation of conservation principles only if causation is being viewed as the transfer of some physical magnitude.
But it is not at all clear that causation involves such transfer even among physical causes and physical effects. There are several theories of causation. Many empirically-minded philosophers, following in the footsteps of Hume, adopt some version of the Regularity Theory, the gist of which is this:
Event-token e (directly) causes event-token f =df (i) e and f are spatiotemporally contiguous; (ii) e occurs earlier than f; (iii) e and f are subsumed under event-types E and F that are related by the de facto generalization that all events of type E are followed by events of type F.
On this theory, what distinguishes a causal event-sequence from a non-causal one is nothing more than the former's instantiation of a regularity. Causation 'in the objects' is just regular succession, just one event after another. Accordingly, nothing gets transferred or transmitted from cause to effect. On this theory of causation, the above objection to mnetal-physical and physical-mental causation collapses.
Of course, there are powerful objections to the Regularity Theory. But there are other theories on which mental-physical and physical-mental causation are unproblematic. On a counterfactual theory,
e causes f =df if e had not occurred, f would not have occurred.
Here too, there is no need for any transfer of a physical magnitude and hence no threat to conservation principles.
But suppose that, in the physical world, causation is a process that involves physical contact and the transfer of energy, momentum, or whatever from the cause to the effect. If causation is such a physical process, then it will be a spatiotemporally continuous one and one can attempt to trace the mechanism whereby the cause brings about the effect. But mental-physical causation is direct: there is no intervening mechanism. To demand that there must be one in the mental-physical case as in the physical-physical case is just to rule out by fiat mental-physical causation.
Why then should there be any problem with a mental state directly causing a physical state? Once one has a specification of the relevant causal properties and the covering law, what more could one ask for?
In sum, the above objection unwarrantedly assumes that causation must in every case involve transfer of some physical magnitude. But it may be that causation never involves such transfer, or it may be that it involves such transfer only in the physical-physical cases. To make the above objection stick, therefore, one must do a lot of work; one must articulate a tenable transfer theory of causation. What one cannot do is simply repeat the canard given at the outset.
You say that from the interactionist perspective, your intention to paint the bathroom causes some states in your brain. If you were an interactionist (perhaps you are, but I'm not assuming so), would you say that your intentions are the only causes of those brain states, or would there also be some other causes, perhaps physical, like other brain states?
Again, I'm off and running this weekend, and might not have a chance to comment in detail until Monday. But I think you are overlooking the irreducible cost of information processing. Information theory tells us that there is an energy cost for doing computational work. In fact the human brain is by far the most energy-greedy organ.
Also, to look at it another way, let's say that we observe the brain at time t, corresponding to subjective state A, then look at it at time t + 1, in a state that corresponds to subjective state B, and find that the transformation from A to B is explicable in terms of ordinary neurochemical causality. What then is the need to add an immaterial mind as the causal agent? I mean, now you are positing a special, entropy-free type of causality, seen nowhere else in the world, in order to allow for a causal conection between an alleged immaterial mind that the neural tissue of the brain. Even if we don't rule it out "by fiat", because is is carefully designed to be completely unfalsifiable, why on earth should we believe this? Is there any empirical way to verify your assertion?
How do we know that all physical transactions involve an energy cost? A timeless, spaceless dimension might interact with ordinary spacetime without energy or entropy expenditure. We would not necessarily be able to detect such a dimension, since being timeless and spaceless, it would be totally indistinct from any field variations in spacetime. An analogy might be that when the mind perceives a Platonic object in the Mindscape, such as the truth of a mathematical proof, it receives information from the Mindscape without the transfer of energy.
We know that bit about physical transactions from the Second Law of thermodynamics.
We might also posit that our brain states are nudged into place by tiny invisible Dutchmen in spats! Aren't we multiplying entities way beyond necessity here?
M
Here is a quote by Carlo Rovelli, a prominent theoretical physicist:
[begin quote]
Time Does Not Exist
Contrary to what is generally assumed, the physical world does not exist "in time". At the basic microscopic level, the world is better described in terms of an a-temporal theory, where physical laws do not express time evolution of physical variables, but just relations between variables. Time emerges only thermodynamically when describing macroscopic variables. Therefore time is only a side effect of our ignorance of the microscopic state of the world. "Time is a side effect of ignorance."
Space Does Not Exist
The physical world does not exist "in space". The physical world is made by an ensemble of particles and fields, which do not live in an external space, but rather live "on each other", and which can be in a relation of contiguity with respect to one another. "Space" is the order implied by this relation.
These two principles are implied by what we have learned about the physical world with general relativity and with quantum mechanics. The second principle is largely a return to the Pre-Newtonian relational understanding of space, while the first has few antecendents in our culture.
[end quote]
I am not saying that this theory has a bearing on the nature of mind. I am only suggesting that we don't have a complete picture of physical causality.
