I claimed that the proximate goal of meditation is the attainment of mental quiet, but listed as an ultimate goal the arrival at what is variously described as enlightenment, salvation, liberation, release. In a comment to the post, Jim Ryan raised a difficult but very important question about the connection between mental quiet and salvation. What exactly is the connection? I would like to pursue this question with Jim’s help. I believe he is is quite interested in it since he tells me that he has been thinking about this question for the last twenty years. One way to begin is by outlining the possible positions on the relation between mental quiet and salvation. There seem to be three main positions. On the first, mental quiet and salvation have nothing to do with one another. On the second, there is a positive (non-identity) relation between the two. On the third, the two are identified.
A. Some will say that mental quiet is a merely subjective state with no soteriological import at all. Supposing a resolute meditator works himself into a blissful state of mental tranquility, why should that be taken to be a state of enlightenment or salvation or contact with ultimate truth? Why is it not just a highly unusual subjective state that few attain? Mental quiet on this approach is a non-intentional mental state, one that is not of or about anything. Lacking object-directedness, non-intentional states lack a necessary condition of having a truth-value. So if mental quiet is a non-intentional state, questions of veridicality cannot arise. One could not suppose that someone in this state possesses any insight into anything transcendent of the state. Mental quiet is an intensely blissful state, but not one revelatory of anything external to one’s egoic consciousness. Thus it does not reveal a non-egoic source of egoic consciousness, nor
another egoic consciousness such as God.
A*. On an extreme version of (A), both the seeking of and the reposing in mental quiet is escapist: not only does it not put us in touch with reality, it leads the meditator into a state of self-indulgent dreaminess that shuts out reality. The difference between the A-position and the A*-position is that according to the former, achieving mental quiet does not help in the quest for enlightenment/salvation, while according to the latter it positively hinders the quest. A traditional religionist might take this line, maintaining that mental quiet and the mystical states that sometimes arise within it are ‘of the devil,’ a ‘snare and a delusion,’ and that the true path to salvation is via faith, or faith plus works, or faith plus works within an authoritarian structure such as the Roman Catholic Church.
A**. On an even more extreme version of (A), the charge of escapism is buttressed with the further claim that there is is no possibility of enlightenment/salvation. So it is not just that mental quiet is no help in its attainment, or that it hinders its attainment, but that there is nothing to attain. Ideological bedfellows as unlikely as Marxists and Randians would join in taking this A**-line and would denounce mental quiet as an opiate.
B. Although mental quiet is not a state of contact with the saving or enlightening power, it is a necessary condition of such contact: One cannot achieve contact without first being in the state of mental quiet.
B*. A more robust cousin of (B) maintains that mental quiet is sufficient for, though not identical with, contact with the saving or enlightening power.
B.** A less robust cousin of (B) has it that mental quiet is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of contact with the salvific power but is nonethless conducive to such contact in the sense that it raises the probability of such contact. B** allows the contact to be achieved even by someone who has never engaged in any formal meditation practice, or one who has but has never entered mental quiet. There is a passage somewhere in al-Ghazzali where he points out that a person who climbs to the top of a minaret is more likely to feel a cooling breeze than one who remains on the ground. Similarly, the gusts of divine favor are more likely to reach one who has made the right preparations, entry into mental quiet being
one such preparation. This image suggests that salvation cannot be caused by the seeker, but must be graciously received. ‘Own-power’ is not enough; ‘other-power’ is needed. Mental quiet is thus a state of mental receptivity or passivity, a state of
interior listening in which one opens oneself to a possible communication from beyond one’s egoic consciousness.
C. On a third main approach, mental quiet is identified with enlightenment/salvation. Achieve one and you achieve the other.
Let me conclude by giving my provisional answer to Ryan’s question. As I see it at the moment,(B**) is the best explanation of the relation between mental quiet and salvation/enlightenment. (C) can be rejected quite easily. I suspect that Ryan, given his naturalism, will plump for one of the versions of the A-approach.
One suggestion: Define "A*/B**" =df "B** with the corollary that for some people or for all people at some times, mental quiet can be stupefying."
That is my view. Yes, as a naturalist, I will see things differently from you, eschewing your "contact with the salvific power" in your B**. So, I'd have to reword that and also remove the emphasis "other-power" as required over and above "self-power". As I said before, I find Zen Buddhism extremely compelling, and the adjustments I make to your array flow from that sort of view of mental quiet. Many soteriologies of mental quiet are inconsistent with naturalism. I think Zen Buddhism is not.
Thanks for a fascinating post.
Thanks for the interesting comment. I think 'proficient meditator' ought to be substituted for 'people' in your definition. The majority of people never experience mental quiet. I am using the term in a strict sense. It denotes a state that is very difficult to attain even by most of those who meditate daily year after year.
