Maverick Philosopher

Ludwig Feuerbach is the source of the pun, man ist was man isst, the punniness of which is lost in the English translation: One is what one eats. ‘Ist’ is translated by is, ‘isst’ by eats. ‘Isst’ is from the infinitive essen, to eat. I don't know whether there is an etymological connection between the German infinitive essen and the Latin infinitive esse, to be, but the similarity is striking.

A nice feature of German is that it marks the distinction between human and animal eating. Essen is what we do; fressen is what the animals do. But if a man pigs out, then he can be called a Fresser. My cat Caissa, old and spoiled, illustrates the opposite: she prefers my food to her own. I have so 'humanized' her that she is now an Esser rather than a Fresser. Indeed, she is on the way to becoming a Delikatesser, indeed, a Feinschmecker.

I once ate in a Jewish delicatessen on the east side of Cleveland in which one of the sandwiches on the menu was entitled ‘The Fresser.’ Of course, that is what I ordered.

The English distinction between the nouns ‘food’ and ‘feed’ parallels the distinction between essen and fressen. Feed is what animals, typically farm animals, get; food is for humans and their pets. I heard of a woman who, suspecting her man of engaging in an extramural liaison, remarked that her evidence was that he was "off his feed." The animal!

Now here is something for Peter to chew on, from Quine's essay "Existence and Quantification" in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays:

We may indeed take "(Ex)(x = a)" as explicating "a exists." John Bacon [sic!] has noted a nice parallel here: just as "a eats" is short for "a eats something," so "a is" is short for a is something." (p. 94)

1. One who advocates a 'thin' theory of existence views existence, both general and singular, as fully capturable by the apparatus of quantification plus (absolute) identity. If so, then it follows that

2. A thin theorist views the question 'What is it for an individual to exist?' as a question that does not have a deep philosophical or metaphysical answer. And from (1) it also follows that

3. Thin theorists reject any distinction in reality between an individual and its existence.

This is an excellent start, but much more needs to be said. (1) and (3) both require commentary. I'll leave (3) for later.

With respect to (1), we can and must ask: quantification how interpreted? There are two main styles of interpretation, the objectual (referential) and the substitutional. (C. J. F. Williams also speaks of a third style, the 'Prioresque' which is a modification of the substitutional interpretation. But we leave this for later.) The following provides a rough illustration of the difference:

Obj. '(Ex)(Fx)' is true iff 'F' is true of some individual

Subs. '(Ex)Fx' is true iff some substituend for 'x' in 'Fx' yields a true sentence.

To appreciate the difference you must appreciate the difference between a substituend of a variable and a value of a variable. An example of a substituend for the individual variable 'x' would be the proper name 'Socrates.' An example of a value of 'x' would be Socrates. In the equation 'x + y = y + x' substituends are numerals, not numbers, and values are numbers, not numerals. Note that if we substitute 'Socrates' for 'x' in the open sentence 'x is wise' the result is 'Socrates is wise' not '"Socrates" is wise.' That is to say: a substituend of an individual variable is a proper name functioning as a proper name, thus used, not mentioned.

All right, but what is the practical difference between the two readings? One difference emerges when we note that there are individuals that lack names. Consider the true existentially quantified sentence, 'There are cacti behind my house that bear no name.' Read objectually, the sentence is true iff 'cactus behind my house that bears no name' is true of some individual — which is certainly the case. Read substitutionally, however, the sentence does not come out true. For on the substitutional interpretation, 'There are cacti behind my house that bear no name' is true iff some proper name substituted for 'x' in 'x is a cactus behind my house that bears no name' yields a true sentence. But there is no such name.

The cacti behind my house are unnamed, but nameable. But there are also in principle unnameable objects among the real numbers. If there are nameless and unnameable objects, then (Obj.) and (Subs.) come apart. And it may also be the case that they come apart if there are objectless names. Consider the false existentially quantified sentence 'There are winged horses.' On an objectual reading, this comes out false, as it should. But on a substitutional reading it comes out true. For on the latter reading, 'There are winged horses' is true iff some substituend for 'x' in 'x is a winged horse' yields a true sentence. Now 'Pegasus' is such a substituend. Plugging this name in for 'x' yields the true sentence, 'Pegasus is a winged horse.'

With this rough understanding of the difference between objectual and substitutional interpretation of quantifiers under our belts, let us now formulate two versions of (1) above:

1A. On a thin theory, existence is fully capturable by the apparatus of quantification objectually interpreted.

1B. On a thin theory, existence is fully capturable by the apparatus of quantification substitutionally interpreted.

Now I am pretty sure that Peter Lupu intends (1A) since his version of the thin theory is close to Quine's and Quine, we know, takes his quantifiers objectually. For Quine, names are eliminable and reference is routed though bound variables. (1B), however, caters better to what the thin theorist aims at, namely, the total elimination of existence as an extralogical, metaphysical topic.

Let me now try to argue that a theory of existence as what objectually interpreted existential quantification expresses is not a truly thin theory of existence. First of all, let us be clear that a truly thin theory of existence eliminates any vestige of existence as a first-level property. Thus on a truly thin theory, 'Cats exist' gets rendered as

4. For some x, x is a cat (Something is a cat)

and not as

5. There exists an x such that x is a cat.

(5) implies that the values of 'x' that make (5) true exist. But those values are individuals. So (5) implies that existence is a first-level property — which contradicts the thrust of thin theories. One can also see this by reflecting on Quine's slogan, "To be is to be the value of a [bound] variable." Since Mungo is a cat, Mungo is a value of the bound variable in (5). Given that to be is to be the value of a bound variable, we may infer that Mungo is or exists. But Mungo is an individual, and first-level properties are properties of individuals. Therefore, existence for Quine is a first-level property — which contradicts the whole thrust of thin theories, which is to remove existence from individuals.

