Here is a remarkable passage from Pascal’s remarkable
Pensees:
A man goes to the window to see the passers by. If I happen to pass by, can I say that he has gone there to see me? No; for he is not thinking of me in particular. But does he who loves someone for her beauty, really love her? No; for small-pox, destroying the beauty without destroying the person, will put an end to love.
And if I am loved for my judgment, for my memory, am I loved? No; for I can lose these qualities without losing myself. Where then is this ‘I,’ if it resides neither in the body, nor the soul? And how love the body or the soul save for these qualities which do not make the ‘me,’ since they are doomed to perish? For can one love the soul of a person in the abstract, irrespective of its qualities? Impossible and wrong! So we never love anyone, but only qualities. (p. 337, tr. H. F. Stewart)
This passage raises the following question. When I love a person, is it the person in her particularity and uniqueness that I love, or merely the being-instantiated of certain lovable properties? Do I love Mary
as Mary, or merely as an instance of helpfulness, friendliness, faithfulness, etc.?
These are clearly different. If it is merely the being-instantiated of lovable properties that I love, then it would not matter if the love-object were replaced by another with the same ensemble of properties. It would not matter if Mary were replaced by her indiscerible twin Sherry. Mary, Sherry, what's the difference? Either way you get the very same package of delectable attributes.
But if it is the person in her uniqueness that I love, then it would matter if someone else were substituted for the love-object. It would matter to me, and it would matter even more to the one I love. Mary would complain bitterly if Sherry were to replace her in my affections. "I want to be loved for being ME, not for what I have in common with HER!"
Now it is a point of phenomenology that love intends to reach the very haecceity and ipseity of the beloved: in loving someone we mean to make contact with his or her unique thisness and selfhood. It is not a mere instance of lovable properties that love intends, but the very
being of the beloved. And what some of us of a personalist bent want to maintain is that this intending or meaning is in some cases fulfilled: we actually do sometimes make conscious contact with the haecceity and ipseity of the beloved. We arrive at the very
being of the beloved, not merely at the co-instantiation of a set of multiply instantiable lovable properties. But how is this possible given Pascal’s argument?
The problem here is related to a question I posed to Jim Ryan of
Philosoblog and
Right Reason in the comments to a
previous post. Ryan was maintaining that the goodness of the existence of the world surpasses the goodness of the existence of the world's inhabitants. But given that the world is a nonperson, how can the goodness of a nonperson be greater than the goodness of a person? The world is presumably some sort of collection as opposed to an individual in its own right. How can its value exceed the value of even one genuine individual in the collection?
The question underlying all of this is quite fundamental: Are there any genuine individuals? X is a genuine individual if and only if X is essentially unique. But this is a question the exfoliation of which must await another occasion.