But even with that modification, I would still reject the definition (assuming the forward slash stands for inclusive 'or') because A* is the view that reposing in mental quiet is a hindrance to salvation. In other words, A* is the view that there is salvation, but that meditation as the quest for and attainment of mental quiet is a sidetrack or merely subjective escapist dead-end.
Since you speak of Zen Buddhism as a soteriology of mental quiet, I take you to mean that there is enlightenment/salvation. But now what exactly is the connection between mental quiet and enlightenment? You seem to be saying that the latter can be attained by one's own unaided efforts, that one can be "a lamp unto oneself." Is meditation as the acheiving of mental quiet sufficient for enlightenment? My B** rejects both necessity and sufficiency. For you, what has to be added to mental quiet to get enlightenment?
I have to run now, more later.
Of course, what is interesting is B** (which I've included as a component of my view), and the question, you rightly point out, remains as to the explanation for its being the case.
My explanation holds true for Zen Buddhism. I believe it describes some other Asian religions correctly to some degree. It probably describes theistic mental quiet incorrectly, as one can interpret what I say as "encounter with Godhead" or the like only with the fuzziest of all-religions-are-one mindset.
My explanation of Zen, then, is this. The fact that the world exists is magnificently good, so good as to be overwhelming to anyone who recognizes this fact. In addition, this fact is seldom recognized. It is recognized only in moments of mental quiet because its recognition is not a propositional attitude and because propositional attitudes obscure this recognition (as, by analogy, two-dimensional talk hindered the recognition of a third dimension in Flatland, though the analogy is poor because I do not mean a change in kind of propositional attitude as in that book but a relinquishing of propositional attitudes.) Of course, how the recognition of the fact that the world is magnificently good can fail to be a propositional attitude is a conundrum. That's a story for tomorrow.
I'd be interested in your reply, Bill.
Secondly, the goodness of this fact so far outstrips the goodness of instances in which particular people, events, and things are good, that it cannot be recognized without jettisoning for the moment the conscious recognition of those kinds of good things. And that cannot be done without ceasing to think of those things, since thinking of them forces evaluation of them.
For these two reasons mental quiet is required to recognize that the fact that the world exists is magnificently good. In outstripping the good and bad of ordinary events and things, this fact's goodness is extremely comforting. The comfort is salvation.
Sorry to drone on, Bill, but you asked. This may be a load of balderdash, and while I admit that, I will maintain that it the balderdash described in the Zen texts (and, ipso facto in Chuang-tzu, the Taoist whose writings moulded Chinese Buddhism into Zen form.) A Western theist might maintain these East Asian phenomena are cases of Man's oblique and distorted encounters with godhead, I suppose.
I could squeeze some philosophical juice out of 'It's tomorrow,' but I will resist that temptation.
Your comments are fascinating, and I see we have much to discuss.
1. There is a distinction among (i) a world exists rather than no world, (ii)this world exists rather than no world, and (iii) this world exists rather than some other (nonempty) world. Is it fact (ii) that you hold to overwhelmingly good? I take it that 'overwhelmingly' does not mean insurpassably. Or does it? Are you saying that this world is the best of all possible worlds when seen aright? That in the end everything is as it ought to be?
2. Zen Buddhism is Buddhism and at the core of the latter are the Four Noble Truths the first of which is that all things are or involve dukkha (pain, ill, suffering, unsatisfactoriness). Sarvam dukkham.
Presumably this holds not only for the actual world but for every possible world of plurality in which there are desirous and aversive critters like us and the lower animals.
Of course, Zen (Ch'an) moves away from early Buddhism, the Buddhism of the Pali canon. Still, I am not sure I recognize much Buddhism in your claim that the existence of the world is "magnificently good." Early Buddhism is essentially this: all is suffering; at the root of suffering is deisre; liberation follows upon the eradication of desire; the way to achieve liberation is by following the Eight-Fold Path.
3. 'This world exists.' You are right that this is not analytic. One reason is that it is contingently true: This world, call it 'Alpha,' might not have existed. A different world, Beta, might have existed in its stead. Beta is just like Alpha except that I did not take up blogging in it, and all relevant facts are adjusted accordingly. I think you are also right that nothing could count as evidence that 'Alpha exists' is not true.
>>Secondly, the goodness of this fact [that this world exists] so far outstrips the goodness of instances in which particular people, events, and things are good, that it cannot be recognized without jettisoning for the moment the conscious recognition of those kinds of good things. And that cannot be done without ceasing to think of those things, since thinking of them forces evaluation of them.<<
This passage contains at least two subtheses. The first is that the goodness of the world's existence surpasses the goodness of the existing of the things in the world. There may be distributive/collective ambiguity here. It is one thing to say that the goodness of the world's existence is greater than the goodness of the existence of each thing in the world taken one by one. It is another thing to say that the goodness of the world's existence is greater than the goodness of the existence of the world's denizens taken collectively. If you mean the second, then is the world more than a collection, an individual in its own right perhaps? What is a world anyway? A set? A mereological sum of concreta? (D. Lewis) A maximally consistent abstract object such as a proposition? (Plantinga, van Inwagen). A concrete individual in its own right?