What I am saying, then, is that (1A) cannot be one of the planks in a truly thin platform. So if Peter interprets quantification objectually, then he is not a thin theorist strictly speaking.

Consider a domain D of exactly four individuals. D contains two Fs (a, b) and two Gs (c, d). No F is a G. By way of eliminating general existence, we might say:

1. Fs exist =df Fa v Fb v Fc v Fd

and

2. Gs exist =df Ga v Gb v Gc v Gd

and

3. FGs do not exist =df ~(Fa --> Ga) & ~(Fb --> Gb) & ~(Fc --> Gc) & ~(Fd --> Gd).

General existence, in other words, reduces to instantiation: the existence of Fs is just the instantiation of F-ness by a or by b or by c or by d. But of course we must assume that a, b, c and d each exist. (If they were Meinongian nonexistent items then the equivalences would be false.) So what is it for a to exist? We got rid of general existence, but now we must try to get rid of singular existence.

It is tempting to say that for a to exist is for a to be a. In general, for any x in D, x's existence = x's self-identity.

Note the difference between (property) identity and logical equivalence. I take it everyone will agree that

A. Necessarily, for any x, x exists <--> x = x

where '<-->' signifies material equivalence. (Logical eqwuivalence is the necessitation of material equivalence.) But from (A) one cannot validly infer

B. Existence = self-identity.

Why not? Well, it is necessarily the case that x is a triangle iff x is a trilareral, but few will conclude that triangularity = trilaterality. They are distinct properties despite their extensional equivalence across all possible worlds.

Although one cannot validly move from (A) to (B), (B) is independently plausible to those with 'thin' inclinations. So why not say this: general existence reduces to instantiation and singular existence reduces to self-identity? If we can dispense with both general and singular existence, then we will have knocked all of the metaphysical 'wind' out of existence, and we will have deflated it to notions that are merely logical assuming (what is not quite obvious) that copulation, inclusive disjunction, and absolute numerical identity are merely logical notions. We will have punctured the airy pretensions of the metaphysicians of existence.

Now I have no problem with reducing general existence to instantiation. Instead of saying 'Fat geeks exist' we can just as well say 'The property of being a fat geek has instances' or, to satisfy nominalist scruples, 'The predicate ___is a fat geek is satisfied. In my book, general existence is not existence strictly speaking. General existence is instantiation. Singular existence is existence strictly speaking.

My problem is with the reduction of singular existence to self-identity. If the existence of a = a's being a, then the nonexistence of a = a's not being a; but whereas the nonexistence of a is a possibility, a's not being a is an impossibility. Therefore, the existence of cannot be identified with a's self-identity. Set forth pedantically:

1. The existence of a = a's being a. (Assumption for reductio)
2. The nonexistence of a = a's not being a. (From 1)
3. The nonexistence of a is possible. (Premise)
4. a's not being a is impossible. (Premise)
5. If two items differ property-wise, then they differ solo numero.(Contrapositive of the Indiscernibility of Identicals)
6. The nonexistence of a is not the same as a's not being a. (From 3, 4, 5)
7.The existence of a is not the same as a's being a. (From 6)

One might try to resist this argument by denying (4). "It is possible that a not be a since it is possible that a not exist: if a does not exist, then nothing can be true of it, not even that it is itself." One who makes this reply, however, presupposes that it is the existence of a that underpins its self-identity when the theory says that existence of a is nothing other than a's self-identity.

Finally, consider the temporal case. If a ceases to exist, does it cease to be self-identical? One might say yes: when an individual ceases to exist it ceases to be anything, including self-identical. But this presupposes that self-identity is a feature of a thing that it can have only when it exists. This, however, contradcits the theory that the existence of an individual is exhausted by its self-identity.

I. Introduction

By now all of us should be fairly familiar with two recurring themes in Bill’s posts about the topic of singular existence: (A) The thin’s theory of singular existence (henceforth, TSE) relying upon identifying singular existence with the existential quantifier is inevitably circular; (B) The question “What it is for a particular contingently existing individual to exist?” is meaningful, has a robust answer, and that the thin’s TSE cannot give an informative and a non-viciously circular answer to this question.

In this post I wish to address these two concerns Bill has from a point of view that is sympathetic to a thin TSE. I shall be using ‘TSE’ to stand for any theory or conception of singular existence. So in this sense, the “thick” conception is a TSE, but so is the “thin” conception, an eliminativist conception, a reductive conception, etc. Some of the material presented here has been already posted on other threads. I shall try to bring them together and knit a coherent integrated position from which we can address issues A and B above. I apologize in advance for the length of this post.

II. Setting up the problem: What types of TSE are possible?

Well, there are several different TSEs possible:

(a) Eliminativist: The colloquial expression ‘. . . exists,’ and its variants are meaningless; they should be replaced with some other expressions. Note: This view is similar to Churchland’s view about mental concepts.

BV: Yes, when 'exist(s)' and cognates are employed as first-level predicates. And then we get a position close to Frege and Russell. But no one is out to eliminate second-level uses of 'exist(s)' not that Peter thinks otherwise.

(b) Reductive: Reductivism about TSE can take two forms:

(b1) Definitional: The expression, concept, *exists* or any of its colloquial cognates can be defined in more basic terms. Thus expressions or propositions of the form ‘. . . exists’ can be systematically coupled with expressions or propositions in which the term ‘exist’ does not appear. All expressions in which the term ‘…exists…’ occur can be translated into expressions in which this term or its cognates do not occur.

(b2) Non-Definitional: Singular (contingent) existence is *reducible* to more fundamental facts by means of certain law-like correlations between singular existence and these more basic facts.

Note: Bill frequently complains that the thins link singular existence to a species of general existence. Such a view, whether it is a correct description of the thin’s conception, is a non-definitional reduction of singular existence to a more fundamental fact, namely, general existence.