(I like those little Dutchmen in spats BTW!)
Maybe idealism isn't so far from the truth after all. If sensation enters the brain from the timeless, spaceless Reality, and out of that Real we build the phenomenon, then this sounds like science has penetrated down to the very foundation of the phenomenon where it exists only as points of brute sensation in the brain. Time could be caused by a shifting of the subjective perspective so that the subject is able to perceive his own actions.
Suppose the subject creates the phenomenon we perceive as physical reality. Then the missing information is not how the subject (this unknown mysterious entity that is somehow joined to this physical universe)is connected to the physical body, but how the subject creates the conception of its physical body within whatever ontological reality it interacts with.
Just felt like having fun with perspective this morning.(G) I think I am becoming an idealist. Except that the ideal I precieve is the Real.
You asked in effect whether, if M causes B, there are not other states involved in the causation of B, specifically, brain states. I'd say yes.
I take it you want to mount some such objection as: if so, isn't B causally overdetermined? B has a complete set of physical causes sufficient to bring it about. If M is also a cause, then B is overdetermined.
Is that where you are going with your question?
Just a quick observation. It seems to me that naturalists who appeal to physical conservation laws to justify the alleged "causal closure of the physical" are actually misapplying those laws. Consequently, a dualist interactionist can happily grant that in mental-physical causation some otherwise conserved physical quantity is modified. (Though, I don't think the dualist could plausibly construe this as a kind of "transfer" since, ex hypothesi, minds for the dualist are nonphysical and thus do not themselves possess physical quantities of any sort that could be transferred.)
The reason is that physical conservation laws like the conservation of energy and the conservation of momentum state that "in a closed physical system some quantity (energy, momentum, or what have you) is conserved." In short, the laws only apply IF the physical system in question is closed. If the system is not in fact closed, then no violation of conservation principles has occurred. We would have an exception to the conservation laws, not a violation of those laws.
Causal closure of the physical is, therefore, not a deliverance of physics, but rather a meta-physical presupposition of naturalistic philosophy.
Regards,
Alan
Yes, that is basically where I was going. You've agreed that some brain states would be involved in the causation of B, but would you say that these brain states are sufficient to bring about B? (That is, would you say that B is causally overdetermined?) If there were this sort of overdetermination, then at just the time when my intention to paint the bathroom (M) causes B, there would be some other brain states (B') that are causing B. If M and B' are both sufficient causes of B, then there would be a kind of harmony between M and B': whenever there is some such M, there would always be a corresponding B' (corresponding in the sense that they are both sufficient causes of B). If we believed this is how things work, we might as well buy into the pre-established harmony, which I prefer.
Steve
Steve
Then when I see see the wind break a tree branch, I wrongly bring in the analogy of how I broke the tree branch. I'm too sophisticated to be an animist so I don't believe that the wind intended to break the tree branch; I strip out from my experience of causality the factor of intention, and all I have left is a vague concept of agency, of cause: the wind caused the tree branch to break.
But is that right? Or is that just a slightly less extreme sort of anthropomorphism?
All of this is very thought-provoking, or perhaps I should say that the configurations of photons impinging upon my retinas from the screen before me have, by an intricate network of neural interactions, caused some interesting mental states.
First of all, Henry, a moment after I had posted my remark about tiny invisible Dutchmen in spats, I realized that your surname is most likely Dutch, and that you might think I had intended some odious little dig along those lines. Nothing could be further from the truth, of course - I had no such motivation. I don't know why I wrote "Dutchmen" and not something else; it must have been some sort of unconscious intentionality.
Indeed, I have not read much about the framework of quantum-gravitational models. I have spent much time in the past familiarizing myself (at least to the level that an interested layman with some mathematical literacy can do so without actually pursuing a formal education in the subjects) with relativity, QM (including quantum electrodynamics and chromodynamics, and various "interpretations" (e.g. Copenhagen, Many Worlds, etc.) of the "quantum reality" question. I recall that Penrose's twistor theory says that space and time are defined as relations between processes, with "processes" involving some action on elementary bits of matter, and the processes themselves considered prior to space and time. Lee Smolin, who has worked with Rovelli, talks about a lot of this in his fascinating book The Life of the Cosmos. Furthermore, it is part of the standard view of cosmology that space and time are not a preexisting framework of the world, but came into existence with the Big Bang (rendering moot the questions "what happened before the Big Bang?" and "if the universe is expanding, what is it expanding into?"). And I know that quantum-gravitational theories require that the gravitational field be described in terms of one-dimensional objects, rather than the extended quanta of string theory, and so do not require preexisting space, and I'm well aware that John Wheeler has often talked about "consciousness-created reality" when discussing the measurement problem. So I do have some familiarity with a lot of this stuff.
But the point here is: is this what we are proposing as our dualist model of how the mind works? You did allow, Henry, that all of this might have no bearing on the nature of mind. And even if so, I would venture to say that it is not entirely outside the imaginable bounds of physicalist inquiry.