The axiology here is tricky. Is it self-evident that the goodness of the world is greater than the value of the persons in the world? The world is presumably a nonperson. How can a nonperson be of higher value than a person? To make this concrete, compare this world with your wife. (Sorry to get personal, but I am trying to be concrete.) Is it self-evident that the goodness of the existence of this world is greater than the goodness of the existence of your wife? Given that you love your wife, she is to you an irreplaceable individual whose being cannot be exhausted by her parts or properties. (To spell this out rigorously would take a lot more energy than I have at the moment; I'll post something on it.) But it is not clear that the world is an individual.
Your second subthesis is epistemological: to cognize the value of the world's existence one must leave out of consideration the goodness of the world's denizens. This is plausible.
Your main conclusion is that mental quiet is the state in which a person is aware of the existence of the world and its magnificent goodness. So mental quiet is a noetic state; it reveals something objective. But it is not just noetic, it also induces what could be called 'metaphysical comfort.' One realizes that, in the end, all is well despite foreground appearances to the contrary. This realization is tantamount to enlightenment/salvation.
So, if I may be permitted to cram you into my schema, you seem to occupy the position I labelled 'C,' to wit: mental quiet is identical to the state of enlightenment/salvation. Achieve the first and one automatically achieves the second. Or am I missing something?
Write again when you get a chance.
1. I ambiguate over your i and ii; I don't think there is any precision in Zen views on that. But iii (best of all possible worlds) is nowhere to be found in Zen.
2. Oh, yes, I am quite willing to consider that Zen isn't Buddhism in a doctrinally rigorous sense. That Chuang-tzu's philosophy is inconsistent with Buddhism is plausible, and that his views are deeply embedded in Zen is a fact. I call it "Buddhism" in an anthropological sense, as religious studies scholars do. The monks meditate in Buddhistic monastaries, read the scriptures, etc. But they also poo-poo the scriptures "as straw," to use Aquinas's phrase. Yet, they clearly assert that Siddhartha was a Zen master and that he taught Zen to some of his disciples and other sorts of Buddhism to others. So, I call Zen a form of Buddhism.
3. Your: It is one thing to say that the goodness of the world's existence is greater than the goodness of the existence of each thing in the world taken one by one. Yes, I believe that is the sense of the Zen texts. Still, I'd probably have to say what I think a world is. I lean towards "the collection of things that exist". But the idea is that the fact that there is a (or this) collection rather than nothing is very good. So, perhaps this is an abstract fact of some kind. I'm not familiar at all with the literature on worlds to which you allude. There is room for development here of my interpretation of Zen here.
Your: Is it self-evident that the goodness of the world is greater than the value of the persons in the world? The world is presumably a nonperson. How can a nonperson be of higher value than a person?
I think the texts mean that the world of such great value needn't have any people in it in order to retain its value. As for Chuang-tzu, he clearly states that no one's consciousness is essential to the value of the world in the passages in which he says that death as return to oblivion or the earth is not an important change for the person dying, as all that matters is that there is this/a world.
Yes, I would have taken 'C' but it clearly says in the texts that monks sometimes reach mental quiet without reaching enlightenment. Nevertheless, the texts also say that the leap or adjustment from that state to enlightenment is slight though momentous in noetic result, as when you finally see the old lady in the famous old lady/young lady optical illusion.
I would like to read what you have written about McTaggart. You have many strings to your guitar -- which I like. As I recall, Mc T's argument involves two main subarguments. The first is to the conclusion that the B-series requires the A-series. The second is to the conclusion that the A-series is contradictory. D. H. Mellor, as I recall, agrees with McT that the A-series is contradictory, but holds that the B-series does not require the A-series. Hence for Mellor time is real but is exhausted by the B-series.
So are you a B-theorist? That would fit nicely with your naturalism. I am not clear, however, as to why you brought up McT.
Is Zen a form of Buddhism in the way Christianity is a form of Judaism?
One of my objections to academic philosophy is that no attempt is made to integrate rigorous technical work with spiritual practice. I see that as a grave deficiency. You will grant that it flies in the face of noteworthy Western traditions, e.g. Stoicism and Scepticism, and not just in the face of most of the Oriental ones. (I use 'oriental' to rankle the PeeCee crowd.) Part of the problem is that many of the technical heads would run in the opposite direction if one used a phrase like 'spiritual practice,' and most of those drawn to such a thing are too mushheaded to do technical philosophy. I admit: I am brushing with broad strokes, shootin' from the hip, etc. But this is the blogosphere, and if I can't get away with that here, then where? [grin]
Because your:
I could squeeze some philosophical juice out of 'It's tomorrow,' but I will resist that temptation.