(c) The *Thick* or *robust* TSE: according to this view TSE will have the form of a *substantive correlation* between singular existence and some *stuff*; a property, a trait, a part, a mode or whatever, such that the *stuff* necessarily holds in all and only cases of singular existence. Call this the singular existence stuff or *SE-stuff*. While every contingently existing entity features SE-stuff, there are significant differences between Socrates’ SE-stuff, for instance, and the moon’s SE-stuff. Moreover, the difference between each of these contingently existing objects and a contingently non-existent one such as Pegasus is that while the former two enjoy similar SE-stuff, Pegasus fails to enjoy the same kind of SE-stuff. Note: Bill holds, I believe, something like this view.

BV: 'Stuff' is not a word I would choose, but if Peter holds a gun to my head and forces me to express myself in 'stuff' terms, I would say: Socrates, a contingent individual, is a singular existent composed of existence-stuff and essence, the latter term used very broadly to encompass all quidditative determinations, i.e., all properties monadic and relational, accidental and essential, all properties pertaining to WHAT a thing is, in a very broad sense of 'what.' But since 'stuff' adds nothing except misleading connotations, I will just say that Socrates is composed of existence and essence. Since existence is not matter, I don't call it stuff. The main point is that there is a real distinction (distinctio realis) between an individual and its existence. On my theory, the existence of Socrates is not a spatial, temporal, or even ontological part of him: it is the unity of his ontological parts or constituents. But since this unity is distinct from that which it unifies, one could say that Socrates is composed of both existence and essence.

The 'real distinction' (distinctio realis) — which I do not intend in Aquinas' sense — will be denied by deflationists (thins, someists). I suspect that every thin theorist will deny that there is a distinction between an individual and its existence. (See Donald C. Williams, "Dispensing with Existence," Journal of Phil 1962)

Socrates, Plato, and the moon each has its own existence since each is a numerically different unity of constituents. As for Pegasus, he has no existence at all. Nor do I wish to say that he is a pure Meinongian essence. One my view, there is no individual Pegasus, and in general there are no nonexistent individuals. What there is is a certain conjunctive property (with such conjuncts as being a horse, being winged, etc.,) a conjunctive property that is not instantiated.

Note the asymmetry: The existence of Socrates is not reducible to the instantiation of any property; but the nonexistence of Pegasus is just the non-instantiation of a certain property.

(d) The *Thin* or *deflationary* TSE: according to this view, TSE includes a Tarski-like truth theory for a fragment of a language such as English involving the word ‘exists’ and its cognates. Call this the T-theory component of TSE. The T-theory includes the typical resources of first-order quantification theory plus (absolute) identity. It may be supplemented as needed by additional resources such as the apparatus of some modal logic, free logic, etc. A substitutional version may be explored in this regard. In addition TSE will include at least one more component, a bridge-theory, that will map certain elements of the T-theory onto expressions of the language that include the word ‘exists’, ‘there are some’, and their cognates. Call this the B-theory.

(di) Now, the T-theory entails consequences of the form:

(T*) ‘(Ex)(…x…)’ is true iff S

where ‘S’ is a place holder for a *set-theoretical* construction that will look (very roughly and in a simplified form) as follows: a is a member of a certain set (e.g., the domain of the quantifiers) such that ….; where ‘a’ is among the constants of the T-theory.

Note: (T*) nowhere includes the word ‘exists’ or any of its cognates.

BV: Here Peter owes us an illustration. Perhaps he means something like the following. Let D be a domain consisting of exactly three individuals, a, b, and c. Suppose each of these individuals is F. We can think of D as a mathematical set. Then a, b, and c are elements of D. We can then say that '(Ex)Fx' is true in D iff Fa v Fb v Fc. E.g., 'Someone is fat' iff Al is fat or Beatrice is fat or Carl is fat.

(dii) The B-theory in turn will entail consequences such as:

(B*) S iff Socrates exists;

i.e., a is a member of a certain set such that… iff Socrates exists. Note 1: (B*)’s left-hand-side (LHS) contains the very same set theoretical construction as we have encountered in (T*)’s right-hand-side (RHS), namely, ‘S’. So (B*) includes the word ‘exists’ or one of its cognates only on the RHS.

BV: This is less than clear. Is S a proposition? It would have to be since (B*) is a proposition. But earlier you said that S is a set-theoretical construction, and thus a set. But no proposition is a set and no set is a proposition. Yes, I know that David Lewis and others hold that propositions are sets of possible worlds, but that is an absurd view, and I hope it is not yours.

Note 2: The T-theory contains an interpretation (or valuation) function that maps each constant to an element of its domain, each predicate to a set of such elements, etc. The B-theory imports these valuations and uses them to entail consequences such as (B*). Hence, we are assuming here that the T-theory’s valuation function assigned the constant ‘a’ to Socrates. Hence, B* is true.

(diii) The T-theory (featuring consequences such as T*)jointly with the B-theory (featuring consequences such as B*) entail sentences of the form (E-equivalences):

(E) (Ex)(x=Socrates) iff Socrates exists;

(div) Now, the E-equivalence of Bill’s McCain sentence will look as follows: (E-McCain) (Ex)(x=a) iff McCain exists

where McCain is a member of the set that serves as the domain of the quantifiers of T* and ‘a’ is among the constants of the T-theory assigned by the latter’s valuation function to McCain.

(dv) The following positions characterize a thin TSE:

(i) Singular existence sentences are perfectly meaningful; hence, an eliminativist TSE is false.
(ii) Singular existence sentences are not definable in more basic terms and singular existence is not reducible to conceptually more basic facts; hence, any reductive TSE is false.
(iii) There is no SE-stuff; hence, a thick TSE is false.