As for conservation, Alan wroteI'm not clear what you're saying here. Are you arguing that adding nonphysical components means the physical system isn't closed?
Again, Henry, you write:I just don't see what the problem is. As Edelman and Tononi write in A Universe of Conscioussness,Yes, we stand in a unique epistemic relationshsip to mental phenomena, as I have argued before. But this doesn't mean that they are in principle not susceptible to a physicalist account. I agree they may not be, but I do not agree that they must not be. To have a subjective view of a brain's conscious activity, it is necessary to be that brain. But why should that mean that a complete scientific description of consciousness is impossible? And place of such a description we are given all sorts of fantastic sources for the mental: unspecified influences from spaceless dimensions; immaterial, undetectable Mind-things that are bound in lockstep to neural activity, uselessly overdetermining the brain's behavior, and so forth. Again: sure, by the very nature of the arguments there is no way to prove them wrong, but why should we believe any of it? I am reminded of Gosse's Omphalos
As for causality, there seems to be an eagerness among the dualists to mock the physicalists for lacking a complete description thereof (as in Steve's letter, and some comments by Henry). It looks to me like what is being pointed out is that the reduction is incomplete, something that never seems to bother dualists much otherwise. We are all quite comfortable, in general discourse, to speak in terms of macroscopic causality, and the efforts of the neurosciences are not, nor should they be, aimed at reducing the causality of mental phenomena all the way down to explaining why like charges repel, or why gravity exists. I don't see why neurological explanations of mental phenomena have to be held to such a standard, when we are perfectly content with physical explanations of other biological mechanisms at the chemical, cellular, organism, or ecosystem level. It seems rather vindictive, if you ask me; we are being asked to account for these phenomena in far more detail than our opponents seem able to provide.
Sorry to have run on so long. I probably should have posted some of this on my own website.
Alan wrote: In short, the laws only apply IF the physical system in question is closed.
Malcolm asked: I'm not clear what you're saying here. Are you arguing that adding nonphysical components means the physical system isn't closed?
I reply: If there are causally efficacious nonphysical powers at work in a physical system, then that physical system is not causally closed (i.e., the "causal closure of the physical" thesis is false as regards the system in question). But if this is the case it does not constitute a "violation" of physical conservation laws. Rather, those laws simply don't apply because they hold only for physical systems that are causally closed.
I hope that clarifies.
Alan
I understand the view that a certain level of explanation may be sufficient for scientific understanding, but I think the value of philosophical questioning is that it can extend beyond what science looks at. Occasionally this philosophical questioning may uncover something overlooked by science.
Zeno questioned the self-evident concept of motion, and it turned out that the concept of motion is not so self-evident, since by special relativity, there is a finite maximum speed, and by quantum mechanics, the concept of a simultaneous determinate position and determinate speed is also incorrect.
I am aware of the argument that the fact that I am conscious is due simply to the brute fact that I happen to BE this particlar body. I think I need a bit more coffee before I attempt to address this. At least one philosopher I recall drew from this observation something of an opposite lesson from yours.
I agree that speculative extensions of physical theory purporting to make room for consciousness don't provide much in the way of reasons to believe that consciousness can in fact be accounted for in this way. I very much doubt it can. But then, is the point of the speculations to provide a defensible positive account of consciousness? Or is it, rather, to show that physical theory does not provide much in the way of reasons to deny the independent reality of consciousness -- unless we (rather prematurely) assume the completion of physical theory and the closure of physical processes?
Similary regarding reduction (which, however, I think is a separate issue from the analysis of causality). There is an important difference between noting that the reduction of consciousness to the physical is incomplete, and arguing that our current arsenal of physicalistic concepts is, in principle, incapable of providing an explanation of salient features of consciousness.
As Bob's comment clarifies, I was not proposing quantum geometric concepts as a solution to the mind-body problem. I was trying to cast doubt on the interaction critique of dualism. A timeless, spaceless background for spacetime would presumably be as problematic as an immaterial mind as regards interaction, yet it is acceptable to physicists.
Please do not take my comments as mocking anything. I take your position very seriously.
You wrote:
The complaint, as I see it, is that physicalists present two options to the dualist: to provide either (a) an intermediate mechanism (which seems question begging), or (b) a fundamental explanation for the interaction between immaterial and material. But physicalists do not have the latter even within their own claimed territory. It is not vindictiveness, but a basic appeal to fairness that I'm making. A lot of people make the mistake that Newton warned against - thinking that employing terms like 'gravity' or, more generally, 'force' provides a full accounting, when really what they do is allow us to refer to something which we don't understand so well. The language provides the illusion of knowledge (in particular, scientific knowledge) where there should instead be an admittance of ignorance, and a degree of charity when confronted with alternative explanations.
Take care,
Steve
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