Sorry to say I never had the time to get through much of Mellor. Anyway, more of McT later.
Many strings, yes. A Gemini; this superstitious remark is irresistable. Many directions, few of them taken with great success.
On the blogosphere: Indeed, I agree.
You want me to squeeze, I squeeze. 'It is tomorrow' features a present tensed use of 'is.' As Bill Clinton wisely taught us, much depends of what the meaning of 'is' is. 'It is now tomorrow' is incoherent given that 'tomorrow' is a temporal indexical the referent of which is the day after the day on which the indexical in question is tokened (uttered, written, etc.) Or can a word like 'tomorrow' function both as an indexical and as a rigid designator? I am reminded of Keith Donnellan's distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions.
Yesterday you used 'tomorrow' as an indexical to refer to today, and today you use 'tomorrow' as a rigid designator to refer to today. Should we say that indexicals can sometimes be used legitimately as non-indexicals?
'Here and now' is a compound indexical expression. But in religious and Platonic contexts it refers to the mundus sensibilis. The reference remains constant no matter where or when the phrase is uttered.
And NOW, to bed.
As for Buddhist enlightenment in particular, the Indian/Pali tradition is pretty clear that mental calm (samatha or samadhi) is not a sufficient condition for enlightenment, and that the two states are not the same. According the the Suttas, the Buddha learned techniques for the attainment of high levels of samadhi from various teachers of his time, and still wasn't satisfied. The Buddha himself developed the technique of vipassana (insight) meditation, which can lead to the realization of nibbana.
Is samadhi a necessary condition for enlightenment? That's a thorny question. Rather than go into it myself, I recommend to both of you an article from the online Journal of Buddhist Ethics (http://jbe.gold.ac.uk/11/mill0301.html) which discusses the issue in admirable depth.
Is Zen a form of Buddhism? IMHO, that's almost entirely a matter of definition, and while it may be of sociological interest, nothing of philosophical importance hinges on the issue. Some Zen schools and traditions emphasize the Indian Buddhist heritage, and some de-emphasize it. I agree with Bill that Jim's phrase "the overwhelming goodness of the world" seems to owe far more to Chinese thought than to Buddhism, but there definitely are figures in the Zen tradition who talk that way. (If you're interested, do a google search on "Critical Buddhism" and you'll turn up a variety of materials on contemporary efforts by Japanese Zen scholars to filter out the Chinese from the properly Buddhist elements in the Zen tradition.)
One final reference, just in case y'all aren't familiar with her work already: anyone interested in naturalistic interpretations of Zen meditative experience should be familiar with the views of Susan Blackmore.
Here is the JBE article you mention. I'll see what I can find by Susan Blackmore.
>>Is Zen a form of Buddhism? IMHO, that's almost entirely a matter of definition, and while it may be of sociological interest, nothing of philosophical importance hinges on the issue.<< Well, Buddhism is what it is, and its nature cannot be a matter of purely stipulative definition. For example, one couldn't 'define out' the three pillars of anatta, anicca and dukkha. The phrase Jim used was 'Zen Buddhism' and surely that is a form of Buddhism. But if you mean that Zen can be practiced in a doctrinally neutral way, then I agree. In that case Zen or Zazen are just names for (seated) nondiscursive meditation. A Greek orthodox monk repeating the Jesus prayer mantra could then be said to be doing Zen -- although they would not talk that way and might chase you off their mountains if you did.
I agree with you that Jim's point about the goodness of the world comports better with Chinese thought. What say you, Jim?
Thanks for the tip about Blackmore, Alan.
And how is that picked out? By the intentions of the founder? By the doctrines found in the collection of texts recognized as canonical by one of the institutions of teaching and practice that calls itself "Buddhist"? If so, which school? Or should we look at to social and cultural history, to those groups who have identified themselves as Buddhist? And how do we resolve the differences between them as to what they regard as essential to Buddhism?
Suggestion: give us a link to your Gadfly post in which you respond to me. Note that there is Link button above. Thanks.
Very nice discussion. Readers should be sure to click on the 'Voici' link above. There is a lot to chew on. One issue among many: Does everything exhibit the three marks of anatta, anicca, and dukkha? Or do only samsaric entities exhibit them? If absolutely everything is impermanent, for example, then nibbana is impermanent.
I should say that my main interest is not in textual exegesis, which can go on til doomsday, but in the meaning and truth of such claims as 'All is impermanent' or 'Everything is devoid of self-nature.'
Also, Alan, you had an earlier discussion of me and the Big Ho. Perhaps you could lay in that link as well.
Here's the beginning of the discussion of your exchange with BH. There's a link at the end to installment 2.
Here's the beginning of the discussion of your exchange with BH. There's a link at the end to installment 2.