III. The “ideology” of a thin or deflationary TSE

(a) A thin or deflationary TSE is a substantive theory of singular existence. While a thin TSE does not appeal to a reductive analysis of singular existence to more basic terms, for there are none, and it does not posit an SE-stuff, for no such stuff exists, a thin TSE offers a *structural explication* of singular existence. Such a theory is substantive because it contains resources that entail a truth-functionally equivalent proposition for each singular existence proposition such that this truth-functionally equivalent proposition is drawn from a pool of resources that are common to all other propositions. In other words, while each consequence of the theory is *thin*, the theory as a whole is *thick* in substance because it contains resources rich enough to entail equivalences for each proposition, including all singular existence propositions. So unlike the *thick* conception of TSE which aspires to purchase a substantive explanation by means of assigning something, SE-stuff, to each singular existence of an object, the *thin* conception is substantive because it contains rich explanatory resources that suffice to explain all cases even though they are thinly distributed in each individual case.

(b) Thus, while no particular proposition of a thin TSE provides a full explication of the singular existence of an object, the theory as a whole achieves a level of explication of singular existence as thoroughly as possible for any theory to achieve (more on this later). However, if one wants a slogan in order to represent the thin’s ideology of singular existence; here is a proposal that captures, I believe, the core of the theory:

Thin’s Slogan: To exist is to be a member of a set that can serve as the domain of the quantifiers.

(c) Notice the division of labor between the T-theory and the B-theory. The former is a theory of truth conditions and in this sense it is not specifically a TSE. But it contains wffs that give truth conditions to sentences or propositions that include the existential quantifier. In this sense it entails the truth conditions of all existentially quantified sentences or propositions that are later on (in the B-theory) exploited for the purpose of explicating singular existence sentences or propositions.

(c) Note also that the semantics given in the T-theory involves only set theoretic constructions. Thus, the ontology of the T-theory is sets. T*, for instance, does not involve a translation into colloquial English or whatever; the RHS of T* refers to a set. Nor can we view T* as identifying or translating statements about the existence of some individual into quantificational language. The word ‘exists’ does not occur in T* nor in ANY part of the T-theory. So the T-theory alone is not a theory of existence, singular or otherwise.

BV: I don't understand how the RHS of T* can refer to a set. 'Iff' connects propositions, and no set is a proposition as I have already said.

(d) The B-theory alone cannot be viewed as a complete TSE either. While it entails biconditionals that feature on their RHS the expression ‘exists’, these biconditionals cannot be viewed as translating or reducing singular existence to anything. Moreover, in order to discern that biconditionals such as B* are in fact true we need to glean into the valuation function of the T–theory in order to verify that the constant appearing on the LHS of B* is indeed assigned to the correct individual object.

IV. Bill’s Circularity Objections to the thin TSE A

(a) Bill has been arguing that a thin TSE is viciously circular. What is his argument? Bill’s argument, roughly, is that a thin TSE (any thin TSE including the one I have just proposed above) presupposes at one point or another the existence of the very objects which the theory aims to explain. Take for instance Socrates. The version of the thin TSE I have proposed will be viciously circular, according to Bill, because it must recall Socrates as a member of the set that serves as the domain of the quantifiers of the T-theory. Hence, Bill argues, he is told by the proponents of a thin TSE that the explanation of what it is for Socrates to exist is given by the fact that Socrates is a member of a certain set. But in order for Socrates to be a member of a certain set, Socrates must exist. Hence, the explanation of what it is for Socrates to exist is given by appealing to Socrates’ existence; not a very informative way of explaining anything: such a theory, Bill protests, is “Trivial”; “Boring”; “Uninformative”.

(b) Indeed! Bill would be right provided the question “What is it for a contingently existing individual such as Socrates to exist?” would have had a *thick* content and a *thick* answer would have been possible without being viciously circular; neither of which, I submit, is possible.

BV: I don't see that Peter has shown that a thick theory must be viciously circular, nor that existence has no thick content. These are key differences between us. On these two points I think Peter is long on assertion and short on argument. But even if I am wrong on both of these points, Peter's theory is still viciously circular! The situation may be this: no thick theory is possible, and Peter's quasi-Quinean theory is also a nonstarter. It might be that the correct theory is a thin theory along Fregean lines as Frege is interpreted by C. J. F. Williams — our man 'Ockham's' teacher — in his important book, What is Existence? Roughly, Williams argues that Quine falls back into the very fallacy unmasked by Frege, the fallacy of thinking of existence as belonging to individuals. This will be the topic of a separate post.

(c) What is the *thick* presupposition behind the question Bill asks? The question assumes that the contingent existence of an object has a unique quality or feature, an SE-stuff, that is unique to each contingent existent and yet shared by all contingently existing beings so as to distinguish them from other things that do not partake in this SE-stuff (Pegasus, for instance, does not share in the SE-stuff, but might feature some other type of quality shared by, lets say, fictional characters). But, what could this SE-stuff be other than, well, the fact that they all share in contingent existence?

BV: I have been somewhat coy about showing my hand, though I show it plainly enough in my book A Paradigm Theory of Existence. I want to throw the issues and problems into relief and show the deficiencies of thin theories. That is Job One. For only if thin theories are unacceptable is there any rational motive to adopt a thick theory. If thin theories are rationally acceptable, then the metaphysics of existence is out of business, Analogy: if naturalism can explain everything, then God and the soul are out of business.

I want to make it clear that I do not take a Meinongian line. For me, as for Quine, everything exists. It is just that for me, this is a substantive thesis, not a thesis that is either logically or definitionally true.

(d) The presupposition behind Bill’s question that in addition to the fact that a given object actually exists or that it could actually exist in some possible world there is some other hidden quality or stuff that applies uniquely to these objects only and that philosophers need to uncover is simply false. For let me remind you that Bill is not interested in giving a causal or scientific account of Socrates’ existence. Bill’s question is not about the causal antecedents of Socrates’ existence. Nor is it about the qualities Socrates enjoys. The question rather is about something that is necessarily identical to the existence of contingently existing individuals but is not their existence. Well, I submit, that the only thing that is necessarily identical to the existence of contingently existing individuals is, what else, their existence.

BV: Peter is now simply making gratuitous assertions when he is not making assertions to which I can attach no meaning. He writes, "The question rather is about something that is necessarily identical to the existence of contingently existing individuals but is not their existence." That's gibberish. I am concerned precisely with the real (extramental) existence of contingent individuals and nothing else. My point is that this existence cannot be denied in an eliminativist manner or reduced to something else such as the instantiation of a property, no matter how exotic. Furthermore, theories like Peter's, despite all the fancy footwork and rigmarole displayed above, in the end simply presuppose that there are existing individuals. He gave his answer above in the form of a slogan:

To exist is to be a [existing] member of a set that can serve as the domain of the quantifiers.

That is blatantly viciously circular. Of course, I added 'existing.' But if the members of the set are some of them nonexisting, then the slogan is false! So my interpolation is charitable and necessary for the slogan to come out true. Will Peter perhaps tell us that the members of the set neither exist nor do not exist, that the very contrast existence/nonexistence does not apply to them? But what could that mean? That would reduce the slogan to meaninglessness.

I fear Peter is being insufficiently radical in his thinness. If he wants to be a thin theorist then he ought to go the eliminativist route and deny that there is any such thing as singular existence. He should maintain that existence is a second-level property with all that that entails. If he goes this route, however, then I will deploy a different set of arguments against him. But at least this way he will avoid my circularity objection.

Here is another tack Peter might take. He could say to me, "Look, I don't care about the ultimate explanation of singular existence. For logical purposes, for purposes of argument evaluation, it is enough that I have a way of representing singular existentials in my notation. And I do have a way: a exists =df (Ex)(x = a)! It works for my purposes. I am not interested in going any deeper than that. It may be that the existence of individuals is a brute fact, or it may be that they are caused to exist moment by moment by God or there may be some other metaphysical explanation; either way, Socrates exists iff there exists an x such that x = Socrates!

But if Peter takes this irenic course he quits the field of battle. For then he no longer espouses a thin theory of existence. He espouses no theory at all. He merely does logic, logic which rests on ontological assumptions that are not questioned.

It is true that I am not concerned with empirical-causal explanations of contingent existents. I am concerned with the logically prior question of the existence of the causal relata without which there would be no causal relations and thus no causal explanations.

(e) For let us suppose otherwise. Suppose that it is necessarily the case that SE-stuff is present if and only if the property of contingent existence is present, but these are not the same property. But how can that be? If the presence of these properties necessarily coincides, then how can they be distinct? What would count in favor of distinguishing them despite the fact that they must coincide jointly? And if Bill cannot cite what distinguishes them under these conditions, then isn’t this simply admitting that the property, quality, mode or whatever that makes up SE-stuff just is the contingent existence of an object? And admitting this much is admitting that the *thick* presupposition behind Bill’s question is false; that there cannot be another property, quality, mode, or “stuff” that is necessarily like the contingent existence of objects but is somehow distinct from it.

BV: These objections are simply artifacts of Peter's illicit introduction of this 'stuff' talk which has little to do with anything I have actually said. See my above remarks.

V. Bill’s Circularity Objection to the Thin TSE B

(a) Bill’s circularity objection has a bite against the thin conception only on the assumption that his question “What is it for a contingently existing individual such as Socrates to exist?” has a meaningful *thick* content and, hence, a substantive *thick* answer. But, both of these assumptions are false. A *thick* answer is impossible to this question for reasons cited above.

BV: What reasons were those? You gave no reasons that I can see; you simply made assertions.

(b) If this is correct, then in what sense can there be any substantive theory of singular existence, thick or thin or whatever? Well, in order to see how a TSE can be substantive we must first let go of the aspiration that a *thick* theory is possible. Then we must come to terms with the fact that there is a sense in which the concept of the “singular existence of contingent objects” is philosophically primitive. The fact that the existence of Socrates as a singular contingently existing object is philosophically primitive does not mean that interesting questions cannot be asked in this regard. One can ask about the causal antecedents of Socrates’ existence, or ask about what are his essential properties. One can even inquire whether it is possible for two numerically distinct objects to share all of their properties. There are many interesting question, philosophical or otherwise, that can be asked even if we give up on the *thick* project. And we can ask the question of whether there can be a theory which describes the structure of existence without eliminating, reducing, or finding a necessary substitute for it. I submit that the best shot at this question is the *thin* TSE.

BV: Although I see no reason to accept a thin theory of existence, I want to thank Peter for his contribution which helps us all see the issues more clearly.

According to Peter van Inwagen, "The thin conception of being is this: the concept of being is closely allied with the concept of number: to say that there are Xs is to say that the number of Xs is 1 or more — and to say nothing more profound, nothing more interesting, nothing more." (Ontology, Identity, and Modality, p. 4)

Connoisseurs of this arcana will recognize it as pure Frege:

. . . existence is analogous to number. Affirmation of existence is in fact nothing but denial of the number nought. (Gottlob Frege, Foundations of Arithmetic, 65e)

'Cats exist,' then, says that the number of cats is one or more. Equivalently, it says that the concept cat has one or more instances. Existence, as Frege puts it, is "a property of concepts." It is the property of being instantiated. Since individuals, by definition, cannot be instantiated, it follows that existence cannot be predicated of individuals. Despite linguistic appearances, 'exist(s)' is a second-level predicate.

The Fregean approach has a lot to recommend it. For one thing, it allows for a neat solution to the problem of general negative existentials such as 'Unicorns do not exist.' The sentence is true, but it cannot be about unicorns, since if the sentence is true, they do not exist. The sentence is about the concept unicorn and says that this concept is not instantiated.

So much for a sketch of the Fregean variant of the thin conception of Being or existence. The question before us is whether Magee's wonderment at the sheer existence of things could be expressed in terms of the thin conception. Could we plug in 'things' for 'X' in van Inwagen's formula and say that what Magee and so many others have wondered at is the fact that the number of things is 1 or more? Or that the concept existence has instances?

I don't think so. Sometimes I wonder at the seemingly stranger-than-fiction existence of Saguaro cacti. It is plausible to maintain that the object of my wonderment is the instantiation of the natural kind Carnegiea gigantea, equivalently, the fact that some of the things in the world are Saguaros. But when I wonder at the sheer existence of anything at all, I am not wondering at the fact that some of the things in the world have a certain nature or belong to a certain natural kind. For existing things are not a kind of thing, as Aristotle remarked in more than one place. (We shall have to examine the famous argument at Metaphysics 998b22 that Being is not a summum genus, not a genus generalissimum.) I am wondering that there are things at all.

Note the difference between wondering at the fact that there are things at all, and wondering at the fact that there are things of such-and-such a kind. Struck by the existence of Saguaros, I attend to Saguaro-nature and its being instanced. The wonder is directed at general existence or instantiation. But when I am struck by the sheer existence of things in general, I do not attend to any nature, but to that without which no nature could be instantiated: my wonder is directed at singular existence, the existence of the individuals without which no concept or property or kind could be instantiated.

The following argument will serve as summary:

1. If existence were merely the being-instantiated of concepts or properties or natural kinds or cognate items, then my wonder at the sheer existence of things in general would be a wonder at the being-instantiated of some concept or property or natural kind or cognate item.

2. But my wonder at the sheer existence of things in general -- at their being as opposed to their nonbeing -- is not a wonder at the being-instantiated of some concept or property or natural kind or cognate item. For existing things are not instances of some concept or property or natural kind called 'existence.' There is no such concept or property or natural kind.

Therefore

3. Existence is not merely the being-instantiated of concepts or properties or natural kinds or cognate items.

Therefore

4. The thin conception (at least as described by van Inwagen above) is inadequate. There is more to existence than the thin conception allows.

(2) follows from (1) by the intuitively clear inference rule of U. I. Surely, if everything is self-identical, then John McCain is self-identical. The inferential move from (2) to (3) is also quite obvious: if McCain is self-identical, then something is identical to McCain. But (3) is just a complicated way of saying that John McCain exists. So we get the surprising result that the existence of John McCain is validly deducible from an a priori knowable necessary truth of logic!

You understand, of course, that the argument is not about John McCain: it is about any nameable entity. Supposedly, Wilhelm Traugott Krug (1770-1842) once demanded of Hegel that he deduce Herr Krug's pen. If we name that pen 'Skip,' we can then put that name in the place of 'John McCain' and run the argument as before.

There is one premise and three inferences. Does anyone have the chutzpah to deny the premise? Will anyone make bold to question inference rules U.I. and E.G.? And yet surely something has gone wrong. Intuitively, the existence of a contingent being such as McCain cannot be deduced from an a priori knowable necessary truth of logic. An ontological argument gone wild! The rabbit of real existence pulled from the empty hat of mere logic!

St. Bonaventura said that if God is God, then God exists. Such reasoning may work in the case of God but not in the case of McCain or Herr Krug's pen.

Note that (1) is necessarily true. (It doesn't just happen to be the case that each thing is self-identical.) If (2) follows immediately from (1), (2) is also necessarily true. And if (2) is necessarily true, then (3) is necessarily true. And the same holds for (4). But surely it is not the case that, necessarily, John McCain exists. He exists alright, but contingently.

So what went wrong? By my count there are three essentially equivalent ways of diagnsoing the misstep.

A. One idea is that the argument leaves the rails in the transition from (3) to (4). All that (3) says is that something is identical to John McCain. But from (3) it does not follow that John McCain exists. For the something in question might be a nonexistent something. After all, if something is identical to Pegasus, you won't conclude that Pegasus exists. To move validly from (3) to (4), one needs the auxiliary premise:

3.5 The domain of quantification is a domain of existents only.

Without (3.5), John McCain might be a Meinongian nonexistent object. If he were, then everything would be logically in order up to (3). But to get from (3) to (4) one must assume that one is quantifying over existents only.

But then the point I have been hammering away at recently is once again thrown into relief: The misnamed 'existential' quantifier, pace Quine, does not express existence, it presupposes existence!

B. Or one might argue that the move from (1) to (2) is invalid. Although (1) is necessarily true, (2) is not necessarily true, but contingently true: it is not true in possible worlds in which McCain does not exist. There are such worlds since he is a contingent being. To move validly from (1) to (2) a supplementary premise is needed:

1.5 'John McCain' refers to something that exists.

(1.5) is true in some but not all worlds. With this supplementary opremise on board, the argument is sound. It also loses the 'rabbit-out-of-the-hat' quality. The orginal argument aopeared to be deducing McCain from a logical axiom. But now we see that the argument made explicit does no such thing. It deduces the existence of McCain from a logical axiom plus a contingent premise which is indeed equivalent to the conclusion.

C. Finally, one might locate the error in the move from (2) to (3). No doubt McCain = McCain, and no doubt one can infer therefrom that something is identical to McCain. But this inferential move is not existential generalization, if we are to speak accurately and nontendentiously, but particular generalization. On this diagnosis, the mistake is to think that the particular quantifier has anything to do with existence. It does not. It does not express existence, pace Quine, it expresses the logical quantity someness.

In sum, one cannot deduce the actual existence of a contingent being from a truth of logic alone. One needs existential 'input.' It follows that there has to be more to existence than someness, more than what the 'existential' quantifier expresses. The thin conception, therefore, cannot be right.

Now it goes without saying that I don't agree with Sartre that existence is an unintelligible surd. For me it is the opposite of unintelligible. But what I will borrow from Sartre is the insight that existence is extralogical. So let's consider the famous 'chestnut tree' passage.

Roquentin, the protagonist, is in a park when he has a bout of temporary aphasia while contemplating the roots of a chestnut true. Words and their meanings vanish. He finds himself confronting a black knotty mass that frightens him. Then he has a vision:

It left me breathless. Never, until these last days, had I understood the meaning of 'existence.' I was like all the others, like the ones walking along the seashore, all dressed in their spring finery. I said, like them, 'The ocean is green; that white speck up there is a seagull,' but I didn't feel that it existed or that the seagull was an 'existing seagull'; usually existence hides itself. It is there, around us, in us, it is us, you can't say two words without mentioning it, but you can never touch it. When I believed I was thinking about it, I must [have] believe[d] that I was thinking nothing, my head was empty, or there was just one word in my head, the word 'to be.' Or else I was thinking . . . how can I explain it? I was thinking of belonging, I was telling myself that the sea belonged to the class of green objects, or that that green was a part of the quality of the sea. Even when I looked at things I was miles from dreaming that they existed; they looked like scenery to me. I picked them up in my hands, they served me as tools, I foresaw their resistance. But that all happened on the surface.

If anyone had asked me what existence was, I would have answered, in good faith, that it was nothing, simply an empty form that was added to external things without changing anything in their nature. And then all of a sudden, there it was, clear as day: existence had suddenly unveiled itself. It had lost the harmless look of an abstract category: it was the very paste of things, this root was kneaded into existence. Or rather the root, the park gates, the bench, the sparse grass, all that had vanished: the diversity of things, their individuality, were only an appearance, a veneer. This veneer had melted, leaving soft, monstrous masses, all in disorder — naked, in a frightful, obscene nakedness. (p. 127 tr. Lloyd Alexander)

This marvellous passage records Roquentin's intuition (direct perception) of Being or existence. (We will have to compare in a subsequent post Jacques Maritain's Thomist intuition of Being with Sartre's existentialist intuition of Being.) Viewed through the lenses of logic, 'The green sea exists' is equivalent to 'The sea is green' and 'The sea belongs to the class of green objects.' For the logician, then, 'exists' and cognates is dispensable and the concept of existence is fully expressible in terms of standard logical machinery.

But as I have been arguing ad nauseam (so to speak), sentences like 'The sea is green' presuppose for their truth that the sea is an existing sea. Compare the reference above to an existing seagull. And, as Sartre has Roquentin says, "usually existence hides itself." It hides itself from all of us most of the time when we are immersed in what Heidegger calls average everydayness (alltaegliche Durchschnittlichkeit, vide Sein und Zeit), and existence hides itself from the logician qua logican all the time. For all of us most of the time, and for logicians all of the time, "existence is nothing, simply an empty form."

What the logician does is to substitute logical Being for real Being. Note that I am not endorsing Sartre's theory of real Being: that it is an absurd excrescence, de trop (superfluous), unintelligible, etc. What I am endorsing is his insight that real Being is extralogical, that it is not a thin notion exhausted by the machinery of logic.

But what if you are one of those sober types who has never experienced anything like Heideggerian Angst or Sartrean nausea or Wittgenstein's wonder at the existence of the world? Well, I think one could still be brought by purely discursive methods to understand how existence cannot reduce to a purely logical notion. We shall see.

. . . the same objection is going to be applicable to any account of existence no matter what it claims. Consider the example of *Socrabe*. Socrabe is a property that is instantiated uniquely by Socrates. But if such an account were to be possible, it would explain the existence of Socrates in terms of the property *Socrabe*. But now such an account will have to assume that such a property exists. And so I will ask: What is it for the property *Socrabe* to exist? Clearly, this leads to an infinite regress that cannot be stopped.

Actually, what one needs is not just a property that is instantiated uniquely by Socrates, but one that is instantiated uniquely by Socrates in every possible world in which it is instantiated. This is a property that only one thing has in the actual world, and that nothing distinct from Socrates has in any possible world. Thus we need a nonqualitative property that individuates Socrates across all possible worlds. So consider the haecceity-property, Socrateity. We can think of this as the property of being identical to Socrates.

Now if someone were to account for the existence of Socrates in terms of the instantiation of Socrateity, then Peter will ask him: what accounts for the existence of Socrateity? But an answer is available: Socrateity is a necessary being, one that exists in all possible worlds, and necessary beings are in need of no explanation. Only contingent beings -- beings that exist in some but not all possible worlds -- need an explanation of their existence.

So I fail to see how any vicious infinite regress ensues. One can explain the existence of contingent beings in terms of the instantiation of a certain special class of necessary beings -- and the buck stops there.

Now note three things. First, what Peter offered us was not a circularity objection but an infinite regress objection. Second, the circularity objection remains in force! For if Socrateity is instantiated by Socrates, then Socrates must exist in order to instantiated said property. Therefore, to explain the existence of Socrates in terms of the instantiation of Socrateity, when Socrates must already (logically speaking) exist in order to instantiate any property, is to move in a vicious circle.

Third, I reject this explanation of singular existence in terms of haecceity-properties, and for two reasons. First, there are, by my lights, no haecceity properties. Second, the explanation is circular as I just explained.

Where does this leave us? Peter's claim is that ". . . the same [circularity]objection is going to be applicable to any account of existence no matter what it claims." So far, Peter has not proven this. He is making a very bold claim as witness the universal quantifiers 'any' and 'no.' And by 'any' he means 'any possible.' To reftue him, then, all I need is an (epistemically) possible theory of the singular existence of contingent beings that is not circular. Here is a theory which is not circular, though it may be worthless for other reasons: the existence of a contingent being is the contingent togetherness of its ontological parts, and these parts are themselves necessary beings. Thus we account for the existence of a contingent being in terms of items that are other than this contingent being: its parts, and their togetherness. I am not presupposing what I need to account for; so where is the circularity?

Now you may just barely glean what I am driving at; but I have said enough to show that Peter's bold claim is mistaken. It is simply not the case that every actual and possible theory of the existence of contingent existents must be viciously circular. Of course, if Peter has a positive proof that this must be so, then I will consider what he has to say.

But Peter has another line of attack that we need to consider:

. . . (S-Ex) does not explain what it is for the moon to exist without presupposing the moon’s existence as a member of some set. True! But, then, so what? The goal of the present account is to explain what the form of existence claims is; i.e., what is conceptually involved when a claim such as “The moon exists” is made. If we can successfully give a general account along these lines of such claims, then we have achieved our goal. Bill, of course, wants more. He wants an account of singular existence to give a general account of what it is for an individual object to exist without presupposing its existence or (perhaps even) the existence of anything else. But the question is this: Can any account satisfy this requirement without being “viciously circular”?

Peter is interested in existence claims and their logical form. Now I am interested in that as well, but also in something deeper, namely, in that which makes true those existential claims that are true. One can legitimately inquire into the logical form of general existential sentences such as 'Moons exist' and singular existential sentences such as 'The Moon exists.' But given that the latter is true, what serves as truth-maker? What makes it true? Being a realist, I say that the sentence is true because -- this is not a causal use of 'because' -- a certain concrete fact obtains, namely the moon's existence. Now how exactly are such existential facts to be understood? These are ontological questions, not mere logico-linguistic questions.

Existence is not a logical notion but an ontological (metaphysical) one. This is the nub of the debate between the partisans of thin and thick conceptions.

I should also point out that it would be absurd to demand a theory of the singular existence of contingent existents that did not presuppose the existence of something. Nor did I ever make such an absurd demand. My demand was that a theory not be circular as (S-Ex) above is circular.

I submit that no such an account is possible! Why? Because Bill’s project is not an invitation to explain the causal antecedents of the moon’s existence; i.e., he is not interested here in a scientific account of how the moon was formed. Nor does Bill’s project involves an account of the essential properties of the moon or the category or set of which the moon could be a member. Rather, Bill is interested in a general account of something that necessarily coincides with and only with the moon’s existence. But what else could that something be except…what else…the moon’s existence.

Peter is not summarizing me fairly here. The moon is just an example of a contingent being. The question is: what is it for a contingent individual -- any contingent individual -- to exist? And note that Peter does have an answer. His anaswer - if I am not putting words into his mouth -- is that it is just a brute unintelligible fact that individuals exist. So why doesn't he come out and say this instead of offering the blatantly circular pseudo-theory (S-Ex) above? He says he is interested in existence claims, but (S-Ex) makes no mention of claims. Peter continues:

Thus, singular existence is not a property nor is it reducible, explainable, characterizable or whatever in any other terms without reminder or without a vicious circle.

The question of whether, and in what sense, existence is a property of individuals demands a separate discussion. But I find Peter's bold assertion here to be unsupported by anything he has said so far. He seems to be saying that existence is an inexplicable primitive, an unintelligible surd. Now if this is what he is saying, then, he too has a thick, extralogical, conception of being, a conception according to which existence is more than what 'existential' quantification expresses. Or is Peter an eliminativist about singular existence? Is he saying that concrete individuals exist, but there is nothing we can say about this existence since it is just a brute fact, or is he saying that concrete individuals neither exist nor do not exist? Does he think, with Russell, that existence is like numerousness, something not sensibly predicable of individuals? Peter concludes:

Hence, the best we can do philosophically is to give the truth conditions of existence claims, including singular existence claims, in the most general way possible. The conceptual tools involved in providing such truth condition will then serve to give an explication of existence. Such an account is revealing not because it reduces the existence of objects to something else. It is revealing because it is sufficiently rich to contain all that we need to state the conditions under which existence statements are true. The terms used to give such truth conditions will of course themselves appeal to the existence of objects. But this fact is objectionable only if we demand from such an account to reduce singular existence to something else. Once such a demand is given up, the fact that such an account appeals to the existence of objects is not objectionable provided such appeal is done properly.

I would like to know how Peter uses 'truth conditions.' Apparently he means something other than truth-makers. Apparaently, he wants to remain within language and state the truth conditions of existence claims in terms of other sentences thereby ignoring what has to be the case in the world if existential sentences are to be true. And yet he speaks of giving an "explication of existence." What could that be on his scheme? What entitles him to use the word 'existence'? Does he admit that individuals exist or not? If he admits that they exist, and claims that nothing can be said about what it is for an individual to exist, then he is apparently opting for a view of existence as an uninteligible surd. But then that is a thick concpetion of being because it admits that there is more to being than what is accessible to logic.

As it seems to me, Peter is waffling. On the one hand he admits that there is singular existence, the existence of individuals, and maintains the ontological -- not merely logical -- thesis that singular existence is unintelligible and inexplcable. On the other hand, he says he is defending a thin conception according to which existence is exhausted by the logical apparatus of quantification. On the latter, existence is just the logical quantity someness, and singular existence goes by the board.

I exist, but I might not have existed. I am not a necessary being, but a contingent being. That is, my nonexistence is possible. We can express this by writing

1. Possibly, I do not exist.

But it is also true that necessarily, everything is self-identical. So we write

2. Necessarily, I am self-identical.

Now if

3. To exist = to be self-identical

then we must infer either

4. Possibly, I am not self-identical

or

5. Necessarily, I exist

or

6. It is not the case that: to exist is to be self-identical.

Since (4) and (5) are both obviously false, and (1) and (2) are true, we ought to conclude that (6) is true and thus (3) is false. There is only one concrete being for whom existence = self-identity, and that is God. God is both self-identical and self-existent; I am self-identical but not self-existent.